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Economic globalization is the figurative wave that lifts all boats, i.e., small as 
well as large economies if it is managed well, if negative side effects are addressed, and if 
its gains are broadly distributed. Globalization is not inevitable, despite technological 
progress, because it depends on political commitment to sustain global economic 
liberalization. In order to better understand the political willingness to support 
globalization it is vital to understand the generally overlooked role that political parties 
play in this context. This paper conducts a case study of Germany’s political parties by 
looking at the messages parties communicate to voters during federal election campaigns. 
By examining the written election programs of the five major parties from 1990 to 2013, 
this study is able to demonstrate a general lack of political will in Germany to support 
and manage globalization. This conclusion must not necessarily hold for other countries. 
The specifics of this study are not suited to allow for broad generalizations, but the fact 
that the political elite in a country that has been exceptionally well integrated into the 
global economy and has profited immensely from open borders and the ability to export it 
goods is so pessimistic about globalization and is only able to muster the ability to pay lip 
service to the idea of shaping and building globalization, but fails at delivering truly 
meaningful policy proposals, makes it difficult to be  hopeful that other states feature 
parties that behave differently from Germany’s parties.   
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CHAPTER 1 
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL PARTIES 
When one thinks about globalization, political parties are probably not among the 
first things that come to mind. The same could be said the other way around, political 
parties usually do not conjure up thoughts about globalization. The connection between 
globalization and political parties is not necessarily obvious. This chapter will illustrate 
their connection and why it is important to the both the political process and the 
economic prosperity of modern democracies. 
1.1 What Type of Globalization and why It Matters 
Globalization is a contested concept and there is a vast body of literature that 
addresses this issue from diverse angles. It is important to clearly outline what this study 
includes and what it omits when using the term “globalization.” One way to think about 
globalization that is among the most observable is the focus on markets (see Levitt, 1983;  
Obstfeld & Taylor, 2003) and economic issues such as competitiveness (see Krugman & 
Venables, 1995), but also the emphasis of globalization’s potential for prosperity and 
peace as addressed by Friedman (2000). Another important focus within the globalization 
literature studies culture is how it is transformed though increased interconnectedness as 





Tomlinson, 1999). Others, like Storper (1992) and Narula (2014), have focused on the 
relationship of globalization and technology, whereas Bauman (1998) and Nam and 
Barnett (2011) study the effects of globalization on mobility and immigration, more 
precisely how it empowers those that have the resources to be mobile on a global scale 
and those who are increasingly punished by their inability to venture outside of their very 
localized existence. Schaeffer (2003) and Perrons (2004) highlight the social 
consequences of globalization, while Sassen (1999) and Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and 
Perraton (2000) address a broad range of issues like human trafficking, the environment, 
gender issues or corporate power, and how all of these issues are affected by 
globalization. These few examples are only a fraction of the literature that deals with 
globalization and the purpose for referencing these works here is merely to show that this 
study only addresses a small portion of this vast and complex issue.  
 The primary focus of this study is an economic conception of globalization, which 
at its core is defined as the “integration of national economies into the international 
economy through trade, direct foreign investment […], short-term capital flows, 
international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology” 
(Bhagwati, 2004, p. 3). Such a definition or focus is not uncommon (see Cook & 
Underwood, 2012; Gilpin, 2001; McGrew, 2011), but it clearly omits cultural factors and 
marginalizes social effects, neither of which should be underestimated. However, this 
study is putting an emphasis on the economic side of globalization. In the context of this 
study it does become important to contrast the contemporary process defined as 
globalization with past integration efforts in order to see if the contemporary 





1.2 How Novel Is Globalization and Is It Ever Expanding? 
 Mankind has already experienced periods in which people, commodities, capital 
and information were exchanged worldwide. In fact, today’s environment is the result of 
historic developments. Human communities have always been engaged in economic and 
social relationships with others; the idea that globalization is a new contemporary 
phenomenon can only be explained by historical amnesia, a process “in which we think 
that just because we are thinking about an idea, it has only just started” (Hall, 2004, p. 
173). Many historians even see a continuous centuries long upwards trend in the 
expansion of global trade, which was only interrupted from 1914 until 1945 (Bhagwati, 
2004; Ravenhill, 2011). Nevertheless, contemporary globalization has some distinctive 
features that previous eras lack. One difference is the way in which states conduct 
international trade today. In the past, the predominant type of exchange was the trade of 
raw materials. Presently, the bulk of traded goods consists of merchandise and value 
added goods for further production. This means that cross border trade matters much 
more to traders than it did in the past. Additionally, it is important to note that there has 
been a substantial and persistent increase in both the scale and pace with which products 
and services, capital, information, and humans are being moved on a global scale (Bisley, 
2007). Therefore, this study uses the term globalization to refer to different times of 
economic integration, like integration efforts in the 21st century as well as those at the end 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is not to say that they are identical but they 
are similar enough to warrant a consistent terminology, just as the term nation state can 
be applied to the United States both in 1814 as well as in 2014, despite the fact that the 





In this study the much more important difference is the cause of the current wave 
of globalization compared to globalization in the past. Earlier integration was based on 
innovations, like the telegraph, the railroad and the steam boat. All of these technological 
innovations reduced transaction costs dramatically, thus creating new opportunities for 
trade, investment and entrepreneurship. These technological advances have continually 
progressed and have become ever more sophisticated and efficient. Today, the costs and 
time needed to overcome distance have been significantly reduced, by supertankers, 
jumbo jets, the internet, and satellite navigation, for example, thus allowing for closer and 
tighter commercial networks over a greater distance, which affect more and more people. 
It is not just the fact that a larger part of the world is better connected than in years gone 
by; it is also the substantially increased rate of these connections that is significant 
(Bisley, 2007; Hirst & Thompson, 2002; Ravenhill, 2011; Roderik, 1997). In other 
words, globalization in the past was primarily based upon technological advances. 
Certainly, today’s technological innovations still create incentives to engage in more 
trade, invest abroad and to increasingly integrate, but globalization in the current era is, to 
a large extent, fueled by governments who “have intervened to reduce obstacles to the 
flow of trade and investment worldwide. The story of globalization has to be written in 
two inks: one colored by technical change and the other by state action” (Bhagwati, 2004, 
p. 11). 
It is precisely the state’s involvement in this current era of globalization that is at 
the heart of this study. Globalization’s driving force is the combination of technological 
innovation and political will. Of these two factors it is the political will that is the more 
ambiguous and volatile one, not technological advancement. It is unreasonable to suspect 
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that innovation and technological progress will cease. The rate of advancement might 
change but a complete standstill is very unlikely. When it comes to state support for 
globalization, however, the picture looks quite different. The first step when looking at 
the state’s effect on globalization has to be to refute the common perception that states 
are being deprived of their power, initiative and legitimacy by an increasingly globalized 
world. This idea is based, in part, upon the belief that states are not able to guarantee the 
economic welfare of their citizens anymore. Instead, private economic actors determine 
issues of production and services and states are unable to resist globalization because the 
costs of not participating in the neoliberal economic model are simply too high (Bisley, 
2007, p. 63). However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to substantiate these claims. 
National policy makers are as relevant as ever. States still raise enormous funds through 
taxation and spend these funds as they see fit. States continually establish and enforce 
laws and they employ legions of people. States still have a powerful tool at their disposal, 
the most powerful form of collective identity, nationalism. Even though people like to 
claim that nationalism is declining and “globalization is the order of the day, a reminder 
is necessary. Nationhood is still being reproduced” (Billig, 1995, p. 9). It is states who 
foster this reproduction, because nationalism is “the cultural and social means through 
which the political system of states is produced and reproduced and there is little 
evidence to support the argument that this important role will be meaningfully 
transformed” (Bisley, 2007, p. 182). In fact “[n]ationalism is a political idea which may 
shut down globalization more effectively than anything else” (Bisley, 2007, p. 186). 
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1.3 Globalization, Political Will, and Political Parties 
In essence, globalization does not confront the state with existential threats; 
rather, it creates further complexities within which the state must operate and to define its 
preferences and “[h]erein lies a vulnerability that cannot be dismissed complacently” 
(Bhagwati, 2004, p. 11), because if a state’s power is ultimately not circumscribed by 
globalization then states retain the potential to stop and even reverse it. This is exactly 
what happened after World War I when governments started to reverse the process of 
globalization by increasing trade barriers. This development started with the U.S. 
Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922 and was later reinforced by the infamous Smoot-
Hawley Tariff of 1930. These two pieces of legislation set off a torrent of protective 
measures all over the world (Bernanke, 2013). This led to a global reversal from a 
relatively open economic system into increasingly closed national economies. One could 
claim that “the United States led the way to closure” (Krasner, 1976, p. 339). This 
demand for increased protectionism was intended to shield national economies from the 
effects of the Great Depression, which was largely caused by three factors: low demand 
and over capacity, high interest rates and central banks who were unwilling to provide 
adequate liquidity, and the gold standard which restricted monetary growth and even led 
to deflation (see Caldwell & O’Driscoll, 2007; Eichengreen, 2004). The Great Depression 
confronted legislators with an economic predicament. The unmatched economic failure 
left them only two choices, “deflation under the gold standard, currency depreciation, or 
direct controls over trade and payments to maintain gold and foreign exchange reserves” 
(Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010, p. 32). States usually ruled out deflation as too costly for the 





choice between maintaining fixed exchange rates or maintaining open trade. The gold 
standard was in essence a fixed exchange rate, which meant that if countries did not want 
to break with the gold standard, then their only other option was to impose trade 
restrictions. A reduction of imports means that monetary liquidity can be secured due to 
lower exports of gold, which is used to pay for the imported goods (Eichengreen & Irwin, 
2010, p. 32). 
The Great Depression manifested an abrupt increase of trade protectionism. The 
implementation of tariffs, import quotas, and restrictions on the flow of capital 
contributed to a sharp reduction in world trade in the early 1930s, which lasted longer 
than the economic collapse itself (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010, p. 2.). The combined effect 
of direct and indirect trade restrictions accounts for a 20% contraction of global trade 
(Madsen, 2001, pp. 866-867). It was only at the end of World War II that governments 
started to engage in the reversal of barriers to trade and began to gradually embrace 
economic openness. Thus, it is important to note that globalization is not an inevitable or 
irreversible process. Previous phases of globalization have experienced setbacks and 
future phases may experience similar developments. In other words the policies and 
consequences of the 1930s might not be a singular experience; a repeat is quite possible 
(Gilpin, 2001; Kapstein, 1996; Keohane & Ney, 2001; Rodrik, 1997).  
If globalization is not a self-perpetuating process, but instead one that is 
dependent upon political will, then it is important to examine this political will more 
closely. From 1986 to 2008 global trade as a share of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) has steadily risen, but leveled out and has remained level since 2008 (until today 
2016). The flow of global capital plummeted in 2012 to a third of its 2007 all-time high 
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of $11 trillion. In other words, currently “[g]lobalization has clearly paused” (“Special 
Report: The World Economy,” 2013, p. 3). The reason is that after 2 decades of 
increasingly free movement of goods, services, and people, governments are increasingly 
fencing off their economies. They are more selective about their trading partners, what 
kind of investment they deem desirable, and how easy they make it for companies to do 
business abroad. This does not mean that states eschew the general principles of free 
trade, but they increasingly try to tip the balance in their favor so as to shield themselves 
from the negative effects of globalization (“Special Report: The World Economy,” 2013, 
p. 3). On a global scale the increased use of such beggar-thy-neighbor policies can slow 
down globalization significantly, potentially even halt or reverse it. 
This leads to the broader question, what determines how political leaders respond 
to the opportunities and pressures of globalization? There are many different ways to 
answer this question. Some scholars would implicate macrolevel variables such as the 
overall structure of the international system (see Gowa, 1994; Krasner, 1976; Mattli, 
1999), or the ability of international organizations to codify and enforce international 
rules and norms (see Keohane, 1988; March & Olson, 1998; Moravcsik, 1993; Nye, 
1970). Another way to approach this issue, however, is to look at mesolevel variables at 
the intrastate level of analysis. As Milner (1998) points out, it is crucial not to exclude 
domestic variables when one is trying to understand global trade liberalization. Using this 
line of reasoning can be very helpful when examining the logic behind the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930, which had a significant effect on global trade by drastically increasing 
U.S. tariffs on a wide scale, and which subsequently caused a strong backlash from other 





the predominant reason for the passage of this particular piece of legislation. 
Schattscheider’s early study (1935) identified lobbying and special interests that 
demanded protection from imports through increased tariffs as the primary culprits. 
Eichengreen (1989) argues that the combined efforts of both agricultural and industrial 
protectionists led to the overwhelming support for the 1930 Act in both chambers of 
Congress. Irwin and Kroszner (1996) demonstrate that a Senator’s voting behavior was 
primarily influenced by his or hers constituency’s economic interests, and Kumiko (2009) 
goes down a completely different road by arguing that research should focus on the 
executive, and in particular the president, and not on the legislature when trying to 
explain Smoot-Hawley.  
On the other hand Pastor (1980) contends that the 1930 Act is the result of party 
politics: “The bill was one of the most controversial issues in the nation for nearly two 
years” (Pastor, 1980, p. 81) with wide national and international media coverage. 
However, when the House voted in favor of the bill 222 to 153, more than 93% of the 
delegates voted along party lines. Similarly, the Senate endorsed the Smoot-Hawley Act 
44 to 42 with more than 81% of Senators toeing their own party’s line. Clearly, 
“partisanship was hardly insignificant” (Pastor, 1980, p. 81). Callahan, McDonald, and 
O'Brien (1994) corroborate these findings, as they find that party affiliation and a 
constituency’s unemployment rate are the two dominant factors determining voting 
patterns. By contrast, specific economic interests within a constituency seem to have no 
significant influence on voting behavior. Other supporters of these findings are Cupitt 
and Elliot (1994) who, contrary to their initial expectations, conclude that political party 
affiliation is the crucial factor explaining the passing of the 1930 Tariff Act. 
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There is certainly a good deal of controversy regarding which variable best 
explains the passing of the Smoot-Hawley Act and it is not the intent of this study to 
necessarily resolve this issue. It may very well be that political parties are not the most 
crucial variable for explaining this particular piece of trade legislation, but to discard 
party affiliation as an explanatory variable seems foolish. However, it appears that a lot 
of existing research on globalization does precisely that. Many globalization scholars 
assume that the impact of political parties’ platforms and preferences have only a 
marginal influence on states’ participation in and stands toward globalization. Shoch 
(1998) strongly contests this view, however, based on his own studies of political parties 
and stands on trade openness. In fact, he concludes that “party competition can have 
significant effects on the making of foreign economic policy” (Shoch, 1998, p. 131). 
More recently Camyar asserts that “the competitive forces of party politics have an 
autonomous impact on patterns of trade outcomes” (Camyar, 2012, p. 403), suggesting 
that political party affiliation is not only a relevant but important explanatory variable in 
policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, Camyar states that “one of the least understood subjects in the 
political economy of international trade is the impact of party politics on trade outcomes” 
(Camyar, 2012, p. 397) and that “scholars should pay more attention to this neglected 
topic” (Shoch, 1998, p. 131). The study proposed here addresses this lack of 
understanding by looking at existing theory in the field of international political 
economy, to show where these theories fall short, and to provide a more accurate and 
robust explanation for what advances or impedes globalization. 
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1.4 The Need for a Broad Conception of Political Will 
Another key issue to establish in this study is how to best gauge if the “political 
will” regarding globalization has changed. A popular approach to studying the effects of 
globalization on a specific issue area involves examining if and how domestic policies in 
this area have changed. The underlying theoretical model for this approach is that 
globalization exerts pressures on states and affords them new opportunities. 
Governments, as the highest, most visible and powerful entity within the state, try to 
devise strategies for their specific country that maximize the gains from globalization and 
minimize its negative effects. These strategies become manifest in new policies (see 
Figure 1.1).  
For example, if an individual wants to study the effects of globalization on the 
welfare state, one could correlate the level of exposure to international markets over a 
certain time frame, with the type of policies introduced during that same time (with some 
lag time) that alter welfare spending. Examples of this kind of research on the effects of 
globalization on states include Deeg (1996), Rotte (2000), Conley (2001), Gelleny and 
McCoy (2001), Swank (2002), Dreher and Ursprung (2008), as well as Hines and 
Summers (2009). With regard to the issue of political will this approach means that if (for 
instance) a government introduces multiple policies that are restrictive in nature vis-à-vis 
globalization (e.g., higher tariffs, technical standards that importers must meet, etc.), then 
we may conclude that the political will for globalization is waning.  
The downside of this approach is that it implies a very limited definition of 
political will, because it links political will exclusively to the government. As Allison 
(1969) and Woocher (2001) illustrate there are other ways to conceive of a political will 
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than a rational unitary actor model. A broader concept of what determines political will 
acknowledges that decisions are not based upon the preferences or will of a single actor, 
but upon the preferences and perceptions of many actors. Their preferences, in turn, 
largely reflect the interests of their respective constituencies and, in the end, outcomes do 
not reflect the goals of any one single actor but those of intensive bargaining and 
compromise. 
Similarly, this research project does not assume that the political will to support 
globalization is solely dependent upon the government. Instead, a more useful approach 
is to look at the process that determines who will hold office and be in power: elections. 
Any government’s willingness to enact, change or dismiss policies depends to some 
extent on the election process and its outcome, because it provides the government with a 
mandate to transform specific campaign promises into actual policies. However, at the 
same time, it morally binds the party in power to their promises while creating a fear of 
retribution in the next election if the government fails to live up to its promises (see 
Budge & Hofferbert, 1990).  
The strategic interaction of parties around elections is particularly fascinating, 
because parties reveal a lot about their own goals and preferences during this time. 
Examining this cyclical process allows for a much broader understanding of whether or 
not political will for globalization is waxing or waning, than an exclusive focus on 
government policies does. By studying the preferences of electoral winners and losers 
alike, one can replace a partial view of political will with a much more complete one. 
This approach is especially meaningful since no party fights an isolated election 





indicate shifts in their policy positions by selectively emphasizing and deemphasizing 
policy themes relative to one another” (Mansergh & Thomson, 2007, p. 323). This way 
the programs of all competitors matter, because the manifesto of the winners will reflect 
the programmatic agenda of all parties, creating what Klingemann, Hofferbert, and 
Budge call an “agenda effect” (Klingemann et al.,1994, p. 3). By conceiving of political 
will as a phenomenon that is based on a cross party agenda, it becomes imperative to 
study the whole party system instead of just government policies. This in turn transforms 
the term political will from something that we simply infer based upon government 
policies into a crucial key that determines policy (see Figure 1.2).  
This chapter has demonstrated that globalization is not a unique phenomenon that 
started in the second half of the 20th Century. Further economic integration is not 
inevitable, and globalization has not made the nation state obsolete nor has it impaired 
governments in any meaningful way. The chapter also made the point that the 
relationship between political parties and globalization has not been broadly studied and 
it is not as well understood as it could be. This is precisely the reason for this research, to 
gain added understanding of the relationship between political parties and globalization. 
Instead of investigating government policies to determine political will towards 
globalization within a country, this research will study the views and policy proposals of 
all major domestic parties within the Federal Republic of Germany. The following 
chapter will substantiate the important connection between globalization and political 


















THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Chapter 1 illustrated the link between domestic political will and policy change. 
The claim is that one can infer general domestic willingness to address and shape 
globalization in a constructive way by what kind of policy proposals parties make when 
they campaign for votes. Such a focus would be incomplete without addressing the 
fundamental connection between globalization and political parties, a link that is not 
based upon narrowly defined issues, such as a response by a domestic party to an import 
quota imposed by another state. Instead it is about how globalization can fundamentally 
alter political power and change domestic alliances. Such a view takes the issue of 
globalization from the fringes of politics to its very heart, and consequently all parties 
will have to respond to globalization. It is this response that will be studied in detail in 
Chapters 5-9, but first it is necessary to theoretically substantiate this claim in order to 
give this research a sound foundation, which is what this chapter (Chapter 2) sets out to 
do. The best way to demonstrate that globalization has an effect on political parties is to 
show how it shifts political alliances. The primary source for this effort is Rogowski’s 
(1998) research in general, but this study will pay particular attention to how he relates 





2.1 Commerce and Coalitions as a Framework of Analysis 
“Commerce and Coalitions” is Rogowski’s (1989) seminal work, which examines 
how domestic political alliances are affected by international trade. His theoretical 
framework is based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts who benefits from 
protection and who does not. The basic logic is that within an economy there are factors 
of production that are scarce and others that are abundant. The factor that is abundant will 
profit from trade, which opens up export opportunities with a larger market and more 
potential customers. Likewise, owners of a scarce factor will be harmed by trade due to 
imports of that factor and the resulting lower domestic price for that factor. In a Stolper-
Samuelson’s simplified two-factor economy of capital and labor, this means that in an 
economy abundant with capital but poor in labor, protectionist measures will hurt capital 
and benefit labor; trade liberalization would benefit capital and harm labor (Rogowski, 
1989, pp. 3-4). 
Rogowski augments this model slightly by introducing land as a third factor. He 
then proceeds to classify each country as either economically advanced or backwards 
with a particular land-labor ratio. For example, he classifies Germany in his historic 
analysis as economically backwards with a low land to labor ratio, meaning that 
industrialists (capital) and the landed nobility profited from trade restrictions while the 
workers (labor) would profit from trade liberalization. Rogowski’s novel step was to take 
this economic model and to link it with a political dimension. He claims that adding this 
political element to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem allows for three crucial assumptions. 
First, groups who profit from a change in trade liberalization will strongly support past 





harmed by trade liberalization will try to stop any further trade liberalization and even try 
to establish obstacles to trade. Second, those who benefit from increased income due to a 
change in trade policies will increase their wealth and with it, gain increased political 
influence. Third, to the same degree as the interest and the means increase to pursue 
certain policy preferences, so will desire and creativity rise to devise new mechanisms 
that can gradually overcome the collective action problem (Rogowski, 1989, p. 5).   
In order to convince the reader that altered exposure to trade shifts political 
alignments and how political conflict is carried out, Rogowski substantiates his claims by 
referring to historic evidence from classical Greece up to the present day. His analysis 
includes Germany from the mid-19th century, which is initially best characterized by 
class conflict and later by an urban-rural conflict. The following sections will look at 
Rogowski’s historical analysis of Gemany in more detail. The benefit of reviewing this 
historical analysis is twofold. First, it will provide an example of how the abstract 
theoretical concepts apply to the actual political process within a country. This will 
substantiate not just Rogowski’s theory, but ultimately also this work, since it builds 
upon that very same framework. The other valuable gain from this analysis is that it will 
highlight the dynamic nature of Rogowski’s concepts. There has been actual change over 
time when it comes to which factors profit from a change in trade liberalization. By 
looking at Rogowski’s historic overview of Germany it will become apparent that 
alterations in trade preferences and redistribution of political power across factors are not 
necessarily linked simply to the passing of time. Instead it is major historical events that 
are most likely to shape trade preferences across factors and alter their relative power. 





technological changes as well as a tremendous transformation of Germany itself and its 
role in Europe and the world. This situates this study reasonably well in terms of 
capturing similar shifts in sectorial preferences and political power distributions. 
 
2.1.1 19th Century Until World War I 
Rogowski begins his analysis of Germany through the lens of his theory in the 
postindustrial revolution era. He classifies Germany during this period as having a 
scarcity of capital, while land and labor were abundant factors. Germany was a net grain 
exporter during this period and trade continued to grow from the 1830s up to the early 
1870s, during which time Prussia’s landed nobility (Junker) and Germany’s workers 
formed an innate alliance for free trade. The opposition to their endeavors came from a 
protectionist industrial sector. It was only in the mid-1870s when American and Russian 
grain, aided by the continuous improvements of railroads and steamboats, started to 
undercut German grain prices on global markets. Land suitable for agriculture in 
Germany moved rapidly from an abundant factor of production to a scarce one (Garst, 
1998, p. 25). At the same time Germany remained a technological laggard, which meant 
that German capital became less competitive compared to the capital held by foreigners. 
The result of this change was that land and capital became the scarce factors. The logical 
consequence was now an alliance of the Junkers and industrialists, which came to be 
known as the infamous “marriage of iron and rye.” Just as Rogowski’s theoretical 
framework predicts, in the mid-1870s landowners and capitalist in Germany united and 
rallied in support of trade barriers and imperialism. Social class then became the defining 





The period from 1870 onward has frequently been regarded as the beginning of 
the first period of globalization (see O’Rourke & Williamson, 1997; Robertson, 1992; 
Silver, 2003). Trade restrictions in Germany during this early time of globalization were 
harmful to labor, but overall trade flows kept steadily increasing. The factor that most 
profited from, and was politically strengthened by this early wave of globalization, was 
labor. Gerschenkron (1943) and Rosenberg (1967) both argued that it was the newly 
acquired wealth and not deprivation that fueled Germany’s emerging powerful socialist 
movement. This movement consistently supported measures that fostered free trade. This 
undoubtedly constitutes an example of empowerment for one group of political actors at 
the expense of another due to the effects of globalization. It was only at the end of the 
19th century that Germany was catching up to other industrial countries, increasingly 
having a capital abundant economy. Subsequently, the new industries, especially the 
producers of chemical and electric goods slowly started to break from the “marriage of 
iron and rye” and formed their own organizations, which promoted free trade. By 1900, 
Germany’s realignment of relative factor endowments had isolated landowners with their 
quest for protectionism, while capitalists and labor started championing free trade. 
German society was moving towards what Rogowski calls, “an urban-rural cleavage in 
politics” (1989, p. 31). This new low-tariff coalition increased in power and achieved a 
victory in the 1912 presidential election, which was one important factor contributing to 
the threatened old elite of landed nobility charging into World War I with patriotic zeal to 
cement their status and power domestically (Rogowski, 1989, p. 40). In a nutshell, this 
brief episode in Germany’s history shows a domestic power shift among political actors 





shifts can be observed among political actors at the end of the 20th/beginning of the 21st  
century and that, in an established democracy, these power shifts will be reflected in the 
way that parties compete for votes with one another.  
 
2.1.2 The Interwar Years (1918-1939) 
The Great War (WWI) had destroyed the liberal argument. The belief that 
economic interdependence makes war so costly that it would render serious armed 
conflicts unthinkable was now shattered. This was thought to be especially true in such 
an economically intertwined region as Europe. But this optimism was now gone. The war 
crippled Europe’s economies and destroyed political trust among state leaders. As a 
consequence, governments generally tried to alleviate their domestic economic struggles 
by relying on beggar-thy-neighbor policies: the idea that a country tries to improve its 
own economic fortunes at the expense of another state by reducing imports through the 
raising tariffs. (Ravenhill, 2011, p. 13). During this period, Germany’s relative factor 
endowment remained unchanged and according to Rogowski’s (1989) logic, politics in 
Germany was still best characterized by an urban-rural struggle. However, this new 
period dramatically changed the positions of strength. Trade barriers favored land as the 
scarce factor of production in Germany.  
In the early years of the Weimar Republic the political right and the agricultural 
sector gained significant power. For example, the German National People's Party 
(German: Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) was only formed in 1918, but already 
achieved an electoral success of more than 10% the next year at national elections. By 





in the highly fractured party system of the Weimar Republic (Castellan cited in Rogowski 
1989, 79). All of this success was achieved based upon a platform that party leaders 
started proclaiming at early public DNVP meetings in 1918. These centered on fervent 
support for a Christian conservative society without Jewish influences, designed to 
uphold the monarchy, agriculture, and the middle class (Hertzman, 1958). 
The Nazis built upon this success and went even further, echoing especially the 
demands of the smallholding peasants, achieving significant regional victories in 
predominantly rural areas. Rogowski (1998, p. 79) refers to Lipset’s (1963) research, 
which illustrates a momentous urban-rural difference in support for the National Socialist 
German Workers' Party in the July 1932 Reichstag election, even after controlling for 
other important socioeconomic factors. Once in power, Hitler ensured that tariffs on 
agricultural products increased further, special financing was made available for farmers, 
and their production inputs were subsidized. An agrarian ideology, which praised rural 
achievements and idealized the virtues of the German farmer, was certainly an important 
building block of the greater national socialist ideology of the superior Aryan race. This 
romanticized and glorified the German farmer which was one of the cornerstones that 
motivated Germany’s conquest of Eastern Europe, motivated and legitimized by the idea 
to create Lebensraum (living space) for a prosperous agrarian German people (Rogowski, 
1989, p. 80). This historic example is important for this study, because it creates an 
awareness of how changes in trade restrictions can be used to foster a particular type of 
rhetoric and ideology, which can have powerful consequences. One should certainly 
expect globalization to still have the power to shift alliances and to empower one group 





lay in the wake of 13 years of Nazi rule, but globalization will still shift power among 
domestic actors and it is reasonable that this will be reflected in ideas and rhetoric that 
parties employ as they fight over voters.  
 
2.1.3 From World War II to the Present 
Rogowski describes the post-World War II era in most of Europe as a time when 
ideology had been overcome, in the sense that the substantial antagonism between labor 
and capital had been surmounted. In West Germany, workplace codetermination and 
welfare policies were gradually accepted and supported by conservatives under the 
leadership of Kanzler Konrad Adenauer (1949-1963). Communist support became 
increasingly marginal and the Social Democrats solidified their new positions in the 
Godesberger Program. This transformed the party conclusively from a socialist workers 
party to a mainstream party that sought broad appeal and accepted the principles of a 
market economy and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
(Rogowski 1989, p. 99). 
Capital and labor cooperated well in West Germany pushing for increased free 
trade.  Rogowski shows that high profile labor organizations like the German Trade 
Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschafts Bund) have continually supported the 
European Coal and Steel Community and its successors all the way to today’s European 
Union (EU). These are organizations that have always had trade liberalization and 
economic cooperation as a central goal. Rogowski further points out that the high cost 
agricultural sector was steadily losing ground. Despite agricultural subsidies through the 





shrink. As of 2015, agriculture accounts for only 1% of Germany’s GDP (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2015). In general, the political power and consensus that a coalition of labor 
and capital has accomplished with regard to increased cross-border trade is well 
illustrated by the manner in which Germany endorsed the Euro. The creation of the 
monetary union was certainly a powerful factor in increasing trade among states and it is 
probably the best example in German politics of the prevalent consensus across all major 
parties1 on unequivocal support of European integration. Voters were very skeptical 
about giving up one of their most cherished national symbols, the Deutschmark, which 
conferred a sense of identity, stability, and prosperity. The monetary union came into 
effect in January of 1999 with the introduction of the Euro as an accounting currency. 
Prior to its introduction, the issue was of great concern to many Germans and 58% of 
them opposed the implementation of the Euro (Heisenberg, 2006, p. 112), nevertheless 
none of the major parties tried to capitalize on this opposition by adopting a critical 
stance towards the monetary union during the 1998 election campaign for the Bundestag. 
In fact, there was a consensus among all the parties represented in the Bundestag to 
exclude the launch of the Euro from the election campaign (Poguntke, 2007, p. 109). 
Certainly cooperation between Germany’s two abundant factors of production, 
labor and capital, is not the only reason why Germany has embraced European 
integration, and by extension significant economic integration, with close to no political 
opposition. Such an understanding would neglect Germany’s broader cultural and historic 
experience. For example, Germany’s motivation for participating in, and even taking on a 
leading role within the EU and its predecessor organizations, has always been based upon 
                                                          
1 Major parties refers here to all parties who were represented in the Bundestag during the election 





the traumatic experience of National Socialism and World War II. Accountable for the 
war and the worst crimes against humanity, Germany’s leaders viewed the European 
project as an instrument for “achieving an 'equality of rights' with their European 
neighbors […like…] the rehabilitation of Germany’s international credentials” 
(Anderson, 2005, p. 79). Likewise, it does not appear sensible to discard Rogowski’s 
argument about Germany’s urban-rural conflict after 1945. As already demonstrated, one 
can see how the Stolper-Samuelson theorem can be convincingly applied to Germany in 
order to identify a connection between international trade and political power, from 
approximately 1870 onward.  
There is no reason to assume that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is only useful in 
explaining why social class became the defining political cleavage as landowners and 
capitalist in Germany united and rallied in support of trade barriers and imperialism in the 
late 19th century. Or why in the 1930s, trade barriers favored land as the scarce factor of 
production and dramatically changed the positions of strength towards land as a factor of 
production resulting in urban-rural conflict. Likewise, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
also explains how labor and capital have increasingly profited from trade and 
subsequently found their political position strengthened in Germany since 1945 and as 
already discussed, it will be the focus of this study to closely examine how Rogowski’s 
argument applies to Germany over the last decade of the twentieth century and the first 







2.2 Commerce, Coalitions, and Its Discontents: Rogowski Reconsidered 
Rogowski’s argument has drawn wide attention in the field of political economy 
and his work has inspired many research projects, this particular study being one of them. 
One important block of literature has tried to assess the veracity of the logic and claims 
put forth in Commerce and Coalitions. There have been a few concrete criticisms over 
the years that have fundamentally challenged Rogowski’s argument or his interpretation 
of history. It is important to take a closer look at these, because if Rogowski’s theory 
cannot be substantiated, then the theoretical foundation of this research would falter. As 
this section will demonstrate, generally speaking, the critique of Rogowski’s concepts is 
not intended to refute his argument but rather to augment them. This comes down to the 
question of what is more desirable: a theory that is parsimonious and very encompassing 
with wide predictive power, but that fails to explain specific deviations from the 
predicted correlation or a narrow approach that is better at explaining all observations, 
but is limited with regard to its scope. The advantage with this research is that it is only 
looking at one case, Germany. That makes it possible for this study to look at the critique 
of Rogowski’s theory and to mostly implement the generally useful tweaks that are being 
suggested within the literature, because the intent here is not to explain a large number of 
heterogeneous cases, but a single case. 
 
2.2.1 Unholy Coalitions and Sector Specific Conditions 
One point of criticism has been brought forward by Brawley (1997), who makes 
the point that the coalition of “iron and rye” was made possible by a willingness of 





Europe at the time. Brawley claims that this logic explains why the coalition formed in 
the first place, but it does not explain why it endured for so long. The Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem does not provide sufficient explanation of this phenomenon. Despite an 
economic recovery and capital becoming an abundant factor of production again, the 
alliance lasted much longer than it should have according to Rogowski’s model.  
Contrasting Rogowski’s concept with the sector-specific factor model helps to 
address this discrepancy. One of the key features of the sector-specific factor model is the 
argument that trade does not affect factors of production in a uniform way. Trade affects 
people differently depending on whether they are employed in the export or the import 
sector. For example, capital that is used in the export sector will benefit from trade 
openness, whereas capital that is used in a sector that competes with imports will face 
further pressures under liberalization. The rate of return for capital in this case is not 
identical and capital that is used in the import sector cannot just start producing export 
goods, because there are costs or obstacles linked to adjustment. The factor-endowment 
model as presented by Rogowski does not take this into account and, instead, claims that 
trade affects everyone who owns the same factor similarly. The argument that the effect 
is similar regardless of whether the factor is used in the import or export sector is based 
on the idea that switching between sectors happens with ease. For example in an 
economy where agriculture is the scarce factor, and capital and labor are abundance, 
trade liberalization means that a worker who is employed in a factory that produces 
farming equipment for the domestic agricultural sector will simply find new employment 
in a factory that exports industrial products like ships or automobiles. This kind of 





specialized and technical, one can see that switching industries becomes more difficult 
and creates more adjustment cost. 
Brawley (1997) concludes that Rogowski’s claims, that the factors that would 
benefit from open trade will pursue such policies and as a consequence see their political 
power increase, does not necessarily reflect reality. As Brawley further points out, a 
simple modification to include partial factor mobility would solve this problem. The 
inconsistencies that come to light when the model is applied to historical cases vanish 
once the concept of partial factor mobility is introduced. This is certainly an issue that 
needs to be taken into account when analyzing Germany’s party competition for federal 
elections and the question should be asked: Do parties consider partial factor mobility in 
any form in their campaign programs? 
Another line of critique addresses the oversimplification in Rogowski’s argument 
and that his theory therefore is unable to take some important general factors into 
account. For example, Woodruff (2005) objects to the idea that the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem is a reasonable foundation on which to base general laws of trade and its relation 
to politics. He claims that Rogowski’s argument is based on a radically simplified view 
of the international economy that is limited exclusively to relative prices. Instead, 
scholars such as Woodruff argue, a methodology is needed that considers an international 
economy that is shaped by repeated crossborder interactions of various domestic 
economies. A further question that Rogowski does not address, according to Woodruff, is 
what are the effects of volatility? Volatility is generated by markets that oscillate between 
economic busts and booms. Likewise, there is neither accounting in Rogowski’s theory 





abandonment. In essence, “trade itself is not a connection between countries, but 
something that faces each of them as an exogenous force” (Woodruff, 2005, p. 217). This 
assessment is probably justified, but it is quite common for structural approaches to 
emphasize the long run and not specific snapshots. In this respect, Rogowski is in good 
company. While this research agrees with the idea of taking a long term perspective, the 
analytical chapters will pay attention to what the effects of volatility are for the way 
German parties compete for votes and whether it seems to alter power distributions. 
 
2.2.2 The Oversimplification of the Three Factor Model 
Midford (1993) bases his critique of Rogowski’s work on how it applies to the 
United States. He points out that Rogowski is not able to explain why multiple unions in 
the postwar United States failed to oppose free trade and why, at the same time, an 
increasing number of capitalists did advocate for protectionism. According to Rogowski 
one should have expected a coalition of landowners and capitalist to push for increased 
trade while labor should pursue protectionist policies. Midford claims that Rogowski’s 
three-factor model is “excessively parsimonious” (1993, p. 543) and that this is the 
reason why it fails to explain reality. For example, Midford argues, a better approach 
would be to discard the notion that labor is one homogenous group that is equally 
affected by trade liberalization or contraction across the board. Skills are not evenly 
distributed across labor and therefore the effects of trade are not uniform. Rogowski’s 
work is not able to pick up on these important nuances. As Martin (2002) points out, 
there is a danger to such a method, because after Occam’s razor has trimmed away 





the pursuit of parsimony. In the end one might only be left with “a theory that is so 
oversimplified that it distorts or misrepresents the phenomenon it is trying to explain” 
(Martin, 2002, p. 10).   
Instead, Midford (1993) suggests a multifactor model approach to explain this 
deviation from what is predicted by the three-factor model. Midford replaces Rogowski’s 
tripartite model with eight factors. The reason for this approach is that factors are not 
completely homogenous; instead an approach that splits up each factor into subgroups 
could be very beneficial.  For example, one could divide labor into subgroups such as 
low-skilled workers and highly skilled ones, public sector versus private sector 
employees, people who work in the service industry or those who work in manufacturing, 
and many more. By doing this division one can more easily see that there could be 
obstacles and costs involved with moving from one subgroup to another.  Thus trade will 
not have a uniform effect upon labor, but instead each subgroup will be affected in its 
own distinct ways (Midford, 1993). This increases explanatory power significantly, but at 
the expense of predictive power. This tradeoff is reasonable for this research and close 
attention will be paid to how parties address each of these subgroups that Midford 
identified and if one can observe different effects of globalization for individual 
subgroups of the initial three factors that Rogowski identified. 
 
2.2.3 The Relative Gains and Strength of Capital and Labor 
Garst (1998) in his analysis of Rogowski’s use of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
has distilled two specific issues that are in need of critical review. One is the fact that 





uniform. The gains to capitalism are relatively concentrated in the hands of a few actors, 
whereas the gains for labor are spread widely across many workers. The implication of 
this is that incentives to organize and to push for further trade liberalization will be 
significantly higher for capitalists, due to these individuals’ higher rate of return. At the 
same time, the concentration of gains enables those who own the means of production to 
mobilize support against protectionism to a far greater degree than the individual worker 
who, individually, possess only a modest share of the increased prosperity. Additionally, 
it is substantially harder (at least by comparison) to organize large groups of workers and 
to motivate them to take action than it is to form consensus among a relatively small 
faction of capitalists. In other words, even though the gains from trade may spread evenly 
across factors, the effects upon each individual factor are not equal. While this critique is 
certainly justified in general, one could argue that influential German labor unions have 
the ability to mitigate this effect and therefore this critique can be neglected for the 
purpose of this research. 
 Another critique that Garst (1998) voices is that Rogowski does not consider the 
effect that trade union strength has on the likelihood that labor and capital cooperate and 
how it is linked to labor mobility. Garst’s claim is that a capitalist’s default behavior is to 
pursue labor strategies that oppose organized worker efforts in order to maximize 
freedom to make unilateral decisions without restrictions from workers. A state of weak 
worker organization does breed contempt for capitalists and generates an adversarial 
environment even when it comes to issues upon which both sides (labor and capital) 
would otherwise agree, such as trade. Strong labor organizations can act as a mediator 





Garst argues, is that this logic rests on an assumption of high labor mobility. As 
previously pointed out, there is no distinction in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem between 
the import and export sectors, because workers are assumed to switch with great ease 
between them. This means that workers who can simply switch between importing and 
exporting industries will have no need to form entrenched worker organizations that can 
facilitate cooperation between workers and their employers with regard to trade.  
Garst (1998) corroborates this assertion by looking at late 19th-century Germany. 
In his reading of history, which differs from Rogowski’s,  labor and capital failed to 
collaborate against the landed nobility in the period from 1890 until 1914, despite 
Germany’s ascension to the rank of a capital abundant economy. Class struggle continued 
to shape German society during this period. Employers resorted to repressing workers 
who lacked strong trade unions. Labor’s political weakness was further emphasized by 
labor mobility, which negated the cooperation between labor and capital that one would 
expect in the wake of increasing domestic capital and a steadily growing global economy. 
Garst concludes “[t]he failure of these coalition possibilities to be realized helped ensure 
that the Reich’s authoritarian political system remained unreformed right up to World 
War I” (1998, p. 38). The question is if this particular observation still holds true today. 
One can reasonably well argue that labor unions have made significant progress in 
Germany since the second half of the 20th century. Their influence within companies and 
politics has been pointedly strengthened over time. Their relative power has fluctuated 
over the years but the principle of codetermination is fundamental to most companies in 
Germany (see Wächter & Muller‐Camen, 2002).  
What all of this means for this study is that a question that needs to be asked is: 
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What kind of positions do parties take on the issue of labor unions? The reason this is 
relevant is that, due to their relative strength, unions can have significant effects on the 
overall support for globalization because they can organize support for less protectionism 
and help to distribute the gains more equitably. 
2.2.4 When Cleavages Do Not Lead to Political Action 
 A different approach to criticizing Rogowski’s theory is to question the link 
between changes in trade patterns and political action, because “[c]leavages do not 
automatically result in group mobilization” (Caproso, 1997, p. 586). It is not a simple 
thing for individuals to comprehend the complex workings of the economy and to 
identify the exact reason that caused a decline of one’s economic situation. Difficult 
economic times can potentially be attributed to a number of reasons, such as more 
demanding environmental standards that are particularly hard for some sectors to adopt. 
Another cause of economic stress could be politically motivated subsidies for one sector 
at the expense of a competing one, for example traditional energy providers versus green 
energy. Likewise, technological change makes certain types of jobs within industries 
obsolete and might necessitate significant restructuring. As Caproso (1997) further points 
out, the individual who is threatened by these developments might not be able to relate 
his/her individual situation to a broader global economic picture. Instead “[s]capegoating 
and expressions of generalized political discontent, that is, anomic violence rather than 
purposeful political organization with clear goals and targets, may be the rule” (Caproso, 
1997, p. 586). Caproso makes an important point, but the issue of voter mobilization does 
not have to be as big an issue as he suggests. Voters in general are not expected to be 
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experts on every issue and they might not fully comprehend the consequences of policies 
like trade restrictions. This problem can be alleviated by political parties that present 
problems and their solutions in a concise manner that voters can understand and pick the 
approach that fits most closely with their own preferences. The true problem is the issue 
of scapegoating, because if parties do not present constructive solutions to complex 
issues such as globalization then voters are left to their own devices as to who will truly 
represent positions that will translate into policies that align with their preferences. 
Therefore it will be essential for this research to examine if election programs present a 
constructive approach to globalization with meaningful policy suggestions so that voters 
can identify their positions or if parties merely use the issue for scapegoating, blaming 
globalization universally for various domestic social ills. If this would be the case then 
Rogowski’s argument would certainly be weakened.  
2.2.5 Implications for This Study Regarding Globalization and Political Will 
These examples have highlighted that Rogowski’s argument has its shortcomings, 
but despite the criticism, Midford still declares that at its core, Rogowski’s theory 
remains unbroken at least for advanced economies. The implication, that changes in trade 
patterns cause alterations in the distribution of power within domestic politics, remains 
undisputed. In fact, Midford’s critique was merely trying to propose “ways in which 
recent advances in the factor endowments approach can be used to strengthen Rogowski's 
model” (Midford, 1993, p. 564). Even Rogowski acknowledges at the end of his book 
that his approach will need adaptation, because an overtly ridged methodology is not 
productive. Using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in an identical fashion for the time of 
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the industrial revolution as well as for the 21st century, Rogowski states, can only lead to 
anachronistic results. For example “a more useful threefold categorization of factors for 
future analysis may be, not that of land, labor, and capital employed throughout 
[Rogowski’s] book, but one of skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital: or, almost 
equivalently, of labor, human capital and physical capital” (Rogowski, 1998, p. 178). 
Garst’s verdict is that “[t]he main, and by no means insubstantial, contribution of 
Commerce and Coalitions (Rogowski, 1989) is to have set forth a bold and parsimonious 
theory of trade and cleavages amendable to testing and refinement that will stimulate 
work on this puzzle” (1998, p. 39). In other words, the critique of Rogowski’s theory is 
not about the affect trade has on domestic political alignments; this appears to be 
generally accepted. The question is how exactly it shapes domestic coalitions. The 
critique is that Rogowski was too parsimonious in his approach: that he either overlooks 
important variables that would help explain such specific coalitions, that the theory does 
not deal adequately with important variables, or that the gains/losses from changed trade 
patterns do not translate as neatly as Rogowski suggests into political action because of 
the omission of specific intervening variables. With each additional variable the ability to 
explain specific historic instances increases but at the same time the universal 
applicability of such an approach decreases sharply. This is the classic dilemma of 
parsimony versus accuracy in theory building, but it is not the intent here to debate which 
approach is superior. Instead the intent is find the best way to go about the research of 
this study. 
This research is built on the premise that globalization causes domestic policy 
change which in turn can shape globalization. Political will is conceived of as an 
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intervening variable between globalization and policy change. The beginning of this 
chapter was designed to lay down the theoretical underpinnings for the claim that 
globalization alters domestic political will. Rogowski talks about alliance formation more 
in an abstract manner, but it is reasonable to infer that this also means a change in the 
overall debate as to what policies are being favored and which ones are being discarded. 
As the political landscape shifts and new alliances are formed, different policies will 
come to the fore and possibly even be implemented. In a modern democracy at the turn of 
the 21st century such shifts in power will certainly be reflected in the makeup of the 
diverse political parties that vie for power and try to represent their clientele. In order to 
fill Rogowski’s sparing approach with more specifics and to make it more tangible for the 
specific context of Germany and to get a better understanding of how political will is 
formed, this study will address those elements (see Table 2.1) that Rogowski’s critics 
have claimed are missing for a better and more complete understanding of how 
globalization affects domestic politics. In a nutshell, this study builds on this existing 
research and along with it asserts that international trade affects domestic alliances for a 
fact.  
Chapter 3 will give more detail as to how German parties use their election  
programs as a tool for competing in federal elections and explain why election programs 
are an excellent source for analyzing the positions of political parties. It will also give an 
in-depth explanation as to why Germany is a particularly important country and why it is 
worthwhile to analyze how its domestic parties deal with the issue of globalization.  
36 
Table 2.1 
Questions to Increase Validity of Rogowski’s Model for Germany After 1990 
1. Do parties consider partial factor mobility in any form in their campaign
programs? (Brawley, 1997)
2. What are effects of volatility for the way German parties compete for votes and
does it seem to alter power distributions? (Woodruff, 2005)
3. How do parties address labor subgroups based upon skill, the sector they work in
(i.e., services versus manufacturing), or do they make a distinction between public
and private workers? Do they propose policies that are clearly with one of these
sub-groups in mind? (Midford, 1993)
4. What kind of positions do parties take on the issue of labor unions? (Garst, 1998)
5. Do parties present meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization
or do they merely use the issue for scapegoating? (Caproso, 1997)
CHAPTER 3 
PARTY ELECTION PROGRAMS AND GLOBALIZATION 
This chapter will first justify the use of party election programs in order to 
determine political will and then move on to look at previous research, which has studied 
the link between political parties and globalization. This prior research will assist in 
identifying relevant hypotheses for the research presented here. This chapter will 
conclude with a theoretically based justification for selecting Germany as the case for this 
study. This final part will also outline and explain the political party and time frame 
selection in this study. 
3.1 Party Election Programs as a Measure of Political Will 
First of all, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the term “party election 
programs.” Election program is the quite literal translation of the German word 
“Wahlprogramm.” An election program is a text, which is published a few months prior 
to an election and it defines a party’s goals for the upcoming legislative period. The 
British term that reflects this concept best is that of “manifesto,” which is commonly used 
in European political science texts that are published in English. The American term 





character of the manifesto. Therefore, this work will use the terms “manifesto” and 
“election program” in an interchangeable manner. 
It is one thing to claim that national elections are a prime opportunity to study the 
political will in a political system on any issue; it is another to determine how to go about 
this analysis. This study proposes a content analysis of election programs of all major 
German parties, because election programs constitute a unique source for analyzing a 
party’s response to globalization. The reason is that political party election programs “are 
the most visible public expressions of a party’s policy position” (Crowson, 2007, p. 146), 
or as and Klingemann et al. (1994) put it “they are the clearest available statement of 
policy intentions expressed by the leadership of competing parties” (p. 241). 
Additionally, the outlined policies have been sanctioned by the whole party and election 
programs also “challenge the party leaders to present a streamlined version [of their 
party’s policy goals] to the public, signalling the general contours of the party’s 
governmental programme for the next legislative period” (Pappi & Seher, 2009, p. 403). 
These programs have a fairly binding character and are also important tools for coalition 
building, because they signal to other parties the core policy positions that a party will 
want to implement once in government.  
This research project defines written party electoral manifestos as its central 
dependent variable, which means it does not follow the more traditional method of 
studying outcomes in the form of government policy. This decision is not made lightly, 
but as previously described it is a much better method to gauge the overall political will 
of political elites than an examination of government policies would be. The most likely 
critique of this approach will focus on the relationship between party election manifestos 
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and government policy. This relationship is most likely perceived as a rather tenuous one, 
based on the idea that parties make a plethora of promises to voters that are meant to 
sound appealing, but are unrealistic and are never intended to be implemented. This 
premise represents a serious challenge for this research project, because if there is no 
serious and meaningful link between election manifestos and policy, then this would 
question the whole study. A potential disconnect, where party programs and policy do not 
demonstrate any form of connection, would also be unfavorable. Fortunately, there is 
already a body of literature that has addressed this issue at length and demonstrated that 
there are strong and meaningful links between election programs on the one hand and 
policy change and policy outcomes on the other. Since the issue is so central to this 
project, a brief summary of the key points of this literature will be helpful. 
Kavanagh (1981) built the theoretical foundation that describes the connection 
between party manifestos and policy outcomes. Here, it should suffice to highlight two of 
his key arguments. First, a manifesto provides a party in power with a mandate, because 
the program lays out a course of future action that a party will follow once its leaders are 
in office. The manifesto legitimizes the government’s implementation of those election 
promises while at the same time setting limits to actions that fall outside of the espoused 
goals of the manifesto. The mandate thus has a dual purpose, because it not only 
empowers the government in its dealings with the political opposition, it also fortifies the 
cabinet in their dealings with professional civil servants. Policy change can be met with a 
significant level of resistance and inertia. A persuasive argument for change is that a 
particular policy represents the will of the sovereign, as expressed by citizens voting for a 





further argues that manifestos represent a vital instrument for ensuring inner party 
democracy. Usually a party’s rank and file members have to give their consent before an 
election program is published and it becomes a tool to keep the party elite in check. 
Secondly, there is the argument that any government will be held accountable at the next 
election for how well it has been able to implement its promises.  
The relevance of this theoretical framework has been tested by various studies 
that have analyzed the fulfillment of election pledges. For example Klingemann, 
Hofferbert, and Budge (1994) present an in-depth study on the function that political 
parties have in the democratic policy process. They closely examine the party systems in 
10 different western democracies over roughly 4 decades. One of their key findings is “a 
remarkably high congruence between the themes stressed in party election programs and 
the subsequent policies enacted by the parties that get into government” (Klingemann et 
al., 1994, p. 368).  Royed’s (1996) comparative study of the Reagan and Thatcher eras 
concludes for Britain that “[v]irtually all of the Conservatives' economic and social 
agenda as stated in the manifestos was enacted” (p. 76). The picture for the US is less 
clear cut, due to the institutional peculiarities as to how power is distributed between the 
President and Congress. Nevertheless, Royed asserts that there is a relationship between 
party platforms and enacted policies. Another study by Royed and Borrelli (1999) 
focuses specifically on whether or not U.S. parties can implement their economic policy 
proposals from 1976-1992. They conclude that the two major parties in the US are able to 
realize their campaign promises. Rallings (1987) studies the effects of election programs 
on government policy in Canada and the UK (United Kingdom) from 1945 until 1979. 





their election manifestos on average more than two-thirds of the time, once they are in 
power.    
Similar studies, which conclude that election programs matter when it comes to 
shaping policy, have been done for Greece (Kalogeropoulou, 1989), the Netherlands 
(Thomson, 2001), Ireland (Mansergh, 2005; Thomson, 2011), Sweden (Naurin, 2011), 
and Spain (Artés, 2012). Additionally, Thomson et al. (2012) conduct research on what 
they refer to as program-to-policy linkage in 10 different democracies. The time frame is 
country specific, with some country analyses starting very early in 1945 and going into 
the early 2000s. However, the majority of studies cover a core period of about 30 years 
starting around 1970. They identified 12,128 election pledges that were specific enough 
to test for potential fulfillment. The likelihood of pledge fulfillment was largely 
dependent on structural factors such as government make up (single party or a coalition 
of parties), or majority or minority government. The range goes from 85% pledge 
fulfillment in Britain down to Ireland and Italy, where a little less than half of all pledges 
are fulfilled. The authors contribute this to the fact that the UK is dominated by stable 
single majority party governments, whereas Italy and Ireland are commonly governed by 
minority coalitions that have a tendency to be short lived and serve a greater plurality of 
interests. On average, they observed that once parties are in power they realize about two-
thirds of their campaign pledges, at least partially. As Budge and Hofferbert (1990) 
illustrate, the significant range of pledge fulfillment can, in large part, be explained by 
structural differences. Countries with multiparty systems are often ruled by coalition 
governments. In order to form a coalition all involved parties will have to compromise on 
some level, which does not allow for such a close link between manifesto pledges and 
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policy outcomes as it would be in a system that is dominated by single majority party 
governments.  
In a nutshell, “[w]ith respect to the program-to-policy linkage, there is generally 
more congruence between the election programs of prospective government parties and 
subsequent government policies than conventional wisdom would expect” (Mansergh & 
Thomson, 2007, p. 324). Budge and Hofferbert (1990, p. 129) even find that government 
spending is to a larger degree determined by manifestos than it is by traditional partisan 
differences. All in all “[t]he overriding impression one gets from this body of research is 
that pledges are fulfilled to a greater degree than most citizens believe” (Thomson, 2011, 
p. 188). This is a crucial body of research that lends a significant amount of validity to
this research project. Nevertheless, one can still rightly argue that a two-thirds 
congruence of the program-to-policy linkage is inferior to the direct study of policy 
outcomes. This may be true, but it is worth keeping in mind that this research does not try 
to demonstrate that explicit promises in election manifestos will lead to specific policies. 
Instead, it claims that examining campaign programs will reveal either a favorable or 
negative attitude among political leaders towards globalization, which will tell us 
something about their political willingness to push for more globalization, to restrain or 
even to reverse it.  
An advantage of looking at election programs, as opposed to examining the 
policies which a party enacts once it is in office, is that it allows for a more holistic 
picture. With this method, one develops an understanding of what all of Germany’s 
relevant political parties assert, regarding globalization. The reason that this is relevant is 





outcomes. For example, Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1993) show that if Christian-
democratic parties face strong political competition from the left, they will pass 
legislation that builds a generous welfare state, even though their own party position is 
much less supportive of a sprawling social government. Left opposition parties can 
demand lavish welfare spending from the government, and thus please their supporters, 
while at the same time creating pressure for the government. If the opposition is able to 
keep welfare state issues on the agenda, then politically right leaning governments will 
often favor generating electoral favor over policy integrity. As Jensen and Seeberg (2015, 
p. 229) point out, this logic is not only true for welfare issues, but can be applied to any 
policy issue. It is a matter of issue ownership or reputational advantage; if the opposition 
has issue ownership within a specific policy field, then it will find a way to successfully 
pressure the government into at least adjusting policies in a manner that it otherwise 
would not have done. Additionally, the prevalent “domestic political debate about foreign 
policy can influence both international relations and domestic electoral outcomes” 
(Ramsay, 2004, p. 478). In international affairs, states do not just look to governments of 
other states for cues as to how states will behave in the future, but also to the political 
opposition, because the “opposition’s rhetoric can be said to have institutionally induced 
credibility as a result of pursuing office through open political competition” (Ramsay, 
2004, p. 478). Similarly, Schultz (1998, pp. 829-830) conducts research that replaces the 
unitary state assumption with a model that entails two strategic actors for each state, the 
opposition party and the governing party. According to this model, states resolve crises in 
international relations by interpreting messages from other governments as well as cues 





position on the international stage by conveying that the government’s position on a 
specific issue is not dependent on a particular party. Instead the state’s actions will be 
consistent even if there is a change of the executive. Another effect which opposition 
parties can have is that they restrain governments to focus on policies that can muster 
broader support, because a government that faces stiff internal opposition on an issue will 
find its negotiation position and credibility with other states weakened. The introduction 
of public competition and a credible opposition party can enhance a state's ability to 
resolve international disputes (Schultz, 1998, p. 841). While Schultz focuses on 
international crises and threats of war between states, it is reasonable to apply the same 
logic to other areas of state interaction, like the promise to lower tariffs, to harmonize 
environmental standards, and to implement a common corporate tax rate. One can also 
expand the connection between international and domestic politics beyond the argument 
that opposition parties have signaling power, but that they also exert a constraining effect 
on governments in international affairs vis-à-vis the domestic political resources that they 
control, thus forcing a government to be more selective in its threats (Shea, Teo, & Levy, 
2014, p. 750). In other words, there is additional information to be gained by going 
beyond government policies with regard to an international issue such as trade 
liberalization and globalization. 
 
3.2 Previous Research and Its Implications 
The idea to examine election programs to see how they relate to globalization is 
not a novel one. The intent of this study is to move away from a common approach across 
various studies, which is to examine the effects of political parties on globalization by 
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relying on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which comprises a 
pooled cross-section of political parties in 25 countries over a little more than 5 decades 
from 1945 until 1998 (see for example Burgoon, 2006; Camyar, 2012; Haupt, 2010; 
Milner & Judkins, 2004). The CMP is a very general approach to providing data, which is 
certainly a useful tool for broad cross-country analysis. In contrast this study is built on 
the assumption that there is additional knowledge to be gained from an in-depth 
investigation with the intent to study the effects of political parties on globalization. The 
goal is to form a more holistic picture that sheds light onto how parties address 
globalization. What messages are parties communicating, or what are they omitting? 
What kind of picture are they painting of globalization? Is globalization presented as an 
opportunity or as a threat? How does this picture fit with a party’s overall position? In 
order to assure that the research carried out here is grounded in theory the following 
section will identify additional theoretical concepts that together with the research 
questions formulated in Chapter 2 is going to guide analysis in Chapters 5-9. 
In order to answer these questions, one must certainly examine the direct 
statements that parties make in their election programs. Statements and policies that 
directly relate to economic globalization are those that address, for example, the issue of 
cross border trade, international competition as well as potential opportunities for 
economic growth and potential risks for domestic employment from international 
competition. They also contain comments about the high profile institutions that are 
generally associated with economic globalization such as the International Monetary 
Fund ( IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), or World Bank. However, as Swank 





indirectly. For example, governments that rely heavily on tax revenue have a tendency to 
enact policies that are often very accommodating to mobile capital and corporate 
taxation. This is motivated by a desire to attract more foreign direct investment or by a 
fear of losing those mobile assets or foreign corporations to another state. In the long run, 
these policies can create a situation where the tax burden is placed, with an exponentially 
greater burden, on less mobile actors such as land and labor. It is valuable to examine 
which political parties support policies that are particularly accommodating to mobile 
assets and which parties, if any, oppose such policies. This way one can get a much better 
understanding of how parties truly position themselves with regard to globalization. 
In other words, globalization is not just affected by obvious trade related factors 
such as tariff rates or trade agreements, but also by many more indirect factors, such as 
for example general transaction cost or national identity that can accelerate, slow down, 
or even reverse economic openness. There is a body of literature that has examined 
multiple of these factors that can have a significant effect on globalization. The next few 
paragraphs will outline these factors and explain how they affect globalization. This way 
one can obtain a more comprehensive picture of whether or not a party supports the 
concept of globalization.  
 
3.2.1 Factors That Shape Attitudes 
The research of Mayda, O'Rourke, and Sinnott (2007) reveals an interesting 
correlation. People who feel that governments are responsible for providing either an 
opportunity for people to earn a livelihood or basic necessities for the unemployed are the 





people to accept increased openness is to demonstrate that the state’s ability to take care 
of its citizens is not diminished by globalization. In fact, Mayda et al.’s research also 
shows that a government’s size is negatively correlated to protectionist attitudes, which in 
turn are caused by an aversion to the risks of economic openness. Government size in and 
of itself is surely no indicator of effective, efficient and comprehensive support among 
people who are adversely affected by globalization. Nevertheless, increasing government 
size seems to, at the very least, give people a feeling of security and confidence that they 
will have support when it comes to weathering the potential storm that increased 
exposure to the global economy might bring. 
It is pivotal to note that, negating the adverse effects of increased exposure to 
international trade through expansion of welfare spending cannot be universally assumed. 
As Rudra (2002) illustrates, less developed countries often struggle to maintain their 
welfare spending, let alone increase that spending, with growing exposure to the 
international economy. A key reason for the lack of correlation between the degree of 
exposure to international trade and the size of the welfare state is the inability of the least 
developed states to improve the skills of their workforce and the absence of strong 
political institutions. In essence, labor’s political gains from an open economy remain 
hypothetical due to an inability to organize, advocate, and pressure the government for an 
increased social safety net. Rudra’s (2002) research only applies to less developed 
countries, which do not include Germany. For Germany, with a relatively educated 
workforce that is able to rely on strong institutions, and rely on the ability to organize and 
advocate, the idea that the losers of globalization are compensated by its winners does 
make sense. As Cameron (1978) points out, citizens’ stance towards trade is shaped by 
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their understanding of the effects that trade can have and how those effects align with 
their self-interest. Globalization does not affect the self-interest of all people equally. 
Increased exposure to international competition will increase hostility towards trade 
among those workers who are most exposed to imports within their sector. Instead of 
increasing government assistance in general, support can be specifically targeted at those 
sectors that are most acutely exposed to external competition.  
Another interesting aspect that must be taken into consideration is what Rodrik 
(1997) refers to as the globalization dilemma. In essence, for globalization to work, a 
smaller and less regulatory state is necessary. However, in order to secure popular 
support for globalization what is needed is a state that does interfere in the market 
through regulation and taxation in order to compensate those people who are suffering 
from globalization. It is not an easy task to address this dilemma and to devise policies 
that can disentangle this complicated relationship. 
Based upon the globalization dilemma, one can draw a number of conclusions. If 
political parties in developed countries want to increase support for globalization, then 
increasing the size and scope of government, in particular with regard to its welfare 
spending, becomes important. Thus, with an expanded welfare state people feel more 
secure and are more willing to accept the uncertainty that a globalized world entails. 
Another important conclusion is that opposition to open trade can be very specific to a 
particular sector even though the overall workforce is in general more ambivalent 
towards the issue. Therefore, it will be critical to look at the type of government 
programs that are suggested, if any, and how those programs might make people more 
open toward globalization. Is government support general or is it focused on industries 
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that face particular pressures from imports? Do Germany’s political parties reflect these 
considerations in their campaign programs? Do parties deal with the globalization 
dilemma? Do they discuss how they want to decrease state interference in order to make 
trade more attractive while at the same time addressing the increased need to compensate 
those who struggle due to increased economic openness? Is it even possible for one party 
to address both issues in the same election campaign or is this where parties potentially 
strategically share responsibilities?  
In most federal elections no single party is expected to win a majority; instead, 
coalition governments are the norm. It is common for German parties to announce at the 
start of an election who their preferred coalition partner will be in case of an electoral 
victory that is short of an overall majority. For example, a party could emphasize a 
position for increased government involvement in their electoral program knowing that 
their preferred coalition partner will emphasize the role of the market and deregulation. In 
this way, both parties can run campaigns that are coherent and not contradictory while at 
the same time achieving the desired amalgamation of decreasing resistance to 
globalization through an increased welfare net while at the same time strengthening the 
market by decreasing government regulation. This is something that an analysis of party 
competition in Germany should not neglect as it would be an interesting finding that 
would demonstrate that parties take the issue of globalization, and their own position with 
regard to it, very seriously. 
To summarize, the additional questions one should ask when examining election 
programs are:  
o Do parties address the globalization dilemma?
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o What kind of policies do parties suggest to strengthen the welfare state? (Keeping
in mind that a larger welfare state leads to greater acceptance of globalization)
o Do parties make general suggestions for improving state benefits or do they
advocate for special protective measures for certain groups?
3.2.2 The Need to Discuss Transaction Cost 
An important avenue in which governments can have a significant effect on trade 
is in the area of regulations. These are not direct measures such as tariffs, but indirect 
effects with never-the-less sizable impact. Rodrik (2000) illustrates this point quite 
convincingly by looking at the US-Canadian border. Despite continuous efforts to reduce 
formal obstacles to international trade and the establishment of a free trade zone the flow 
of goods, services, and capital across this border seems to be a good deal smaller than 
what one would expect if the same region would form one domestic market. This finding 
is especially interesting given the similar socio-economic state of both countries as well 
as the mostly shared language. The cultural differences between people from Detroit, 
Michigan and Windsor, Ontario are probably no more significant than those that one will 
find within the US, let’s say between people from Seattle, Washington and those from 
Birmingham, Alabama. There are certainly multiple factors that will help to explain this 
missed trade, but perhaps the best explanation is that “national borders demarcate 
political and legal jurisdictions. Such demarcations serve to segment markets in much the 
same way that transport costs or border taxes do” (Rodrik, 2000, p. 179). Any form of 
cross border exchange is faced with additional and sometimes very sizable transaction 





states. This means that domestic policies which increase or decrease these cross-border 
transaction costs can have a significant impact on cross-border trade flow. When 
analyzing what kind of policies German parties have advocated for over the last 25 years 
it is important to include policies that affect cross-border transaction costs because, as 
Rodrik (2000) points out, they do have a significant effect on trade.  
There are different ways in which a party might position itself with regard to the 
harmonization of various standards, such as labor laws, environmental regulations, or 
even technical standards. These all can reduce transaction costs if they become more 
uniform, but the most substantial obstacle is the difficulty of enforcing contracts across 
jurisdictions. Ranjan and Lee (2007) illustrate precisely this point with their research. 
They show how a lack of contract enforcement is negatively related to trade flows and 
that dependable international institutions are a key factor for overcoming the issue of 
contract enforcement. This need for strong institutions is especially true for a country like 
Germany that primarily trades very complex and technologically advanced goods and 
services (North, 1990).  
This makes it important also to look at the type policies, if any, that address this 
issue of contract enforcement as outlined in party programs. Such policies could include 
very broad suggestions or discuss the power of specific international organizations such 
as the World Trade Organization. In the case of Germany, it is essential to look at the role 
that parties outline for the institutions of the EU, because its various bodies have a 
significant bearing on, amongst other things, the issue of contract enforcement between 
Germany and its closest neighbors. Since transportation cost between the Federal 
Republic and its EU neighbors are so low, it is here that the costs for a lack of contract 
52 
enforcement and low levels of harmonization soar relative to the total transaction cost. 
What kind of role do parties outline for EU institutions? Do they intend to curb or extend 
the powers of the EU? Which policy areas come under scrutiny: human rights, 
environmental standards, economic issues? These are important issues that can have 
direct consequences on future trade levels and it will be interesting to see if one can 
identify patterns that address the issue of regulatory harmonization and contract 
enforcement in party programs, over time. 
3.2.3 Globalization and Parliamentary Power 
The issue of transaction cost and regulatory harmonization leads to a very 
important question: Does globalization adversely affect democracy? A common fear in 
this context is the concept of a race to the bottom (see Bisley, 2007; Vanberg, 2000). In a 
globalized world governments increasingly compete with each other to attract large 
investors and the vast flow of capital which they promise: innovation, growth, and 
sustainable jobs. The fear is that no government can afford to fall behind in this 
competition and therefore will face incentives and pressures to be more investment 
friendly than the other states. In a worst case scenario, this leads to a downward spiral or 
race to the bottom that only ends once the “bottom” is reached, a neoliberal bottom, 
where the market dominates everything and the state’s role is merely reduced to 
enforcing contracts that are generated by the market (see Krings, 2009; Rudra, 2008). 
One can argue about how likely such an outcome is where the German 
government bows to the power of the market and the market in turn shapes German trade 





setting and accounting for public will. This type of view is based to some degree on the 
notion that once globalization has gained enough traction it becomes this unavoidable 
phenomenon that only leads to policy convergence (see Drezner, 2001). However, this 
outlook does not have to be so negative, in fact “[g]lobalization is not inevitable. The 
continued integration of national markets and growth of the global economy depend on 
domestic political support” (Hays, 2009, p. 150). This means that governments ultimately 
will not just simply bow down to the pressures of the market in a globalized world, 
because domestic political support determines the rate of convergence and could even 
result in a reversal of globalization trends in settings where there is strong public 
opposition. One should not forget the intricate relationship between executive branch and 
legislative branch in a country that frequently influences convergence. As Martin (2000) 
points out, parliaments are usually not directly involved in the negotiation of treaties or 
other forms of cooperation that are designed to increase economic cooperation. This does 
not mean that parliaments have no power to shape trade negotiations, rather they have 
delegated their power to the executive. Any bargain struck by government leaders will 
have to pass through a domestic implementation process and it is here where agreements 
without parliamentary support will get bogged down and possibly fade into oblivion. 
Ultimately this can lead to “an implementation deficit” (Martin, 2000, p. 189), which 
weakens a government’s position for future negotiations, as its inability to push 
implementation of agreements decreases its credibility and reputation abroad. This means 
that voters can influence the implementation of international agreements by electing a 
party that reflects their personal preferences. This logic only makes sense if voters are 





have an incentive not just to control the executive power, but to also secure strong 
parliamentary support in order to strengthen the Executive and make it more credible as it 
engages in negotiations on the international stage. 
These general theoretical concepts can undoubtedly apply quite differently within 
a state depending on the particularities of its political system. Within a parliamentary 
system the government has a majority in parliament and can usually count on support 
from the legislature when it comes to the implementation of treaties which the executive 
has negotiated. By comparison, within a presidential system such as the United States, the 
President might face significant opposition if his or her party has lost control of congress. 
Nevertheless, Martin’s logic of the potential implementation deficit is still relevant for a 
parliamentary democracy such as Germany, because, while its government can rely on 
parliamentary support in the Bundestag, the Executive will still have to consider 
parliamentary support across the whole spectrum including the opposition, especially if 
the general population is unsupportive. Usually, the government will be able to whip the 
votes in the Bundestag to secure support for an international agreement that it has 
negotiated, but if the electorate opposes it, then the ruling party can face stiff opposition 
at the next state election. 
At first glance this might be counter intuitive, because the state elections for 
Germany’s 16 Bundesländer should, in theory, be about the issues within the particular 
state and not about matters and disputes at the federal level, but here the concept of 
second-order elections becomes relevant. This concept goes back to Reif and Schmitt 
(1980), who used this term to distinguish between two kinds of elections. The vital 





elections in parliamentary systems or the national presidential elections in presidential 
systems. The other set is a deluge of “second-order” elections. These are by-elections, 
local and regional elections, those to a second chamber and the like. The particular 
significance of these elections lies in the dichotomy that they have institutionally binding 
consequences only at the level at which they are carried out; nevertheless their outcomes 
are both shaped by and felt at the national level. Parties do not solely garner votes based 
upon their policy proposals for the specific context of the second-order arena, but also 
according to issues at the primary political arena of the state. In other words, any treaty 
that Germany’s government negotiates and adopts will be, at least to some extent, put to a 
vote at the next state election. Widespread opposition to the new treaty can be bad for the 
government for two reasons. First, if this opposition leads to a loss of votes at the state 
level there are relevant consequences at the federal level. The dilemma for the federal 
government is that often a change of leadership at the state level in one or two states is 
sufficient to tip the balance within Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, thus restricting 
the federal government’s policy options, despite strong support in the lower house, the 
Bundestag. Furthermore, the public will draw inferences from the performance of a party 
in second-order elections, thus attempting to assess a party’s chance of a potential win or 
loss in a first-order election at the national level. 
The issue of how globalization affects parliamentary power certainly warrants a 
closer look at the election programs of Germany’s parties and what positions they 
formulate with regard to international agreements. Important questions in the respect are:  
o Do parties address international treaties and cooperation at all in their election 





o Do they offer divergent positions or are they relatively uniform across the whole 
party spectrum?  
o Are these positions very broad and general or are they specific and precise?  
o Are there continuing trends over multiple elections or do positions seem rather ad 
hoc and opportunistic policy proposals that correlate with salient issues around 
the time of an election?  
o Do the responses to these questions reflect any patterns based on a political 
left/right cleavage?  Essentially the point of asking these questions is to get a 
feeling for how well, if at all, parties do communicate their goals when it comes 
to international agreements.  
o Do they involve voters in order to build support to globalization and to guarantee 
a successful implementation? 
 
3.2.4 Why the Issue of Identity Matters So Much  
When it comes to globalization and the determination of how people might 
respond to globalization, the most rational approach is to evaluate an individual’s 
economic self-interest and to conclude whether globalization affects it positively or 
negatively. This rational approach frequently fails to align with reality. For example, 
Rankin (2004) examines the relationship between economic self-interest and the 
emotional factor of identity for Americans and Canadians, regarding the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He finds economic self-interest can be difficult to 
determine for the average citizen, as it requires access to information and some degree of 
analytical skill to determine the effects of NAFTA on that citizen’s individual economic 
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situation. Messages about national identity, however, rely on attitudes, symbols, and 
emotions that are generally more accessible and easier to address for individual citizens. 
Heuristics such as images of fellow Americans who have blue collar jobs that will be lost 
to Mexican competitors lends an easier way for citizens to understand trade agreement 
impacts, even if it tends to pitch international trade partners as competitors. It is 
important to note that identity does not have to be primarily national. Forms of identity 
that allow for a wider, more comprehensive and inclusive type of identity are possible 
too. Such forms of identity will be more open to supranational arrangements.  
Hooghe and Marks (2004) study the relationship between economic rationality 
and national identity, and how these factors influence individual attitudes towards 
European integration. While their study focuses on European integration, rather than 
globalization, their findings can reasonably well be extrapolated to a globalization 
framework. After all, Europeanization is “a ‘nested’ phenomenon, in that it is taking 
place within a broader process of globalization, and may even be contributing to it” 
(Anderson, 2003, p. 42). Additionally, economic integration is a key factor of European 
integration. Likewise, Mitchell’s (2014) research demonstrates that the stronger an 
individual’s European identity is, the greater or stronger their support for further 
economic integration. Subsequently, a straight forward cost benefit calculation does not 
exclusively determine preferences on economic integration, rather a number of “soft” 
factors such as identity play in, because “[a]t its most encompassing level, globalization 
implies the diminishing importance of national boundaries in circumscribing the way 
people act and think” (Anderson, 2003, p. 38).    





important when it comes to an individual’s attitude toward increased integration, but 
economic factors become less important as national identity becomes more salient to an 
individual. They refine this finding by emphasizing the crucial distinction of exclusive 
and inclusive national identity. It is the exclusive national identity that ignores rational 
economic calculations and opposes further integration. This finding is in line with 
Rankin’s (2004) reasoning that supranational identity can significantly decrease 
resistance to economic integration. Hooge and Marks (2004) further point out that 
political parties have a key position when it comes to shaping inclusive or exclusive 
national identities. This is especially true for parties that vie for votes of European 
constituencies, because of the strong supranational character of the EU. European parties 
that want to invoke a supranational identity have it relatively easy within the EU, because 
“European identity is not empirically opposed to national identity” (Kohli, 2000, p. 126). 
The EU is not just an abstract institution or an idea that is hard to comprehend for 
Europeans. Instead, the idea of a shared European identity is constantly being 
reproduced. This happens through the political process within the EU, where domestic 
politicians regularly present their policies within a European context. This can take many 
forms, such as blaming the EU for forcing domestic politicians to implement EU 
regulations. A European context is frequently invoked for the purpose of benchmarking 
national policies; either to justify one’s own policies because compared to the rest of 
Europe the national achievements look quite good, or to discredit the opposition because 
all other European states are achieving better outcomes. There are also the physical 
symbols that persistently remind European citizens that they are part of something bigger 





they deal with their own state, like government buildings that feature not only the 
national flag but also the European flag. Similarly, state issued identification cards like 
passports or drivers’ licenses refer to the EU, as do car license plates. Most important for 
those states that are part of the European Monetary Union is the legal tender (the Euro) 
that millions of EU citizens handle every day and that is issued by the European Central 
Bank.   
It is important to note that even in this European setting, political parties must 
operate within a specific national social, cultural, and historic context. This context has 
significant influence on how easily a party can shape identities towards inclusive or 
exclusive identities and how easily political actors can tap into and foster supranational 
identities. In the United Kingdom reference to a supranational identity is much more 
difficult. British identity has generally been defined in opposition to Europe (Gamble, 
2003) or outside of it, due to the historic experience of the British Empire (Kent, 1993). 
German elites have used Europe as a means to overcome the trauma and political realities 
of World War II, the process of European integration offering Germany a way of leaving 
its blemished national identity behind (Poguntke, 2007). Europe also became an 
instrument for “achieving an 'equality of rights' with their European neighbors […and…] 
the rehabilitation of Germany’s international credentials” (Anderson, 2005, p. 79). 
Historically, a European identity has been a key feature of the Federal Republic. 
Therefore, Germany’s political parties should be able to tap into and foster a European 
identity to overcome resistance to economic integration. It is necessary to closely look at 
how parties address the issue of the EU and a European identity.  
o In which way do parties address the issue and does their approach seem likely to 
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increase or decrease Germans’ feeling of belonging to a wider European 
collective?  
The additional indirect factors that are important to this study have been 
summarized in Table 3.1 to provide for a clear overview of what to look for when 
analyzing party programs. This table will make it easier to identify relevant themes and 
ideas that parties use to attract votes and how they relate to globalization in the long run. 
3.3 Why Study Germany Since 1990? 
This case study will be built upon theoretical sampling, meaning that the selected 
case is chosen for its theoretical significance and not statistical significance (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 537). The section below outlines the theoretical reasons for selecting Germany 
after 1990.  
Size matters in international relations, especially for structural approaches (Jervis, 
1978; Mearsheimer, 2001; Walt, 1985; Waltz, 1979). This paper justifies selecting 
Germany by relying on a structural approach even though this epistemological choice 
might initially seem somewhat counterintuitive. Germany is certainly an economically 
important state with a GDP of $3.98 trillion.2 However, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) Factbook lists the EU, the USA, China, India, and Japan ahead of Germany in 
terms of their respective GDP. This leaves Germany in sixth place, which is not a bad 
position, but it makes Germany less interesting to someone taking a structural approach. 
Using structural logic examining the EU, the US, or China is far more relevant, especially 
since their respective GDPs dwarf that of Germany’s; so why not choose to examine one 
2 All GDP figures on this page are from the CIA World Factbook and are based upon purchasing power 
parity. 
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of these three economic behemoths more closely? Any of these three entities would make 
for a very worthwhile research project, but they are all very distinct when it comes to 
political parties, party competition, and their potential effects on globalization. The 
theoretical framework of this research does not fit China’s particular type of one-party 
rule, thus leaving only the US and the EU. As stated previously this project is not 
designed to be the sort of statistical analysis that is based on data from the CMP. Rather it 
is striving to be a “thick” description and content driven analysis, and any attempt to 
encompass both of them would have to be so superficial in order to be manageable that it 
would be nearly meaningless. In essence, one must choose between these two economic 
giants and this research focuses on the EU, which is probably the more complex and 
varied economic player of these two due to its supranational makeup.  
However, the theoretical framework of this research is also not well suited to 
analyze the EU, because its structures of governance are broadly distributed over the 
supranational, national, and subnational levels (Risse, Cowles, & Caporaso, 2001), with 
authority dispersed between them (Rosamond, 2000). This makes it hard to decide which 
level to emphasize and analyze. Intuitively one might be inclined to look at the 
overarching supranational level, but this is a great deal more difficult than it would 
initially seem. Party competition certainly occurs at this level, but elections for the 
European Parliament (EP) are “second-order” elections (see Reif & Schmitt, 1980; 
Schmitt, 2005; Weber, 2007). In other words, elections to the EP are never purely about 
who should represent Europe’s citizens at the supranational level. Instead they always 
reflect to some extent the respective 28 national elections. This is because elections to the 
EP are held nationally by national parties under national electoral laws. The news 
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coverage is done by the national media apparatus, and the public discourse in relation to 
the election focuses on domestic issues, often dominating the campaigns. However, 
although EP elections have the appearance of national parliamentary elections, they differ 
in a very decisive way as they do not determine the allocation of political power within 
member countries. Hence there is little at stake for national parties (Weber, 2007). 
Additionally, EP elections offer very little in terms of a real choice over alternative 
policies that determine the future of Europe, nor is the average voter interested in such 
matters (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004). Hence, parties run their familiar campaign 
strategies, platforms, and slogans that they coined for their primary national elections. In 
other words, “elections to the EP are fought by national political parties to win the 
support of nationally minded voters on national political issues” (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 
2004, p. 284). In order to examine the effects that political parties have on globalization, 
one should study the undiluted “first-order” elections. Yet again, an in-depth study of 28 
national party systems is unrealistic. Instead, this research focuses exclusively on 
Germany and there is good support for this choice: hegemonic stability theory. 
Krasner (1976) claims that states are the only relevant actors in the international 
system and that their behavior is determined by the structure of the system. In particular, 
Krasner is interested in the institutional appearance of free trade. He explains the 
occurrence of a stable free trade structure, in the otherwise anarchic international realm, 
through power imbalances. In so doing he undoubtedly builds upon Kindelberger’s 
notion, that “[f]or the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one 
stabilizer” (Kindelberger, 1973, p. 305). This powerful stabilizer or hegemon has a 
significant incentive to create and enforce a stable free trade system. Because of its size 
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the benefits of a free trade area outweigh the costs of establishing such an order. 
Krasner’s logic has become known under the label “hegemonic stability theory” (Snidal, 
1985) and has attracted a lot of attention because it provides a mechanism for overcoming 
the logic of the anarchic self-help system.  
The traditional structural argument is that every state has to fend for itself 
securing its own survival and security. In this setting, states are not interested in absolute 
gains, they are rather concerned with relative gains, meaning that the fact that one’s 
power, influence, wealth, etc. is increased based upon cooperation with other states is not 
good enough if other states gain more, relative to one’s own state. This makes any form 
of cooperation unlikely because there will be very few instances when two or more states 
can profit from cooperation to the same extent. With regard to free trade arrangements 
this means that there will always be one participating state that has an incentive to create 
a tariff for some industry in order to obtain favorable relative gains. The consequence, of 
course, is that since balancing of power is the default response of states in the 
international system (Waltz, 1979, p. 126) all other states will have to raise their own 
tariffs, thus curtailing cooperation and free trade. Similarly, negotiations over nontariff 
barriers to trade, such as safety regulations or environmental standards, among multiple 
states with diverse preference will never find an outcome that provides equal utility to all 
involved. As the game theoretical concept of “asymmetric coordination games” 
illustrates, once a state agrees to a certain solution, this solution becomes self-enforcing 
with the result that one state consistently does better than the others.3 Therefore, the 
stakes are extremely high and usually a bargain will not be struck, unless there is “an 





undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties [who] helps ease 
distributional tensions through […] side payments” (Mattli, 1999, p. 56). Another key 
element of hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon must be large enough and 
well-structured in order to provide for other states a position on which to converge. In 
some sense the hegemon must be a role model that other states will want to follow. 
Germany certainly plays this role within the EU (Crawford, 2015, p. 338; Mattli, 1999, p. 
104). It has the necessary size to provide a substantial position upon which to converge, 
but more importantly it also has institutions that have proven to be strong foundations for 
growth and prosperity, 
However, there have been ample critiques pointing out the possibility “that 
hegemony is a historical accident and is inherently unstable” (Stein, 1984, p. 384), 
because even Britain and the US, at the zenith of their power, only created “subsystemic” 
orders (Stein, 1984, p. 367). It is hard to foresee that any state will become so powerful 
and big that all states have an incentive to converge on its position. This leads to the 
question, how should one view hegemonic stability theory in light of this critique? A 
reasonable assessment is that “critiques of hegemonic stability theory have not destroyed 
its analytic foundations, they have advanced the debate about it in unquestionably 
important ways” (Gowa, 1994, p. 28). For example, Mattli (1999) has been able to 
validate hegemonic stability theory at the regional level, especially in the case of the EU. 
He demonstrates that Germany is exactly the “one stabilizer” (Kindelberger, 1973, p. 
305), the paymaster of Europe and the creator of a regional order. As Eichengreen (2000) 
points out, when it comes to monetary issues, Germany’s hegemonic position stems from 





source of liquidity, as well as being the monetary union’s key creditor state, a type of 
lender of last resort (Matthijs & Blyth, 2011; Paterson, 2011, p. 73). Germany is 
motivated, in large part, by the fact that it absorbs a disproportionate amount of the 
negative externalities that arise from the lack of a free trade order. Germany profits 
disproportionately from trade, especially within the EU, and trade is the lifeblood of its 
economy. In other words, Germany has a strong incentive to create and support a system 
that radically lowers transaction cost, such as a free trade area and a monetary union. 
These economic incentives constitute a necessary condition for Germany to assume the 
role of regional hegemon, but they do not represent a sufficient condition. As Mattli 
pointed out, for the coordination problem to be resolved there must be a leader “whose 
membership or cooperation in the group is perceived, by all or by a majority within the 
group, to be more important to the group than that of any other state” (Mattli, 1999, p. 
55). The following four paragraphs each give a different reason why Germany is the 
unrivaled leader of the EU in general and the Euro zone in particular. 
One way to determine if other Euro zone countries view Germany as an 
indispensable state is through simple inference. As Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, Germany 
is at the very heart of almost all trade relationships. The only exception is Ireland, whose 
economy is centered on the Anglo-American economies. The other states in the Euro 
zone would lose one of their most important trading partners and in many cases the most 
important one, if Germany were not part of the free trade and monetary zone. However, 
the indirect consequences of an EU without Germany would be even more profound. For 
example, as Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, Portugal receives 12.9% of all its imports 





almost 33% of Portugal’s imports. However, the close to 33% that Spain exports to 
Portugal is dependent on Spain’s imports from and exports to Germany. Without imports 
from Germany, Spanish manufacturers would have to pay higher prices for their 
production inputs. Similarly, Spanish companies would not achieve the same economies 
of scale without access to the German market, which absorbs 11% of Spanish exports. 
Both examples mean that Portugal would have to pay higher prices for the 33% of 
imports it obtains from Spain. Germany, on the other hand, would be much less affected 
if there were no trade relations with Portugal, because for Germany, Portugal is only one 
of its many trade partners. A similar analysis is true for other Euro zone states and their 
relationship to Germany. Just as Krasner (1976) predicted, Germany is the state with the 
political power in these relationships, because it incurs less cost if the relation is 
terminated. This is also evident in the way voting rights have been designated in the EU, 
ensuring that no state surpasses Germany in the way votes are allocated to states in the 
European Council or seats are allocated in the European Parliament.4 
Another way to determine if other states regard Germany’s leadership role as legitimate 
is revealed through the process of policy adaptation. “Adaptation to the policies of the 
leader makes not only political but also economic sense; that is, it is likely to be the least 
costly change within the group” (Mattli, 1999, p. 55). Possibly the most important 
policies, with regard to the monetary union, revolve around the creation of the European 
Central Bank (ECB). As Hayo and Hofmann (2006) point out, the Bundesbank has 
served as the template for the ECB, in other words, adaptation of the German model into 
the monetary framework confirms the Euro zones implicit acceptance of Germany’s 
                                                          
4 For more details see the decision making process in the European Parliament and the Council of the 





leading position. This type of logic allows one to interpret the British reluctance to join 
the Euro zone not so much as a decision based upon economic calculation, but rather as 
an expression of an underlying averseness to accepting German leadership. 
A third justification for Germany as the undisputed leader of the EU is its 
assumption of the “role of regional paymaster” (Mattli, 1999, p. 56), thereby resolving a 
lot of the tensions that arise from integration. The logic of a paymaster is that cooperation 
between actors is at times undesirable to one of them because another actor profits more 
from the cooperation. This problem can be overcome when the actor who profits more 
from the cooperation than the other actors uses some of the additional benefits and shares 
them with the other actors. The term paymaster has caught on in the media (“Germany: 
Europe’s Reluctant Paymaster,” 2009) and is well illustrated by the EU’s 2011 budget. 
One clearly recognizes that Germany bears the brunt of the cost associated with Europe’s 
integration. Its national contribution of €23.1 billion accounts for 19.3% of all national 
contributions to the EU’s budget. By comparison, the next three largest contributors are 
France, Italy, and Britain with €19.6 bn, 16.1 bn, and 13.8 bn respectively. This, 
however, does not necessarily justify why the term paymaster should be used exclusively 
for Germany, because based on the contributions alone one could identify two or even 
more paymasters. A close look at the net contributions to the EU allows for a different 
interpretation, as the gap in funding for the EU becomes much bigger. Germany’s net 
contribution is €9 bn, whereas France, Italy, and Britain only have a net contribution 
of €6.4 bn, €5.9 bn, and €5.6 bn, respectively, which equates to roughly 71%, 66%, and 
62% of Germany’s contribution.5 Germany unmistakably overpays. This is referred to 
                                                          
5 Member states primarily fund the EU in three ways. The most important source is a percentage of the 





within game theory as making side payments. Within the setting of the EU Germany is 
willing to overpay, because it ensures cooperation.6  
Finally, the ongoing Euro crisis is another great example of Germany’s 
importance for both the EU and the Euro area. The media is full of analysis and 
speculation regarding the Greek and Italian debt crises, the involvement of French banks, 
a possible breakup of the Euro zone etc., while at the same time Portugal, Ireland, and 
Spain desperately hope not to be dragged down by the current developments (“Europe's 
currency crisis,” 2011). While there are many actors involved, such as the affected nation 
states and their respective financial sectors, the ECB and ample other high profile EU 
institutions, in the end, everybody knows that the most important response to the problem 
will come out of Berlin, not Brussels, Paris, or any other capital (“The euro crisis,” 2011). 
It is not hard to see that the Euro crisis unmistakably reveals how power “works in the 
European Union, putting Germany in the driver’s seat at the expense of the European 
Commission and other member states. [… Merkel …] is now calling the shots, with 
France as a distinctly junior partner, setting out demands for economic policy 
coordination along German lines and using her leverage as Europe’s paymaster to gain 
consent” (Taylor, 2011, n.p.).  
Germany’s role as regional hegemon and its willingness to take on that 
responsibility are vital for the EU’s future. The fact that this is not a theoretical thought 
                                                          
each member state collects on behalf of the EU and the last one is based on import duties, for services and 
goods brought into the EU, which members amass for the EU. The two primary expenditures of the EU that 
go directly towards specific member states are agricultural support, based upon the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), and structural funds, which are sent according to the EU’s regional policy. Additionally 
Britain receives a sizable rebate, in form of a refund, due to the fact that the UK receives very little money 
from the CAP, due to its relatively small agriculture sector. The difference between the funds that a state 
pays to the EU and the money it receives back in form of the CAP and structural funds makes up a state’s 
net contribution.   





experiment was amply demonstrated by the words of Poland’s foreign minister Radek 
Sikorski (2011) when addressing his host in Berlin, the German foreign minister: “I will 
probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear 
German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity. You have become 
Europe’s indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead” (pp. 9-10; emphasis in the 
original). Therefore, it is legitimate to extrapolate Europe’s mid- to long-term position on 
globalization based upon its indispensable nation’s position, i.e., Germany’s position.   
Now the task remains to explain the selected time frame. This study covers a 23-
year time span, starting in 1990 and ending in 2013, and will examine all German general 
national elections within the time frame. The year 2013 is a natural cut-off point as it 
marks the year when Germany held its most recent elections at the national level. The 
choice to limit the sample to the year 1990, however, is certainly more contestable; why 
should the time span not be extended or even contracted? Every nation has historic 
experiences that are of such magnitude that they become defining events. They represent 
a break with the past and the beginning of a new and different future. These incidents can 
reshape identity, culture, and collective awareness and result in a post- and prehistoric 
event consciousness, like with the US and 9/11. Certainly, October 3rd 1990 is such a day 
for Germany, restoring its unity and sovereignty. Since this research project is interested 
in an in-depth analysis extending the scope to pre-1990 would increase the complexity to 
a significant degree, because one would have to go back at least between 1 and 2 decades 
so as to contrast pre-1990 developments with postunification ones. It is also not clear that 
expanding the time frame of this study would lead to better results, with regard to our 





others, for example Milner and Judkins (2004), Kriesi et al. (2006), Haupt (2010), and 
Camyar (2012) have already covered this time period. However, what has not been 
analyzed by any of these authors is the time period between 2003-2014, which is a unique 
period in post WWII history, because it covers the time frame when globalization started 
to significantly slow down for the first time since the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 
(“Special Report: The World Economy,” 2013). It is essential to address whether political 
parties in Germany changed the way they address globalization during this time period, 
but first, a brief look at the Federal Republic’s party system is necessary to provide a 
useful frame of context for the subsequent research.  
 
3.4 The German Party System 
Originally, Germany’s party system was very polarized between the Union of 
CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany/ Christian Social Union in Bavaria) 
and the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany). Both organizations had very 
pronounced political, programmatic, and cultural differences. The Union had a clear 
conservative and Catholic background, and propagated strong allegiance to the West, 
meaning Europe and the USA. The SPD viewed itself as the champion of democratic 
socialism, representing unions and workers. The party favored neutrality between the two 
superpowers and vehemently objected to Germany’s integration into NATO (Alemann, 
2015). In other words, the two major German parties used to have very tight links to 
specific social groups, and this is also true for the smaller FDP (Free Democratic Party) 
which was particularly attractive to entrepreneurs and the financially better off (Alemann, 





at which point German parties tried to change their profiles in order to be more attractive 
to a wider swathe of the population. The most important change was the SPD’s rejection 
of Marxism and the acceptance of the social market economy as Germany’s economic 
foundation (Scarrow, 2002, p. 81). During this same time another interesting 
development took place in terms of the makeup of the Bundestag. A plurality of political 
parties existed in parliament after the 1949 election, with 10 parties sending delegates to 
the Bundestag. This diversity was quickly replaced through an effort to consolidate the 
number of parties in the1950s, by changing the electoral law in order to introduce a 
threshold.  Parties that could not muster at least 5% of the popular vote would not be 
granted any seats in the Bundestag. The goal behind the change was to limit the 
fragmentation of the legislature and to avoid giving power to small extremist parties 
(Elff, 2012, p. 55). As a result, the number of parties in parliament shrunk to only three 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The CDU/CSU and SPD took turns governing with the 
help of the FDP, who played the role of kingmaker by forming a coalition with the 
strongest party, thus achieving a majority in parliament.  
Germany’s political parties are traditionally the gate keepers with respect to 
political mobilization and interest formation. This quasimonopoly was only once 
seriously challenged in the mid-1970s and 1980s, when concerned citizens felt that the 
established parties were unable to articulate and respond to the burgeoning worries of 
environmental destruction and an increasing nuclear arms race. Initiatives formed by 
citizen were, for the first time, able to circumscribe parties' ability to dictate the political 
agenda. While some have seen this development as a sign of party failure, in the long run 





96). The activism during this period led to one important lasting change in the party 
system, which is the formation of the Green party. Its political relevance was established 
when the party was able to clear the 5% threshold in the 1983 election, a feat the party 
has been able to replicate in every subsequent election. 
In the Soviet occupation zone the political process was much simpler. Under 
direction from Moscow social democrats and communists were forced to join and form a 
new party: the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands or simply SED). The purpose of the party was to organize social and 
political life and to ensure that the German Democratic Republic follows Soviet 
leadership. Smaller parties existed in East Germany too, but their relevance was 
negligible, due to the fact that election outcomes were always predetermined by the SED. 
Politics in East Germany was dominated by this party, but the party’s power didn’t stop 
there, as it controlled many aspects of life. It was in charge of the unions, and it regulated 
all youth programs, sports, and all other forms of social event or organization. The party 
also significantly restricted freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and repressed any 
form of civil society. Only religious organizations had some form of autonomy, but they 
too were largely marginalized due to the state’s espousal of atheism (Alemann, 2015). 
German reunification in 1990 was a pivotal moment for Germany and had profound 
consequences for Germans socially, economically, politically, and culturally, but when it 
comes to Germany’s party system the consequences were surprisingly small by 
comparison. Instead of two parties on the right and two parties on the left there was now 
a third party on the left. The former communist party that had ruled East Germany for 





office in 1990 (Elff, 2012, p. 52). In general the months before formal unification were 
used by the western parties “to effectively colonize the new and newly democratized 
parties in the east, a process which culminated in formal mergers between eastern and 
western parties by the end of 1990,” just in time for the federal election that year 
(Scarrow, 2002, p. 80). 
Despite the process of unifying the country, party politics seem quite constant as a 
whole. Change prior to reunification has been very measured and even the formation of 
the Green party and their electoral success resulted, for a long time, only in a new 
distribution of seats in the Bundestag. 1998 saw a new government constellation take 
shape when the Greens joined the government of Gerhard Schöder. Unified Germany 
also did not produce any significant changes other than adding the former East German 
communist party to the pool represented in the legislature. The PDS caused a shift at the 
federal level in the two plus two power left-right split to which Germans had become 
accustomed (Elff, 2012, p. 69). At the beginning of the new century Germany’s economy 
was struggling and unemployment was affecting more than 10% of the labor market. This 
downward trend had a negative impact on the acceptance of the two biggest parties, 
especially the, at the time governing, SPD which suffered a significant lack of support. 
This lack manifested itself at the national level in 2005, when both large parties’ electoral 
losses disqualified either of them to govern with one of the smaller parties. The only 
option left, other than to form a coalition with more than two parties which has not 
happened in Germany since the 1950s, was to form a Grand Coalition under the 
leadership of the CDU/CSU with the SPD as the junior partner. In 2013 Angela Merkel 





government coalition. It will be interesting to see if one of the two major parties will be 
able to increase its support to the point that they can govern again with a smaller party. 
Even though Germany’s party system has been very stable since 1949 this does 
not guarantee that its future will be as calm and durable. Populist parties, especially on 
the right side of the political spectrum, receive support and voting for these parties is a 
form of registering protest with the five dominant political parties. While such protest 
parties receive bursts of support especially at the local level, the only party that has been 
able to move from protest party to being represented in the Bundestag is the Greens in the 
1980s. The Left party did join the other four parties in 1990, but instead of being a protest 
party, it can build on historically grown support due to the fact that it controlled the 
political landscape for close to 50 years in former East Germany. The bigger challenge 
for Germany’s five major parties is a more general disenchantment with politics and 
criticism regarding the way that parties operate and how they are structured. One way 
that this disapproval expresses itself is through decreasing party membership and the lack 
of young people who are engaged in political parties these days. Nevertheless, the 
consistent creation of new political parties demonstrates that the concept of relying on 
organized parties to express political will and to represent particular positions is alive and 
well in Germany (Alemann, 2015). 
It is important to note that the German party system consists of more than five 
parties. There is actually a great number of parties that participate in elections to the 
Bundestag, but only a handful of them are able to secure seats in parliament, for reasons 
outlined above. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, there have been between 22 and 33 parties 





obtain a seat in parliament number, at a maximum, five. This paper only focuses on (and 
considers meaningful) the five parties that were able to secure seats in parliament since 
1990. This is justified by these parties’ ability to convince at least a certain minimum of 
voters, of their merit. These parties have also been consistently involved in the political 
debate and receive regular attention in the media where basic party positions are 
examined. Other parties, take for example “The Violets – For Spiritual Politics”7 or the 
Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany8 are rather out of the ordinary and most voters will be 
very unfamiliar with their specific party programs, if not even completely unaware of 
their existence. 
To summarize, this chapter illustrates why party election programs are a good 
measure to assess the overall political disposition towards globalization and other key 
policy areas that have an effect on globalization. This chapter also highlights other more 
indirect factors that parties might address in their election campaigns and it identifies the 
significant long term effects that these factors may have on globalization. It also provides 
an overview of Germany’s party system and a theoretical justification for why it makes 
sense to select Germany for this study and why the 1990-2013 election programs of the 
five major parties are a sensible subset of all possible elections and parties. The following 
chapter, Chapter 4, will outline the methodology that is applied throughout this research. 
 
  
                                                          
7 For more details see http://die-violetten.de/  











Do parties address the 
globalization dilemma? Do 
parties propose policies 




Increased support for globalization, 
because voter feel increased 
protection.  
 
No Decreased support for globalization 
due to a feeling of insecurity. 
 
 
Are these policies geared 
towards the majority of 
people or are they focused 
on special interest groups?  
Special Effect can be broad or affect only 
special interest groups depending on 
whether or not the message is geared 
towards the population as a whole or 
only towards a subset. 
 
Theoretical foundation: Rudra (2002), Rodrik (1997), and Cameron (1978) 




Do parties address the 
issue of regulatory 
harmonization and contract 
enforcement? 
Yes Voters get a better understanding of 
the potential consequences of 
globalization. This creates certainty 
and increases support.9 
 
No Voters are uncertain as to what the 
consequences of increased economic 
liberalization are. This decreases 
support for globalization.  
 




                                                          
9 A clearly defined unpopular policy can of course generate strong opposition, but overall the idea here is 
that uncertainty about the consequences of any process will generally create opposition. Uncertainty does 









Do parties communicate 
their goals with respect to 
international agreements 
and do they offer voters 





Voters fell involved and 
governments can more easily 
implement international agreements. 
No Voters are not involved and have no 
way of expressing their opinion via a 
vote. Increases the likelihood of 
opposition to international 
agreements and potentially affects 
their implementation adversely. 
 
Theoretical foundation: Martin (2000) and Hays (2009) 




Do political parties try to 
use European identity to 
overcome resistance to 
Economic integration? 
Yes Voters’ European identity is used to 
overcome resistance to Economic 
integration. 
 
No Voters might not see economic 
integration with in Europe as 
desirable and oppose further forms 
of liberalization or advocate for 
increased economic closure. 
 
In which way do parties 
address the issue and does 
their approach seem likely 
to increase or decrease 
Germans feeling of 
belonging to a wider 
European collective? 
 
Special Parties could be referring to the 
EU/Europe with negative images, 
which will lead to less European 
integration and  decrease acceptance 
to globalization 














Import Partners for the Eurozone’s Eleven Largest Economies (Excluding Germany) 
 
 




















France Germany 19.5 Belgium 10.7 Italy 7.7 
Italy Germany 15.4 France 8.7 China 7.7 
Spain Germany 14.4 France 11.7 China 7.1 
Netherlands Germany 14.7 China 14.5 Belgium 8.2 
Belgium Netherlands 16.7 Germany 12.7 France 9.6 
Austria Germany 41.5 Italy 6.3 Switzerland 6 
Greece Germany 10.7 Italy 8.4 Russia 7.9 
Portugal Spain 32.9 Germany 12.9 France 7.4 
Finland Germany 17 Sweden 16 Russia 11 
Ireland UK 32.5 USA 14 France 10.2 
Slovakia Germany 19.4 Czech Rep. 17.4 Austria 9.1 













Export Partners for the Eurozone’s Eleven Largest Economies (Excluding Germany) 
 
 




















France Germany 15.9 Spain 7.3 USA 7.2 
Italy Germany 12.3 France 10.3 USA 8.7 
Spain France 15.7 Germany 11 Italy 7.4 
Netherlands Germany 24.5 Belgium 11.1 UK 9.3 
Belgium Germany 16.9 France 15.5 Netherlands 11.4 
Austria Germany 29.4 USA 6.4 Italy 6.1 
Greece Italy 11.2 Germany 7.3 Turkey 6.6 
Portugal Spain 25 France 12.1 Germany 11.8 
Finland Germany 13.9 Sweden 10.1 USA 7 
Ireland USA 23.7 UK 13.8 Belgium 13.2 
Slovakia Germany 22.7 Czech Rep. 12.5 Poland 8.5 










Figure 3.4 Comparison between parties that participate in Germany's federal elections 































“Knowledge is understood to be the best understanding that we have been able to 
produce thus far, not a statement of what is ultimately real” (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 2). 
With regard to the link between globalization and political parties Chapter 3 already 
highlighted a lot of the knowledge that has been attained within the field of political 
science over the last few decades. One thing that sticks out within this literature is its 
almost exclusive reliance on large-N statistical cross-country analysis. The question one 
should ask in this situation is: Could our understanding be improved by applying a more 
diverse methodology when it comes to studying the effects of globalization on national 
politics? 
This research is built on the assumption that a multiple method approach is in fact 
advantageous for increasing understanding of an issue in general and for the complex 
issue of globalization and how it relates to party politics in particular. This work utilizes  
a case study methodology that employs process tracing to complement the existing large- 
N statistical cross county analyses that have already been done. Certainly, the analysis 
over the remainder of this work will have to prove this assertion, that there is an added 
benefit to drawing on multiple methods, but first this chapter will discuss the benefits of 




4.1 Case Studies 
The term case study here is understood as “an intensive study of a single unit for 
the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). For 
the purpose of this research the single unit is the Federal Republic of Germany since its 
reunification. Studying how domestic political alliances in Germany are affected by 
international trade will allow for a better grasp of how Rogowski’s theoretical concepts 
apply in the real world. This knowledge can ultimately be used to generate further 
research and subsequently increase understanding of how domestic alliances are impacted 
by globalization in other developed economies.  
Before elucidating the particular type of case study that will be carried out in this 
study, it will be helpful to demonstrate the merits of pursuing a case study, especially 
since this is not the predominant approach within the field of political science (see 
Schwartz-Shea, 2003). What are the advantages of pursuing a case study for this research 
project in the field of international political economy over alternative methods like 
quantitative research or formal modeling? 
Case studies are “able to identify plausible causal variables, a task essential to 
theory construction and testing. […] Indeed, analytic theory cannot do without case 
studies. Because they are simultaneously sensitive to data and theory, case studies are 
more useful for these purposes than any other methodological tool” (Achen & Snidal, 
1989, pp. 167-168). George and Bennett (2005) state that case studies have an advantage 
over statistical methods due to “their ability to serve the heuristic purpose of inductively 
identifying additional variables and generating hypothesis” (p. 45). Case studies are also 
excellent at developing typological theories, meaning theories that illustrate how different 
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arrangements of independent variables can lead to various types and levels of dependent 
variables. Such typological theories instead of looking at variables in isolation will 
generally emphasize the interaction between different variables (see George & Bennett, 
2005, p. 46). Likewise Odell (2001) argues in favor of case studies over quantitative 
studies when it comes to their ability to introduce novel concepts, enable classifications, 
generate hypotheses, and for producing new persuasive and substantive theories. The 
reason for this superiority stems form case studies’ “[m]ore comprehensive and more 
detailed contact with concrete instances of the events and behavior about which we wish 
to generalize” (Odell, 2001, p. 169). 
This closeness generally leads to a very detailed and rich analysis, which makes 
case studies an outstanding method for constructing contextualized explanations of 
individual instances (Kacowicz, 2004, p. 120). While constructing a specific historical 
explanation is not the focus of this research, a detailed explanation of the manner in 
which political parties within Germany compete for votes is an important part of the 
puzzle. Such contextualized historical explanations have a distinct advantage, because as 
Odell (2001, p. 170) points out, statistical methods tend to prefer and emphasize structure 
over process. One should not detract from the importance of structures, but statistical 
methods are usually not adequate at explaining variation that occurs within a structure. 
Change within structures is best analyzed by looking at the processes of how that change 
came about. The best tool for doing this is by means of a case study. It is informative to 
see the extent to which and how the process of competing for votes in Germany’s federal 
elections has changed with increased globalization and what this change reveals about the 
political elites’ views on globalization. 
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Certainly case studies are no panacea and like every other approach they have 
their shortcomings. Overall, case studies sacrifice parsimony and wide-ranging 
applicability in order to gain well-defined subcategories with a high level of detail. Some 
do criticize that case studies tend to run contrary to Occam's razor and therefore are 
inferior due to their lack of elegance and persuasiveness. The logic is that parsimonious 
theories are superior, because of their falsifiability criterion. Theories with a limited 
number of assumptions are easier to test and have a broader reach, since they can be 
applied to more cases (see Popper, 2002). One way to counter this notion, that parsimony 
is per se superior to more complexity in the social sciences, is to point out the inherent 
danger of reducing social phenomena to the fewest possible number of assumptions, also 
known as oversimplification (Martin, 2002, p. 32). King, Keohane, and Verba assert that 
parsimony is an assumption about the make-up of the world, which implies that it is 
simple. “In the social sciences, some forcefully defend parsimony […], but we believe it 
is only occasionally appropriate. Given the precise definition of parsimony as an 
assumption about the world, we should never insist on parsimony as a general principle 
of designing theories” (King et al., 1994, p. 20). In other words parsimony is only useful 
when we can assume that the world we are trying to observe is simple, which is probably 
not the case when it comes to political processes that affect economic growth, income 
equality, employment, etc. on a global scale. 
Even when methodologists agree that parsimony is not necessarily a great guiding 
principle in the social sciences, they nevertheless tend to view the contributions to theory 
made by research designed around a single case as quite limited (King et al., 1994). Not 
to dismiss this critique, which seems intuitive, there is a case for depth over breadth. 
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Bennet (2004) points out that some of the most influential work in political science, 
which has demonstrated the limitations or flaws of accepted theories, has been based 
upon single case studies (see also Rogowski, 1995). For example a case study that has 
been very influential over the years in the field of political economy is Schattschneider’s 
(1935) work Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. An even more famous and far reaching 
case study is Kindleberger’s (1973) work which illustrates that stability is only achieved 
if there is a stabilizer. His case study has become the fundamental building block of 
hegemonic stability theory as outlined in Chapter 3.   
Single case studies can be quite influential and offer new insights. Furthermore, 
one should keep in mind that the goal of this research is not to weigh the relative 
importance of individual variables. Questions of relative importance are best addressed 
by statistical analysis.  “[C]ase studies remain much stronger at assessing whether and 
how a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing how much it mattered” (George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 25). Accordingly, the findings of this research are not intended to 
generate universally applicable inferences and rank them based upon their relevance. 
Instead the goal is to help with what case studies are best at; refining concepts, 
identifying potentially missing relevant variables, and testing causal mechanisms. 
Before the actual case study can begin one more critique needs to be addressed, 
because it calls into question whether or not case studies can meet the most basic 
principles of scientific research: objectivity and comprehensiveness. Every researcher 
must resist the natural tendency to focus on evidence that substantiates their claims while 
at the same time overlooking or downplaying observations that fail to corroborate their 
assumptions. Often the claim is that systematic statistical analysis with its standardization 
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is the best solution for this dilemma. Defining explicit criteria for coding procedures 
combined with statistical techniques make theory testing and the formulation of 
inferences easy (Braumoeller & Sartori, 1999, p. 141). The logic is that research that does 
not apply rigorous statistical analysis is inherently in danger of being subjective. 
While the warning is pertinent one needs to keep in mind that any form of 
categorization is always subjective. There are very few if any natural categories: Even 
seemingly obvious categories such as gender, race, and nationality are constructed. The 
same is true of any statistical research, the way information is coded, divided, 
categorized, and selected is always subjective (see Martin, 2002). Additionally, any 
conclusion reached on the basis of statistical inquiry is always “compromised to the 
degree that the variables as measured fall short of reflecting the respective theoretical 
constructs perfectly, and to the degree that the analysis has omitted variables that could 
not be measured” (van Evera, 1997, p. 79). 
In other words subjectivity is an issue for any kind of research and not just for 
case studies. It is questionable if there is any research in the social sciences that is 
objective in the sense of being free from any form of personal biases. This is why 
objectivity to scientists simply means an “agreement on the results of a given 
observation” (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 36). This type of agreement is often easier to 
achieve for statistical work with its specific data sets, categories, coding, etc. A human 
content analysis by contrast can suffer from the disadvantage that “the number of 
inferences to be drawn from a text can be tantamount to the number of readers” (George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 236). This disadvantage can be overcome by providing a detailed 
explanation as to how the case study is conducted, allowing others to understand the 
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process that led to the findings of this research to allow them to reproduce its results, at 
least to a significant extent.  
 
4.2 Explanation for how Key Terms Are Counted 
Chapters 5 through 9 each summarize seven election programs of a specific party 
and analyze the programs with regard to globalization. The analysis in these five chapters 
follows a standardized pattern. First, there is a brief historic overview for each party, this 
will allow for a better understanding as to where the party comes from, where it falls 
within Germany’s political spectrum, what the party’s core policy goals are, and who the 
party’s core constituents are. The first analytical step is the counting of key terms 
throughout the party’s seven election programs from 1990 through 2013. The idea is to 
look for key references that are linked to globalization and to see how often a party uses 
these terms and in what context the terms are used. The following few paragraphs serve 
as an explanation as to how this counting is done. References regarding globalization are 
clustered according to key terms and their normative implication. The relevant terms are: 
globalization, export, import, trade, and free trade. The first three of these five terms have 
very straightforward equivalents in German: Globalisierung, Export, and Import. The 
term trade is more complicated in German. The noun trade is simply Handel, but the verb 
to trade is handeln in German, which depending on the context can refer to trading or to 
taking action. The number referenced in this analysis only counts those instances that 
explicitly refer to trade, and omits those that refer to taking action. The term free trade 
has a very literal translation in German with the identical meaning as it would have in 
English, which is Freihandel. The reason for these five terms is that they best capture the 
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economic side of globalization within election campaigns as they represent very 
commonly used and known terms by Germany’s public. Additionally, selecting five 
specific terms to address in election campaigns makes it also easier to compare and 
contrast the programs of all five parties. It is necessary to note here that the counting of 
references is not so much about individual references as it is about the dispersion of 
references throughout election programs. Therefore, multiple references in one paragraph 
are only counted as one. The logic is that one can distinguish between parties that 
mention globalization 10 times in different paragraphs of an election program and those 
that mention it 10 times in one paragraph. Ten dispersed references imply a much higher 
salience then highly concentrated ones. This research claims that globalization is an 
important issue that should be linked to multiple policy fields and not be treated as 
singular field by itself, which is why in this analysis, references are counted by 
paragraphs and not individually. 
The term normative implication refers, in this context, to what the specific term 
implies. Every globalization term is placed into one of five categories based upon what it 
is saying or implying. The categories are Risk/Danger, Unjust, Neutral, Positive 
Outcomes, and Opportunities. This means that every reference in any of the seven 
analyzed election programs is placed in one of those five categories. For example, a 
globalization reference that is mentioned in a context which claims that globalization 
creates a lot of uncertainty for the domestic job market is counted in the Risk/Danger 
category. The Unjust category captures references which assert that globalization 
increases income disparities or leads to exploitation of weaker or less developed 
economies, like the Greens' (1998, p. 133) statement that globalization aggravates 
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unequal development between regions. Any reference that links one of the five key terms 
to a favorable consequence is placed in the Positive Outcomes category. A great example 
would be the CDU’s statement in 2013 that Germany’s exports guarantee millions of 
well-paid domestic jobs (CDU, 2013, p. 7). It also includes the SPD’s claim that 
Germany is a strong export nation and ought to remain one (SPD, 2009, p. 10). In the 
second example, exports are mentioned in a positive context but it does not imply a 
positive cause and effect relationship as the first example does. This serves as an 
important reminder that this exercise is only about counting references; it does not say 
anything about the quality of the individual references. The category Opportunities is for 
references that refer to a potentially beneficial future development, like the statement that 
the creation of a free trade zone is viewed by the CDU as a way to prevent trade disputes 
(CDU, 2002, p. 68). This type of analysis is included in each party’s chapter as a means 
to give an overview of how Germany’s major parties position themselves on 
globalization and related economic issues.  
This exercise of counting references for each party and assigning them to one of 
the five categories will provide a good overview on how parties position themselves on 
the issue of globalization, but in and of itself it is insufficient to truly understand a party’s 
position on globalization. This is why each party analysis will also include a summary of 
each election program that was published during the covered 23-year time period of this 
research. This makes it possible to understand a party’s overall position on various social, 
economic, environmental, demographic, or cultural issues, for example. Through this 
exercise the individual globalization statements can be better placed and understood 
within a party’s broader context.  
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To summarize, using a case study as a systematic method for examining party 
platforms with regard to globalization constitutes a novel approach. It is important to 
keep in mind that the point here is not to identify the one best research method and then 
closely pursue. Instead, one needs to keep in mind that both statistics and case studies 
have weaknesses that can be offset by the other method (van Evera, 1997, p. 83). The 
reason for building this research on a case study is that the literature that examines the 
effects of globalization on domestic politics and institutions relies almost exclusively on 
statistical cross country analysis of large- N samples, for which the Comparative 
Manifestos Project provides a majority of the data. The consequence is that the field as a 
whole misses out on the opportunity to “validate knowledge” which is most readily 
achieved when different methodologies are viewed as complementing, rather than 
trumping, one another (Singleton & Straits, 2010, p. 13). The goal is to gain additional 
insights by applying a different approach 
Before progressing to the actual analysis it is important to address three additional 
issues. One is the creation of a yard stick against which to measure party election 
programs in terms of how rational actors ought to deal with the topic of globalization 
given Germany’s particular economy and the relevance of trade. The second issue that 
requires further elaboration is to provide more background on the role of election 
programs for the Federal Republic and what the program creation process looks like. The 
final issue is to determine if parties should be seen as strategic actors that seek to 
maximize votes or if they are primarily policy focused with an emphasis on achieving 
programmatic consistency. The following sections will address each one of these points 
in detail before moving on to the party program analysis. 
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4.3 Defining a Yardstick 
How parties present the issue of globalization to voters in an election program 
certainly depends on various factors, many of which vary substantially from party to 
party. Chapters 5 through 9 provide details on the parties’ general positions, their historic 
development, core values, who their primary supporters are, and so on. Nevertheless, 
based upon Germany’s particular economy there are a few things that one should be able 
to expect, if parties deal with globalization in a rational and constructive manner. 
Certainly, parties do not present a unified view on the matter and neither should they, but 
it is reasonable to form some kind of expectation as to how the issue is addressed. The 
same logic is true of other topics, for example when it comes to the guiding principle for 
Germany’s economy, here all parties support and reaffirm the concept of the social 
market economy. They all oppose both pure capitalism and Marxism as a framework for 
the economy. Instead all parties praise its achievements and identify the social market 
economy as a key building block for Germany’s prosperity and stability. Parties certainly 
do fight over the precise meaning of what it means to be a social market economy or 
whether Germany’s current policies are in harmony with this particular type of economy, 
but there is a basic consensus regarding its general benefit. Additionally a specific party’s 
particular views on the social market economy can be reasonably well extrapolated from 
its general position within the political left-right spectrum. Similarly, one should be able 
to expect German parties to agree on a few key points when it comes to globalization and 
to communicate these to voters, because Germany’s economy is relatively wealthy and 
strong while at the same time relying disproportionately on trade, for an economy of its 
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size.1 
Therefore, this study asserts that it is reasonable to expect German parties to 
address globalization and trade as important elements in their election campaigns. 
Undoubtedly, parties will look at the issue in different ways and emphasize diverse 
aspects of globalization. They will also come to different conclusions regarding its utility, 
depending on their specific point of view, but the expectation is that the issue is 
addressed in relation to various policy fields and not just in the context of foreign policy. 
Additionally, this research presupposes that globalization should be dealt with in a 
constructive manner clearly outlining its benefits and downsides dependent on each 
party’s specific values and general policy preferences. A discourse by the parties that is 
one-sided in the way it deals with globalization, by presenting globalization either as a 
scourge or panacea, has to be considered populist. Instead, parties should outline policies 
that are purposefully designed to maximize the benefits from globalization and to ensure 
its universal reach, without neglecting to account for its environmental, cultural, and 
social impact.   
4.4 The Election Program Formation Process 
In order to explain the process that it takes to write an election program in 
Germany it is important to understand the central role that political parties have when it 
comes the formation of the political will, a role that is legitimized by Germany’s 
constitution (see Grundgesetz Article 21). How German parties fulfil this role is specified 
1 Examples of Germany’s very strong involvement in the international economy are for example its foreign 
trade to GDP ratio, defined as export ratio plus import ratio, which amounted to 86% in 2015. Similarly, its 
position within Europe is unparalleled as the continent’s major trading country (see Sections 3.4 and 6.4 for 
more detail). 
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in the 1967 Law on Parties (German: Parteiengesetz). One element of this law, which is 
highly relevant for this research, is the provision that all political parties must outline 
their goals in written political programs (see Parteiengesetz Article 6, Section 1). The law 
also specifies a requirement that all such programs must be submitted to the Federal 
Election Chair prior to an election (see Parteiengesetz Article 6, Section 3). This means 
that written election programs are not a voluntary tool of parties for communicating with 
the electorate, but the fulfillment of a legal requirement. Naturally, parties attempt to use 
this legal stipulation as a means to persuade voters and it is clearly written with voters in 
mind, but it is also a means of meeting a legal requirement. This guarantees that all 
parties publish a program prior to an election, which makes them a great tool for 
scientific research, because it creates consistency which is important for tracing 
developments over time and for comparing different periods with one another.  
This is one reason why there is ample scientific analysis that examines the content 
of election programs and its implications,2 but by contrast there has been very little 
exploration regarding the process of how election programs are formulated and written. 
In general “it is surprising that only scant attention has hitherto been devoted to the 
intraparty practice of writing manifestos” (Dolezal et al., 2012, p. 870). A view that is 
shared by Däubler (2013, p. 338) and Korte and Schoofs (2013, p. 3) asserts that election 
research has addressed the process of how election programs are created in a rudimentary 
fashion at best. In other words lots of attention has been paid to the content of election 
2 The whole idea of the Manifesto Project is to allow the scientific community to carry out content analysis 
of parties’ electoral manifestos. The project’s data set covers over 1000 parties in more than 50 countries 
since the end of the Second World War. This data set is widely used by researchers who examine election 
programs, as previously pointed out under Section 3.2. For details see 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents/information. 
94 
programs, but the process of writing an election program remains rather vague. The 
literature on German election manifesto formation does, however, outline some common 
practices. The whole process is initiated with the party leadership, who will begin with 
the development of a program up to 2 years prior to an election, by forming an election 
program commission. This body’s responsibility is to organize the program formation 
process by dividing the program into subfields and to organize the participation of the 
general party membership in the process (Däubler, 2013, pp. 342-343). 
The details of how parties allow their members to engage in the program 
formulation process differs somewhat from party to party, but there is an overall shared 
pattern. All parties combine various avenues for participating in the program formation 
process. In order to give the whole process structure, the program is subdivided into 
several policy fields which are then addressed by individual work groups. These groups 
hold various sessions where they debate their specific policy field and develop 
programmatic suggestions. Oftentimes, prominent party functionaries will be assigned to 
help guide these panels. These discussions are also used to allow the general membership 
to discuss policy ideas with party subject matter experts (Korte & Schoofs, 2013, pp. 4-
5). 
All parties allow their members to submit program suggestions at their local party 
office, which are then submitted to each party’s respective federal office in Berlin and the 
respective work groups. Parties also use special events like workshops or conventions 
that are either centrally organized by the party’s federal office or at the state or even 
regional level. The parties differ a little bit in how much they consolidate these events, 
with the CDU and SPD usually holding more centralized conferences whereas the other 
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parties, especially the Greens, tend to focus on regional events that allow for wider 
participation (Korte & Schoofs, 2013, pp. 4-5). In recent years parties have also begun to 
use the internet to allow party members and even the general public to provide feedback 
on specific policies or to discuss topics in a more open and general manner online (Korte 
and Schoofs, 2013, p. 6). The idea is to gather input and ideas from a wide audience and 
to identify a broad consensus within the party. Each work group is tasked with bundling 
the information and writing a draft chapter for the election program for their particular 
policy area. 
The next step in writing a program takes place under the leadership of the election 
commission and involves a handful of people at best. The task of this small circle is to 
revise the individual sections and to combine them into a complete draft program. This 
draft will then be reviewed, revised and approved by the party leadership (Däubler, 2006, 
p. 343). Party elites and the candidates for a seat in parliament then discuss the draft
program and gather feedback. Depending on the party this can also mean going back to a 
candidate’s respective constituency and debating the party program at the local level. 
Feedback is subsequently collected by the party’s election commission and incorporated 
into the party program. Once completed, the party executive has one more chance to 
tweak the program before the program is presented for ratification at a special party 
convention (Däubler, 2006, p. 343). The program can still be amended as requested by 
the ratifying body. It is rare that passages are deleted from the program at this stage. Once 
the program is accepted by the general party body at the party convention the party 
begins to publish and to disseminate the work. This happens via handing out printed 
copies of the program in public places, making them available in party offices, or by 
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making the material available online on the parties’ respective websites. In recent years, 
making the program available online on the parties’ various websites has become 
increasingly popular and one can expect that in the future online publications will 
increasingly replace hard copy programs. 
The step of presenting the election program for approval to the general 
membership is actually a means of fulfilling the legal requirement, which states that a 
party’s election programs must be ratified at a party convention (Parteiengesetz Article 9, 
Section 3). The election program is thus much more than a strategic paper that was 
written by the party elite to maximize votes. The party certainly has voters in mind, but it 
is much more than that. It constitutes the programmatic roadmap of an entire party for the 
next legislative period. It is important to note in this context that programs are not 
devised every 4 years from the ground up, instead they are largely developed by building 
on the existing material of previous elections (Däubler, 2006, p. 340). This means that 
German election programs present a lot of continuity from one election to the next. 
However, this continuity does not represent a dogmatic attachment to the concepts and 
values of previous election programs. A good example of a strong and unprecedented 
policy reversal from one election program to the next is the CDU’s position on 
abandoning nuclear energy by 2020 (CDU, 2013, p. 30) even though the party had, in 
previous elections, always reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear energy as an important 
element of Germany’s energy mix to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Significant policy 
changes within parties are possible, but quite rare. One can speculate that the 2013 
program would not have included a 180° change without the extraordinary circumstances 
of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011. The reason that election programs are 
97 
largely based upon previous manifests is that parties highly value consistency across 
programs, which means that programmatic considerations are very important in the 
program development process and purely vote maximizing calculations are limited 
(Däubler, 2006, p. 355). One might still contend that even if parties are largely consistent 
in their programs there are still plenty of opportunities to slip in populist statements on 
less important issues that are only of momentary importance. Section 3.1 looks at this 
issue and summarizes a body of research that shows that parties largely do try to 
implement campaign pledges. Mansergh and Thomson (2007) summarized it best when 
they state that “[t]here is little truth to the argument that pledges are cheap, in the sense 
that they are confined to peripheral policy areas or to specific issues that are of little 
consequence. Parties generally make the most pledges on the policy themes they 
emphasize most” (pp. 322-323). 
It is also important to note that German election programs are largely influenced 
by a historic process and much less by professional campaigning. While parties in 
Germany have started to use outside consultants to help with running election campaigns 
and to use a more top down approach, such developments are still relatively new and are 
fledgling at best, compared to the level of professionalism that campaigns present in the 
United States when running for office at the federal level (Alemann, 2015). This means 
that the manner in which election programs are written in Germany allow for limited 
opportunity of party elites and candidates to leave “an unequivocal personal mark on 
them” (Elf, 2012, p. 68). The picture looks different for smaller populist parties, but they 
have not been able to clear the 5% electoral threshold at the federal level and have thus 
not be able to wield power within the legislature. The five centrist parties examined by 
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this study largely forgo populist discourse, because the risk of losing voters at the center 
is perceived to be much higher than the risk of losing voters to left-wing or right-wing 
fringe parties (Elf, 2012, p. 69). 
4.5 Two-Level Games and Honest Broker 
Another important issue in this context is to determine whether or not parties are 
strategic actors that focus on vote maximization or if they are primarily concerned with 
policy goals and programmatic consistency. This determination has a direct bearing on 
the research conducted by this study and therefore requires additional attention. The 
validity of this case study is compromised if parties create election programs primarily as 
vote-maximizing tools, because then it largely reflects a party’s best effort to differentiate 
itself from other parties and to attract a maximum amount of votes by presenting popular 
positions. It is worth remembering the debate in Section 3.1 in this context, which 
demonstrates that parties generally do not make campaign promises that they do not 
intend to keep. That discussion does not to need to be repeated, as summary statement on 
that issue will suffice here: “[w]ith respect to the program-to-policy linkage, there is 
generally more congruence between the election programs of prospective government 
parties and subsequent government policies than conventional wisdom would expect” 
(Mansergh & Thomson, 2007, p. 324). In other words, parties are not strategic actors in 
the sense that they focus on attracting voters by making empty campaign promises in 
their election programs; such behavior has negative long-term effects as it undermines 
party credibility.  Strategic actions of political parties do not have to be so blatant, as 
Klingemann and Volkens (1997) demonstrate. They examine party behavior by defining 
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two archetypes of parties, the program orientated and the competition oriented party. The 
program orientated party focuses on the programmatic integrity of its programs while the 
competition emphasizing party aims to maximize votes. Subsequently programs will 
either reflect more actual values and policies that are coherent with a party’s past 
programs and historic heritage or it will be more or less a manifestation of a precisely 
engineered vote-maximizing tool. They use these two ideal types to guide their analysis 
of German election programs that spans close to 5 decades. One of their conclusions is 
that German parties have a tendency to emphasize programmatic consistency over party 
competition calculations (Klingemann & Volkens, 1997, p. 532). They also assert that 
German party politics demonstrate a relatively low level of polarization compared to 
other Western political systems (Klingemann & Volkens, 1997, p. 535). This is an 
assertion that is corroborated in the preceding Section 4.3, which illustrates the distinct 
preference of German parties to emphasize programmatic consistency across elections in 
their campaign program writing process. Besides the empirical evidence that German 
parties are more concerned with programmatic consistency as opposed to strategic vote 
maximizing calculations, there is another reason that further justifies looking at election 
programs as largely genuine programmatic expressions of a party in the context of 
globalization.  
When it comes to examining national parties and the issue of globalization, 
parties need to not only take domestic considerations into account, but also international 
ones. The term that is used in this regard is that of two-level games, because actors need 
to combine the national level with the international one. This creates additional demands 
and constraints on actors, because they must devise policies that align with both levels 
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(Putnam, 1988). In terms of party election programs, this means that all parties, whose 
goal it is to form a governing coalition, must devise policy proposals for international 
issues, like globalization, with other states actors in mind. Populist policy suggestions 
will not be implementable when they need to be negotiated and agreed upon with other 
states. If parties disregard this logic then they decrease their chances of forming a 
coalition government, because it will signal to other parties that cooperation on foreign 
policy issues will be difficult at best. Germany’s history since 1949 shows that its 
governments have consistently tried to be a responsible partner to its Western allies and 
institutions. Transatlantic alliance and European integration are ways for German 
governments to signal reliability and to prove that it is a strong bilateral and multilateral 
partner (Oppermann, 2013, p. 28).  
Once parties are able to form a government and begin to devise international 
policies they will have to act between two spheres: the international and the domestic. 
Governments, and by extension the parties that make up the governments, take on a 
special role between these two levels, they become a form of mediator or broker between 
the two. There is certainly not just one correct way to conceptualize this mediating role, 
the one that is chosen for this research is that of “honest broker.” The honest broker is the 
most effective actor when it comes to these two-level games, because credibility is key 
when it comes to cooperating at the international level and for building international 
agreements. Due to a lack of formal enforcement mechanisms that are available on the 
domestic level, honest brokers become much more relevant when it comes to foreign 
interactions. Formal rules are much less of a constraint on such mediators and their 
actions in general are not necessarily guided by strategic profit maximization 
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calculations. Instead, the honest broker is much more controlled by norms of appropriate 
behavior (March and Olsen 1998). The key norm in this context is “the expectation of 
neutrality […] constitutes the most prominent norm” (Talberg, 2010, p. 248). Party elites 
or governments are certainly not without personal preference or bias, and brokerage does 
not necessarily mean impartial, instead it is “about making sure all relevant views were 
represented” (Burke, 2005, p. 232). In this sense the responsibility of an honest broker is 
to “promote a genuine competition of ideas” (Porter, 1980, p. 26). This means that 
political parties that are interested in shaping policy at the international level, such as 
economic policy, can only hope to do so through consistent and rationally founded 
proposals. Strategic vote maximizing policy proposals will fail, because brokers must 
“persuade parties through the power of better argument[s]” (Talberg, 2010, p. 248). 
To summarize, there are two reasons that legitimize this research’s decision to 
look at party election manifests as primarily expressions of a party’s programmatic 
preferences. These are first, the program formation process that emphasizes consistency 
and circumscribes party elites’ abilities to include personal preferences. The other reason 
is the need for parties to engage in two-level games and to act as honest brokers between 
the domestic and international levels, which is a role that emphasizes transparency, 
inclusiveness, and cooperation while limiting gain-maximizing calculations. The 
following chapters will look at the five major German parties and analyze their election 





The Christion Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands), which is usually just referred to as the CDU, is Germany’s major 
conservative party. Before addressing the CDU’s policy proposals regarding 
globalization for all federal elections since 1990, it is important to briefly present a 
background on the CDU, to show where it is coming from and which role it plays in 
German politics. The CDU cannot hark back to a pre-1933 organization, as the party was 
only formed after the western Allied victory powers took control of what would become 
West Germany, in 1945. However, the CDU has ideological roots in the wider European 
Christian democracy movement which erupted in the middle of the 19th century as a 
response to a modern state that infringed on the traditional sphere of influence of 
institutionalized churches. The movement's aim was to establish mainstream political 
parties across all social classes which derive their values from the concept of Christian 
solidarity. In this respect they distinguish themselves from the secular conservative 
parties (Zolleis, 2008). The most predominant representative of this political development 
in Germany was the German Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei), which came into 
existence after the establishment of the German Reich (Reichsgründung) in 1871. 
Although the party was never able to achieve widespread support, its position in 
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the middle of the political spectrum meant that it was a frequent coalition partner, even 
providing the most chancellors during the Weimar Republic, until it was dissolved in 
1933 by the Nazis (Bellers, 1991, p. 28). Following the events of 1945, Christian political 
parties tried to re-establish themselves, yet there was an obvious break with the previous 
Christian democratic movement. While trying to stay connected with the tradition of its 
predecessor organization, new parties were established with the intention of bridging 
denominational differences by replacing the close link to the Catholic faith with more 
abstract Christian values (Zolleis, 2008, p. 63). 
The early formation of political parties after 1945 was strictly supervised by the 
Allied occupation forces and limited to local and later regional parties. The official 
formation of the CDU in the Western occupied zones at the federal level did not take 
place until 1950, even though the first federal election took place in 1949. Konrad 
Adenauer, who was a successful Centre Party politician and mayor of Cologne until 
1933, was sustained as the chairman of the new party at the first party convention in 
Goslar. Consequently, Adenauer personifies the link between the CDU and its 
predecessor, the Centre Party (Bellers, 1991, p. 27).  
The only region where local Christian centrist parties did not join the larger CDU 
organization was in Bavaria. Here, a local movement formally created the Christian 
Social Union (CSU) in 1946. One issue that caused heated debates from the start was the 
Bavaria question, referring to whether or not the CSU should join the wider Christian 
movement, which ultimately would have meant joining the CDU. The reason for these 
highly passionate debates and resistance to joining the CDU is rooted in Bavaria’s 
historic experience, a primarily agrarian and heavily Catholic society that was deeply 
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skeptical of the industrial developments taking place during the second half of the 19th 
century, because of the way that industrialization was seen to change norms and values of 
society, especially in the urban centers. It was regarded as essential to maintain an 
ideological separation from Prussia and the instability that it brought, during the years of 
the Weimar Republic (Schlemmer, 1998, p. 18-20). This view was even extended to Nazi 
rule, which from the perspective of Bavarian conservative circles, was inextricably linked 
to Prussianism. In that respect, it became paramount to purge anything Prussian from 
Bavaria and not to link oneself to outside groups (Schlemmer, 1998, p. 20). Another 
reason for refraining from joining larger Germany-wide political movements was that 
after losing the Second World War there came into existence a type of renaissance of 
federalism. Federalism was viewed as a panacea to totalitarian rule and dictatorship. This 
Federalist movement was not unique to Bavaria, but there it actually resulted in the 
formation of an independent, slightly more conservative, sister party of the CDU 
(Schlemmer, 1998, pp. 20-21). The CSU has since then remained independent from the 
CDU and exclusive to Bavaria, but at the federal level the CDU and CSU form a joint 
faction, which is usually referred to as "the Union" in the federal parliament (Bundestag). 
Its basis is a binding agreement known as a Fraktionsvertrag between the two parties, 
which closely links them together and usually means that they participate in elections 
with one election program, which later forms the foundation for the Fraktionsvertrag. Of 
the seven Union party programs analyzed in this research there was only 1 year in which 
the CSU presented their own program to voters in Bavaria, 1990. For the other six 
elections, there is only one shared program for each election. Since the CDU has greater 
appeal to the majority of German voters (in 15 of 16 total states) and since the CDU is the 
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dominant partner in this relationship, the election program analysis below will refer to the 
CDU when both parties are intended.  
In general, the CDU can be placed in the center right position on Germany’s 
political spectrum and builds upon three primary pillars. The first pillar is Christian 
values, as indicated by the party’s name and already briefly outlined in the history party 
overview. Referring to its Christian roots and values is not as pronounced in the party’s 
rhetoric, identity, and policies as one might find with the conservative right in the United 
States (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004). Nevertheless, there are regular references to 
Christian values, God, and the Creation. For example, in their 2013 election campaign the 
CDU writes that their policy proposals are always guided by their Christian view of 
humanity (CDU, 2013, p. 78).  
The other two pillars are social conservatism and economic liberalism. Social 
conservatism is exemplified by the CDU’s views on social and family policy. For 
example, the CDU has made a consistent effort to promote more traditional gender roles 
than any of the other four major parties. The CDU has also frequently advocated policies 
that reinforce a rather hierarchical organization of society, which is historically rooted in 
Europe’s feudal systems. One way this has expressed itself, especially in the past, is the 
CDU’s efforts to uphold Germany’s traditional three-tier school system, in which 
students are sorted from a very early age and placed on academic tracks that largely 
determine future opportunities for those students. Another area where the CDU’s 
conservatism has shone through is the liberalization of criminal law, especially on issues 
such as abortion and divorce (see Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2017). The third 
pillar, economic liberalism, is the party’s commitment to Germany’s liberal economic 
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order, which is based on competition, markets, deregulation, and individual 
responsibility, but that does not exclude the social element of Germany’s social market 
economy. Social element refers to the government’s active intervention on markets to 
promote social equality and stability. The CDU has, over the years, regularly advanced 
aspects of the social system in Germany, such as introducing the concept that time spent 
raising children will be recognized and rewarded when determining retirement benefits or 
the creation of public long term care insurance (FDP, 2009, p. 2). 
Overall, the CDU has been the Federal Republic’s most successful party in terms 
of filling the Chancellorship with its leaders. There have only been two periods in which 
the German Chancellor has not been a member of the CDU party. The first, from 1969 to 
1982, saw Willy Brandt (SPD) and then later Helmut Schmidt (SPD), leading Germany’s 
government. The second period was after Germany’s reunification in 1990, from the time 
Gerhard Schröder succeeded Helmut Kohl in 1998, until Schröder lost a vote of no 
confidence and the subsequent election in 2005.  
In terms of popular support, the CDU/CSU has done even better. There were only 
3 (out of 18) federal elections where they did not receive more votes than all other 
parties. They were second to the SPD in 1972 and 1998 and tied with the SPD in the 
2002 election. Overall this means that the CDU has been in a position to shape German 
politics from the top down longer than any other party. The party has had a tremendous 
impact on German politics over the years. During the time period considered in this 
study, only the election programs for the 2002 and 2005 federal elections were written at 
a time when the CDU was the leading opposition party. The implication of this is that 
CDU election programs are particularly important, because given the party’s electoral 
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track record, one can assume that there is a greater chance that the policies proposed by 
the CDU will shape government decisions. Not just because the CDU is more likely to 
form the government after an election, but also because it can expect to have its 
government program measured against its campaign promises. Opposition parties always 
have the benefit of being able to promise a lot, because they will not be in a position 
where they must deliver policies based on their electoral campaign. This is especially 
true, the more unlikely it is for a party to take on government responsibility. A great 
example for this tactic can be found in the 2013 program of Germany’s most left party. 
Building on the general discontent over bank bailouts in the wake of the financial crisis 
the party promises to solve the issue of reckless banking practices by socializing private 
banks (Die Linke, 2013, p. 29). Even if there was a legal basis for such a socialization of 
banks, no other party would support such a policy and if the party had entered 
negotiations to form a government they could always easily have said that the 
socialization of banks was an issue that they had to sacrifice in order to join a coalition 
government. 
Besides the traditional presentation of the path forward, for at least the next 
legislative period, the majority of CDU programs are a bit different, because they are not 
centered on attacking the sitting government. Instead they are about explaining and 
justifying past policy decisions, as well as highlighting the accomplishments of the 





5.1 The CDU Election Programs 
This section summarizes the key points from each election program as they relate 
to globalization. The intent is to highlight the primary message the CDU communicates 
to voters for each election. While the emphasis is certainly on globalization, trade and 
other economic issues, the goal is to take a broader look at the election programs, at least 
to some extent. This is  very beneficial in addressing the questions previously raised (see 
Chapter 3), as some of them require a broader view: for example, Haupt’s (2010) 
assertion that parties on the left have limited policy options to protect the working class 
as globalization pressures governments to intervene less. The review of the seven election 
programs is followed by an analysis of what the CDU says about globalization and how 
the CDU’s programs relate to the theoretical positions on globalization as outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
 
5.1.1 The 1990 Election 
The 1990 election program, with its barely 23 pages, is significantly shorter than 
the average CDU election program. Additionally, it has a fairly large font and large 
picture/diagrams which gives this program, compared to the other CDU campaign 
programs, more the feeling of an excerpt than that of a full-fledged election manifesto. 
The overarching theme is the reunification of Germany and the integration of the so-
called new federal states (neue Bundesländer). For the CDU this means primarily 
demonstrating a strong commitment to the social market economy, which has been the 
foundation for Germanys postwar prosperity. The central elements for the CDU, of this 
type of economy, are individual responsibility and a fair distribution of growth. 
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Economic growth needs to be distributed fairly so that all Germans can achieve their own 
prosperity and social security (CDU, 1990, p. 5). It is interesting to see that the CDU 
almost exclusively focuses on the idea of some sort of universal prosperity, given that 
this election is so fundamentally different. Because millions of new voters are up for 
grabs who have not been socialized into the political tradition of the Federal Republic, 
one might expect more details about what is at the heart of the CDU and what its vision is 
for a unified Germany. Instead, there are only vague references to less government and 
increased self-reliance among citizens, so as to make it clear to Germany’s new citizens 
that the familiar reliance on the state will be significantly curtailed. The future will be 
about creating opportunities to independently attain personal prosperity (CDU, 1990, p. 
5).  
With regard to globalization, there is no direct mention of the issue. The election 
program is, generally speaking, preoccupied with the issue of a unified Germany, but 
international competition is addressed and presented as something mostly positive. 
According to the CDU, Germany’s international competitiveness is a fundamental 
building block in Germany’s strong export growth since the early 1980s, and it is this 
international competitiveness which makes Germany a global export leader. According to 
the CDU, the German economy is especially competitive when it comes to high-tech 
products and sophisticated services; these represent tremendous opportunities for 
Germany and need to be further advanced, but not without keeping social protections in 
place (CDU, 1990, p. 6). One essential factor for attaining prosperity and social 
protection is the partnership between employer associations and unions, which needs to 
be further strengthened (CDU, 1990, p. 10). The election program does not specify how 
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this should be done; instead it makes ambiguous references about making German 
farmers more competitive. The only specific elements in that context are a) a 
commitment to improve the rural infrastructure and b) to better enforce European 
production quotas for the agricultural sector, as overproduction in other states hurts 
German farmers (CDU, 1990, p. 10). Other than the special interest in the agricultural 
sector there is no distinctive mention of any other group that needs special support or 
protection from either global or European competition. In fact, the program talks about 
the creation of the European monetary union as a tremendous opportunity for Germany, 
as long as the monetary union uses the German Mark as a template for its monetary 
policies (CDU, 1990, p. 20). This example reflects a general trend with regard to German 
identity and Europe. The CDU unmistakably communicates strong allegiance and 
identification with a German fatherland, but the party also asserts that Europe is 
Germany’s future and that the CDU is ready for a true partnership based on the European 
spirit (CDU, 1990, p. 19). It is important to keep in mind that the CDU envisions a 
Europe that is largely shaped by German influence. 
When it comes to international agreements and standards, the CDU in 1990 
pushes for international agreements to increase environmental standards in general. It 
also includes a specific ban on chlorofluorocarbon, as well as special protection for the 
polar ice caps and the Alps. Additionally, the CDU commits to reward developing 
countries with debt relief programs if they make special efforts to protect the 
environment (CDU, 1990, p. 16). Furthermore, the 1990 program also makes a reference 
to trade liberalization, stating that the Uruguay round, as part of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade framework, needs to be finalized to reduce harmful protectionism 
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that negatively impacts Germany and third world countries (CDU, 1990, p. 22). 
 
5.1.2 The 1994 Election 
By 1994 the initial reunification euphoria had subsided and the reality of 
rebuilding a country that had become less prosperous with every decade that had passed 
since the Soviet Union separated it, first economically and later physically, from the rest 
of Germany, had begun to sink in. In 1990 the unemployment quota for West Germany 
was at 6.4%, but now the figure for the unified country had risen to 9.6%, leaving 3.5 
million job seekers without employment. The East-West difference within the unified 
Germany was significant at that time. While the unemployment quota in West Germany 
was at 8.1% it was, at 14.8%, getting close to twice as high in the new states. Other 
differences included a mostly unprofitable economy, outdated infrastructure, rundown 
housing, lower wages and government benefits. All of these issues are addressed in the 
CDU’s 1994 election program (see CDU, 1994, pp. 8-12). Another large section of the 
program focuses on creating private jobs that do not rely on government help. There are 
also a plethora of policy suggestions that aim to create more jobs: increased flexibility 
and less protection on the job market, privatization, deregulation, and less bureaucracy 
are all proposed as remedies for unemployment. Most of these issues are addressed rather 
vaguely and leave a lot of room for interpretation (see CDU, 1994, pp. 12-18). 
Further policy proposals include reducing taxes and decreasing the state, which 
relates in particular to the initial increase of government activity and involvement as a 
response to integrating East Germany's planned economy into the rest of the country. The 
CDU commits to reducing government involvement, but without providing details. The 
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motivation for this plan is that a leaner state will be able to reduce taxes, in particular 
corporate taxes especially for small businesses and thereby improve Germany’s global 
attractiveness to foreign direct investment (see CDU, 1994, pp. 18-19). Overall, there is a 
sense of urgency, due to competition, in the CDU’s 1994 program. The fear is that if 
changes are not made quickly to the economy, then Germany's competitiveness will be 
jeopardized and its prosperity will decrease (CDU, 1994, p. 20). A very important issue 
in this regard is the privatization of government assets and companies. Privatization is a 
very salient topic for the CDU in 1994. While the issue is mentioned in almost all CDU 
election programs (with the exception of 2013), the concentration of privatization 
references in the CDU’s 1994 program is very high, with 13 separate mentions. As a 
point of comparison, privatization is mentioned only nine times in all other CDU election 
programs combined. Another important issue for the CDU in their 1994 election program 
is the restructuring of Germany's welfare state. The goal is not to overburden the social 
safety net, which for the CDU means, on the one hand more self-reliance, and on the 
other hand better support for the truly needy (CDU, 1994, p. 31, pp. 38-39). However, it 
is neither clear what increased self-reliance specifically means, nor who qualifies as truly 
needy.  
The program also signals a strong commitment to NATO as Germany's primary 
guarantee for safety and peace, but also includes clear support for the integration of the 
Eastern European states formerly within Russia's sphere of influence. This includes their 
integration into the European Single Market, which certainly means more competition for 
the domestic economy, but also opens up ample export opportunities. However, this is 
not discussed within the program and the voter has to draw this conclusion by him-
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/herself (CDU, 1994, p. 52). The most direct and important statement about globalization 
can be found in the last chapter. The CDU writes that access to industrialized states’ 
domestic markets is a crucial factor for the progress of developing countries. That is why 
the CDU proposes a reduction of protectionism and the strengthening of free trade, to 
enable those countries to develop without outside assistance (CDU, 1994, p. 53). 
 
5.1.3 The 1998 Election 
The 1998 program with its 33 pages, is the second shortest CDU program overall 
and a good deal shorter than the average number of pages. About half the program 
addresses issues like security and measures to cut crime rates, or how younger and older 
generations will live together as one society. Here, issues like retirement, long term care, 
and respect for one another are important topics. Improving living quality, both among 
rural as well as in urban populations, is an issue as well. This includes support for 
farmers, better infrastructure, and introducing environmental standards. As part of their 
agricultural program the CDU not only speaks out against production caps and subsidies, 
but also calls for deregulation to give producers increased flexibility as to how they want 
to act in the market and how they fund themselves. Additionally, the CDU states that 
negotiations at the WTO should be used to ensure that European, ergo German, 
consumer, animal, and environmental standards become global regulations (CDU, 1998, 
p. 26), so as to protect German farmers against less regulated and, hence, cheaper 
imports. Tax harmonization with regard to energy sources within the European market is 
also addressed, because of its potential to adversely affect German companies’ 
competitiveness (CDU, 1998, p. 27). 
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The other half of the program heavily focuses on the economy, employment, and 
most importantly the rebuilding of East Germany. A major theme in this context is the 
privatization of state owned companies or selling of state held shares of companies, but it 
also promotes the privatization of government services like all nonmonetary 
unemployment assistance (CDU, 1998, pp. 5-6). It is also suggested that in the process of 
overcoming the structural deficits that have their roots in the East’s communist past, the 
principle of competition should guide the transformation of Germany’s social net (CDU, 
1998, p. 9). These statements are very ambiguous. There is no explanation as to what this 
might mean in terms of policy proposals. The only thing that is clear is that there will be 
more competition. This is especially important for East Germany where the aim is to 
increase the competitiveness of products and to transfer government responsibilities to 
private entities. The claim is that combined with more deregulation and less government 
this will lead to more dynamic exports (CDU, 1998, pp. 10-11).  In a nutshell, the CDU’s 
economic policies have the primary goal of creating a competitive economy (CDU, 1998, 
p. 13). 
Another theme in this context that the CDU promulgates in this election program 
is the maxim that anyone who works must be financially better off than those who do not 
work (CDU 1998, p. 7). While this is a reasonable idea (if social welfare benefits are 
more lucrative than low paying jobs, people have an incentive not to take those low 
paying jobs) the reality translates to less government support for people without 
employment. This can increase fear of international competition, as the cost for being out 




The program concludes with a six-page final chapter about Germany and its role 
in the world and in Europe. This includes a commitment to support NATO, to cut back on 
immigration, and a very brief passage about development. Here the message is that the 
poor states have to help themselves, but that Germany will support them in their efforts to 
be self-reliant. Prerequisite for this support are sufficient standards with regard to human 
rights, the rule of law, and an economy based upon the principles of a social market 
economy. This final section also includes a statement that Germany will promote its 
environmental standards abroad and seek harmonization of global rules and norms in this 
regard (CDU, 1998, p. 33). 
 
5.1.4 The 2002 Election 
The Christian view of humanity, for the CDU, is the compass that leads them in 
their efforts to shape a responsible and sustainable human society (CDU, 2002, p. 24). A 
core building block for such a human society is the renewed social market economy, 
which encourages freedom and creates incentives for individual responsibility. This way, 
Germany’s economic performance will be strengthened (CDU, 2002, p. 6). The CDU 
proposes the following policies for achieving this economic vision: deregulation of the 
job market (CDU, 2002, p. 10), and structural reformation of labor laws, with the intent 
to generate a new balance between security and flexibility. In this new relationship there 
is clearly increased emphasis on flexibility (CDU, 2002, p. 12). With regard to the 
unemployed, the message is best characterized by the idea of conditional support. This 
reflects the idea that government support, or at least some of its services, will 
increasingly be made available only to those who meet certain requirements. Although it 
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is not clearly defined what this means, one practical example would be that those who 
receive unemployment benefits need to demonstrate that they have been looking for work 
(CDU, 2002, p. 13).  
The CDU also maintains that the economy will broadly benefit from additional 
support for small and medium sized businesses. This will largely happen on its own once 
the government takes a step back and is less involved in the economy. Concrete steps for 
achieving less government participation are to reduce taxes and to cut back on red tape 
(CDU, 2002, p. 16). A sore spot for Germany’s overall economic performance lies with a 
lack of investments in East Germany. The CDU plans to remedy this imbalance, once in 
power, through special subsidized loans with an emphasis on small and midsized 
businesses in East Germany (CDU, 2002, pp. 27-28). The CDU also points out a need for 
better support of families with children; this includes a special emphasis on helping 
women in the work force by creating a more gender-neutral system. Additionally, 
mothers and fathers need better working conditions in order to more easily combine work 
and life with children. According to the CDU, this is an issue for which unions should 
increasingly fight (CDU, 2002, p. 36). 
Of course, the 2002 program also includes the staples of any political campaign at 
the highest national level such as a commitment to increase safety by fighting crime and 
terrorism with more determination, and to avow that the funding for Germany’s 
retirement program is secure. In terms of international trade and globalization this 
program is rather sparse. There are two brief references that call for increased tax 
harmonization across Europe (CDU, 2002, p. 9, p. 53). With regard to international trade 
institutions this campaign program mentions the WTO twice, both times in conjunction 
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with consumer rights. The CDU states their aim is to negotiate with the WTO higher 
global consumer protection standards and more stringent guidelines for farming (CDU, 
2002, p. 51, p. 53).  
When it comes to national identity this election campaign, compared to previous 
CDU campaigns, has definitely stepped up the references to German identity, or as the 
CDU calls it “enlightened patriotism” (CDU, 2002, p. 4). It is not clear what 
distinguishes enlightened from ordinary patriotism. For the CDU this patriotism includes 
a sense of national belonging where the majority identifies themselves with a shared 
destiny, which is created by a common history, language, cultural heritage, religion, 
philosophy, works of art, etc. (CDU, 2002, p. 60). The CDU further propagates a 
strengthened national identity with a meaningful form of commemorating the peaceful 
revolution against the East German regime (CDU, 2002, pp. 31-32) and it clearly defines 
Germany as a special place for Christian churches (CDU, 2002, p. 32). 
 
5.1.5 The 2005 Election 
For the 2005 federal election the CDU opens up with a chapter about the 
fundamental principles that should determine Germany’s direction for the next legislative 
period. The very first issue addressed is the fear of globalization. The CDU 
acknowledges that many people are fearful of the prospects of increased globalization; 
they counter this apprehension by presenting a very positive view of globalization. 
According to the CDU, international trade and global economic activities entail the 
greatest of possibilities for Germany’s future. It is the CDU’s aspiration that the German 
people fully participate in and benefit from these developments. Politics must promote 
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democratic values and the social market economy, but also recognize and seize 
Germany’s opportunities, something that is not possible with a continuation of the “carry 
on as usual” attitude of the Schröder government (CDU, 2005, p. 3). 
Employment is an important issue, with a current unemployment rate of more 
than 10%. Policy proposals include supporting research and development more 
effectively, to implement European legislation without adding additional national 
regulations, and cutting back on red tape. Novel ideas include the deregulation of the job 
market, if these suggestions would significantly impact workers and unions. For example, 
there would be no termination protection for new employees in small companies for the 
first 2 years of employment or only temporary contracts to begin with. The overall 
number of exceptions to collective labor agreements would increase or there could even 
be a temporary moratorium on union regulations for companies that are in a critical 
position, if two-thirds of employees agree. Another measure that employers could utilize, 
according to these policy proposals, is that wages for new hires can be 10% below the 
union standard wage rate (CDU, 2005, p. 12). 
Infrastructure is also an issue that is addressed in the context of competitiveness 
and the CDU commits to increase funding to better connect Germany across borders 
particularly via rail (CDU, 2005, pp. 20-21). Additionally, nuclear technology is 
supposed to be maintained as a hallmark of German technology with great export 
potential (CDU, 2005, p. 19). The recurring special attention to the agricultural sector is 
also present in the 2005 program. The focus is, again, the harmonization of 
environmental and animal standards at the WTO to secure that German competitiveness 
is not adversely affected (CDU, 2005, p. 23).  
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The program ends with a final paragraph about foreign aid and how the German 
government will prioritize help to those developing countries that have structures of 
governance in place, which will allow them to use the aid effectively. This paragraph also 
talks about the need to partner more closely with developing countries to secure German 
interests, because in a globalized world the increasing problems and struggles in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America directly endanger Germany’s security and prosperity (CDU, 
2005, p. 38).  
 
5.1.6 The 2009 Election 
This election program begins with an overview of the CDU accomplishments 
over the last 4 years in government and then moves into addressing the global financial 
crisis, explaining what caused it and how to prevent similar developments in the future. 
The most important message for the CDU is to explain that more government 
involvement is not the answer. A government led economy does not create prosperity, 
according to the CDU, which is why it emphasizes hard work and ingenuity as ways for 
creating a prosperous Germany. People need incentives and creative freedom; this is the 
source of prosperity and solidarity. The state should only intervene in times of crisis 
according to the CDU (CDU, 2009, pp. 7-8).  
Of course, there is the usual talk about decreasing bureaucratic obstacles, debt 
reduction, balancing the budget, and lowering taxes. A point that appears more important 
for the CDU is to emphasize that unemployment should not be financed by the 
government; instead it must only support measures that effectively fight unemployment. 
In this regard two principles are vital: first, that any support rendered automatically 
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entails an obligation for the recipient and, second, that those who work must be 
financially better off than those who do not (CDU, 2009, pp. 30- 32). This does not mean 
that the CDU is against supporting the unemployed. For example, the manifest states that 
it is better to save low paying jobs by subsidizing them instead of paying for 
unemployment benefits. This position seems to be quite contrary to the CDU’s assertion 
that the government is not adept at making entrepreneurial decisions, but this 
juxtaposition is not addressed in their election program. Other positions which are 
promoted with regard to social standards are the call for more flexibility and individual 
choice in the health care sector. The goal here is to increase independence, individual 
prevention and personal planning for both health care and long-term care (CDU, 2009, 
pp. 34-37).  
Global problems need to be addressed at the global level. For example, the 
regulation and control of the financial sector needs to be internationally harmonized. The 
CDU clearly states that it is committed to global free trade and against protectionism. It 
will also forcefully fight against any form of distortion when it comes to competition on 
global markets. Furthermore, they want to promote a fair treatment of developing 
countries during WTO negotiations. There should be a better framework for developing 
countries to participate on international markets. With regard to the global economy, they 
also campaign for better regulation to protect intellectual property, environmental 
standards, animal rights, and health standards (CDU, 2009, pp. 27-28).  
Another important element that must not be overlooked in this particular election 
program is the CDU’s basic motivation, which is their love for their country and their 
desire to serve their fatherland (CDU, 2009, pp. 10-12). The CDU also likes to point out 
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that Germany is a European culture-nation with a rich cultural heritage. This heritage 
originates from the variety of Germany’s states and shapes its national identity (CDU, 
2009, p. 52). In the same vein the CDU demands that the European Union pay more 
attention to national identity and do more to protect it (CDU, 2009, p. 53). One important 
reason for this emphasis on national identity and identification with the homeland is that 
it provides orientation and belonging in an age of globalization where people are losing 
their roots (CDU, 2009, p. 60). These types of patriotic assertions are framed by the 
unusual layout/format of this program. Throughout the entire program all pages have a 
header that consists of the programs title, page number, and Germany’s national colors, 
thus conjuring up feelings patriotism, identity, and belonging for the reader. This 
manifest specifically addresses the governments need to take into account “proximity” in 
the age of globalization. All countries are practically Germany’s neighbors and therefore 
have an impact on Germany. Therefore, the CDU asserts, that globalization needs to 
guide all policy formation (CDU, 2009, p. 90). Unfortunately, this proposed future 
shaping of all policy fields by globalization never materializes; by the time the next 
election comes around in 2013 the CDU does not pay any special attention to 
globalization in their election campaign, as will be demonstrated in the summary of the 
CDU’s 2013 program. 
 
5.1.7 The 2013 Election 
The 2013 program begins by reviewing the struggles of the last few years: 
financial crisis and recession, ongoing European debt crisis, significant demographic 
change, and fast growing international markets with new opportunities. The CDU asserts 
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that the best way forward for Germany in this environment is to solidify its role as export 
champion, but this is only possible as long as Europe is doing well. This is why Germany 
must be active in stabilizing Europe and to ensure that the government runs a balanced 
budget (CDU, 2013, p. 4). The middle class needs to be supported especially when it 
comes to opening and running businesses, but it also requires better provisions for 
workers. While they reject a legally binding universal minimum wage, the manifest does 
support collective bargaining agreements and calls for employers and unions to agree on 
minimum wage standards for their respective sectors/industries (CDU, 2013, p. 5). 
Additionally, in order to overcome these challenges the CDU focuses on strengthening 
families, on providing national security, and creating a home country that is worth living 
in. In this respect, the important message is that Germany is a culture nation, whose 
cultural heritage merits preservation (CDU, 2013, p. 7). 
The bulk of the 2013 program addresses many traditional CDU issues, such as 
support for elderly citizens and how they ought to be an active part of society even at an 
advanced age. The CDU again addresses increasing mobility through better 
infrastructure, Christian values, education, technological advances, more funding for 
research, health care, and cheap energy.  With regard to global competition and 
globalization, the CDU once again pays special attention to agriculture by stating that 
providing special support in accessing global markets will help agriculture to seize 
opportunities (CDU, 2013, p. 60). They also assert that Germany’s prosperity and 
stability are closely linked to the political, economic, social, and ecological developments 
in Europe and also globally. The 2013 program suggests that, due to globalization, states 
are increasingly dependent upon one another and Germany has a significant interest in 
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taking an active role, internationally. Germany needs to actively promote peace, 
cooperation, and human rights on a global scale. International institutions like the United 
Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the EU are indispensable for Germany 
when it comes to achieving these international goals. The CDU is deeply committed to 
maintaining and even increasing Germany’s role within them (see CDU, 2013, p. 74).  
It is the CDU’s goal to promote sustainable development and more global justice. 
The idea is to increase development aid in order to generate more growth among 
developing countries. This manifest points out that this must not lower human rights or 
harm the environment. In this context the CDU speaks of a social and ecological market 
economy. Such developments are best achieved when Germany cooperates with its 
partners, in particular the EU (CDU, 2013, p. 77). With regard to development and 
international institutions the CDU declares that it will push the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to resume negotiations with the intent to meet the interest of developing countries 
better, to let them participate more fully in global markets (CDU, 2013, p. 78). 
 
5.2 Initial Election Program Analysis 
This section outlines a basic analysis of the five key terms as they appear in all of 
the seven CDU election programs since 1990. An in-depth explanation of how the 
programs were analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regard to the key terms can 
be found in the previous chapter under 4.3. Figure 5.1 shows all direct references 
regarding globalization sorted according to the five key terms. A close look at the 
numbers reveals some important patterns. First, the term globalization appears to be 
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relatively new to the vernacular of election campaigns. While the data do not say 
anything about the CDU’s use of the term prior to 1990, it is safe to assume that the term 
was at least not used in any systematic fashion prior to 2002. Related terms such as trade 
and exports have been used in programs in the 1990s. This suggests that even though the 
CDU discussed globalization related issues for a long time, the party did not view the 
concept of globalization as a relevant issue which warranted discussion with voters in 
their election campaigns. The data also clearly show overall references regarding any of 
the five key terms have significantly increased over the years, with the majority of 
references appearing in 2009 and 2013.  
These data must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because the 2009 and 
2013 election programs are also the two longest ones with 94 and 80 pages, respectively. 
The average CDU program is 58 pages long, with the shortest in 1990 containing only 23 
pages. However, the overall trend is clear: There are more references of the key terms in 
the later programs showing that the party views the issue with increasingly greater 
importance for the electorate. Two more important observations need to be addressed in 
this context; the CDU mentions the term free trade only four times in all of their 
programs. This seems to suggest that while the party is comfortable with discussing 
globalization as a topic, the CDU seems much more hesitant to use the term free trade, 
possibly due to the lack of control that is associated with the term. If trade is free, then 
governments lose their ability to steer and direct trade in a favorable manner. It is unclear 
if the CDU avoids using the term free trade because it would relate to a loss of power for 
the government over the economy, or if it is motivated by a desire to avoid giving voters 
the impression that the government is not going to protect the domestic economy from 
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harmful trade.  
The most interesting observation is the disparity between export and import 
references. There are only two references to imports in 2009. One deals with energy 
imports in a neutral manner (CDU, 2009, p. 24), and the other suggests that import 
standards are necessary in conjunction with transatlantic trade (CDU, 2009, pp. 84-85). 
The two references in 2013 call for increased energy independence and cleaner energy 
through a reduction of energy imports (CDU, 2013, p. 15, p. 28). It is as if imports are not 
important to Germany and if the topic is addressed at all, it is narrowly focused on the 
energy sector and defined as something that needs to stop because energy imports are 
bad, as they are environmentally more harmful than domestic options or they are 
politically undesirable because they support Russia, for example. The reason for this 
imbalance is that exports are seen as something good: they reflect strength and 
superiority, because other economies want and need German products more than their 
own domestic options. Imports, on the other hand, are regarded as the opposite, 
something that denotes weakness and threatens domestic jobs.  
Figure 5.2 shows the normative meaning that goes along with any of the 
globalization key terms. Comments that are regarded as neutral in nature by this study 
make up the largest single group of references, but there are also a significant amount of 
references that present the globalization related terms as something that has either 
generated positive outcomes or as something that creates new opportunities for Germany. 
There are also some references that link globalization to risks and danger, but they are 
clearly outnumbered (about four to one) by references that emphasize the positive 
outcomes and new opportunities in conjunction with globalization and the other key 
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terms. Since Figure 5.2 relies on the same data set, one can observe here too, that the 
number of references has significantly increased over the years.  
Figure 5.2 shows an aggregate summary for all key terms, but this does not 
illustrate how the CDU values each of the individual terms. Therefore, the next step is to 
look at each one individually. Beginning with trade, one can see that the CDU 
communicates a predominantly positive message regarding this issue (see Figure 5.3). As 
previously mentioned the term free trade is only used four times by the CDU and seems 
to suggest that while the party is comfortable with discussing trade it seems more hesitant 
to use the term free trade. However, when it does mention free trade then it is in a largely 
positive context, with three positive and one neutral reference (see Figure 5.4). 
References on export are significantly more numerous in CDU election campaigns than 
those on free trade as one can see in Figure 5.5. They too appear in a mostly positive 
context (about two-third of instances) and only 7% are linked to risks and dangers, while 
the remainder are considered neutral (see Figure 5.5). This is not surprising as Germany’s 
export prowess is generally considered a great accomplishment.  
Despite the fact that trade and exports are addressed in such an overwhelmingly 
positive light, it is surprising that imports are only mentioned four times, two of them 
being neutral and another two mentioning imports in a negative context. The term 
globalization is a relatively new term to the party’s election program vernacular and as 
such it is not yet unequivocally used in a positive context like exports are for example. 
Here positive and negative references appear roughly an equal amount of times, but the 
largest group are the essentially neutral references, as demonstrated by Figure 5.6.  
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5.3 Election Programs and the Theory on Globalization 
and Political Parties 
Before delving into how the CDU election programs relate to the previously 
outlined theory in Chapter 3 it is important to reemphasize the role that trade plays for the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the generally rather peculiar position that the CDU 
takes on the issue of  trade liberalization, given that Germany is over proportionally 
involved in trade. For example, Germany’s exports of goods and services in 2015 totaled 
46.9% of its GDP, which is a very high percentage for a developed economy of its size. 
By comparison the average export rate compared to GDP for the other Group of Seven 
countries and China is 23.7%.1 Clearly Germany excels at selling its products abroad, but 
the picture that the CDU paints of globalization is rather different. The CDU often 
presents these issues as part of a strategy to assist developing countries, or that due to 
globalization the problems from poorer regions in the world are now affecting Germany 
(CDU, 2005, p. 38). Occasionally trade liberalization is even presented as doing 
something altruistic for poor developing countries (see CDU, 1994, p. 53). One could 
argue that it doesn’t really matter why governments engage in trade liberalization as long 
as they do it. It is certainly true that a strong export economy like Germany’s will benefit 
from general trade liberalizations regardless of whether they are justified in terms of 
supporting fledgling economies around the globe or as a measure for promoting the 
domestic economy. The problem is, if voters come to primarily associate trade 
liberalization with assisting others, then in times of uncertainty or domestic need, real or 
perceived, popular support for a liberal trading system could rapidly wane.  
                                                          
1 Compare to USA 12.6%, France 30%, UK 27.4%, Italy 30.2%, Japan 16.2%, Canada 31.5 % and China 
17.9% (source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016a).  
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A similar danger lies with one-sidedly emphasizing the increased dangers of 
interdependence that globalization creates when it comes to political, economic, 
ecological, and social stability (for example CDU, 2013, p. 74), when there are plenty of 
advantages from an interdependent world (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Voters can jump to 
the conclusion that in order to improve domestic stability and prosperity one needs to 
push for more protectionism and isolationism. It is a fight for the national interest which 
needs to be protected from international institutions and international trading regimes. 
The idea that taking back control means increasing prosperity is a very powerful one as 
the 2016 Brexit debate has shown. For example Michael Gove (2016), Britain’s justice 
secretary asserts “if we vote to leave, we take back control” (n.p.). It would be much 
better for a country whose prosperity depends so much on international trade to openly 
discuss the pros and cons of being actively engaged in a globalized world. This would 
certainly include addressing the domestic benefits of an open international economy, thus 
minimizing calls for protectionism in times of crisis.  
First off, important themes identified within the literature are not at all addressed 
by the CDU. Brawly (1997) outlined the importance of looking at the issue of partial 
factor mobility, which is not addressed at all by the CDU. It appears that partial factor 
mobility is too complex an issue for the CDU to address in its election programs. The 
issue of volatility, which was primarily defined by Woodruff (2005) as oscillating 
between economic busts and booms, is only addressed in a limited form by the CDU 
when the party addresses the 2007-2008 global financial crises in its 2009 campaign. The 
reason the CDU does not talk more about volatility in its election program might be due 
to the fact that the CDU was the governing party for the majority of the time frame 
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analyzed here. As such, the CDU had an inherent desire to be associated with a period of 
stability and not volatility. Additionally, the issue of volatility, which is the result of the 
effects that  economic cycles have on trade and subsequently on employment, are most 
likely also too complex for an election program for the general electorate.  
The question of how parties address labor subgroups as put forth by Midford 
(1993) is easily answered for the CDU. There is no distinction between labor subgroups 
except for some special attention which is paid to people who work in the agricultural 
sector. This sector accounts only for 1% of Germany’s GDP and the attention the CDU 
pays to agriculture in their election programs is much more part of an effort to emphasize 
the CDU’s efforts to protect Germany’s countryside and farming as part of its cultural 
heritage and identity than it is an attempt to discuss economic policies let alone to 
formulate a response to globalization. The CDU does much better when it comes to 
addressing the role of unions, which is an important element in addressing the negative 
consequences of globalization as outlined by Garst (1998). The CDU clearly recognizes 
unions as an important part of Germany’s society and economy. Due to Germany’s 
traditionally strong unions, voters can feel some sense of security knowing that unions 
are an important element in defending their interests in a globalizing world, but the 
influence and the effectiveness of unions have been waning since reunification. As 
Behrens et al. (2003) point out, Germany’s unions have been active in a wide array of 
fields but are missing a strategic long-term focus and are falling short of their potential. 
While the CDU does not question unions’ legitimacy it is also not really interested in 
advancing their position or formulating a vision for unions in a globalized world. There is 
no mention of how or if unions need to adapt in any way to a globalized world. This 
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constitutes a missed opportunity for the CDU. 
Caproso’s (1997) question of whether or not political parties present meaningful 
policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or do they merely use the issue for 
scapegoating, needs to be addressed in two parts. First, the CDU does not treat 
globalization like a whipping boy. In general CDU election programs do not blame 
globalization as the cause for Germany’s broader problems, but globalization is often 
presented as an ominous force that has the potential to negatively affect Germany (for 
example CDU, 2005, p. 90), in particular its culture (see CDU, 2009, p. 60), but these 
instances are overall balanced out by positive references about the potential benefits (for 
example CDU, 2005, p. 3). When it comes to presenting meaningful policies with regard 
to globalization, here the CDU falls short. There are brief but consistent references about 
ensuring that developing countries have better access to global markets. While this is 
certainly an important topic, the CDU’s proposals are very vague. There are no specifics 
as to how that will be accomplished. The only other issue that is otherwise consistently 
discussed is increasing Germany’s competitiveness by occasionally referring to tax cuts. 
But usually, it is more about tax harmonization with other countries. Given that 
globalization is such an important and all-encompassing topic (CDU, 2009, p. 90), it 
certainly deserves more attention and precise policies to deal with issues such as social 
mobility and worker protection in a global economy, or how to let developing countries 
better participate on global markets, etc. 
Three other important questions are: Do parties address the issue of regulatory 
harmonization and contract enforcement (Ranjan & Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000)? Do parties 
communicate their goals with respect to international agreements, and do they offer 
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voters clear choices (Hays, 2009; Martin, 2000)? These are issues that the CDU takes up; 
for example, they address regulatory harmonization in every campaign since 1994. There 
is a heavy focus on policy upload, meaning the CDU promises to ensure that German 
environmental, consumer, agricultural and animal rights standards will become the 
standard for the WTO and the EU in particular, but also for other states in general (see for 
example CDU, 1994, p. 26; CDU, 1998, p. 51; CDU, 2009, p. 71-72). Likewise, the 
harmonization of taxes and financial regulations are a recurring theme. Again, the goal is 
to ensure that other states adopt German standards (see for example CDU, 2002, p. 9, p. 
53; CDU, 2013, p. 19). This is, in essence, also what the CDU communicates to the 
German electorate when dealing with the party’s aims concerning international 
agreements. It is all about the policy upload. International agreements must be based 
upon German environmental and consumer rights. Other agreements which the CDU 
strives to achieve are increased deregulation and privatization (CDU, 1994, p. 15), 
increased access for domestic producers in the agricultural sector to global markets 
(CDU, 2013, p. 60), and special arrangements for developing countries to allow them 
increased market access (CDU, 1990, p 16; CDU, 2009, p. 28).  
While the CDU does present some policies regarding regulatory harmonization 
and international agreements, these policy proposals are lacking in clarity and quality. 
For example, the CDU almost exclusively focuses on the policy upload. The message that 
the CDU wants to send to voters is clearly that a CDU government is strong and can take 
action on the international stage. The inherent election promise that goes along with 
argumentation is that Germany does not need to change; instead the world will be 
changing in order to adopt Germany’s environmental, labor, and consumer standards as 
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well as German taxes. Instead of presenting policies that represent rather wishful thinking 
than answers to a globalizing world, the CDU could address in more detail with whom 
they will partner and how they are going to generate global support for their idea. This 
should also include an outline of areas in which Germany might have to change, because 
negotiations at the international level will ultimately result in some form of policy 
download as well. While it probably does not make sense to outline detailed changes, 
some general areas could be highlighted. Additionally, it certainly requires a good deal of 
hubris to assume that German standards are always superior, as recent developments in 
the automotive industry have shown. American emission standards are in many ways far 
more stringent and better at protecting the environment that German ones (Ewing, 2016). 
It would be far more honest and constructive to include policies and practices that work 
well in other countries and to outline potential ways of implementing them domestically. 
Another problem is that the CDU’s positions are very ambiguous. For example, 
what does it mean that developing countries should receive special support in accessing 
global markets? If taken at face value this must include access to the world’s largest 
market: the EU’s internal market. A primary export of developing countries are 
agricultural products, which cannot compete effectively due to the protection that 
domestic/EU internal agricultural products enjoy. Granting access and abolishing special 
protection for the agricultural sector clearly conflicts with the CDU’s calls for increased 
support to German farmers, who receive special attention throughout election campaigns, 
not just in regard to international agreements. While the average voter probably does not 
necessarily detect such incongruence within the CDU’s election programs, it nevertheless 
shows that the CDU does not have a coherent response to globalization in the way they 
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communicate with voters.  
The literature on globalization and its domestic response highlights the need for 
political elites to discuss the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; 
Rudra, 2002). This is a key building block for alleviating fears of social instability and a 
loss of prosperity. If the CDU were interested in increasing support for globalization, 
then its election programs should focus more on the size and scope of government with 
regard to globalization, in particular with regard to its welfare spending. This is an issue 
that the CDU completely omits in their election campaigns. Instead, they focus on a 
message which calls for a smaller state with more responsibility for individuals to take 
care of themselves. This is combined with the CDU’s recurring message that 
competitiveness is everything, which creates a potent combination that certainly creates a 
measure of anxiety for people who feel threatened by competition. This is an especially 
poignant concern for those individuals who are less educated or have not acquired sought 
after specialized skills that will make them attractive to employers. A diminished social 
net and a government who expects them to be more independent will likely increase calls 
for protection from outside competition and demand a more closed off economy. In 
essence, with a smaller welfare state people feel a diminished sense of security and are 
less willing to accept the uncertainty that a globalized world entails.  
 The last important theoretical building block that must be addressed is the issue of 
identity. Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004) have put 
forward the idea that emphasizing a European identity is an effective tool for most 
European states to decrease negative attitudes about globalization. Analysis of the CDU 
election programs reveals that the CDU does not attempt to foster any form of European 
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identity that could offset resistance to more economic integration. Within the CDU’s 
rhetoric there is no room for an open multilayered identity. Instead the CDU frequently 
refers to Germany as a homeland, a place of belonging and identification, a place of 
special cultural heritage that needs to be preserved. Perpetuating a distinct German 
identity and cultural heritage has been an integral part of the CDU’s election campaigns 
as part of addressing the party’s social conservatism. People who read the CDU’s election 
programs could easily feel that globalization threatens this unique German homeland. As 
a matter of fact, the CDU itself links globalization to people losing their roots, which the 
CDU claims is a trend that needs to be reversed. Emphasizing and protecting the German 
homeland is what will give the people orientation and a sense of belonging in the world 
today (CDU, 2009, p. 58). Similarly, the CDU’s emphasis on Germany’s Christian 
heritage and identity also does more to create a feeling of needing protection from the 
outside world than to promote a sense of openness towards other cultures and religions.  
It is amazing that the party that has had such a vital role in shaping Germany’s 
economic success over the last 6 decades, an accomplishment that has increasingly relied 
on international trade especially within the EU but also globally, has not been able to find 
a way to address its three primary pillars in a mutually reinforcing manner. The CDU 
continues to address Christian values and social conservatism in a way that undermines 






5.4 Conclusion of CDU Analysis 
In 2009 the CDU proclaimed that in the future the issue of globalization needs to 
guide all policy formation in Germany (CDU, 2009, p. 90). This is what one would 
expect from the government of a country that is so profoundly linked to the international 
economy. While globalization and trade are mentioned more frequently in the last few 
election manifests, these references still fall short of what one would expect. This vital 
issue still does not receive the attention that it should; instead the CDU spends time and 
energy on other matters. For example, in the 2009 election program the CDU spends 
three and a half pages about volunteer work and sport (see CDU, 2009, pp. 54-57), but by 
comparison the topic of globalization is only sparsely addressed in a comprehensive 
fashion. The number of references is shooting up, but the quality is not. Most references 
that do mention exports, globalization, etc. are usually meaningless. There are references 
about globalization, which are linked to some other issue, such as, in times of 
globalization local government increases in importance (CDU, 2009, p. 69), or that the 
tourism industry is under tremendous globalization pressure (CDU, 2009, p. 68). 
References such as these do nothing to define the kind of globalization that the CDU is 
pursuing, how globalization is good for Germany, or what its weaknesses are and how 
Germany will address these weaknesses to maximize its profits from being engaged in an 
increasingly interdependent world. Why does the CDU not discuss what worker 
protection means in a globalized world? Similarly, it would be beneficial for voters to 
hear how globalization affects social mobility. Most importantly, the CDU must 
communicate the benefits of imports to the German economy. International trade is not a 
one-way street and the CDU must stop treating imports negatively, as something bad that 
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is best ignored. There is always an inherent danger that the German public will, in a time 
of crisis, expect their government to do something to restrict imports in an effort to 
protect domestic employment. This would be myopic since “protectionism is an 
ineffectual and counterproductive response to the economic problems of much of the 
work force” (Irwin, 2016, p. 91). It is time that the CDU takes an unequivocal stance on 
globalization, clearly outlining its benefits for the German economy and how to share its 
benefits more equitably. This could, over time, build a persuasive consensus that well 
managed openness is the best guarantor for Germany’s prosperity in the 21st century. 
However, as long as the CDU presents globalization with ambiguity and as something 
that threatens German identity, then every economic downturn will lead to calls for more 












































































































































The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands), generally just referred to as SPD, is not only rich in tradition; it is also 
Germany’s oldest political party. It has survived four political systems and has been a key 
party for most of its existence. The SPD has its roots in a meeting in Gotha when the 
General German Workers' Association (Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverein) met and 
merged with the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische 
Arbeiterpartei) in 1875. Both groups were less than a decade old when they merged. 
There were internal ideological differences over how to advance the interest of the 
working class. One wing called for the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist order, 
while the other believed in improving the position of workers through social reform with 
gradual steps through a parliamentary process (Decker, 2017a). Due to the Socialist 
Laws, which were enacted in 1878, the party’s ability to do its work was severely 
curtailed. The Socialist Laws (officially in German: Gesetz gegen die gemeingefährlichen 
Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie) were a series of acts from 1878-1890 that were 
aimed at curbing the dangerous influence of Social Democrats in Germany. Two failed 
assassination attempts against Germany’s Emperor, whose perpetrators were attributed to 
the political left, were justification enough for enacting the laws. The new legislation did 
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not outright ban the party, but severely restricted publications and meetings of Social 
Democrats and could even lead to arrests. This prompted Social Democrats to print their 
banned publications abroad, to run their candidates as independents, and for a good deal 
of work to be performed in secret. The only group that was largely spared from this direct 
harassment were Social Democrats who were part of the legislature, due to their 
parliamentary immunity (see Evans, 2005). Even though the Socialist Laws were 
designed to suppress the new merger of the General German Workers' Association and 
the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, in reality the repression ended up 
strongly unifying the two formerly distinct parties and fostered strong party discipline.  
While the SPD was not dependent upon any other organization, it did 
immediately establish a close and mutually beneficial affiliation with the trade unions, 
while still maintaining a clear separation from them. The repeal of the Socialist Laws in 
1890 was a prerequisite for the organizational development and regional restructuring of 
the SPD, which occurred at the turn of the century. It was finalized at the Jena 
Conference of 1905, when the organization “underwent centralization […] and 
organizational homogeneity was imposed on the local associations” (Panebianco, 1988, 
p. 76).
In 1914, SPD membership surpassed the 1 million mark and reflected the parties 
assent as Germany’s strongest political party. At the end of the First World War the more 
radical wing of the party broke off to form what eventually became the Communist Party 
of Germany, their reasoning being that the parliamentary process did not bring about the 
desired progress of the workers movement as effectively as a revolution might. This 
secession weakened the party and while the SPD was able to rule Prussia continuously 
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from 1919 until 1932, the party was not able to replicate this success at the national level. 
During the years of the Weimar Republic the party was part of multiple coalition 
governments, but the overall political instability of the young republic, as indicated by 
the nine general elections over 14 years from 1919 until 1933, also affected the SPD. The 
last coalition government with SPD involvement fell apart in 1930. During Hitler’s rise to 
power, the SPD was too weak to prevent the end of the Weimar Republic. When the SPD 
voted against Hitler’s Enabling Act in 1933 the party was shortly thereafter banned and 
its members heavily persecuted (Decker, 2017a).  
 The SPD’s reorganization after the Second World War in the Western occupied 
zones did not initially lead to electoral success. In fact, during the first decade of the 
fledgling Federal Republic, the SPD was relegated to the opposition. The SPD’s 
predicament was caused, in part, by its lack of transformation. The leadership of the post-
World War II era consisted primarily of the same party functionaries who led the party 
before 1933, and the basic statutes, which laid the foundation for the SPD’s outlook and 
conduct, closely resembled old decrees (Jun, 2004, p. 253). Additionally, the new 
political and economic climate in the young republic substantially transformed the labor 
movement. The so-called “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder), with its increase in 
real wages and increased consumption opportunities, even for the working class, slowly 
worked against Marxist ideas. The party started a transformation process in the 1950s, 
which was completed in 1959 when the SPD completely purged Marxism from its 
program at its party convention in Bad Godesberg. The programmatic resolution was 
symbolic for the transformation from a single-issue party, based upon class, to a people’s 
party (Jun, 2004, p. 254).  
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 In 1972 the SPD succeeded for the first time at becoming the strongest party of 
the Federal Republic at the national level. The key to this success was that its policies and 
proposals were able to attract both the party’s traditional clientele of industrial workers as 
well as large portions of the aspiring middle class. Its programmatic core was based upon 
organizing the economy according to the principles of Keynesianism, deescalating 
tensions between East and West Germany, and introducing new social policies. In 1982 
the party took on the role of opposition leader as the Kohl era began (Decker, 2016). 
Gerhard Schröder’s victory in 1998 over the incumbent chancellor Kohl was considered 
to be a political rupture. It marked a generational change with the first government, which 
for the most part consisted of members who did not experience the Nazi era or World 
War II. The first legislative period of the SPD-led government was marked by the lack of 
a clear course when it came to economic and social policies. It was only in 2003 after his 
reelection that Chancellor Schröder pursued a clear goal as he pushed a market liberal 
reform agenda through parliament. This Agenda 2010 constituted a solid challenge to the 
policies that the party had pursued in the past and large parts of the party were not 
prepared to accept this strong programmatic realignment (Decker 2016).  
 While the SPD barely missed capturing the majority of votes at the early election 
in 2005, ever since, the party has not even come close to the share of votes that its main 
rival, the CDU/CSU, regularly wins at federal elections. In 2009 and 2013 the party 
reached its worst election results since 1949 with only 23% and 25% of the overall votes, 
respectively. This is a serious failure for a party that considers itself a large people's party 
with broad appeal and having garnered around 40% of the votes at general elections since 
the 1960s. This dramatic drop in electoral support is best explained by the programmatic 
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shifts that the SPD enacted in the post-WWII era. In 1959, with the adoption of the Bad 
Godesberg program the party officially renounced Marxism and affirmed its commitment 
to democracy, the social market economy, and deescalating East-West tensions. This 
transformed the SPD from a much narrower worker’s party into a broad people’s party 
(SPD, 1959). The next significant programmatic shift was solidified 40 years later, at the 
party’s 1989 convention in Berlin. The Berlin program expanded the SPD’s focus beyond 
its traditional issues of social justice, worker’s rights, and international cooperation to 
include strong concern for environmental protection, gender equality, and international 
peace (SPD, 1989). The most recent paradigm shift was formalized in the Hamburg 
program of 2007, which was necessary to embed the significant liberal market reforms 
that Chancellor Schröder had pushed through parliament from 2003 until 2005. 
The Agenda 2010 reforms were Schröder’s response to the EU’s Lisbon strategy, 
which was designed to transform the EU’s economy into the most competitive knowledge 
based economy in the world by 2010. The intention was to create a better framework for 
economic growth and to decrease unemployment in Germany. The implementation of this 
reform agenda meant that the SPD more or less broke with its long tradition of 
advocating for more worker’s protection and increased social equality. Despite the 
opposition in his own party, Schröder announced significant reforms in March 2003 in a 
government declaration before parliament. He stated that the efforts of the state must be 
curtailed. Instead, the state will encourage more individual responsibility and demand 
greater personal efforts from everyone. No group in society will be spared; everyone has 
to contribute their share (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 2479). Agenda 2010 was largely 
implemented by the SPD and Green government from 2003 until 2005. At the heart of 
145 
these reforms was a provision that limited payments from Germany’s state run 
unemployment insurance. Under the new guidelines, income based unemployment 
benefits would end in most cases after 1 year, after which further benefits would require a 
means test and would be based upon the general welfare provisions. Additional changes 
made it easier to hire and fire employees, increased the retirement age, and increased 
employee’s contributions to the social safety net. Agenda 2010 was regarded by many 
party members and supporters as a betrayal of some of the fundamental principles of 
social justice and democracy. As a response former members of the SPD and union 
members founded a new party in January of 2005 called Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit 
– Die Wahlalternative (WASG), which stands for Labour and Social Justice – The
Electoral Alternative. Even the SPD’s former party chairmen and candidate for 
chancellor in the 1990 election Oskar Lafontaine joined the new party and became its 
most important figure. He later organized a coalition of the left with the former East 
German communist party, which was the basis for the founding of the Left party (for 
more details see Chapter 9). This new party established an alternative for voters left of 
the SPD on the political spectrum, whose political relevance is underpinned by federal 
electoral successes in which they received approximately 10% of votes.  
6.1 SPD Election Programs 
This section summarizes the most important points from each election program as 
they relate to globalization. The goal is to identify the core message that the SPD 
communicates to voters for the examined 23-year time span in federal elections. The 
emphasis is on globalization, trade, and other economic issues, but the goal is to take a 
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broader look at the election programs in general. This is necessary to address the broad 
questions previously raised (see Chapter 3). The review of the seven election programs 
will be followed by an analysis of how the SPD relates to the issue of globalization and 
trade, as well as how the SPD programs relate to the theoretical positions outlined in 
Chapter 3. 
6.1.1 The 1990 Election 
In the introduction of their 1990 election program, the SPD asserts that the 
ecological-social market economy must be a key element of a modern Germany. 
Furthermore, the party proclaims that the SPD represents security in all social areas like 
no other party. Of course, it also mentions the challenges and opportunities that go along 
with the reunification of Germany, like improving living standards in East Germany, 
making sure that people find employment, and restructuring the planned economy. The 
1990 program also promises a policy change in Germany’s military spending. The SPD 
vows to drastically reduce the defense budget and to use the funds instead for improving 
social equality in Germany, Europe, and the Third World (SPD, 1990, p. 6). 
The first chapter in the 1990 program is all about environmental policies. The 
SPD starts out by asserting that the ecological restructuring of the industrial society and 
the ecological realignment of the social market economy is the paramount political goal 
of the next decade (SPD, 1990, p. 7). Accordingly, the program talks about the need to 
reduce energy consumption. The SPD supports measures for renovating buildings to 
make them more energy efficient and to make energy saving appliances that are produced 
in Germany an export hit (SPD, 1990, p. 8). The program also includes calls for increased 
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taxation for using cars and a new energy strategy, one that does not rely on nuclear 
technology. The final building block of the SPD environmental policy proposals is a call 
for more harmonized environmental standards and regulations (SPD, 1990, p. 9). Another 
important topic for the SPD is the important role that unions play in German society. 
According to the SPD, they are a vital element for modernizing Germany’s economy 
(SPD, 1990, p. 20), but they also protect the rights and interests of regular workers 
through the principle of codetermination and they also push for environmentally friendly 
production processes (SPD, 1990, p. 25). 
 Issues such as the creation of new affordable homes that people can live in with 
dignity, better family support, increasing equality between genders, care for the elderly 
and securing living standards for seniors make up the middle section of the program. One 
issue that is fleetingly mentioned is health care (see SPD, 1990, pp. 13-18). Within these 
pages there is also a brief point that addresses international competition, stating that 
Germany is an excellent location for companies and that the SPD will improve this 
position even further. The rest of the program does not pick up on this issue though, so it 
is not clear how this will be achieved. The only policy proposal that directly addresses 
competitiveness is the suggestion that small business will be granted tax free saving as 
long as the money is used for investments into the company (SPD, 1990, p. 13). 
 The SPD heavily criticizes the CDU government for their decision to declare the 
Deutsche Mark as the only legal tender for East Germany. According to the SPD this 
exposed the uncompetitive East German economy instantaneously to global markets 
without allowing any time for structural reforms, which caused a tremendous amount of 
unemployment and burdened the state with huge fiscal obligations (SPD, 1990, p. 19). 
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The SPD’s proposed solution to this problem is to heavily invest in qualification 
measures, to increase privatization, to increase investment in infrastructure, and to 
support new entrepreneurs more effectively. Another important issue for the SPD in 1990 
is the peace dividend. Since the iron curtain peacefully collapsed and East-West tensions 
had largely subsided the SPD calls for a much reduced number in the troop strength of 
the Bundeswehr and in the number of foreign troops stationed in Germany. The SPD also 
demands that no nuclear weapons be stored on German soil and they promise to support a 
lower number of military forces in Europe as a whole, though it remains committed to 
NATO as Germany’s primary security alliance. The issue of globalization is not 
mentioned at all in the 1990 program and trade is only mentioned once in the context of 
creating trade policies that are more in favor of developing countries, so as to build a 
socially and ecologically responsible global trade order (SPD, 1990, p. 23). 
 
6.1.2 The 1994 Election 
In 1994 the SPD puts an emphasis on creating jobs, especially in East Germany 
and a general drive to modernize the economy, the state, and society as a whole. They 
acknowledge that this is only possible if Germany’s economy remains highly productive 
and internationally competitive. This is why the Social Democrats want to foster more 
structural reforms and ensure that German products have an internationally recognized 
high standard of quality and innovation. This also applies to products from the newly 
integrated federal states, which require some additional support and protection to become 
competitive. The economy as a whole is faced with tremendous opportunities as a result 
of its geographic proximity to the newly opened markets in East and Central Europe. 
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These new export markets will be made accessible and developed with the help of 
federally backed export credit guarantees (SPD, 1994, pp. 10-13). 
This program focuses on strong unions and the ability to engage in collective 
bargaining as vital building blocks for a prosperous and social society. Employees must 
have the right to go on strikes and labor laws and protections need to be adapted to better 
reflect new technological developments. One opportunity that needs to be advanced is to 
have machines run much longer, while at the same time ensuring that workers do not 
work overtime. Thus, jobs could be created and employees would be able to improve 
their work life balance (SPD, 1994, pp. 15-17). Additionally, it is important to ensure that 
as the economy grows, and with it the workforce, that women are able to more fully 
participate. It is a task of the state to ensure gender equality and to build job training and 
academic programs that are specifically targeted at women to improve their qualifications 
(SPD, 1994, p. 19, p. 21). 
Another issue that has a high priority for the SPD in its 1994 campaign program is 
to build a social and ecological society which is backed by a stable and effective social 
support system. Goals in this context include to push for global environmental standards 
and to persuade EU partners to introduce taxes that create more green incentives. 
Furthering environmentally friendly research and development is the best way to 
guarantee that German manufacturers have green products that are essential for the 
markets of the future (SPD, 1994, pp. 26-27). This also includes a competitive and 
ecologically responsible agricultural sector that adapts to new environmental 
requirements and grows to utilize more of Germany’s land. However, the SPD also 
includes a pledge to support part of their traditional clientele, coal miners. The support 
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for this particularly dirty form of energy extraction is certainly juxtaposed to the 
otherwise environmentally protective message of this election program (SPD, 1994, pp. 
29-31).
Of course, the SPD also addresses the need for a state with a strong social agenda 
and refers, in this context, to the constitution which defines Germany as a social state 
(SPD, 1994, p. 58). In terms of policies this means that the SPD advocates for 
strengthening the state’s ability to provide a good education for all children in society 
regardless of their background and to strengthen families with children. Further policy 
issues that are addressed are providing more subsidies for home builders, ensure 
affordable housing, and protection for retired people in general, but especially for those 
who are in need of long term care (SPD, 1994, pp. 38-49). Securing a successful 
transformation of the East German states is also an important concern for the SPD. 
Failure of the system in East Germany does not mean that the people are a failure. 
Therefore, opportunities must be created for everyone, and the burden of rebuilding the 
former socialist state must be equally shared (SPD, 1994, pp. 50-51). Additionally, the 
SPD supports policies that create more gender equality, a balanced budget, better policing 
against crime (SPD, 1994, pp. 50-69), and more support for culture and the arts. Artistic 
freedom and culture are essential elements for society and must be available to anyone, 
according to the SPD. The government should actively encourage projects and 
institutions that promote culture that transcends national concepts (SPD, 1994, p. 22). 
The SPD expresses concern over nationalism, also in conjunction with international 
cooperation, because in the party’s view, overcoming nationalism is vital for building a 
peaceful and cooperative Europe (SPD, 1994, p. 74). 
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The final chapter of the 1994 election program focuses on the new role that a 
unified Germany must find on the international stage. Germany’s goal must be to take on 
more responsibility globally and to promote peace and security. Part of this responsibility 
includes supporting development efforts in the southern hemisphere that are sustainable 
and in harmony with the environment, while at the same time promoting social justice 
and sustaining personal liberty and abhorring exploitation (SPD, 1994, p. 72).  
The SPD also expresses strong support for the EU and NATO as the two pillars 
upon which Germany’s stability and security are based. The party also acknowledges that 
transatlantic cooperation at the end of the 20th century is more about economic 
cooperation between the USA and Europe than it is about questions of mutual security. 
While the SPD never mentions the term globalization anywhere in its election program, it 
does state that Germany is integrated into the global economy like no other state. It is 
therefore in Germany’s interest to promote economic cooperation and to foster 
sustainable development within a fair global trade order. While trade must be open and 
fair, it is requisite that it does not promote environmental or social dumping. According 
to the SPD these provisions need to be included in the next round of GATT negotiations, 
but without creating new restrictions to trade (SPD, 1994, pp. 73-75).   
 
6.1.3 The 1998 Election 
The SPD refers to their 1998 program as a blue print for a better and more just 
Germany (SPD 1998, 79). Unsurprisingly, this idea of a better Germany begins with an 
argument to finally vote the CDU led government out of office. The SPD claims that 
policies which promote unity within Germany’s society and social justice are long 
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overdue. A fair distribution of collectively achieved prosperity is necessary. Therefore, a 
renewal of the social market economy is indispensable with a promise of more jobs, 
innovation, and justice (SPD, 1998, p. 12). It is paramount in this respect that companies 
and unions sit down together to jointly agree upon the measures that they want to take to 
reduce unemployment (SPD, 1998, p. 11). With regard to globalization, the SPD wants 
the German economy to utilize all the opportunities that go along with an increasingly 
globalized world. The best way to make use of these opportunities is by advocating for 
policies that increase domestic reforms and international cooperation. A particularly 
important building block for this cooperation is the European unification process which 
creates new possibilities for increasing prosperity and jobs. It must be the goal to extract 
a maximum of utility from competition and markets, but globalized markets require a fair 
global economic order. This order needs to be built upon the foundation of a social and 
ecological market economy and ought to work against any form of protectionism (SPD, 
1998, pp. 14-15). 
The SPD campaigns unequivocally for the right of unions to engage in collective 
bargaining, as it is a hallmark of Germany’s social makeup. It guarantees flexible 
solutions for individual industries and prosperity for society as a whole (SPD, 1998, p. 
18). The SPD also calls for more protection for employees by, for example, making it 
harder to fire people or increasing benefits for workers who have been laid off. 
Companies that are willing to hire the unemployed are promised financial incentives like 
discounts on lower indirect labor cost or to get reimbursed for on the job training (SPD, 
1998, pp. 23-24). Tax policies under a SPD led government will increase corporate taxes, 
but will generally lower taxes for individuals and reduce the number of tax exceptions 
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(SPD, 1998, pp. 27-30). The SPD’s election program includes a chapter called social 
security and justice, which is where the party lays out its policies on retirement benefits, 
health care benefits, affordable housing, and immigration (SPD, 1998, pp. 37-44). The 
guiding principle for all these issues is that any form of community does not just afford 
rights but also includes obligations (SPD, 1998, p. 38). 
Other issues that the SPD addresses in their election program are increasing 
support for families, new policies that promote more gender equality, better education 
opportunities for youth, ensuring secure retirement benefits, and advocating for 
ecological modernization with harmonized European environmental regulation and 
international standards against environmental dumping (SPD, 1998, pp. 45-61). The SPD 
also promotes a state that acts as a partner for citizens in building a strong community. 
This can be accomplished by providing excellent public services, creating more local 
opportunities for democratic participation, and increased funding and support for culture. 
It is important to note here that for the SPD culture means diversity and not the 
perpetuation of a specific national identity (SPD, 1998, pp. 62-67). Pledges to increase 
crime prevention efforts and to unequivocally punish offenders are also included in the 
SPD’s 1998 program. The party asserts that there is a social component to the overall 
crime rate. This is why crime prevention for the SPD also includes steps to reduce mass 
unemployment, provide better education, and an overall strong social net, especially for 
families, so that everyone can participate in society and its material prosperity (SPD, 
1998, pp. 68-69).  
The final chapter of the 1998 program addresses what the SPD calls the new 
international responsibility of a unified Germany. The party formulates a decisive 
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commitment to the European integration process, because a unified Germany is the best 
guarantee for peace, security, and social stability. It is vital that Germany be an engine for 
European and international cooperation with the intent to raise social standards across 
Europe, but also to promote tax harmonization in Europe and to combat tax havens (SPD, 
1998, pp. 72-73). The SPD also seeks to promote an economic order that is shaped by the 
principles of a social and ecological market economy. International organizations like the 
UN, OECD, WTO, International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Group of Eight must 
build an economic order that creates fair global competition and is built upon 
environmental and labor standards, which prevent exploitation of humans and the 
environment. In this regard, it is an important step for the SPD to strengthen the role of 
labor unions so that employees everywhere have a way to get their voices heard (SPD, 
1998, p. 75). The SPD also reaffirms its commitment to NATO as the key for the security 
and stability of Europe and a pledge to agitate for reforms of the UN to strengthen its role 
and independence (SPD, 1998, p. 77). The most important tool for the Social Democrats 
in terms of succeeding in a globalized world is the European economic and monetary 
union. The introduction of the Euro as legal tender creates the opportunity for the 
members of the monetary union to shape the future conditions of globalization (SPD, 
1998, p. 74). 
6.1.4 The 2002 Election 
The SPD’s 2002 program begins with a preamble, which outlines the SPD’s 
achievements during the previous legislative period, stating that the party has pursued 
policies for the center that started a renewal of Germany. The party plans to continue this 
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renewal process and to pursue further reforms that modernize Germany and make it 
fairer, more ecologically responsible, and more progressive. The SPD presents 
fundamental alternatives such as consolidating public spending or irresponsible expenses 
that create risks for future generations, social cohesion or the polarization of society. The 
very first so-called fundamental alternative that the SPD presents is choice between 
reasonable rules for the globalization of the economy or markets that are left to 
themselves (SPD, 2002, pp. 7-8). 
 The remainder of the SPD’s program is a list of policies sorted into 20 different 
policy fields. Interestingly, the very first one is about Germany’s role in the world. 
Typically, this type of chapter is at the end of the election campaign and not at the start, 
which says something about how relevant the party considers the topic to its electoral 
success. This program is clearly an exception; international issues in general and 
globalization in particular are given unusually high importance by the SPD in 2002. The 
party states that globalization is a reality; any attempts to stop it are illusionary. To let it 
run its course is dangerous. Instead it is crucial to shape it and to use its potential for 
everyone (SPD, 2002, p. 15). The goal must be an economic order that is built upon the 
goals of a social and ecological market economy.  The SPD advocates for global trade 
relations that focus on the interests of the developing countries. This means also that the 
SPD will fight for further trade liberalization in future trade negotiations. All these efforts 
must be realized under the guiding principle of strengthening employee rights and 
improved environmental protection. Specific policies that the SPD pursues in this regard 
include a stable financial system that can function as an engine for economic growth. 
Developing countries should receive better access to markets for their products and 
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medication should be more available to their people. Additionally, developing countries 
need a fair integration into the global trading system. More access to the WTO and a say 
in its structures will ensure that poor countries can see their own interests reflected in 
global trade regimes (SPD, 2002, pp. 15-16).  
 When it comes to Germany’s role in a globalized world, the SPD campaigns for a 
strong EU and while the European integration process has its own intrinsic value, it 
remains the indispensable answer to globalization. Therefore, it is paramount to 
strengthen the European society and its social model. The Euro is a key element in this 
regard as well as the EU enlargement into the former Soviet bloc states. The sizeable 
increase in the EU’s internal market entails significant opportunities for the German 
economy (SPD, 2002, pp. 16-18). At a later point in its program, when the SPD talks 
about the economy and employment, the SPD acknowledges that global economy 
developments influence domestic development, because Germany is part of a globalizing 
world. It is important that Germany play an active role in building clear rules into the 
global economy that reflect the party’s social and ecological values. The EU is an 
important tool in this regard. In fact, it is the SPD’s goal to shape the EU into the world’s 
most dynamic and competitive economy by 2010, an economy that supplies global 
markets with high quality products (SPD, 2002, pp. 20-22). In this context, the SPD 
identifies five lead industries: automotive, chemicals, energy, electrotechnology, and 
machine construction. These industries are global leaders and must remain such. This is 
why it is highly important that Germany remains a very interesting and competitive 
location so that companies keep investing in Germany (SPD, 2002, p. 21). This instance 
constitutes the only point where the SPD singles out certain industries. Otherwise the 
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party only talks about the economy as a whole, except for the sporadic references about 
coal mining. The 2002 election program includes one such instance as well. The SPD 
places a particular focus on renewable energy without oil or nuclear energy, in order to 
build a sustainable and green energy supply for the future. Interestingly enough, the SPD 
emphasizes that domestic coal remains an important element of this modern energy plan 
as long as it used in an environmentally friendly way (SPD, 2002, p. 36). Clearly, this is 
not motivated by concerns for the environment, but is an attempt to pander to some of the 
party’s oldest supporters.  
  Other policy goals include tax reforms, with significant income tax cuts, better 
support and training for the unemployed, more flexibility with regard to labor laws in 
order to make it easier for companies to hire and fire people, better and more job relevant 
education and higher education for everyone regardless of their socioeconomic 
background (SPD, 2002, pp. 23-33). In general, the program tries to find the right balance 
between reforms that create more flexibility and opportunities at the expense of some 
security, while at the same time reforming government programs so that they work more 
efficiently and effectively. Overall the goal is not to create flexibility at the expense of 
the social safety net (SPD, 2002, p. 27). Specific efforts that the SPD plans once it is in 
power are to implement the idea of demand and support. Besides demanding more 
flexibility from voters the Social Democrats support people in need with better services 
for the unemployed, more transparence with regard to social security payments and its 
eligibility requirements, affordable housing, more support for children, and increased 
flexibility for single parents (SPD, 2002, pp. 44-48). Furthermore, the SPD advocates for 
more gender equality, a health care system that provides services based on need and not 
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on income, consumer protection, domestic security, and immigration (SPD, 2002, pp. 53-
64).  
 In terms of culture and identity the SPD reaffirms that Germany is a pluralistic 
society which is based upon mutual respect and recognition. The SPD asserts that it has 
always been a party that fights for justice and against exploitation and marginalization. In 
order to improve the cooperation between various diverse groups and people in Germany 
the SPD fights for the recognition of all different cultures and that they are accepted as 
equal (SPD, 2002, p. 67). The party also calls for a form of culture that includes a 
European dimension as well as inclusivity of minorities, allowing minorities to be 
reflected within Germany’s culture. This strengthens the overall cohesiveness of 
Germany’s society (SPD, 2002, p. 69).  
 
6.1.5 The 2005 Election 
The SPD’s 2005 election program starts by justifying the election for which SPD 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had called, 1 year earlier than scheduled. Germany’s 
economy was stagnating and unemployment historically high at the turn of the century. 
The SPD-led government felt that the only way out of this situation was significant 
reform of Germany’s social net and employment structure. These reforms were highly 
controversial within German society, but also within the SPD itself. When Chancellor 
Schröder came under threat of losing his parliamentary majority he called for an early 
election hoping that voters would support his reform course and give him a new mandate. 
 The 2005 election program starts out with a format of broad declarations and an 
analysis of Germany’s current situation. The basic message that the party wants to 
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convey is that it still affirms its commitment to a strong economy that fairly distributes its 
gains and is the foundation for everyone’s prosperity. In this context, the SPD advocates 
for a strong state that provides a maximum of social security to its citizens (SPD, 2005, p. 
3). The program then proceeds to list all the problems that the current SPD-led 
government inherited from the Kohl era and how hard Schröder and his cabinet had to 
fight to overcome this legacy. This appears to be a bit out of place, given that the SPD 
had been in power for almost two full legislative periods. In addition to blaming the 
coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP for increased government debt, increased indirect labor 
cost, and the failed transformation of East Germany, the SPD also claims that the 
previous government has created a social safety net of illusions and shaped labor policies 
without perspectives, which has led to a situation where Germany is unable to meet the 
challenges of globalization and demographic change (SPD, 2005, p. 4). 
 One indication of Germany’s very strong economy is that no other country 
exports as much as Germany (SPD, 2005, p. 5), which fits nicely with the general 
perception that German parties like to communicate; exporting goods is a sign of strength 
whereas a high level of imports reveals how moribund an economy is. While the SPD 
emphasizes Germany's exporting strength, it also very directly criticizes the CDU/CSU 
and the FDP for continuously propagating the misconception that prosperity is best 
achieved through unrestrained markets. According to the SPD global markets need rules 
and regulations to work effectively, but the economic policies of the Union and the FDP 
advocate for more market power, which would transform Germany into a different 
country, one where the social market economy would not be seen as a prerequisite of 
economic success but rather as a liability to Germany’s prosperity.  Instead of politically 
160 
 
shaping globalization, the CDU/CSU and FDP would simply subjugate Germany to 
globalization’s forces. Deregulation and market forces would only lead to insecurity and 
a lack of prosperity (SPD, 2005, p. 13). The SPD also tries to differentiate itself from its 
competitors on the left of the political spectrum by vilifying their positions. SPD argues 
that other left parties’ proposals are absolutely unsuitable for addressing the problems of 
a modern knowledge based society in a globalized world, primarily because their 
solutions would bankrupt the state and create a culture of state dependency. The SPD 
calls this ‘irresponsible populism’ (SPD, 2005, p. 14).  
 The election campaign then changes format and goes from this broad declarative 
style to an action point format by formulating a list of 21 goals for Germany, which will 
determine the policies that the SPD will enact during the upcoming legislative period. 
The SPD’s plan includes further investment in higher education and job training, as well 
as stronger support of women in jobs that are traditionally male jobs. The platform also 
propagates a restructuring of employment centers. Here the emphasis is on providing 
more personnel to increase support for job seekers to reduce the time that an individual is 
unemployed (SPD, 2005, pp. 16-22). They also reiterate their support for a minimum 
wage, employee protection laws to prevent a hire and fire culture, as well as the right for 
labor unions to autonomously negotiate with employers (SPD, 2005, pp. 23-24) 
 The SPD states that employees have made a lot of sacrifices in the past few years 
to get Germany’s economy back on track and to reduce unemployment numbers. Some of 
the reforms that the SPD legislated were not easy to stomach for large parts of the 
German public, which is why it is now the time for employers to make similar sacrifices. 
Now that the economy is doing better, it is only fair that employees benefit fairly from 
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increased profits (SPD, 2005, p. 23). Another social issue that is important for the SPD is 
that household income increasingly determines the educational opportunities of children, 
which is why the SPD wants to better fund schools and provide more school programs 
that offer children developmental opportunities throughout the entire school day. Early 
childhood education would also receive more funding by the SPD, for example by 
providing government subsidized day care for a growing number of parents. Here, there 
is special emphasis on supporting children of immigrants who are more likely to have 
language barriers (SPD, 2005, pp. 28-29). Retirement and long term care, along with 
sports and culture, are touched upon only briefly and without much substance (SPD, 
2005, pp. 35-36). Culture is discussed in a very intangible way and is linked to identity, 
not to a type of homeland, Christianity or some narrow definition of identity and culture, 
to which the CDU regularly refers (SPD, 2005, p. 32).  
 With regard to taxes, the SPD promotes the idea that those who are more 
prosperous than others need to do more to support society as a whole, which is why a flat 
income tax is not acceptable. A progressive tax system and a reduction of tax exemptions 
are at the core of the SPD’s social agenda. In that context, the SPD also clearly speaks 
out against using taxes exemptions, especially in the EU, as a tool for creating incentives 
for companies to relocate to a more tax friendly location. This only leads to a disastrous 
race to the bottom, which is why the SPD calls for urgent tax harmonization across the 
EU (SPD, 2005, p. 38). Other issues that the SPD addresses are the need for a global 
energy solution and a competitive agricultural sector. Unfortunately, there is nothing 
global in the positions that the SPD outlines. Instead there is only talk about clean energy 
and a reduction of Germany’s energy dependence. Concrete policy proposals include 
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subsidies for green forms of energy production while at the same time promoting new 
highly efficient coal plants. It is interesting to note that the SPD sees coal mining as a 
profession with a future in Germany. Such statements can only be meant to please some 
of the party’s oldest supporters: the coal miners (SPD, 2005, pp. 25-26).  
On the last two pages of their 2005 program the SPD addresses Germany’s global 
role. First, there is the affirmation that the EU is a vital tool for cooperation and that it 
can increase peace, security, and global justice (SPD, 2005, p. 41). The SPD assures 
voters that it has learned that security is not just based upon military strength, but that a 
peaceful and forward looking approach can increase stability and peace. In order to 
accomplish this goal, it is paramount that Germany strengthens its alliances and the high 
profile international institutions (UN, NATO, EU) of which it is a member. The SPD 
asserts that Germany must play a more pronounced role in these institutions and take on 
more leadership responsibilities. With regard to development issues, the SPD states that it 
wants to realize the UN’s Millennium Development Goals and in an effort to show its 
commitment the party promises to increase the budget for international development 
from 0.51% to 0.7% of Germany’s GDP. Other concrete policy proposals include more 
debt relief for poor countries, to promote fairer global trade via the WTO, and to stop 
subsidizing agricultural exports (SPD, 2005, p. 42). The following are two of the most 
well-formed ideas on globalization contained in the entire platform: Germany has an 
important role in shaping globalization so that its effects are more just (SPD, 2005, p. 
41), and Germany must build an alliance with NGOs and religious organizations to shape 
globalization in a positive way (SPD, 2005, p. 42). It is interesting to note that the SPD 
not only recognizes and communicates to voters that globalization needs to be shaped or 
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formed, but also that it affirms that it is possible to shape globalization. Unfortunately, 
these declarations remain vague and rather limited. It would be much more helpful to 
explain in more detail how the SPD is planning to make globalization work better for the 
German people. Given the impact that globalization has and its impact on a broad range 
of policy fields it would be more sensible to address the issue throughout the election 
program and not just squeeze in two ambiguous references on the last two pages of their 
election platform. 
 
6.1.6 The 2009 Election 
One of the SPD’s primary goals is to generate a social partnership between 
companies and unions to share responsibility for sustaining peace and stability. This 
creates a society where every citizen takes on personal responsibility for shaping a social 
home or homeland. While the SPD uses the same German word, “Heimat” that the CDU 
does throughout their election programs, for the SPD this word has a very different 
connotation. It is not linked to a particular nationality, culture, or religion; instead it 
reflects a place of acceptance, inclusion, and belonging regardless of race, gender, 
nationality, sexual orientation, age, or religious convictions (SPD, 2009, p. 13, p. 59). 
The core goals for this type of society are employment for everyone, an easier transition 
for youth into the labor force, a more sustainable energy concept, comprehensive gender 
equality, increased support for families of all shapes and types, and a stronger Europe that 
stands for international cooperation and peace. All of these goals must be built upon the 
proven foundation of the social market order which has created 60 years of success for 
Germany. All that is necessary now is to restart the social market order that Social 
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Democrats and the unions have built in the past (SPD, 2009, pp. 13-14).  
 The SPD also claims responsibility for transforming Germany from the sick man 
of Europe to its uncontested powerhouse. According to the SPD, it was the reforms that 
the Schröder government introduced that brought about this transformation and generated 
an innovative and powerful export sector with a strong domestic market (SPD 2009, 15). 
While there is generally a consensus among experts that the SPD-led reforms at the 
beginning of the 20th century have helped to strengthen Germany’s competitiveness they 
are also associated with social coldness and have created many heated debates within the 
SPD, as well as drawing a lot of critique among traditional SPD supporters. Therefore, it 
is important to see the party referring to those policies as the key building blocks in 
Germany’s success, while at the same time calling for a new social beginning and a 
turning away from the seemingly unjust policies of a Merkel-led government.  
 The key economic goal for the SPD in 2009 is overcoming obstacles to social 
mobility (SPD, 2009, p. 31). The building blocks for achieving this goal are universal 
employment at an income level that allow households to be self-sustaining (SPD, 2009, p. 
20, p. 31). A big concern for the SPD in this regard is the company practice of hiring 
cheap contractors who work for less money instead of offering fulltime employment with 
full benefits and protection. In order to combat this development, the SPD would 
introduce policies that require companies to pay equal wages to both regular staff and 
contract employees if they are doing the same work. The other big issue that the SPD 
pushes, in order to promote social mobility, is collective bargaining. This bargaining 
must take place autonomously and its outcomes need to be unequivocally honored. The 
SPD demands that as part of any collective bargaining all negotiating parties need to 
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agree on a minimum wage standard for their particular industry. This would allow 
employees to lead self-sustaining lives based on a livable wage (SPD, 2009, pp. 31-32). 
Besides a minimum wage, the SPD also calls for a lowering of taxes, housing subsidies 
for people with low incomes, and more financial support for families. These measures are 
designed to guarantee a sustainable financial situation for anyone and everyone who 
works (SPD, 2009, p. 33). 
Additional policies that the SPD suggests in order to create more social mobility 
are reforms of the education system to create fewer path-dependencies and to make 
academic achievement less reliant on parental income. Germany also needs more 
employment options for older workers, a legal right to child care so that parents can 
work, gender equal pay, and better integration of immigrants and people with disabilities 
in the workforce (SPD, 2009, pp. 33-42). Secure retirement and available long-term care 
are also necessary along with an overall good health care system that provides universally 
good care and not care based on individual wealth (SPD, 2009, pp. 51-54). It is also 
interesting to see that the SPD emphasizes the social component of its environmental 
policies. The party argues that pollution and noise disproportionately affect poor people 
and their health. Therefore, social justice demands greener technologies and more 
environmentally friendly production processes in order to improve the quality of life for 
all citizens (SPD, 2009, p. 73). 
Towards the end of their 2009 election campaign the SPD talks about a global 
community of responsibility. Globalized markets require political globalization, a 
multilateral political process that devises fair rules and is designed to generate new global 
structures. In this process, there must be a special emphasis on support for the poorest 
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individuals. Financial, economic, and resource crises must not be pushed on the world’s 
poorest. Instead there should be a global solidarity to help especially those with the 
greatest needs. The SPD would address these issues by strengthening the United Nations 
and reinforcing its role as the only legitimate global leader. In the wake of the global 
financial crisis the SPD perceives an opportunity to reorder the international financial 
system. It is an opportunity to strengthen the role of the IMF and World Bank and to give 
developing countries a bigger say within those organizations. Another important building 
block for global solidarity is free and fair global trade; the financial crisis must not lead to 
a walling-off of markets or protectionism. Instead the WTO needs to find better ways of 
enabling developing countries to participate in worldwide trade; this includes the 
abolition of agricultural export subsidies as well as social and ecological minimum 
standards (SPD, 2009, pp. 81-82). The SPD also campaigns for greater acceptance and 
implementation of human rights as well as a greater effort to achieve the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals (SPD, 2009, pp. 87-89). 
 
6.1.7 The 2013 Election 
In 2013 the SPD celebrated its 150th anniversary and the party used that year’s 
federal election program to remind voters of their long tradition, that they are Germany’s 
oldest democratic party and the party with the longest social democratic tradition in the 
world. Since its founding in 1863 the party has fought for freedom, democracy, and 
justice. Its members have always promoted solidarity and a progressive society, which 
protects and enables individuals (SPD, 2013, p. 4). Based upon this tradition the SPD 
campaigns for a Germany that is better and more justly governed, which primarily means 
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creating a new social balance (SPD, 2013, p. 6). The SPD asserts that the reforms and in 
particular the agenda 2010 which it initiated while in government from 1998 until 2009 
created a great foundation for success in Germany, because it caused an increase in 
spending on education and research. The reforms also vastly expanded sources of 
renewable energy and got thousands of people off of welfare payments and into the labor 
market. The SPD asserts that social democratic policies during this period have 
transformed Germany into a strong country with great potential (SPD, 2013, p. 7). 
 However, the current Union and FDP government squandered these opportunities. 
The risk of not being able to participate in Germany’s society has increased during their 
reign. This is especially true for people with disabilities, single parents, people who have 
only minimal professional qualifications, or those who have a weak socioeconomic 
background. Additionally, a successful education largely depends on parental income, 
which does not help to overcome social mobility in Germany. Thus, current policies 
increase divisions within society (SPD, 2013, pp. 8-9). The SPD believes that this 
development is only exacerbated by the Merkel government and its stringent austerity 
policies, because it adds to the crisis and curtails the state’s ability to build structures that 
enable all citizens to participate fully in society. The SPD does not suggest increasing 
government debt. In fact, it advocates saving, but not when it comes to education. A well-
educated and highly specialized workforce is key for achieving a prosperous, inclusive 
society, therefore the SPD wants to increase spending on education and research, which 
should be financed by tax increases for rich people (SPD, 2013, pp. 10-12). This 
emphasis on education is all encompassing from providing more childcare opportunities 
for small children to designing a school system that does not categorize students early in 
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their development (which creates path dependencies). The SPD’s educational goals also 
include ensuring better student performance, free university education, excellent trade 
and crafts programs, as well as secondary opportunities for anyone who wants to improve 
their skills and education throughout their life. In general, education policies need to be 
designed to provide constant opportunities for all walks of life (SPD, 2013, pp. 47-49). 
An important element of the SPD’s 2013 election program is its critique of what it 
refers to as market radicalism.  For the SPD, the conservative and neoliberal ideology that 
markets by themselves will be able to generate prosperity and a better society has been 
proven to be incorrect in the wake of the global financial crisis. The solution to this 
problem is a new beginning for the social market economy, new economic policies that 
do not allow for market radicalism that is able to take risks which privatize profits, but 
leave society with all the burdens if anything goes wrong.  What is necessary is a new 
economy with a culture of sustainability and long term growth. This requires 
compensation models for top managers that reward long term growth and more 
participation of ordinary employees in company decisions. Additionally, a larger share of 
company profits needs to be distributed among all workers and not just top executives 
(SPD, 2013, pp. 13-14). To this end the SPD reiterates multiple times the need for strong 
unions and independent collective bargaining. One of the primary goals of this bargaining 
should be to ensure that all employees are compensated equally if they do the same work. 
This is intended to address the problem that a significant share of Germany’s workforce 
labors in contract positions, which do not get compensated as well as regular positions, 
and also afford fewer benefits and protection compared to regular positions (SPD, 2013, 
pp. 17-19). One basic step to achieve a modicum of fairness in this regard would be a 
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universal minimum wage. This is an issue that is addressed in detail on four pages of the 
2013 campaign program, plus it is mentioned seven more times throughout the program 
(SPD, 2013, pp. 18-21, p. 31, p. 52, p. 66, p. 78, p. 79, p. 87, p. 103). 
 Other policy goals for the SPD in 2013 are intended to boost prosperity and 
equality include overcoming the gender gap in pay, creating more employment 
opportunities with benefits, to build a better qualified and trained workforce, to make it 
easier for foreigners to get their credentials recognized in Germany, to generate more 
incentives for private investment, and to create an atmosphere that makes it easier for 
entrepreneurs to start their own businesses (SPD, 2013, pp. 20-31). The Social Democrats 
also campaign for better support for retirees. The transition into retirement needs to be 
more flexible, and benefits for people who have made retirement contributed for more 30 
years need to be adequate to sustain a living standard that is above the welfare level. 
Additionally, the definition of contributing to retirement funds needs to be widened to 
include time for rearing children and providing long term care at home for family 
members (SPD, 2013, pp. 79-81).  
 Improved integration of foreigners into Germany’s society is also an important 
issue for the SPD. First, they propagate a very pluralistic view of society and culture. 
There is no talk about a German culture, only of an inclusive culture that is open to 
anyone who is not opposed to Germany’s democratic and pluralistic values. The SPD 
wants to allow everyone who is a legal resident in Germany to be able to take part in 
local elections and to allow dual citizenship (SPD, 2013, pp. 58-65). It is also important 
that diversity is reflected in Germany’s cities, where neighborhoods are heterogeneous 
living arrangements that reflect society as a whole. The forming of ghettos, may they be 
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due to cultural backgrounds or based on income, must be strongly combatted. This is one 
of the reasons why the SPD advocates for rental and utility assistance for low income 
families (SPD, 2013, pp. 84-87).  
 Environmental policies are also addressed. The SPD acknowledges that green 
policies have an important social component to them, because poor people suffer more 
from environmental problems since they lack the means to mitigate environmental 
problems or the mobility to just move to a neighborhood that is less impacted by 
pollution (SPD, 2013, pp. 91-92). Another point that the party makes in this context is 
that Germany’s energy transformation needs to be socially responsible. This transition is 
the determined move away from a national energy mix that includes nuclear power to one 
that exists completely without it and instead includes an increased share of energy from 
renewable sources. The SPD acknowledges that this requires significant investments that 
are largely financed by taxes on energy products, leading to relatively high prices. 
Therefore, policy must ensure that simple customer’s obligations are eased and that 
manufacturing companies that consume a large amount of energy need special tax cuts on 
energy consumption (SPD, 2013, pp. 39-41). With regard to Europe, the SPD not only 
supports the economic and monetary union, but also calls for a social union (SPD, 2013, 
p. 106). The goal must be to build a stronger social market economy in Europe, because a 
unified Europe can be strong and resist the cold pull of markets. It can also enable its 
citizens to succeed regardless of international competition and it can promote its values 
all over the world. European unity is key in this regard and it must include a harmonized 
tax system within the EU. Otherwise fair competition within the EU’s internal market is 
not possible (SPD, 2013, pp. 24-25). 
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The final chapter addresses globalization as part of Germany’s foreign policy 
strategy. The SPD describes a rapidly changing world that often is not just and where 
especially the poor suffer from the consequences of climate change and unfair global 
trade. Injustice is increasing around the world and it is unclear if fair and socially just 
globalization is possible or under what type of structure it could materialize, with rising 
economic powers like China, India, and Brazil. According to the SPD, a multilateral 
approach is necessary for solving the problems of promoting peace and overcoming 
violent conflict, stopping climate change, alleviating poverty and hunger, and subjecting 
financial markets to sensible regulation (SPD, 2013, p. 112). It is paramount that the 
globalization of markets is followed up by political globalization. Multilateral 
organizations are viewed as the primary means for achieving this type of globalization 
and a more just global order. Chief among all possible organizations are the United 
Nations as a tool for peace and security, but also smaller or more regional organizations 
like NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, 
WTO, and the Group of Twenty are important elements for achieving peace and a fairer 
distribution of wealth. In essence these organizations need to be strengthened and at times 
reformed so that they can truly fulfill their mandate and promote a better global order. 
Additionally, Germany needs to play a bigger role within these organizations and use its 
influence to shape new rules for fairer trade and better regulation (SPD, 2013, p. 113). 
Key steps in building a fairer world are ensuring global standards that protect humans 
from exploitation and abuse. Laws against any kind of forced labor, more protection 
against child labor and improved efforts to protect women and guarantee gender equal 
pay. Employees everywhere need to have the right to form unions and to engage in 
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collective bargaining (SPD, 2013, p. 114). The goal of German foreign policy must be to 
create the global structures that can make sure that these key steps can actually be 
implemented.   
 
6.2 Initial Election Program Analysis 
The following is a basic analysis of the five key terms across all seven SPD 
election programs. A detailed explanation of how the programs were analyzed, counted, 
clustered, and coded with regard to the five key terms can be found at the end of the 
methods chapter under 4.3. Here, the goal is to jump right to the analysis. Figure 6.1 
shows all direct references regarding globalization sorted according to the five key terms. 
By looking closely at the data, the following patterns can be detected. First, the term 
globalization appears to be relatively new to SPD election campaigns. The first time the 
SPD used the term in any of the examined election programs was four times in 1998. It is 
certainly possible that the party has referred directly to globalization in an election 
program prior to 1990, but one can assume that the term was at least not used in any 
systematic fashion prior to 1998. The most frequent use of the term globalization was 
during the 2002 and 2005 campaigns with a count of 15 times versus 10 instances for the 
2009 and 2013 elections. This is remarkable since the campaign programs for the last two 
examined elections are almost twice as long in terms of page count than the SPD’s first 
two election programs in the 21st century (113 pages versus 209 pages). In terms of 
saliency for the term globalization there has been a fairly sharp increase starting in 1998 
through 2005, but since then the SPD has emphasized the issue less frequently. 
Related terms such as trade, exports, and imports were used in the SPD’s 1990, 
173 
 
1994, and 1998 programs, but only a combined total of 15 times. This appears to be a low 
count for a combined 180 pages of campaign material for those three elections, after all 
the combined level of exports and imports accounted already for about 40% of 
Germany’s GDP for each of those three elections (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p. 20). 
Since 1998 these terms have been used a bit more frequently in SPD election campaigns 
for a total count of 42 instances on 322 pages, but still, given that during the last election 
in 2013 the combined level of exports and imports had reached about 70% of Germany’s 
GDP (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p. 20) usage of these terms has not kept pace with 
economic realities. Trade related issues remain a marginal topic. 
 The term free trade is only fleetingly mentioned in the 2013 election program. 
One reference affirms the SPD commitment to building a comprehensive transatlantic 
free trade agreement, based upon progressive rules and regulation for protecting 
economic, ecological, social, and financial standards (SPD, 2013, p. 112). The other 
reference warns that free trade must never become a gateway for social and wage 
dumping (SPD, 2013, p. 114). A possible reason for largely avoiding the term “free 
trade” is that the SPD does not want to communicate the idea that trade would flow into 
Germany without any control. If trade is free, then governments lose their ability to steer 
and direct trade in a favorable manner and the average voter might fear that they will be 
worse off due to the negative impact of unregulated harmful trade and the lack of 
domestic protection. It appears that the only reason why the SPD mentioned the term in 
2013 was the fact that negotiations about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) had just commenced. In the meantime, the SPD has revoked its 
support for TTIP (Sattar, 2016), referring to the deal as dead, thus confirming their 
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generally critical view regarding free trade agreements. 
There is a serious inequity between import and export within the platforms. There 
is a four to one ratio between export and import references in favor of exports. There are 
six references on imports spread across all election programs except for the 1990 and 
2005 programs. All of them are about energy imports and talk about imports in a negative 
context, emphasizing that Germany must decrease imports in order to increase its 
independence. The only import reference that is not related to the energy sector can be 
found in the 2013 program, which refers to the need to stop the imports of wild animals 
(SPD, 2013, p. 87). Exports are mentioned more frequently, but not necessarily in a 
positive way. The largest share of export references is used in a negative context. One 
line of critique addresses export subsidies for agriculture products that create an unfair 
advantage for rich countries over developing countries. This is why the SPD calls for a 
stop of these subsidies and advocates for the WTO to address this issue with adequate 
rules (SPD, 2002, p. 16). The SPD also warns that an economy which is so heavily 
involved in exporting, as is Germany’s, becomes exposed to the internal struggles and 
problems of other countries, because if either the economy or political stability in another 
state is threatened this causes demand for German exports to decline and weaken 
Germany’s economy, due to the fact that a lot of its growth is driven by international and 
not domestic demand (SPD, 2013, p. 10). Another point of critique regarding exports for 
the SPD is the issue of weapons sales and nuclear technology transfer to foreign states, 
which are generally viewed as negative by the SPD when they involve states that are not 
established democracies with a strong record when it comes to protecting human rights 
(see for example SPD, 1994, p. 77; SPD, 2013, p. 40).   
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 References on trade are similarly mixed. The SPD warns that trade is often not 
fair and can have negative consequences (SPD, 1994, p. 73; SPD, 2002, p. 15; SPD, 
2013, p. 108), but the Social Democrats also affirm that trade can have positive 
consequences or generate new desirable opportunities (SPD, 1994, p. 73; SPD, 2002, p. 
34; SPD, 2005, p. 32; SPD, 2009, p. 74). These positive effects can most likely be 
harnessed when trade is free and fair (SPD, 2009, p. 82). Overall, Figure 6.2 shows that 
in the early 1990s there are very few globalization and trade related references in SPD 
election campaigns and that if these issues are mentioned, then it is predominantly in a 
negative context. For the period from 1998 to 2005 this changes. The SPD mentions these 
topics more frequently and the largest share is neutral in nature and not negative. In fact, 
references that refer to globalization and trade terms are more often positive than 
negative. This changes for the 2009 and 2013 elections: Now references with negative 
and neutral context are most common. The number of references that highlight the 
positive effects or opportunities for growth that can result from globalization and trade 
have decreased by almost 30% compared to the previous two election programs, even 
though the page count has almost doubled for the last two elections.  
Is it justified for the SPD to change the way they communicate with voters about 
globalization and trade after 2005? In 2009 the combined level of exports and imports 
had reached 60% of Germany’s GDP and in 2013 it rose another 10 percentage points 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, p. 20), making trade a more relevant issue than ever. In 
terms of employment, Germany’s economy was doing great; unemployment had fallen 
consistently from close to 5 million people in 2005 to about 3 million people without 
work at the time of the 2013 federal election (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016). However, 
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the global financial crisis also had its effects on Germany. The Federal Republic’s GDP 
which had grown in 2006 and 2007 by close to 4 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively, 
fell sharply in the wake of the global financial crisis. In 2008, GDP growth fell below 1 
percentage point and shrunk by more than 5.5% in 2009. Germany certainly felt the 
negative consequences of being so internationally connected, but GDP bounced back 
strongly in 2010 and 2011. It grew respectively by 3.9 and 3.7 percentage points 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016a). A more important indicator for the SPD’s changed 
rhetoric was the fact even though more and more people were employed overall, people 
were losing real income. Aggregate real income fell by 0.5% in Germany from 2000 to 
2013. It is only since then that real incomes have grown a little over 4%, until 2015 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016b). One can assume that the SPD leadership did not want 
to communicate that Germany’s economic activities, including trade, were positive 
developments since the majority of voters generally did feel that they were personally 
increasing in prosperity. 
Figure 6.2 presents an overall summary for all the examined key terms, but it does 
not illustrate how the SPD values each individual term. The following text will undertake 
this task. Figure 6.3 illustrates that the SPD presents a mostly balanced message on trade. 
An even share of references discuss trade with four specific connotations: neutral, 
praising its positive effects, illustrating its potentially positive outcomes, and highlighting 
the unjust nature of trade. Warnings of the risks and dangers of trade appear less 
frequently in the SPD’s programs, compared to the other four connotations. This means 
that the SPD paints a slightly more positive picture of trade. As previously mentioned, the 
term free trade is only used twice, once in a positive context and one time negatively.  
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How the SPD addresses the topic of exports is illustrated by Figure 6.4. The SPD 
refers to exports 23 times in its election campaigns, with the largest share of them 
emphasizing the risks and dangers that can arise as a result of exports. The second largest 
share of references are neutral in nature and only about a fifth of all export references 
appear in a positive context. The SPD has a particularly hard time formulating any 
potential future benefits for Germany that might come as a result of its vast exports. The 
only instance in which the SPD does talk about future opportunities with regard to 
exports is in 1998, when the party states that Germany’s economy can become the global 
leader for green technologies through the export of ideas, services, and high tech products 
(SPD, 1998, p. 57). This is somewhat surprising since Germans are usually rather proud 
of their export power (see Zeit, 1989). Imports are hardly mentioned in comparison to 
references on trade or exports in SPD election programs. There are only six instances and 
they all emphasize negative effects of imports such as increased energy dependence on 
foreign powers or adverse environmental effects. 
The term globalization is relatively new to the party’s election program language 
and is primarily used in a neutral or negative context, accounting for 59% and 24%, 
respectively, as shown by Figure 6.5. Only 7% of SPD references refer to the positive 
effects of globalization and only 10% of them illustrate the positive opportunities that it 
can bring about.  
 
6.3 Election Programs and the Theory on Globalization  
and Political Parties 
Before closely looking at what the SPD says about globalization in its election 
programs and how it relates to the theoretical concepts previously outlined in Chapter 3 it 
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is important to reemphasize the role that trade plays for the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Here it is important to remember that Germany is over proportionally involved 
in trade compared to other developed economies of its size.1 Even though Germany has 
built an economy that is uniquely involved in an intricate web of imports and export of 
disproportionate size, the SPD’s election programs hardly account for this. Trade and 
globalization should be a primary topic for a country whose economy depends so heavily 
on the import of goods and services not just for consumption, but largely for 
subcomponents that are used in the production process of products that are made in 
Germany, but are, to a large degree, exported to foreign markets. Instead, these issues 
remain marginalized in SPD election programs. In a first step, political parties in 
Germany should clearly communicate to voters the importance of the international 
economy and access to global markets for their country. In a second step, the parties 
should offer clear policy alternatives to voters as to how to deal with an increasingly 
globalized world. Instead Germany’s economic global involvement is treated, at best, as a 
second-rate issue. It would be much more progressive for a major party of a country 
whose prosperity depends so much on international trade to put topics of globalization 
and trade front and center of its messages to the electorate. This would certainly include 
addressing among other things the domestic benefits of an open international economy 
more directly, thus minimizing calls for protectionism in times of crisis.  
The issue of partial factor mobility as outlined by Brawly (1997) is not addressed 
by the SPD at all. Partial factor mobility is seemingly too complex an issue for the SPD 
to discuss with voters via election programs. Likewise, the topic of volatility, as defined 
                                                          
1 For details see the overview of Germany’s disproportionate trade involvement at the beginning of Chapter 
5 or Section 5.3. 
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by Woodruff (2005) as oscillating between economic busts and booms, is only talked 
about in the context of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, which is an important topic 
for the SPD in the 2009 election campaign. The program references the term crisis 47 
times, because for the SPD, this is not just an economic slump, but the result of an 
ideology that puts profit maximization over people (SPD, 2009, p. 5). The Social 
Democrats use the crisis as legitimization to call for a reboot of the social market 
economy (SPD, 2007, p. 8), which does sound somewhat hollow given the significant 
social restructuring of the SPD-lead Schröder government. This makes it somewhat 
difficult for the party to discuss volatility, since it was part of four out of the five most 
recent governments. This explains why the SPD is largely quiet on the issue of volatility, 
because the party has no interest to self-incriminate by linking its stay in government 
with a period of instability. Prior to governing Germany, the SPD did talk about volatility 
to some extent with regard to the unification process of East and West. The SPD 
regularly bemoaned the Kohl government’s inability to provide a structured and socially 
responsible transition for the citizens of the former socialist state. Even though the 
political unification is complete there remains a deep East West divide which will not 
improve until social economic equality can be achieved (SPD, 1998, p. 31). In essence, 
the SPD only addresses volatility marginally. They do not use arguments that address the 
issue of volatility in a consistent and structured manner in the way that it competes for 
votes. 
Midford’s (1993) question about how parties address labor subgroups is simple in 
the case of the SPD. Generally speaking, there is no distinction between labor subgroups 
except for the special emphasis by the SPD on the coal mining sector, which repeatedly is 
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referred to as an indispensable resource for Germany. This continues all the way up to the 
2009 election (SPD, 2009, p. 29) and while the 2013 program does not explicitly refer to 
German coal production, it does affirm its support for coal energy as a part of Germany’s 
energy mix (SPD, 2013, p. 34). When it comes to the argument by Garst (1998) that 
unions are an important element in addressing the negative consequences of 
globalization, this is where the SPD shines. In Germany, the workers’ movement fueled 
both the unions and the SPD. Fighting for worker’s rights and to embed capitalistic 
pursuits into a larger economic and political process, which looks beyond narrow 
individual gains, has historically been at the heart of both organizations. Even though 
unions in Germany are organizationally and politically independent from political parties, 
the SPD was founded as a worker’s party and unions have universally agreed with the 
party’s political program, at least in principle. In turn the Social Democrats have accepted 
unions as a vital counterweight to the interests of capitalists (Oertzen, 1976). 
There is a consistent thread that runs through all of the analyzed SPD programs, 
which is that unions are an important key for the SPD when it comes to building a strong 
socially just society. The SPD views unions as vital actors for helping to transform and 
modernize the economy (SPD, 1990, p. 20). The right of unions to engage in collective 
bargaining is, according to the SPD, a hallmark of Germany’s social makeup, which 
guarantees flexible solutions for individual industries and prosperity for society as a 
whole (SPD, 1998, p. 18). For the SPD, unions are essential to Germany’s prosperity and 
success, because unions are a vital tool for building a broad consensus and stability, 
through social equality. This is why the SPD in recent years has focused heavily on 
addressing the problem that an increasing number of Germany’s workforce labors in 
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contract positions, which afford fewer benefits and protection compared to regular 
positions (SPD, 2013, pp. 17-19). This is one reason why the party is advocating for a 
universal minimum wage (SPD, 2013, pp. 18-21). The relevance of unions for the SPD is 
well illustrated by the way the SPD talks about mutual achievements. For example, it 
talks about how its cooperation with unions demonstrates that it is possible to civilize 
capitalism in Germany. This is supposedly apparent by the way that the rights of 
employees have been strengthened in Germany and how regulation has been created that 
defines social and ecological standards which allow for Germany’s economic prosperity 
to be widely enjoyed (SPD, 2009, p. 85). Furthermore, prosperity and democracy have 
been underpinned by the social market economy, which has been mutually shaped by 
Social Democratic policies and unions (SPD, 2009, p. 14). In a nutshell, the SPD firmly 
believes that strong unions which are able to get things done are an essential element for 
shaping social democracy (SPD, 1994, p. 17). The SPD also asserts its desire to build a 
cooperative global world order that can shape the future by mutually solving problems. 
The SPD wants to build and shape this new order with broad support and influence from 
all sorts of groups and people, like civil organizations, social movements, churches, and 
unions (SPD, 2013, p. 106). However, one thing that is missing from the SPD’s programs 
is a clear position as to what the role for unions is in an increasingly globalized world. Is 
their role changing due to globalization? Does the SPD envision unions to take on 
specific responsibilities that might be new for unions? These kinds of questions remain 
largely unanswered by the SPD, as if globalization and unions are two completely 
separate topics. 
The question of whether or not political parties present significant policies when it 
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comes to globalization or if they rather use the issue for scapegoating, as put forward by 
Caproso (1997), deserves a nuanced reply in the case of the SPD. As previously stated 
the SPD refers to globalization in a more negative context than in a positive one, but that 
does not mean that the party presents the issue as the culprit for Germany’s economic or 
social challenges. The Social Democrats have a hard time coming out and speaking in 
support of globalization, but the party has more or less shown its support for a while in 
favor of an open trade order. In 1994, the SPD emphasized the tremendous opportunities 
that resulted from access to the previously blocked markets in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The party even promised government funding to assist with the development of 
these new markets (SPD, 1994, pp. 10-13). This is why the SPD generally asserts that 
trade must be open and fair, as long as it does not lead to environmental or social 
dumping (SPD, 1994, p. 73). Even the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 did not change 
the party’s stance on the issue; free and fair global trade remain essential; the financial 
crisis was not a reason to wall off markets and to promote protectionism (SPD, 2009, p. 
82). 
An important point to highlight in this context is the how the Social Democrats 
recognize and communicate to voters that globalization is not an unstoppable 
phenomenon that sweeps over a country. In the 2005 election program the SPD accuses 
the CDU/CSU and FDP of simply submitting to the forces of globalization, causing 
deregulation and unrestrained market forces to significantly increase anxiety and 
diminish prosperity (SPD, 2005, p. 13). A government under the leadership of Gerhard 
Schröder would, instead, ensure that Germany lives up to its important role in shaping 
globalization so that its effects are more just (SPD, 2005, p. 41). This applies both 
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domestically but also internationally, especially when it comes to building an 
international economy where developing countries have equal opportunities. 
Unfortunately, these assertions that globalization can be shaped and managed in a way 
that can help to create more prosperity and equality remain vague and rather limited. It 
would be much better if the SPD communicated more consistently and in more detail its 
vision for shaping globalization in the 21st century. 
The complementary questions of how the SPD addresses the matter of regulatory 
harmonization and contract enforcement (Ranjan & Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000) as well as 
how it communicates its goals and how it offers clear choices to voters with respect to 
international agreements (Hays, 2009; Martin, 2000) will be addressed over the following 
paragraphs.  The issue of regulatory harmonization is consistently addressed by the SPD. 
With regard to tax harmonization the party calls for such policies in general, but 
particularly for Europe (SPD, 1998, p. 73), because otherwise fair competition within the 
EU’s internal market is not possible (SPD, 2013, pp. 24-25). The most prominent 
instance is in the 2005 program, which calls for the limiting of tax exemptions on an 
international level to avoid creating incentives for companies to relocate to places with a 
more beneficial tax code (SPD, 2005, p. 38).  
The emphasis though is not necessarily on tax harmonization, but on advocating 
for a more just global order. According to the SPD the globalization of markets needs to 
be complemented by a form of political globalization and international institutions are the 
indispensable key for achieving this. They are also vital for promoting peace and a fairer 
distribution of wealth (SPD, 2013, p. 113). In this regard the SPD calls repeatedly on 
various organizations, but especially on the WTO, to liberalize markets, but not without 
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building shared standards, because social and ecological minimum standards are essential 
for preventing the exploitation of humans or the environment (SPD, 1998, p. 75, SPD, 
2002, p. 16). The SPD also asserts that it is primarily developing countries who suffer as 
a consequence of protection. The WTO needs to assure easier participation for these 
countries in global trade. It is paramount in this regard that export subsidies for 
agricultural products need to be banned, but the SPD does mention again in this context 
that WTO rules and standards must include binding social and ecological minimum 
standards (SPD, 2009, p. 82). In a nutshell, the WTO is capable and has the obligation to 
develop a sustainable economic model with the necessary regulation to promote fair 
competition (SPD, 2013, p. 111). Another institution that the SPD referred to in its 1998 
program in conjunction to international labor standards is the ILO, which is a subsidiary 
of the UN. The ILO is particularly concerned with empowering workers and guaranteeing 
their right to bargain collectively. It also fights to prevent any form of discrimination 
among workers and to end forced as well as child labor. The SPD’s most comprehensive 
call for supporting the work of the ILO comes from 2013, when they expressly call for 
strengthening the organization and supporting its mission (SPD, 2013, pp. 111-113).  
The SPD heavily emphasizes the need for markets and free trade to not be 
obstructed by beggar-thy-neighbor policies, but to be firmly guided by social and 
ecological rules. It is not always all that clear what these policies will entail in detail as 
the policy proposals presented throughout the SPD election campaigns are somewhat 
lacking in clarity and quality. For example, it is good to know that the SPD calls for 
ecological standards when it comes to the way globally traded goods are manufactured, 
but there is a great deal of ambiguity entailed in these policy proposals. There are 
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certainly various degrees of stringency when dealing with environmentally friendly 
manufacturing processes, but generally the SPD’s proposals are not detailed enough to 
allow for a better or more specific understanding. It is probably part of the inherent nature 
of election programs to leave some sort of vagueness, but one thing that is particularly 
lacking from the SPD is the policy download with regard to trade and global markets. 
The SPD has a virtually exclusive focus on the policy upload, which means that it only 
communicates to voters that an SPD-led German government is strong and can take 
persuasive action on the international stage. This type of argumentation also means 
indirectly that the SPD is suggesting to voters that Germany does not need to change, or 
at least not in any significant manner. Instead, other states will be changing in order to 
adopt Germany’s environmental and social standards. An approach that also includes the 
policy download would be more helpful and honest for voters, allowing them get a sense 
about how an SPD-led government would deal with the policies that other states are 
pushing for, or regulations that important international institutions are planning to 
introduce. 
According to the literature, addressing the globalization dilemma is an important 
step for political elites if they are interested in a positive domestic response to 
globalization (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). Discussing the globalization 
dilemma is an important step for helping voters to overcome their fears of social 
instability and a loss of prosperity. The SPD does not address this issue directly; the party 
does not link globalization with a need to strengthen the welfare state, but due to its 
generally worker/employee friendly rhetoric voters will most likely pick up on the SPD’s 
desire to support and strengthen the position of those people who are particularly 
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vulnerable to a more competitive environment, as the party repeatedly addresses the need 
to strengthen the social safety net. The only problem for the SPD is that its message will 
be compared to the reality of Agenda 2010, which removed protection and required more 
self-reliance by citizens. One specific way the SPD is trying to demonstrate its support 
for social equality is the introduction of a binding domestic minimum wage. According to 
the SPD this would achieve a minimum standard of fairness and suggest to voters that 
regardless of whether or not Germany is more or less involved in a globalized world, 
there a minimum standard below which no one can fall. The issue of a national minimum 
wage is addressed in one paragraph in the 2005 election program (SPD, 2005, p. 23), but 
in the following election program the Social Democrats discuss this topic in detail in two 
lengthy paragraphs. Additionally, there are six additional references throughout the 
program that mention a minimum wage (SPD, 2009, p. 10, p. 32, p. 33, p. 50, p. 57, p. 
67, p. 68, p. 86).  The 2013 election manifest closely looks at the topic on four pages, 
plus the SPD mentions and advocates for the issue seven more times in the remaining 
part of the program (SPD, 2013, pp. 18-21, p. 31, p. 52, p. 66, p. 78, p. 79, p. 87, p. 103). 
Thus, while they do not directly reference the globalization dilemma, the party does 
present policies that are generally well positioned to alleviate the fears that voters have in 
conjunction with globalization and the potentially resulting increase of competition. 
However, the party could do a lot more for greater acceptance of globalization in 
Germany. The SPD could communicate a more direct link between globalization and 
desired reforms to Germany’s safety net that are designed to increase social security 
especially for low skilled workers. This could be a tool to considerably increase support 
for globalization, but it is not apparent that the Social Democrats have any interest in 
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such communication.  
 The final theoretical building block that must be addressed here is the work by 
Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004), who have put forward 
the idea that emphasizing a European identity is an effective tool in general for European 
states to overcoming resistance to globalization. The SPD does not talk directly about 
building a European identity or how such an identity would relate a German national 
identity, but there are plenty of instances throughout the party’s election programs that 
communicate to voters the importance of the EU and present Europe as something with 
which voters can identify. The SPD feels that the European Union is the best guarantee 
for peace, security, and social stability (SPD, 1998, p. 72). In 1990 the SPD even warned 
that Germany’s unification process must not lead to a situation where Germans lose sight 
of the long-term goal to building the United States of Europe (SPD, 1990, pp. 22-23). 
This constitutes the strongest endorsement of the European integration process by the 
SPD and was probably a step too in terms of surrendering national identity and autonomy 
to European institutions. The party did not mention the idea of a United States of Europe 
again in any of its subsequent programs, but the deep connection between Germany and 
Europe is frequently addressed. For example, the 2002 program states that we2 belong to 
Europe and Europe belongs to us (SPD, 2002, p. 16). The Social Democrats also 
acknowledge that nation states will reach their limits in this new global century (SPD, 
2009, p. 85) and the key for succeeding in a globalized world is the successful integration 
of Europe (SPD, 1998, p. 74).  
 The goal for the SPD with regard to Europe is to build a social Europe, a powerful 
                                                          
2 Referring to Germany  
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actor for building social equality (SPD, 2013, p. 9) and a global force for peace (SPD, 
2013, p. 107). Interestingly, the SPD recognizes the connection between overcoming 
national identities and being successful in a globalized world, stating that as globalization 
increases, the more necessary the European identity becomes (SPD, 2002, p. 11); and 
while the idea of a unified Europe has its own intrinsic value, it also remains the 
indispensable answer to globalization (SPD, 2002, p. 17). Besides its open support for the 
European integration process and a European identity, the SPD also actively tries to build 
a form of culture and identity in Germany that is not nationalistic, parochial, or exclusive 
(SPD, 1998, pp. 62-67). For example, when the Social Democrats talk about German 
culture in their election programs, they refer to it as an inclusive culture that is open to 
anyone who is not opposed to Germany’s democratic and pluralistic values (SPD, 2013, 
pp. 58-65). The goal is to build a society where every citizen takes on personal 
responsibility for shaping a shared homeland, which is not linked to a particular 
nationality, culture, or religion; instead it ought to be a place of acceptance, inclusion, 
and belonging regardless of race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, age, or religious 
convictions (SPD, 2009, p. 13, p. 59). This type of culture generates cohesion and can 
create identity (SPD, 2009, pp. 76-77). It is interesting to note that this type of 
understanding is not related to concepts of nationality, but has a very broad humanistic 
conception, thus, potentially not appealing as directly to voters who have strong 
nationalistic/patriotic feelings about Germany, but allowing for a much more inclusive 
understanding of culture. The SPD also pursues a similar strategy when it comes to 
religion. The party expressly respects and values religious freedom (SPD, 2009, p. 48). It 
recognizes the value that churches and religious communities bring to Germany’s society 
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(SPD, 2002, p. 47) and the vital role that they can play in solving its problems (SPD, 
1994, p. 11). The one thing that the Social Democrats do not do is mention Christianity in 
any form, not once. This does not make the SPD popular with voters who are looking for 
a political party that reassures them that culture and identity in Germany is rooted in a 
Christian heritage and that this legacy will be actively perpetuated in the future. It does 
however foster a society that is not afraid of diversity. This generally open outlook that 
the SPD continuously communicates to voters in their election programs certainly is a 
building block for decreasing fear and acceptance of globalization, because the SPD does 
not talk about globalization as threatening to a particular national, religious, or cultural 
identity. 
 
6.4 Conclusion of SPD Analysis 
The SPD propagates a form of social state that can be defined as organized 
solidarity by people who support one another, and the more affluent ones help out those 
who are not as fortunate. The community helps those who are in need. The social state 
expands people’s liberal basic rights to include social rights. Government support is not a 
handout, but a legal right based upon prior contributions (SPD, 2009, p. 49). This type of 
social state has the advantage that it can ameliorate fears of individual hardship caused by 
globalization. This sense of security is further increased by the SPD’s struggle together 
with unions over the last century to prove that it is possible to civilize capitalism through 
collective bargaining and by allowing employees to have a say in the companies for 
which they work. This is achieved by creating employee rights, and by agreeing on social 
and ecological standards that create borders for markets and allow society as a whole to 
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participate in the gains of an increasingly prosperous society (SPD, 2009, pp. 85-88). 
By looking specifically at the ways in which the SPD addresses issues of trade or 
globalization it becomes apparent that the party does not propagate a liberal global 
economic order, but it also does not have a protectionist agenda either. The SPD’s 
general disposition towards outside influences is one that is predominantly open to a 
global world. This attitude is rooted in the fact that historically the Social Democrats had 
a very open and non-nationalistic mindset. The party took a highly positive stance from 
the beginning on international collaboration, as it viewed cooperation between the nations 
as a central issue in the tradition of the international workers’ movement. This traditional 
openness and belief in cooperation means that the SPD is somewhat predisposed to 
embrace global openness and cooperation, as long as they do not infringe upon hard 
fought for social standards and workers’ rights. In other words, unlike the CDU the SPD 
does not propagate a nationalistic identity that is threatened by a progressively globalized 
world. International cooperation and a certain degree of openness towards change are not 
anathema to the Social Democrats, but despite these general characteristics the SPD does 
not take a strong enough position in favor of trade. The following paragraph explains 
why. 
The SPD assures voters that they live in a country with a very competitive 
economy that makes Germany strong. Germany is the strongest export nation in the 
world and the SPD takes great pride in that (SPD, 2005, p. 5; SPD, 2009, pp. 10-11). The 
SPD also claims that the reforms of the Schröder government have made Germany into a 
modern economy and one of the most successful countries in the world (SPD, 2013, p. 7). 
However, the strong country that the Social Democrats like to talk about depends on 
191 
imports and exports to a significant degree. In 2015 the foreign trade-to-GDP ratio for 
goods and services in Germany was 86%, in absolute terms. This amounts to imports of 
more than 949 billon Euro and to almost 1.2 trillion Euros worth of exports (see 
Appendix). Clearly, Germany’s economy would look very different without the global 
liberal trading order and the economic union that it has actively shaped in Europe for 
more than 6 decades since the creation of the European Coal and Steal Community. The 
way the party communicates with voters does not reflect Germany’s exceptional success 
which would not be possible without globalization.   
A more congruent approach for the party would be to embrace globalization and 
to communicate to voters a commitment to openness, while at the same time to strongly 
advocate for ways to share benefits more evenly and to define how to better support 
globalization’s losers. The SPD runs the potentially grave risk of painting an ambiguous 
picture or even slightly negative one of globalization, because if voters on the left of the 
political spectrum see globalization as a negative development or a threat to their social 
standing, then the SPD will lose those voters. As demonstrated in Chapter 9, there is a 
party to the left of the SPD, which is much better at using populism to convince voters of 
the need to stop and reverse globalization.  
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Figure 6.1 SPD Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms 








































































Figure 6.3 Trade References SPD 






































The core principle of the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) is 
liberalism rooted in the 18th-century Enlightenment (Aufklärung) movement. The party 
does like to refer to this tradition and views itself as a defender of liberalism in Germany 
(FDP, 1990, p. 11); the party refers to itself routinely as the Liberals, which is a widely 
accepted name for the FDP’s members. The historic divide into a national liberal and a 
left liberal movement meant that the liberals where not much more than a marginal 
development in Germany for the first few decades of the 20th century. This changed after 
the Second World War in 1948 when the FDP was officially formed at the federal level 
and was able to combine both liberal wings into one party. While there were multiple 
parties represented in the German Bundestag after the first federal election in Germany 
1949, by the end of the 1950s, all of these had dwindled away in competition between 
right leaning CDU and the left leaning SPD. The only exception was the FDP, which was 
continuously represented in the German Bundestag from 1949 until 2013 and took on the 
role of kingmaker in this mostly three-party system, which meant that from 1949 until 
1998, the FDP was only excluded from the governing coalition two times. Initially the 
national liberal wing was more dominant and led to an alliance with the CDU, but in the 
late 1960s the social liberal wing of the party gained more dominance
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and was able to cement its power in the first SPD and FDP coalition and the national 
liberal wing left the party. This did not mean that the FDP was now a strongly unified 
party, because the nationalists within the party were replaced by market liberalists 
(Oppelland, 2017). This group increasingly gained power so that the FDP often acted 
within the governing coalition as a counterbalance to the Social Democrats’ economic 
and social policies. This was especially true for economic policies, because the Liberals 
believed that they had to prevent the SPD’s socialist experiments (Vorländer, 2013, p. 
498). The party began slowly to align on economic issues with the CDU/CSU and formed 
a coalition in 1983 that started the Kohl era. At that point, the market liberal forces within 
the party were so dominant that the social liberal wing left the party.  
 The party slowly lost its kingmaker monopoly in the mid-1980s when the Green 
Party entered the Bundestag for the first time. Since then, one can observe a form of 
programmatic alignment: on the one hand between the FDP and CDU/CSU and the 
between the SPD and the Greens, on the other. This new alignment was the reason that 
when the SPD once again gained supremacy in 1998, it did not choose the Liberals as 
their coalition partner (for the first time). Instead, the SPD opted for the Greens. This led 
to the FDP’s longest spell in opposition, until the party joined the CDU/CSU in a 
coalition government in 2005 when the FDP achieved it strongest result ever netting 
almost 15% of votes. Back in government, the FDP made a few high profile blunders at 
the start of the legislative period, which resulted in the German public perceiving the 
Liberals as untrustworthy. In addition, the party’s chairman Guido Westerwelle was 
unable to use the high profile of his position as foreign minister to the party’s advantage 
(Decker, 2014, pp. 31-32). As a result, the FDP received historically low electoral 
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support and did not clear the 5% threshold to receive any seats in parliament; for the first 
time since their inception, there are no Liberals in the Bundestag. 
The FDP perceives itself as based on its liberal tradition both in a political as well 
as in a societal sense as a party of the center, meaning central to the two major parties, 
CDU and SPD. Due to its strong promotion of market liberalism, the FDP is more closely 
aligned with the CDU on issues that affect the economy. When it comes to the separation 
of state and church, or issues like national identity, gender roles, or family policies, the 
Liberals are better suited to cooperate with the Social Democrats. This is why the party 
has traditionally been able to appeal to a broad variety of people and not just a particular 
subsegment of German society. However, the share of self-employed and small business 
owners who vote FDP is much higher than the overall FDP vote share. By contrast the 
share of workers who vote FDP is always lower than the FDP overall share. Other 
specific elements that are overrepresented among FDP voters are academic degrees and 
the male gender (Oppelland, 2017). The challenge going forward for the FDP will be to 
make themselves recognizable to voters as more than a one-issue tax cut party, as well as 
to become attractive to the SPD again so that the FDP’s success of getting into 
government is not inextricably linked to the performance of the CDU/CSU. While the 
days of being kingmaker are certainly over, the FDP could still expand its options by 
being programmatically more viable to enter a coalition with the SPD and the Greens.  
7.1 FDP Election Programs 
This section summarizes the most important points from each election program as 
they relate to globalization. The goal is to identify the core message that the FDP 
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communicates to voters for the examined 23-year time span in federal elections. The 
primary focus will be on globalization, trade and other economic issues, but the intent is 
also to look broadly at the overall message of the election programs. This will be 
important for addressing the broad questions previously outlined in Chapter 3. 
7.1.1 The 1990 Election 
The FDP attempts to attract voters by somewhat embellishing the party’s history. 
By linking and mixing its own history with the efforts of others that pursued liberal ideas, 
like efforts in the 19th century largely by students at the Hambach Festival to unify 
Germany and to advocate for freedom and democracy at a time of censorship and 
repression, the FDP has created a narrative of itself that appeals to an intellectual segment 
of the population. The party takes credit for influencing and shaping Germany’s Weimar 
constitution and especially the liberal elements of the 1949 Constitution. The FDP also 
links itself to what it refers to as the liberals in the other part of Germany and their efforts 
at building a free and liberal society (see FDP, 1990, p. 11). Thus, the party is able to call 
upon a 150-year-long tradition of liberal values, which still needs to be defended. While 
the open suppression of freedom has been brought to a halt, the creeping threat to 
freedom still continues. This is why citizens must be vigilant and guard against panaceas 
from the right and left, bureaucracy and government paternalism, nationalism, fears of 
social exclusion, environmental destruction, and the ever- increasing call for simple 
answers to complex issues (FDP, 1990, p. 12). Thus, when it comes to Germany’s three 
core principles of freedom, equality and justice, the FDP regards the freedom of the 
individual as the paramount principle, because only policies that guarantee freedom of 
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the individual ensure the freedom of everyone (FDP, 1990, p. 12). In essence, for the 
FDP there exists an inexorable link between individual freedom and economic freedom 
and government intervention in both spheres must be limited. This belief leads to the 
party’s consistent clarion call for more freedom and less government (FDP, 1990, p. 13). 
In terms of policies this means that the FDP pushes for market based solutions 
and the freedom for individuals to self-determination, because bureaucracy stifles 
creativity and innovation, according to the FDP. Furthermore, the party asserts that 
market based solutions and privatization are the best option for environmental protection, 
because competition and innovation are most likely to lead to new solutions that are more 
environmentally friendly and that create more sustainable jobs in the future (FDP, 1990, 
pp. 16-17). Environmental policies are mentioned in more detail towards the end of the 
FDP’s 1990 election program and primarily focus on the reduction of energy 
consumption, reducing pollution, and fostering international efforts towards increased 
global environmental protection (FDP, 1990, pp. 84-86).  
Regarding international security and the role of a unified Germany in 
international relations, the FDP regularly refers to the Helsinki Accords as a road map for 
Germany’s future international engagement. The Helsinki Accords (1975) were designed 
to improve relations between the West and the Communist bloc. The FDP communicates 
to voters that their goal in this context is to continue the dialogue and the cooperation 
between old rivals and to reduce Germany’s military forces as well as to significantly 
reduce spending for future military procurement (FDP, 1990, pp. 25-29). The goal is to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union and to include it in the development of Eastern Europe. 
The opening of Eastern Europe entails the opportunity to overcome the continent's 
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prosperity gap. Closing this gap has to be of paramount concern in order to alleviate 
political and social tensions. A key component for overcoming this gap is the freedom of 
cross border movement of people, goods, and services, which is why the FDP pushes for 
a more integrated European Union. A key element for European integration is the 
establishment of a central European bank that can create stability (FDP, 1990, pp. 23-24). 
The FDP also desires the European Community to actively shape a free global 
market economy. Protectionism, as a tool of European economic policy, is not acceptable 
and must be avoided (FDP, 1990, pp. 22-24). Private efforts, in combination with a 
generous government support program, are the best solution for giving people in Central 
and Eastern Europe a prospect for the future (FDP, 1990, p. 25). The goal for developing 
countries is to help them align their economies with the successful principles of the social 
market economy. The FDP commits 0.7% of Germany's GDP to development help. 
These funds should be awarded in a manner that leaves more room for local authorities to 
adapt to the specific needs of the recipient country. The goal must always be to create a 
better framework for economic progress and more private efforts, but also to improve the 
wellbeing of the poorest, by increasing the social safety net (FDP, 1990, p. 32). The 
global reduction of trade barriers and competition distorting regulations are an important 
goal of Liberal policies. In this context, the GATT must be applied not just for industrial 
products, but also to agricultural ones. Environmental standards matter too, when it 
comes to development assistance, which is why only sustainable and environmentally 
friendly projects should receive funding (FDP, 1990, p. 32). The FDP also promises the 
elimination of government subsidies for agricultural products (FDP, 1990, p. 93). 
The FDP’s economic policies are best characterized by a strong belief in 
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competition and the unrestrained exchange of goods and services both domestically and 
internally. Trade restrictions and government protection for specific industries must be 
removed and in general more markets and less government are the keys to success (FDP, 
1990, pp. 34-35). These principles have to be applied especially to the states in East 
Germany, although a transitionary period might be warranted. Overall, the goal is to 
significantly reduce regulation to allow for more flexibility and individual creativity. 
With regards to East Germany, there is also an added emphasis on privatization and 
access to markets (FDP, 1990, pp. 35-37). When it comes to the labor market, the FDP 
advocates for more market elements and fewer restrictions, so that supply and demand for 
employment can more quickly find an equilibrium. The FDP recognizes labor unions and 
collective bargaining; it even suggests that Germany’s model of codetermination could be 
a good example for the rest of Europe. The FDP does assert that collective bargaining and 
unionized employment contracts create entry barriers for long-term unemployed, which is 
why the FDP aims to create exceptions for people who have been excluded from the 
labor market for an extended period of time (FDP, 1990, pp. 38-40). This trend of calling 
for liberalization of markets and privatization is also manifest in the FDP’s policies on 
creating apartments and houses in order to combat a domestic shortage of housing. The 
FDP primarily seeks to deregulate and to abolish rent ceilings in order to create an 
incentive for investment into new housing space. However, the party does acknowledge 
that there is a need to improve housing assistance for low income families through the 
structural improvement of housing assistance payments (FDP, 1990, pp. 42-43). When it 
comes to tax policies, the FPD views taxation as an essential element of Germany’s 
economic vitality, which is why the party rejects tax increases in order to finance 
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Germany’s reunification. Additionally, the party asserts that the rate of taxation is a 
significant factor that affects companies’ relocation plans, especially in the future 
common European market. This is why it is vital for Germany to reduce corporate taxes; 
the FPD also includes a few specific tax cuts for corporations in its election program, but 
also pledges to increase tax cuts for children (FDP, 1990, pp. 44-46). 
In terms of social policy, the FPD only propagates more flexibility when it comes 
to the transition from workforce into retirement, that raising children needs to generate a 
positive effect for the calculation of retirement benefits, and that more options for long 
term care of the elderly must be created (FDP, 1990, pp. 57-62). There is no talk of 
welfare benefits, unemployment benefits, or any other form of transfer payments. There 
is some mention of gender equality and better protection of gay rights (FDP, 1990, p. 52, 
pp. 69-71). In terms of immigration, the FDP does not have specific proimmigration 
policies which it promotes, but it does acknowledge the contribution that immigrants 
make to society. The FDP also wants to grant them the right to vote in local elections and 
to obtain German citizenship without having to renounce their citizenship of origin (FDP, 
1990, p. 53). The FDP also espouses some ideas regarding culture, which are intended to 
foster the unity of the German culture nation. It is not clear what this means other than 
that the FDP wants to emphasize the plurality of cultures and provide added financial 
support for cultural projects (FDP, 1990, p. 77).  
7.1.2 The 1994 Election 
The FDP starts its 1994 election program by communicating to voters the party’s 
guiding principles, which are an orientation towards increased performance, more global 
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openness, and added tolerance. Markets play a central role in the FDP’s answers to 
common problems. The FDP rejects what it refers to as the redistribution politics of the 
SPD and the Greens, and instead calls for marked based solutions, regardless of who 
opposes such an approach or which powerful interests might object. The approach of the 
past, which attempted to insure everyone against any possible negative externalities, is no 
longer affordable. Government must, instead, promote flexibility and empower the 
middle class to help itself. The FPD also unequivocally objects to what it perceives as 
discriminatory behavior by the SPD and the Greens of society’s high achievers. High 
performance must be rewarded and not shamed or stifled, which is why people should 
vote for the FDP. After all, it is the only party that will promote liberal values and 
prevent a tax and fee government that the parties to its left on the political spectrum 
would instigate (FDP, 1994, pp. 5-8).   
The FPD promotes policies that are intended to overcome inflexibility and a sense 
of entitlement. One central element for achieving these goals is to curtail government 
involvement in the economy, by regulating less and privatizing more. A comprehensive 
approach to lowering taxes is also necessary, according to the FDP, so that mature 
citizens have more freedom. This tax reform is also intended to address ecological 
elements to foster more competition and to reward environmentally friendly behavior as 
well as to create an energy consumption tax (FDP, 1994, pp. 21-23, pp. 34-35). One of 
the FDP’s core goals of the 1994 election program is to create more jobs. In order to 
achieve this goal the party calls for a two-pronged approach. The first step is to 
deregulate the labor market. The FDP clearly views the agreements between employers’ 
associations and trade unions as a significant entry barrier for the long-term unemployed. 
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More flexibility in general on the labor market and specific exceptions from collective 
bargaining agreements for those people who have not worked in a while will make them 
more attractive on the labor market and allow them to find a way back into the work 
force (FDP, 1994, pp. 18-20). The second element of the FDP employment strategy 
focuses on restructuring the social safety net. The current system of government support 
is spread over many different agencies with different rules and regulations. According to 
the FDP, the answer is to streamline the process and to drastically reduce the number of 
involved government entities. As a result, the process will have more transparency and 
equality among applicants, as well as prevent abuse. Combined with an expectation for 
more individual responsibility and less government support, more people will have 
incentive to work, because often times the amount of government support makes finding 
employment less attractive (FDP, 1994, pp. 81-83). Additionally, the ability of 
unemployed people to reject work that does not fit with their previous career and to retain 
full benefits needs to be significantly curtailed (FDP, 1994, p. 20) The FDP also 
emphasizes the need to reduce indirect labor costs. The FDP plans to decrease these 
costs, and thus make labor more productive and more attractive for employers, by 
reducing unemployment insurance payments and by breaking the link between health 
insurance payments and income. Instead, everyone ought to pay a set rate for the type of 
coverage one desires and potential shortfalls within unemployment insurance need to be 
paid for by the federal government’s budget. Low income households will receive 
subsidies to ensure that they can afford health insurance contributions (FDP, 1994, pp. 
84-87).
The FDP promulgates an active form of government planning and involvement in 
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the housing market, with the intent to build new, modern, and energy efficient homes and 
apartments, by keeping the housing market an attractive investment opportunity. This 
will provide ample housing in order to prevent rent explosions and increased 
opportunities for generating wealth. Again, one of the primary goals is less regulation, in 
order to make more land available and to simplify the building process. The FDP also 
professes its commitment to rent subsidies for people with low income, especially for 
families with children (FDP, 1994, pp. 77-79).  
Other policy areas that the FDP addresses in its program are gender equality, with 
a particular emphasis on providing more support for balancing career and family needs, 
as well as protecting women from violence (FDP, 1994, pp. 99-101). The family must be 
awarded special protections, as it is the core unit of society. It is very important for the 
FDP to stress that the term family is not linked to a specific form, but rather that all 
children must receive special protection and support regardless of their parents’ living 
arrangements. (FDP, 1994, p. 61). The party also reiterates its intent to allow foreigners 
to vote in local elections and to allow dual citizenship in some instances, although they 
also clearly state that Germany is not an immigrant nation (FDP, 1994, p. 53). In terms of 
culture and identity the FDP pursues so-called liberal culture policies, which are designed 
to support the unity of the German culture nation (FDP, 1994, p. 116). It is not really 
clear what this means other than that culture and artistic freedom must not be burdened 
by bureaucratic regulation. There must be an element of stronger private involvement, 
and strong support for the cultural infrastructure in the new federal states, which has been 
threatened by a reduction of government support since reunification. Additionally, the 
FDP is interested in a stronger effort to promote German culture abroad (FDP, 1994, p. 
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116). This idea of promoting a national culture is also viewed as an important element in 
boosting Germany’s reputation abroad and, as such, is a tool for successful diplomacy. 
To this end, the FDP emphasizes the need for actively promoting a view of Germany as a 
culture nation (FDP, 1994, p. 125).  
In terms of the role that a unified Germany should play in international relations, 
the FDP suggests a country that is more involved in international institutions and that is 
strongly committed to NATO and the UN. The guiding principle for Germany’s foreign 
interactions is peace politics, which is best achieved at a global level with a strengthened 
UN. For Europe, the emphasis is more on the Helsinki Accords and cooperation with 
Russia to reduce arms, especially nuclear, and to overcome nationalistic developments 
such as those which exist in the former Yugoslavia (FDP, 1994, pp. 117-225). Trade 
policies are an important element for the FDP’s overall foreign policies. The party views 
open global markets as a vital element for strength and prosperity. Protectionism is not an 
option for Germany to solve its problems (FDP, 1994, p. 31), which is why the FDP 
welcomes the completion of the Uruguay Round as part of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They see increased trade as greater opportunity for growth 
and development especially for developing countries. The significant reduction of 
agricultural tariffs means that developing countries, for the first time, have the 
opportunity to access rich countries’ markets. In addition to market access and direct 
financial support, developing countries need help that is designed to change structures 
and systems. This is the best way for developing countries to help themselves (FDP, 
1994, pp. 134-135).  
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7.1.3 The 1998 Election 
In 1998 the FDP starts with a preamble that reiterates the party’s core goals of 
reducing government, lowering taxes, and restructuring the welfare state. Interestingly 
enough, these goals are seen as a necessary response to a new age of globalization, a time 
to prepare to face new challenges (FDP, 1998, p. 5). This is the first instance in which the 
FDP mentions globalization in the election programs that are examined in this study.  
The first concrete problem that the FDP addresses in its last program of the 19th 
century is the need for more employment opportunities. Unemployment is a very difficult 
challenge and the most socially beneficial policies are those that generate jobs. The FDP 
calls for a renewal of Germany’s market economy, a stark contrast to the current 
collective bargaining process, which creates too much rigidity and too many privileges. 
Germany needs flexibility and opportunities, which are best achieved through 
deregulation as well as lower and fairer taxes. To this end, the FDP calls for very 
comprehensive tax cuts, in order to benefit all, by simplifying the tax code, reducing 
income taxes, increasing tax credits for children, a larger tax free base income, and 
reducing of the wealth tax, just to name the most important ones (FDP, 1998, pp. 6-10). 
A further boost to employment would come from cutting subsidies, especially for the 
domestic production of coal, more privatization and deregulation (FDP, 1998, pp. 12-15). 
The FDP also reiterates its call for a reduction of indirect labor cost by reducing 
contributions to unemployment insurance, health insurance, and retirement benefits. This 
also means that the government will only provide more basic services for its citizens; 
rather, people are encouraged to find individual ways to protect themselves against 
individual risks (FDP, 1998, p. 18).  
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According to the FDP, education is the ethical foundation of the civil society and 
it creates jobs. In other words, it is unethical to support a system which does not offer 
equal educational opportunities to all its residents. Education is the new social question of 
the 21st century, because under globalization success is increasingly determined by 
individual qualifications. This is why schools and universities need to create equal 
opportunities for all students; outcomes are negligible if the opportunities are fair. More 
government funds need to be spent on education and the responsibility for education 
needs to be redistributed, so that more decisions can be determined locally. More 
competition is necessary for the best education concepts and independent assessment 
regarding the quality of institutions that provide education. Additionally, some of the 
tasks of educating people for a globalized world need to be taken over by private entities 
whenever it is sensible to do so (FDP, 1998, pp. 25-31). Schools and universities must 
also prepare the next generation for the ongoing globalization process by reducing the 
time it takes to graduate or to obtain a degree (FDP, 1998, p. 20). Government and 
private efforts need to provide more opportunities for continuous and on the job learning, 
so that all people have the opportunities to broaden their skillset or to specialize and 
deepen existing skills (FDP, 1998, pp. 28-33).  
Restructuring the agricultural sector is also an important economic topic for the 
FDP. The key is to allow the agricultural sector more freedom to develop and to improve, 
by fostering an entrepreneurial mindset among farmers through more deregulation and an 
added emphasis on individual responsibility. At the same time, export subsidies for 
agricultural products must be reduced on a global level and government meddling in 
markets must also be reduced, or ideally eliminated. Overall, the goal for the agricultural 
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sector must be to facilitate competition and targeted structural development for rural 
areas that revitalizes those regions and thus creates new employment opportunities. It is 
important to note that this does not warrant lower environmental standards or less 
protection of animals. In fact, future development must be environmentally friendly and 
sustainable according to the FDP (FDP, 1998, pp. 20-23, pp. 99-100).   
The FDP illustrates its social policies under the heading liberal is social, claiming 
that the most social policies are those that create work. Germany needs a fundamental 
reform of its social net, because a state economy with the best social intentions is inferior 
to a market economy which secures the best social results. At the core of the market 
economy is flexibility, transparency, deregulation, competition, and lower payments into 
the welfare system (FDP, 1998, p. 37). The FDP further calls for more private 
responsibility in securing financial means for retirement, more flexibility for the 
healthcare sector with different payment and service structures based upon individual 
preference, a more restrictive approach towards welfare payments, education for youth 
that teaches self-reliance, equal opportunities for men and women, flexible work 
arrangements to get back into the work force, and special protection for the family as 
society’s core unit. Family in this context has a broad definition to be very inclusive in 
order to protect children regardless of their living situation (FDP, 1998, pp. 38-46), as 
mentioned above.  
With regards to explicit trade and economic policies, the FDP considers 
globalization a challenge and a tremendous opportunity for Germany’s economy, which 
makes it vital not to overregulate the economy so as to adversely affect Germany’s 
competitiveness (FDP, 1998, p. 61). The ability to compete globally will determine 
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Germany’s strength and its ability to effect change in the future. Internationally, the FDP 
is committed to working with its partners, especially in NATO, the OECD, and Europe, 
for peace and stability, as well as greater respect for human rights. The party also 
promises to continue the enlargement of the EU as a tool for peace and prosperity, as well 
as to build a strategic partnership with Russia and the Ukraine. Additionally, the FDP’s 
foreign policy must always include the goal to secure global free trade and to strengthen 
the WTO. Globalization is an opportunity for more competition and open markets, which 
strengthen peace and prosperity. An important opportunity that globalization grants is the 
ability for developing countries to better and more quickly obtain access to the markets of 
rich industrial states through a reduction of trade barriers (FDP, 1998, pp. 90-95). 
International development and global economic activity must not lead to environmental 
harm, which is why there should be internationally agreed upon and binding 
environmental standards (FDP, 1998, pp. 92-93). The introduction of the Euro as legal 
tender for the members of the European monetary union is viewed by the FDP as the 
strategic answer to the challenges of globalization, because it strengthens both Germany’s 
competitive position within Europe and at the same time increases Europe’s global 
competitiveness (FDP, 1998, p. 20, p. 97). 
The issue of culture is briefly addressed, and the FDP professes its support for 
culture and the arts. They suggest better cooperation between the state and private 
initiatives when it comes to supporting all sorts of artistic expressions. Support does not 
mean influencing, which is why cultural policies must always be liberal in nature and not 
restrictive. Even in times of tight budgets, the government should support cultural 
projects, because Germany needs to meet its responsibilities as a culture nation (FDP, 
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1998, p. 35), although it is unclear what this actually means. In terms of identity and 
immigrants, the FDP states that integration is crucial. Immigrants must not be excluded 
or experience any form of segregation; this is especially true for child immigrants. It 
would be wrong to let them grow up with a foreign consciousness. Allowing them to 
reach maturity with a domestic identity is ideal (FDP, 1998, pp. 56-57). The FDP accepts 
the principle of immigration, but it must be limited, actively controlled, and a preference 
must be placed on individuals who speak German. Foreigners should receive the right to 
vote in local elections and the children of foreigners who are born in Germany should 
receive conditional citizenship until they are 25 years old, at which point they must 
choose between German citizenship or retaining their parents’ nationality (FDP, 1998, 
pp. 56-58).   
 
7.1.4 The 2002 Election 
As part of a larger global process Germany is undergoing a transition from an 
industrial society to an information society according to the FDP. Capital, labor, and 
information are becoming increasingly mobile, national borders lose their relevance, and 
the state is losing control. The other parties misunderstand the role of the state as a 
paternalistic guardian over its citizens. The FDP claims that the other parties promote a 
state that is ever increasing its involvement in society but at the same time becomes less 
able to have control over developments within society. The FDP believes in mature 
citizens who can decide what is or what is not in their own best interest. Citizens need to 
be proactively involved in society and have the freedom to solve their own problems, 
without having to run to the state for help on every little issue (FDP, 2002, p. 1). 
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An important component of the FDP’s 2002 program is the criticism of the 
current SPD and Green government, whose economic policies have failed. They have 
proven to be interventionist, short sighted, unsystematic, and contradictory and the 
current government’s call for a “new” social market economy is unnecessary, because 
Germany only needs to return to the principles of the social market economy (FDP, 2002, 
p. 3). The elements of this social market economy that the FDP likes to highlight are
comprehensive tax cuts, more flexibility on the labor market, a reform of the social net, 
plus more individual responsibility and choice when it comes to preparing for retirement. 
With regards to flexibility in the labor market, the FDP wants to see additional private 
entities that help in the process of finding new employment, restricting unemployment 
benefits to 12 months, and eliminating industry wide wage agreements. All of these 
efforts are designed to lower labor cost or to increase consumption, which is the only way 
to maintain global competitiveness (FDP, 2002, pp. 3-8). Globalization and technological 
advances have significant effects upon the German labor market, devaluing unskilled 
labor and increasing the need for a highly trained and skilled workforce. This requires 
more flexibility and effort from society. The principle of quid pro quo must dominate the 
welfare state; in this context Germany must move away from the principle of collective 
responsibility and embrace the idea of individual responsibility. Only a strong personal 
effort warrants later intervention of the state on one’s behalf (FDP, 2002, pp. 8-10). 
Another way to reduce indirect labor costs must include a more flexible and economic 
health care sector. The core principle of health care is individual choice when it comes to 
premiums and services; a one size fits all approach is not economical. There must be 
more choice for individuals between government mandated health care insurance and 
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private alternatives. The principle of increased individual responsibility also guides the 
FDP’s retirement policies: There has to be more private retirement investment. On the 
one hand more individual responsibility and choice and on the other, more private options 
and less government involvement best define FDP policies (FDP, 2002, pp. 10-16).  
According to the FDP education is the most neglected element of German politics 
and it is time for liberal policies to guide education. After all, education is a right of every 
citizen and the right education system creates people with solid general knowledge and 
the necessary technical skills for their field along with the required social competency to 
perform in the job market. Germany’s international competitiveness primarily depends on 
how well people are prepared for the job market and their ability to adapt to future 
challenges (FDP, 2002, p. 29). Private organized forms of education are a welcome 
alternative to the government centric approach and are to receive the same kind of 
financial support as public entities would. Children are to be assessed and receive 
targeted lesson plans that help them to overcome specific weaknesses that they might 
have. This is especially important for immigrant children who learn German as a second 
language. In general, there should be more competition between different schools and 
universities as well as more flexibility for choosing specialized education and to 
approaches to schooling. It is the FDP’s goal to ensure equal opportunities for all children 
in Germany, but it rejects the expectation of equal outcomes (FDP, 2002, pp. 30-37). In 
terms of postsecondary education, the FDP calls for improved vocational training that 
conveys more internationally transferable skills and more individuality for universities. 
Universities must compete for the best talent domestically, but also internationally. 
Germany’s reputation for research and development must be increased internationally. In 
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order to achieve these goals the FDP promotes more flexibility and autonomy for 
universities (FDP, 2002, pp. 38-41).  
Other important issues in this campaign are families, immigration and culture. 
Families are the heart of a society, where family is defined as a living arrangement that 
involves children. The FDP’s stance is that families need more financial and structural 
support, which is why the party suggests things like additional tax relief or more flexible 
child care and education offers for families (FDP, 2002, pp. 47-49). Immigration is also 
addressed by the FDP with the goal to actively steer immigration so as to influence who 
comes into the country, and who does not. Language skills are a key determinant for 
eligibility and new immigrants must participate in mandatory language classes if they 
lack sufficient proficiency, because the ability to communicate with others is vital for 
effective integration. Furthermore, integration has to be improved so that immigrants can 
be productive and contributing members of society. Interestingly enough, the FDP 
specifically states that integration does not mean assimilation, which fits with the party’s 
overall pluralistic world view (FDP, 2002, pp. 61-64). In terms of culture the FDP only 
expresses great appreciation for culture and states that is valuable for a free and liberal 
society. A new point in this context, for the 2002 platform, is the call for preserving 
Germany’s historic legacy, which includes the German language, music, fine arts, as well 
as architecture (FDP, 2002, p. 68). 
When it comes to Germany’s security and role in a global world, the FDP builds 
upon trusted organizations such as NATO, the UN and the EU. A special focus is placed 
on advocating within the UN for human rights, especially gender quality, and better 
environmental protection. A particularly important point in this context of the EU is its 
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enlargement in Eastern Europe, because it will increase stability and prosperity. The 
enlarged common market is a tremendous opportunity for Germany’s economy and the 
best answer to a globalized world. This is why the shared currency is vital, because it 
reduces the cost of transnational transactions and thereby increases competitiveness 
(FDP, 2002, pp. 78-84, p. 87). In terms of trade the FDP promotes the notion that trade is 
good for all states, and better access to markets for developing countries is key to 
improving their position. Free trade is the foundation for prosperity; it is the solution and 
not the problem according to the FDP. The WTO is a vital organization for improving 
market entry especially for poor countries who need better access to the rich world’s 
agricultural markets. Additionally, the WTO must continue its quest for abolishing trade 
barriers, which in combination with technological progress, deregulation, and 
standardized regulations will increase global prosperity, especially in the developing 
world (FDP, 2002, p. 81, pp. 85-86). 
 
7.1.5 The 2005 Election 
For this early election, the FDP starts by summarizing the recent public debate 
about the challenges and opportunities of globalization, the risks and costs of an 
overextended social state, and the need for society to adapt to an increasingly aging 
population. The best solution to these issues is individual freedom, because the individual 
pursuit of happiness is what will guarantee the best collective outcome. The FDP presents 
a complete concept that is designed to realize this freedom through a market based 
economic renewal. At its core this renewal will focus on creating jobs through education 
and research in a liberal social state (FDP, 2005, p. 1). As the party states, this is not an 
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easy undertaking, because many people view freedom as insecure, individual 
responsibility as a breeding ground for selfishness, increasing local responsibility as 
weakening of the federal government, and assertions by the FDP for solidarity are 
regarded as hollow verbal commitments (FDP, 2005, p. 2).  
The party sticks with its traditional recipe for growth and prosperity. The FDP’s 
most important goal is to create an environment that generates more employment 
opportunities. The primary path for getting there is through drastic simplification of the 
tax code and significant reduction of taxes in general. Combined with decreasing the 
indirect labor cost, by for example switching to private health care options or new 
retirement options with generally later retirement, this will lead to more jobs which in 
turn means less government spending on various types of support plus more contributions 
to the welfare system through gainful employment. As a result, government budget’s will 
not be strained anymore and lost revenue from tax cuts will be offset (FDP, 2005, pp. 4-
12). Additionally, the introduction of a citizen payment is supposed to bundle all existing 
forms of government support under one administrative scheme. Thus, complexity will be 
reduced and transparency increased, and administrative cost for the government will be 
significantly reduced by administering all forms of payment through the finance ministry 
as a form of tax rebate (FDP, 2005, pp. 7-10). Dissolving the government agency for 
labor (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) as well will save additional administrative cost and 
allow for private entities to take over some of the agency’s function, especially the job 
and placing services (FDP, 2005, pp. 14-15). The goal of all labor market and welfare 
policies must be a situation in which it is always more profitable for people to work than 
to receive government support. Otherwise a structural incentive to not work exists, which 
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cannot be in the best interest of a society (FDP, 2005, p. 8). 
Additional ways of increasing employment for the FDP include more 
competition, which means getting rid of monopolies especially government ones as well 
as increasing flexibility on the job market. As the export world champion who profits 
from open markets, it is important for Germany to make adjustments to retain that 
position. One important way of doing this is by avoiding any form of minimum wage, 
because it only aggravates problems in the labor market. In fact, the job market has come 
back to being an actual market, which requires flexible company specific solutions and 
not industry wide collective wage agreements. Instead, companies need better work 
councils that give employees a stake and a say in their firms. Companies also need more 
flexibility to respond to markets which necessitates contracts that make it easier to fire 
people in times of a downturn (FDP, 2005, pp. 12-14).  
Education must be restructured in Germany to allow every child equal 
opportunities in life. This must especially include preschool tests that assess the ability of 
each student to succeed in school. Here, a special focus must be placed on language 
capabilities and if necessary extra learning opportunities must be made available to 
ensure that all students are on an equal footing by the time they enter first grade so that 
they all can follow and comprehend what is being taught. According to the FDP, there 
need to be more options for all-day schools and a school system that is designed for 12 
years and not the traditional 13. When it comes to tertiary education the FDP calls for 
more competition and excellence of German universities and generally more freedom, 
which includes the right to charge tuition. This is a reversal from previous positions 
(FDP, 2005, pp. 22-24) 
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Other issues that the FDP addresses in 2005 are environmental standards, gender 
equality, and culture. In terms of environmental policies, the FDP suggests shared 
binding European standards that increase protection but are, at the same time, not 
bureaucratic. They pursue a primarily market based approached that incentivizes 
environmentally friendly behavior because of cost savings, such as the reduction of 
energy costs or the implementation of an emissions trading scheme. In this way, modern 
market driven methods and environmental protection can be brought into harmony. This 
process will be become faster in the future as research and development increases and 
becomes less bureaucratic (FDP, 2005, p. 18, pp. 25-27). With regards to gender equality, 
besides the FDP’s general support for the issue, this time the party presents a new idea, 
which is to get rid of the income tax rule that allows couples to have one income taxed at 
a lower rate at the expense of the other income, which gets taxed at a higher rate. This 
exponentially reduces the net contribution of the lower income and reduces the incentive 
to work for the spouse who gets paid less due to the lower rate of return. It is usually men 
who earn more money and then in turn are placed in more favorable tax class at the 
expense of their spouse. This sends the wrong signal because it undervalues the 
performance of women and discourages them from contributing to the labor force. The 
state needs to additionally contribute strongly to the expansion of child care facilities to 
allow families more flexibility and to allow both parents to work or to make it easier for 
single parents to earn a living (FDP, 2005, p. 34). Art and culture is an important field 
that has significant value for society and that requires more government and private 
support. The goal of state support for art and culture must be the preservation and further 
development of the cultural legacy including the German language. As with the 1998 
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platform, it is not really clear what this cultural legacy is, but in contrast to the CDU it is 
not defined as specifically German.  
 In the final chapter of the 2005 program the FDP lays out its plan for more 
international cooperation. The chapter begins by describing the success story of the EU 
and by highlighting the peaceful cooperation among the people of Europe as the 
foundation of this achievement. According to the FDP the EU must be a dynamic 
economy in a globalized world and a drive for performance, high educational standards, 
and open markets will lead to further economic success. This is why strengthening the 
EU has to remain a focal point of German foreign policy. The following are especially 
important in this context: enforcement of the subsidiarity principle, the reduction of 
subsidies, more investment in education, the ratification of a European constitution, and 
giving more power to the European Parliament. The FDP wants to cooperate more with 
the UN, NATO, the USA, China and Russia. They also emphasize more collaboration 
with Asia and the Middle East (FDP, 2005, pp. 44-48). Globalization is an opportunity 
for growth and prosperity from the FDP’s point of view. Isolation and the erection of 
barriers only cause a significant loss of wealth and would harm Germany, because it has 
especially profited from globalization. The export dependence of Germany’s economy 
means that there are few states that profit as much from open markets as Germany. Mass 
unemployment and loss of social cohesion are not caused by globalization but by a lack 
of domestic reforms. Globalization cannot be stopped, but one can decide to profit from 
globalization. Accordingly, the FDP supports the creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade 
Area and free trade between rich and developing countries, which  in combination with a 
strengthened WTO is the only way to overcome the prosperity gap. Direct development 
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aid is also helpful, but here, the guiding principle must be quality over quantity. 
Additionally, aid must be used to build up liberty, the rule of law, and market economies 
(FDP, 2005, pp. 49-50). 
 
7.1.6 The 2009 Election  
The Liberals start their 2009 program with the basic premise that all political 
actions must be guided by prioritizing some principles over others. These principles are: 
freedom over equality, production over redistribution, private over state, personal 
responsibility over faith in government, and equal opportunities instead of attempting to 
equalize outcomes. Those who want more freedom and equal opportunities in Germany 
need to vote for the FDP, because it is the only party that will promote more freedom and 
responsibility and less government paternalism (FDP, 2009, p. 2). Germany must prepare 
itself for the future and this is best achieved by allowing people to develop without 
restrictions. Responsible citizens know that the government does not take care of all their 
problems, but they must also be able to trust that the state will not create new burdens for 
them (FDP, 2009, p. 2).  Besides the goal to increase freedom and individual 
responsibility they also promote the successful social market economy because it 
generates wealth. For the FDP, a core element of the social market economy is a 
government that creates a framework for individuals and markets, but one that does not 
seek to interfere with them (FDP, 2009, p. 3). In essence, the state creates an equal 
playing field and provides basic rules and regulations that are primarily designed to 
produce fair chances for everyone, but the state does not care how the game is played or 
the outcome of the game. The social market economy can unleash its full potential (FDP, 
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2009, p. 5). 
 One important element for achieving this vision is fairer, lower, and simpler 
taxes. This is why the FDP wants to introduce a tax exemption of 8000 Euros for every 
family member and a maximum income tax rate of 35% percent. In order to create more 
equality between multiple people with income in one household, the FDP will rescind the 
opportunity to tax one income lower at the expense of the other. Another important 
reform in regard to taxation is a restructuring of corporate taxes with the intent to lower 
them and to make German companies more competitive (FDP, 2009, pp. 6-7). These tax 
cuts will be made possible by more budget discipline from the government at all levels as 
well as through the introduction of a citizen payment. This will be more cost effective, 
because it bundles all forms of government support and transfer schemes under the 
finance ministry, thus reducing complexity and increasing transparency, while at the 
same time cutting the state’s administrative costs for these programs (FDP, 2009, pp. 8-
9). In the wake of the financial crisis, the FDP also addresses the need for better financial 
regulation and supervision. However, it is also important to note that the crisis is not an 
indication of market failure, but of government failure. The solution is better regulation 
and more company internal supervision and review (FDP, 2009, pp. 9-10). The Liberals 
also foster more environmental protection, especially in the form of reducing energy 
consumption, for which the signing of a global energy reduction agreement would be 
vital. The FDP wants to invest more into new technologies, in particular into renewable 
energy sources, to reduce the consumption of coal, oil, and gas. Emissions trading is also 
a helpful tool to reduce pollution, but this must also include all forms of transportation. 
The Liberals also emphasize protecting biodiversity and using natural resources, 
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including fish, in a more sustainable manner (FDP, 2009, pp. 52-64).  
 A flexible labor market is essential for a dynamic, prosperous and free society as 
well, which is why the Liberals reject industry wide collective bargaining or any form of 
minimum wage, because that only destroys jobs. Wage negotiations must take place in a 
decentralized atmosphere and be based upon the needs and opportunities of each 
company. The cost for work councils must also be reduced, by reducing the number of 
legally required members of a company that have to be on such a council (FDP, 2009, pp. 
11-15). There is further potential for job creation if the indirect labor cost can be reduced. 
One option for achieving this is to cut company subsidized health spending for 
government health care options, or the lack thereof. Cost can be cut by allowing for more 
choice and private alternatives that offer different rates and services. Another way of 
reducing cost is by allowing new ways of paying for retirement, for example instead of 
increasing retirement contributions, employees should have options to save according to 
their own preferences and to rely more heavily on private saving. A fixed retirement age 
is also anachronistic in the 21st century. Older people still want to contribute and use 
their skills. This is why flexible options, including part-time work, are much more 
sensible. Long term care must be organized based upon individual choice, with the state 
bearing the responsibility to provide a basic framework of care, but the details must be 
flexible and individually adjustable (FDP, 2009, pp. 16-21). 
 In the 2009 election program, for the first time, the FDP takes the position that 
Germany is an immigration country which needs to actively steer immigration so as to 
influence who comes to Germany based on a point system, where desirable skills and 
qualifications guarantee additional points. Lack of language skills still means that such 
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immigrants have to take mandatory language classes. In general, the FDP views 
immigrants and their respective cultures as an opportunity and a benefit to Germany’s 
society. The party also regards dual citizenship as a tool for increasing identification for 
immigrants with their new nation (FDP, 2009, pp. 36-37). In terms of culture, the FDP 
only expresses great appreciation for culture, because it is the foundation of society and it 
deserves more government and private support. The goal of the FDP in this regard is to 
include everyone in the shaping and production of culture (FDP, 2009, p. 37). The FDP 
views the promotion of German culture and language abroad as a tool for increasing 
German influence, but also as a means for fostering cooperation and understanding, 
which is increasingly important in times of globalization (FDP, 2009, p. 69). 
 Again, education takes on a crucial role for the FDP, because it is the key to 
freedom, to social participation, and personal happiness and prosperity. Education can 
overcome any socio-economic, cultural, or religious background so that everyone can 
determine their own destiny regardless of their parents’ position within society. 
Education is the essential social question within society, according to the FDP, which is 
why they commit 7% percent of Germany’s GDP to education and another 3% of GDP to 
research and development. Besides less bureaucracy, more decentralized decisions, and 
more competition between alternative forms of primary and secondary education, the 
party’s most novel element is the voucher system that parents can use for their children 
once they reach 1 year of age. These vouchers will allow them to use various forms of 
free offers for their children, like arts and crafts programs, music, physical activities, or 
early education. Language proficiency is also very important to the Liberals, which is 
why they want to introduce mandatory tests for all children once they turn 4 years old to 
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assess their language abilities and to provide special support where necessary, so that all 
children can fully participate once they reach elementary school. Furthermore, continuing 
education is becoming increasingly important in a globalized world, which is why the 
FDP is calling for more cooperation between schools, universities and other forms of 
adult learning to improve the quality and opportunities for continuous learning in order to 
improve the skills and abilities of Germany’s work force. Universities are to compete 
more directly with one another and have more flexibility regarding the degrees they offer. 
Better education is allowed to cost more, which is why the FDP continues to support 
university tuition (FDP, 2009, pp. 42-47).   
 The FDP’s international policies are designed to promote rule of law, democracy, 
and the social market economy, because these principles are the best guarantee for peace, 
freedom, and prosperity, which are the ultimate goals of the FDP’s foreign policy. These 
goals are best achieved through cooperation with allies and through international 
organizations. Besides promoting prosperity, the Liberals also call for widespread 
disarmament and comprehensive arms controls (FDP, 2009, pp. 66-67). The EU is also a 
vital issue for the FDP, because the EU is Germany’s answer to globalization and the 
means through which globalization’s potential can be best harnessed. It is through the 
EU’s common market that Germany can fully unfold its strengths, because it allows for 
unimpeded competition, which is the best engine for growth and prosperity. Additionally, 
the EU provides a unified voice and the ability to shape international outcomes much 
more effectively than individual states could and the Euro provides stability against 
financial shocks and lowers transaction cost which, again, increases competitiveness 
(FDP, 2009, pp. 70-71). The Liberals also object to any form of protectionism when it 
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comes to international trade. This includes calls from national leaders to buy national 
brands or any form of competition distorting subsidies. Markets must be open and 
concluding the ongoing Doha Round would be the best defense against protectionism 
(FDP, 2009, p. 72).  
 
7.1.7 The 2013 Election  
The beginning of the FDP’s 2013 program focuses on growth, because growth 
enables everyone to rise. The goal is that everyone in Germany has the opportunity to 
improve their social standing through their individual effort. The most important factor 
for enabling such a rise is the social market economy, because it is the foundation for 
prosperity, progress, and growth in Germany (FDP, 2013, pp. 7-8). Policies for which the 
FDP advocates in order to facilitate this goal are a stable currency, national responsibility 
for national debt within the European monetary union, simpler and lower taxes, less 
bureaucracy, more deregulation, competitive energy markets, and financial rules that are 
both leaner and more effective (FDP, 2013, pp. 8-22). This first chapter unusually entails 
a section about globalization, which is traditionally addressed by the FDP in their last 
chapter. Here, the FDP points out the enormous opportunities that globalization and more 
international cooperation can bring. It is only necessary to remove obstacles that prevent 
cooperation and create more freedom for individuals. As an export nation, Germany 
requires free trade and not export restrictions, even as a tool to reduce a trade surplus. 
Germany will only succeed under future competition with states like China, Brazil, and 
India when Europe comes together and becomes stronger, not by becoming weaker (FDP, 
2013, pp. 22-23). Free trade also helps in the global fight against poverty, which is why 
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the FDP consistently fights for reduction of trade obstacles and trade liberalization. Open 
markets generate increased utility for everyone as they create progress, growth, and new 
jobs. Through trade, states with a low natural resource endowment can peacefully secure 
scarce resources they would otherwise be lacking. Trade also creates new markets and 
interaction between nations which ultimately leads to understanding and peace (FDP, 
2013, p. 23). 
 Education is an important component for the FDP, because it creates opportunities 
and allows for a self-determined life. This is why education must become more 
comprehensive and develop into a lifelog endeavor. Education must be more accessible 
for children who do not come from an affluent or highly educated home and it must be 
more targeted at the specific needs of children. This is best achieved through policies and 
lesson plans that are locally determined. Additionally, education must not create path 
dependencies, but rather allow for second chances (FDP, 2013, pp. 25-28). Reforming the 
social safety net remains an important issue for the FDP in 2013 as well, because it 
creates more equality and lowers indirect labor cost which is vital for job creation. One 
thing the party is particularly proud of is the reduction of government interventions in the 
economy during the last legislative period, so as to keep the labor market open and 
flexible. One big obstacle to market entry according to the FDP, is a minimum wage or 
industry wide collective bargaining, which is why the party consistently objects to those 
issues. Instead, it is more effective to reduce costs, by increasing equality and 
transparency through the citizens’ payment, more flexible retirement regulations, and a 




 The FDP also communicates its usual views about families, homosexuality, 
gender equality, immigration, and culture. It is interesting to note that the FDP’s goal of 
building an inclusive, multicultural society with equality for everyone is justified and 
even considered essential in order for Germany to persist in a globalized world, because 
there is a great need for diversity and flexibility in the 21st century (FDP, 2013, pp. 39-
48) 
 
7.2 Initial Election Program Analysis 
The following section is a basic analysis of the five key terms as they appear in all 
seven FDP election programs. A detailed explanation of how the programs were 
analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regards to the key terms can be found in 
Chapter 4.3. Figure 7.1 illustrates all direct references regarding globalization sorted 
according to the five key terms. The FDP started using the term globalization, out of the 
seven programs analyzed by this study, in 1998. Of the five analyzed terms, it is also the 
one that is most often used by the FDP, which is unusual, when compared to the other 
major German parties. While the overall number of mentions of globalization, trade, and 
exports are largely even throughout the seven programs, if one takes out the two early 
elections when the FDP did not refer to globalization at all, the picture becomes different. 
Since 1998 there are almost as many globalization references as there are combined trade 
and export ones. This demonstrates the party’s relative ease and comfort in using the term 
globalization within its election programs, which is a good deal higher, with 39 
references, than most other major German parties, 1 except for the Greens who use the 
                                                          




term 60 times, but the Greens also have the longest combined page count for all seven 
programs with over 1000 pages. The FDP only makes it to slightly above 600 pages, 
meaning that the saliency of globalization is higher in FDP programs than it is in those of 
the Green party. A similar observation can be made in regard to free trade, to which the 
FDP refers in all of its programs, except in the 1990 program. None of the references 
mention free trade in a negative context and the total of 13 references is also much higher 
than the average references of Germany’s other parties of only four.2 In contrast, the 
issue of imports is hardly discussed at all by the FDP, except for the five instances in the 
party’s 2009 program, which addressed imports of biomass and electrical energy. It is 
interesting that even the party that is so overtly in favor of trade and globalization does 
not address imports with the relevance that the issue has for Germany’s economy. The 
Federal Republic’s manufacturing sector, which imports goods from all over the world, 
could not be the self-proclaimed export world champion (FDP, 2005, p. 12) without the 
intricate network of global suppliers that manufacture subcomponents for Germany’s 
exports. This fact finds no mention in the FDP election programs; instead the issue is 
only mentioned in regard to relatively marginal issues of biomass and electricity imports.  
 By looking at the normative meaning that goes along with any of the globalization 
key terms as highlighted by Figure 7.2, one can easily see that the FDP refers to the five 
key terms more often in a positive context than in a negative one, which is not surprising 
since it is congruent with the party’s general positive disposition when it comes to issues 
of trade and competition. It is very interesting that almost all references that emphasized 
the potential risks or negative outcomes appear almost exclusively prior to the 2002 
                                                          
2 Free trade references by the other major German parties: CDU 4, SPD 1, Greens 3, and The Left 8 
229 
 
election. At the same time, most references about the opportunities and potential benefits 
that can result from increased trade and globalization occur in the same time frame. 
Starting with the 2002 election, comments about the five key terms that relate to dangers 
or risks as well as opportunities sharply declined, whereas the references that relate the 
crucial terms with positive outcomes have markedly increased. This suggests that the 
FDP abandoned its mixed opinions about globalization and economic interdependence at 
the start of the 21st century, in favor of an almost unequivocal commitment to 
globalization and trade. 
While Figure 7.2 shows an aggregate summary for all key terms, it falls short of 
identifying how the FDP regards each of the individual terms. This is why the following 
paragraphs look at each key term individually, starting with trade, which is undoubtedly 
the issue that the FDP refers to most often as leading to desirable outcomes.  
Approximately 25% deal with trade in a neutral manner or highlight its potential benefits. 
Only 8% of all trade references in FDP election programs have some form of negative 
context. Additionally, the instances that fall in this category are either critical of trading 
certain small subsegments of the overall traded share of goods (FDP, 2009, p. 62), or they 
simply state that a particular element of trade creates challenges that need to be addressed 
and overcome (FDP, 2002, p. 77), but nothing that could be qualified as a critique of the 
principle of trade itself (see Figure 7.3). The same is even more true for the expression 
free trade which is used 12 times in a positive context and only once in a neutral one (see 
Figure 7.4). This fits perfectly with the Liberal’s strong belief that competition without 
obstacles leads to more jobs, more prosperity, more freedom, and more innovation. 
References to globalization are relatively numerous and close to a third of them highlight 
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the positive effects of the phenomenon, especially to new opportunities that it can bring 
to Germany’s society and economy. 
A little bit less than half of all globalization statements are neutral in nature (see 
Figure 7.5). This ratio is largely due to the party’s 1998 program, which mentions the 
issue 11 times. Many of them are simply used as a backdrop to justify some policy, for 
example, because we live in a globalized world we need a particular education policy 
(FDP, 1998, p. 25). These statements are not intended to say anything about globalization 
itself; instead the term is more used as a rhetoric tool in that particular election campaign. 
The 25% of negative references, simply express that globalization creates challenges (for 
example FDP, 1998, p. 5 or FDP, 2002, p. 84).  
 When it comes to exports and imports the picture is more mixed. The largest 
single group of references to exports in the seven examined FDP election programs 
mentions the issue in a negative context. The remaining references to exports are almost 
evenly split between neutral and positive ones (see Figure 7.6). The negative references 
are predominantly from the first three election programs and relate to arms or waste 
exports. One additional negative export reference points out the dependence of 
Germany’s economy on exports in the 2005 election (FDP, 2005, p. 49). Overall, one can 
say that the FDP does not view exports in a negative light, especially over the last decade.  
With regards to imports there are only eight instances where they mention the  
issue, which surely is not much. Twice, the party mentions electricity imports as a good 
means for increasing competition in the energy market and to lower cost for consumers 
(FDP, 2009, pp. 53-54). The remaining mentioning of imports is either neutral or 
negative (see Figure 7.7). The negative references are negligible as they focus on 
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marginal issues such as imports of small arms or standards for biomass imports. The one 
really interesting reference is from 1994, in which the party highlights the export 
opportunities and the import pressures for the German economy (FDP, 1994, p. 31).  
 
7.3 Comparing Election Programs to Globalization 
and Political Parties 
The following section addresses the questions and hypothesis that are outlined in 
Table 2.1 at the end of Chapter 2 and Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Brawly’s (1997) argument 
about the need to look at the issue of partial factor mobility is not addressed by the FDP. 
It is most likely not feasible for a party to address partial factor mobility in an election 
campaign, due to the topic’s complexity and the party’s desire to make broad statements 
that attract as many voters as possible. This also explains why Midford’s (1993) question 
about how parties address labor subgroups can be easily answered: they do not 
distinguish between subgroups. The question of volatility as defined by Woodruff (2005) 
as fluctuating between economic growth and recession is only marginally addressed by 
the FDP. The issue of reunification and its economic impact are rather less important to 
the FDP and likewise the issue of the global financial crisis barely registered in the 
party’s 2009 election program. Since the FDP was the junior partner to a CDU-led 
government prior to four out of the seven examined federal elections, the FDP had an 
incentive more often than not to be associated with a Germany that experienced stability 
and not one that was engulfed in turmoil. For the three elections during which the FDP 
campaigned as an opposition party, the Liberals spent way more attention on blaming 
Germany’s social and economic problems on an attitude of entitlements and government 
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handouts, which is perpetuated by SPD governments. This is much easier to 
communicate to voters than to explain to voters the consequences that economic cycles 
have on trade and consequently also on employment.  
The issue of labor unions and their role in a globalized world is addressed by 
Garst (1998), wherein he asserts that it is important to ask what kind of positions parties 
take on the issue of labor unions. This is relevant as parties can be a vital instrument for 
promoting globalization due to their ability to organize support for trade liberalization 
and to help distribute the gains from trade more equitably. The FDP does not spend much 
time on trade unions. The message that they communicate about unions is that their 
influence must be curbed and instead that works councils should gain in influence (FDP, 
1990, p. 39). Additionally, the special privileges that unions enjoy within works councils 
is supposed to be tossed as well (FDP, 2005, p. 14). The advantage that works councils 
present for the FDP over labor unions is that collective bargaining agreements between 
unions and employer representatives are often negotiated for whole industries, whereas 
the agreements between works councils and companies are very specific. This means that 
these negotiations can much better meet the specific needs of employees and the 
company (FDP, 2002, p. 7). According to the FDP this creates flexibility, adaptability, 
and innovation which are drivers for growth and new employment opportunities. 
Agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions are, according to the 
Liberals, a significant entry barrier for the unemployed, especially those who are long-
term unemployed. More flexibility and specific exceptions from collective bargaining 
agreements for the unemployed will create more opportunities for them (FDP, 1994, p. 
19). It is only in the 2013 election that the FDP speaks out in favor of trade unions and 
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collective bargaining for individual industries, but this appears to be motivated less by a 
genuine belief in trade unions and labor unions, but as a means to suppress calls for a 
national minimum wage (FDP, 2013, pp. 30-31). In other words, unions are not a viable 
partner for the FDP when it comes to building a prosperous German economy that shares 
its gains equitably. 
Caproso (1997) addressed the idea that parties regularly use globalization as a 
subject to deflect attention from other issues, instead of presenting meaningful policy 
suggestions that actually deal with globalization. The FDP certainly does not use the 
issue of globalization for scapegoating. The party views the changes that go along with a 
globalized world as a challenge (FDP, 1998, p. 5) that no longer allows for global 
compartmentalizing. Most problems in the 21st century are of a global nature and as such, 
affect Germany too. An attitude of “that is someone else’s problem” is not productive; 
instead obstacles need to be addressed and overcome (FDP, 2013, p. 91). The FDP is 
quite optimistic that Germany can master those challenges by deregulating and 
decentralizing to unleash individual ambition and creativity, because it is not the 
government but rather the efforts of individuals who will help to harness the full potential 
of globalization. When it comes to presenting meaningful policies with regards to 
globalization, the FDP has two primary issues for which it advocates, besides 
deregulation and the reduction of direct and indirect trade barriers. One is more 
decentralization of the education system and a special emphasis on preparing students for 
the globalized world (FDP, 1994, p. 20). The other is to emphasize the need for Europe to 
act in a more unified manner, to speak and act with one voice (FDP, 2009, p. 70). The 
FPD also believes that globalization creates much more awareness for human rights 
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issues from all over the world and in turn more willingness and resources to improve 
human rights problems (FDP, 2009, p. 76). The best way to sum up the message that the 
Liberals are communicating with regard to globalization is probably from the 1998 
election program. Here, the party asserts that globalization is a chance for growth, open 
markets, promoting peace, and increasing prosperity, through an international division of 
labor und the free exchange of ideas, services, goods, and capital (FDP, 1998, p. 91).  
Regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement can be important issues for 
voters and can affect support for or opposition to globalization (Ranjan & Lee, 2007; 
Rodrik, 2000), which is why it is relevant to look at how the FDP addresses this issue in 
their election campaigns. In 1994, the Liberals asserted that Germany must be actively 
involved in setting and determining global standards (FDP, 1994, p. 32). The remainder 
of that year’s election program entails various specific examples of areas in which the 
German government should be actively involved. These areas include traffic policies that 
need to be coordinated and harmonized across Europe, due to increasing cross-border 
traffic (FDP, 1994, p. 75). Other issues that allegedly need a unified approach are the 
harmonization of asylum policies (FDP, 1994, p. 129), Europe-wide environmental 
standards (FDP, 1994, p. 128), and of course harmonized tax policies (FDP, 1994, p. 15). 
Other FDP election programs are not as prolific with calls for regulatory harmonization; 
nevertheless, there are some instances particularly when it comes to tax laws. More 
important is the observation that harmonization for the FDP does not mean that others 
need to adopt German standards, but rather to look for and adopt the best regulation. For 
the FDP, this usually means a solution that requires less regulation and government 
involvement. For example, in 2002 the party specifically states that there is no need for 
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special German regulations that do not exist in other countries (FDP, 2002, p. 23) and 
that all such existing regulations that exceed EU requirements will have to undergo a 
rigorous necessity test (FDP, 2005, p. 20). In 2009, they warn that additional domestic 
regulations for the agricultural sector will cause production to go abroad (FDP, 2009, p. 
23). Contract enforcement does not feature too prominently in FDP election programs, 
but there are occasional instances such as the call for the WTO to be more actively 
involved in the defense of intellectual property rights (FDP, 1998, p. 71), the demand to 
uphold European competition laws (FDP, 1994, p. 32), or the request for the ECB not to 
deviate from its mandate not to use monetary measures to solve government finances 
issues of individual members’ states (FDP, 2013, p. 83). However, the most prominent 
call by the FDP for contract enforcement is one is from 1994, when the party called for 
the establishment of a European law academy, which would ensure a unified 
understanding and implementation of laws across Europe. The target group of this 
academy would not only be judges, lawyers, and prosecutors, but also economic experts 
and government employees (FDP, 1994, p. 60). The way the FDP addresses contract 
enforcement and regulatory harmonization is closely aligned with the Liberals’ core 
principles of less red tape and more individual freedom. In that regard, this message 
should fit well with the FDP’s core constituency, but it might deter those who are afraid 
of a deterioration of German standards through increased global involvement. 
 Martin (2000) and Hays (2009) addressed the point that it is important for 
political parties to communicate their goals with respect to international agreements to 
voters and to examine if they offer voters clear choices. In terms of the FDP, the answer 
is relatively straightforward: The party is pretty consistent and clear in its approach to 
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international agreements. This means, in particular, working through international 
institutions. For example, when it comes to security and stability, the FDP is clearly 
committed to NATO and seeks to strengthen the role of the organization beyond the Cold 
War, by using it to promote nuclear disarmament (FDP, 1998, pp. 94-95; FDP, 2002, p. 
88; FDP, 2005, p. 51). Another important policy goal that the FDP pursues in regard to 
international organizations is the general support and strengthening of the UN, but also 
reform of the organization so that it better reflects the political and economic realities of 
the 21st century, which of course, among other things, means more influence and power 
for Germany (FDP, 2005, p. 67). The FDP also claims that more human rights issues 
must be addressed and solved within the framework of the UN (FDP, 2013, p. 90)  
As a key element for economic growth, peace and stability, as well as to ensure 
that Germany’s interest are represented at the international stage, the FDP has always 
pushed for freedom of cross border movement of people, goods, and services. The 
necessary freedom and cooperation is best achieved through a process of 
institutionalization, which is why the FDP pushes for a European union (FDP, 1990, pp. 
23-24). The Liberals certainly see European integration as a tool for stability and peace in 
its own right, but the greatest potential for Germany is derived from the common market 
and the best answer to a globalized world (FDP, 2002, p. 80). Trade liberalization is one 
of the FDP’s primary foreign policy objectives. This is why the party welcomes the 
completion of the Uruguay Round (FDP, 1994, p. 135), and demands the finalization of 
the Doha Round (FDP, 2009, p. 72). The Liberals send a very clear message to voters that 
they support the efforts of the WTO to reduce trade obstructions and to provide more 
opportunities for increased market access. Additional goals include ensuring that the 
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WTO makes a larger effort to increase competition through mutually respected rules, in 
order to build global competition rules (FDP, 2002, p. 85). This is the best approach for 
Germany’s future because, as a nation that has a highly export oriented economy, is it 
essential to secure open, free, and fair markets. In order to combat economic nationalism 
FDP continues to support the WTO and call for the completion of the Doha round (FDP, 
3005, p. 15). 
Another previously identified topic in the literature on globalization is the 
domestic response of political elites to the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; 
Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). This is crucial because it is an indispensable factor for 
alleviating fears of social instability and a loss of prosperity through globalization. The 
FDP pursues an assertive market liberalization strategy and communicates this to voters. 
An integral part of the FDP’s campaign programs is also a smaller and less involved 
government in general, but also one that provides less support to those who depend on 
various forms of social services. There is no mention in the FDP’s campaign programs 
that there is a tradeoff between openness and increased need for support. The simple 
answer by the Liberals is that free trade helps fight poverty, or in other words, more free 
trade means less poverty. The simplicity of this logic will do little to persuade anyone to 
embrace more openness if they feel they are threatened under an increasingly competitive 
global economic order. The consistent undercurrent that competition and competitiveness 
is essential, is what the FDP communicates to voters with their more than 560 references 
throughout the seven election programs. Strongly increasing competition and a slim state 
create a potent combination that certainly creates a measure of anxiety for people who 
feel threatened by such developments, which is naturally a most distressing concern for 
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those individuals who are less educated or lack marketable and specialized skills. If the 
FDP would find a way to call for trade liberalization, more competition and less 
government intervention on markets without reducing the social safety net that 
government traditionally provides, the FDP would have more success persuading 
Germans of the merits that follow globalization. Currently, the FDP’s globalization 
message should only appeal to those who are economically better off and are highly 
skilled, because they need to worry much less than the average citizen about becoming 
marginalized.  
 The final relevant theoretical argument that must be addressed is the issue of 
identity. Emphasizing a European identity is generally a useful tool for most European 
countries to decrease nationalistic attitudes that are opposed to globalization (Anderson, 
2003; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Rankin, 2004). Careful examination of FDP election 
programs does not show an active promotion of a European identity. There are only a few 
references about identity that refer to culture as an important part of forming and 
solidifying identities (FDP, 2013, p. 49). Culture is also the source of identity and an 
engine for creativity and innovation (FDP, 2005, p. 39). The type of culture that the FDP 
describes is not based on any nationalistic criteria and everyone is invited to join the 
process of creating art and shaping culture. The only exception to this general rule is the 
German language which is clearly defined as an element of the culture that must be 
protected and further developed. While the party has a very positive outlook on the idea 
of Europe, this is all on a natural matter-of-fact basis, without any underlying emotional 
attachment that would resemble an identity, with one exception. In the most recent 
election, the FDP states that European student exchanges help foster friendship and 
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cooperation, and thereby strengthen European identity (FDP, 2013, p. 81). In a nutshell, 
the FDP does not play with nationalistic rhetoric in their election campaign and thereby 
does not impede potential developments of a European identity for voters, but the party 
also does not really do anything to nurture an emotional attachment to and identification 
with the European institutions that are largely key for Germany’s economic success 
within the common market.   
 
7.4 Conclusion of FDP Analysis 
The FDP is the only German party that is strongly in favor of economic trade and 
that wants to strengthen the institutions that promote more open trade and increased 
access to markets. Voters cannot walk away from a Liberal election program and wonder 
about the FDP’s advocacy for economic globalization: It’s very clearly laid out. 
However, the German electorate will certainly wonder if they should vote for a party that 
is promoting globalization in order to increase competition and individual 
freedom/responsibility. A lot of the FDP’s policy proposals focus on reducing 
government involvement in favor of individual choice or the reduction of regulations and 
protections so that German competitiveness is increased. The problem for voters will be 
that in many instances replacing a standardized government service with a catalogue of 
options that people can choose from only means more choice if the various options are 
affordable. If one cannot afford to choose anything but the cheapest option, there is no 
increased freedom. If people link globalization with a need to increase competitiveness 
by creating choices between alternative options of government services than a more open 
world will deter those people who are afraid that they will be forced into buying the 
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cheapest government services that are inferior to premium options that the better-off can 
afford. If the FDP is serious about promoting globalization among a broad spectrum of 
voters then it must address the globalization dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997;  
Rudra; 2002). Otherwise it is unlikely that most Germans will accept globalization if it 
means both increased competition and less government support for those who do not 
perform at the highest level. 
 Another dilemma is the FDP’s communication with voters over imports. The 
biggest problem with globalization is if people think of it as a zero-sum game, because 
then globalization must always produce winners and losers. While trade liberalization 
certainly does create individual losers, it normally does not create economies that win and 
ones that lose. Trade generally creates competition, which leads to more specialization, 
higher productivity, more variety, more growth, and increased prosperity (see Chapter 2 
for details), which in turn can be used to compensate those who lose from trade. 
However, the FDP, which is otherwise staunchly in favor of trade liberalization and 
competition, also indirectly communicates to voters the message the trade is a zero-sum 
game. This becomes apparent in the way the party talks about imports and exports. The 
FDP brags that Germany is the world’s export champion (FDP, 2005, p. 12), but almost 
completely omits imports. The reason is that imports are seen as bad or losing and 
exporting goods and services is a sign of strength or winning. This type of zero-sum 
thinking leads to protectionism and oversimplifications, because any kind of economic 
downturn can easily be blamed on too many imports or a negative current account 
balance. It would be much to better communicate both sides of the same coin as positive 
things. Germany cannot be the self-proclaimed export world champion without imports. 
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Germany benefits hugely from the vast amount of goods that it imports, but these are 
benefits that are never articulated by the FDP. The FDP’s goal should be to articulate an 
unequivocal message regarding the benefits of trade, because otherwise voters might 

































































































































































ALLIANCE ‘90/THE GREENS 
 
Alliance '90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), usually simply referred to as 
Greens (Grüne), is a combination of a West German protest party and an East German 
civil liberties party. In its founding phase in the late 1970s, the Greens were a union of 
likeminded people rooted in the student protest movement of the 1960s. This movement 
viewed itself as an extra-parliamentary opposition to the established parties and the 
parliamentary system as a whole. At the time, a broad spectrum of the movement’s 
supporters were left-leaning radicals who rejected the idea of conceding government 
authority to conservatives. Its supporters were primarily motivated by environmental, 
antinuclear power, antiwar, and gender equality issues. In 1979, the first Green parties 
were formed at the state level (Landesverbände) and in January 1980, the party was 
formed at the federal level. Originally, the Greens were very heterogeneous, which led to 
a lot of conflict initially and groups that would soon leave the party. The first group to 
break with the Greens were the conservatives within the movement. This was a relatively 
painless separation. It was much more difficult for the left leaning radicals to leave as 
they considered it a betrayal of their principles when the Greens joined the SPD at the 
state level in a coalition to govern the state of Hesse. The party became divided into 
principalists, who oppose the political system and its inherent compromise in order to 
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generate majorities, and the realists who viewed participation in governments 
unavoidable if one wants to change society (Decker, 2016). The party was able to garner 
more than 5% of votes for the first time at the federal level in 1984, a feat the party has 
been able to replicate ever since, except in 1990 when they failed to adequately address 
the tremendous change that a unified Germany would experience.  
In 1989, when the regime of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany began to 
crumble, various East German civil rights movements merged under the banner Alliance 
‘90, including the East German Green party. Unlike the western Greens who failed to 
enter parliament, the Alliance ‘90 was able to enter the Bundestag with eight seats, due to 
the special provision of the 1990 election that allowed parties secure seats if they won 5% 
of votes in either West or East Germany. Later in 1993, the Alliance ’90 merged with the 
West German Greens into Alliance '90/The Greens. The members of the former civil 
rights movement felt marginalized within the new party. The fact that the Greens were 
unable to initially incorporate the ideas and values of its East German wing was also 
apparent in elections in the new states (Poguntke, 1998). The Greens were only able to 
improve this at the start of the new century by presenting a program that also appealed to 
citizens of the former German Democratic Republic by talking increasingly about 
questions of social equality. While the party was able to establish itself as the fourth 
politically relevant party since the mid-1980s, it was only able to form a governing 
coalition at the federal level in 1998 and 2002. The Greens have traditionally linked 
themselves to the SPD, but the Social Democrats have lost a significant share of the vote 
since 2005. Subsequently, the Greens opened themselves up to coalitions with the CDU, 
or CDU and FDP. While this worked at the state level, it was harder to find common 
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ground at the national. The Greens programs are traditionally characterized by a strong 
emphasis on environmental policies and the desire to achieve ecological, economical, and 
social sustainability.  
A programmatic challenge for the future will be to continuously meet the 
demands of its voters. On the one hand, the Greens rely on the traditional voters who 
have supported the party from its beginning, due to its espoused values. On the other 
hand, many new supporters are economically privileged (Patton, 2014, p. 37), meaning 
the party has limited programmatic options, as social and economic policies that are too 
left will deter the Greens’ new clientele. New opportunities arise for the party from its 
disproportional backing among young voters and its traditional strong female support 
(Decker, 2016).  
 
8.1 Green Party Election Programs 
This section summarizes the most important points from each election program as 
they relate to globalization. The goal is to identify the core message that the Alliance 
‘90/The Greens communicates to voters for the examined 23-year time span in federal 
elections. The primary focus will be on globalization, trade and other economic issues, 
but the intent is also to look broadly at the message that is being communicated. This will 
be central for addressing the broad questions previously outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
8.1.1 The 1990 Election 
The Greens election program in 1990 is built upon the idea that Germany requires 
a new, complete rethink. The model of a society where the individual pursuit of one’s 
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own interest would also be beneficial for society as a whole has failed. What is left is 
unjustifiable material and social injustice that that covers whole continents with poverty 
and leaves people destitute, but even in Germany, the self-centered model of society 
creates poverty and dependence. The way that humans currently ransack the environment 
will leave nothing but a poisonous planet behind. This is especially true if the wasteful 
industrial model of the rich states is expanded and forced upon the rest of the world. This 
is why a radical change of direction is necessary to build a sustainable economy that 
operates in harmony with the environment and not at its expense. It is necessary to 
implement a way of living that protects the diversity of plants and species, one which 
does not diminish them. The collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe must 
not be used as a justification to implement the destructive Western model of capitalism in 
that region. This is why the Greens offer an alternative model of society and for the 
economy (Alliance '90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 4-5).  
Environmental protection is a core element of the Greens’ platform and the party 
insists on the strong reduction of greenhouse gases and of carbon dioxide, because global 
warming and the depletion of the ozone layer are severe threats for humans and the 
environment. Economic growth and expansion must not be the goal of Germany’s 
economic policies, but rather less waste and consumption. Energy efficient technologies 
must be especially supported. However, as the destruction of the environment is not 
solely a national problem it is essential that leading industrial states set common climate 
goals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 50% within 20 years, to globally share 
technologies that reduce energy consumption, and to abandon fossil fuel entirely by 2100. 
Additional goals include banning of chlorofluorocarbon, prohibiting genetically modified 
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crops, and restricting airline travel. For Germany, in particular, this means heavy taxes on 
fossil fuels, a mobility strategy that reduces the importance of the automobile in favor of 
public transportation, and by requiring that new cars only be outfitted with small, 
efficient, and environmentally friendly engines (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 8-
12). The Greens also present a comprehensive program to protect the environment 
through more ecologically friendly production and consumption, as well as drastically 
improved recycling efforts. Special emphasis is also placed on changing the agricultural 
sector into an ecologically friendly and sustainable part of the economy.  
Since the Cold War came to a peaceful end there is no need for Germany to be in 
any military alliance, including NATO, and a complete demilitarization of Germany is 
justified. This is why the party calls for a ban of all nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons on German soil, the dissolving of Germany’s armed forces (the Bundeswehr), 
the removal of all foreign troops currently stationed in Germany, and banning any form 
of arms exports. This type of one-sided disarmament will send a strong signal to 
Germany’s partners and will become a vital element of Europe’s peaceful new order 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 18-20). The Greens also have a list of policies that 
they promise to implement once in power that will generate social rights and allow for 
more flexibility in the way that people organize their work life balance. The Greens 
promise that ecological necessities do not lead to more social injustice. The additional 
cost for building a sustainable economy will largely be paid for by those who command 
more resources. In order to protect anyone from being socially excluded from society, the 
Greens suggest a basic payment for those who fall below a minimum monthly income. 
Their social policies are clearly aimed at strengthening unions in their negotiations with 
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employers. The party also calls for abolishing contract labor and establishing equal 
benefits for part and full-time labor. In order to better manage work-life balance, the 
Greens call for an immediate, 35-hour work week and a gradual transformation to a 30- 
week. The party promises to implement a 50% quota for all new jobs which must be 
offered to women (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 22-25). They also take strong 
positions on health and housing policies. The Greens are squarely opposed to genetic 
research. They demand a system which eliminates co-payments for doctor visits or 
treatment, and better service offers for long-term care. This will be financed by those who 
possess an abundance of financial means. In terms of housing, the shortage of affordable 
living arrangements must be addressed by the state through government housing projects, 
but future projects need to focus on environmentally low-impact housing (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 25-28). The Greens also present various policies to increase 
gender equality within Germany’s society, and especially to grant more legal rights for 
women who are physically or sexually assaulted by men (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, 
pp. 29-34). The Greens call for more transparency of the state and less surveillance of its 
citizens and a state that promotes an open society with equal rights regardless of a 
resident’s nationality. A German nationalist identity must not be permitted and foreigners 
must be able to obtain German citizenship without abdicating their previous citizenship 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, pp. 36-38).  
The Greens' foreign policy proposals are based upon the assumption that rich 
industrial countries have systematically exploited third world countries for centuries. This 
must change, through generating more support for the United Nations, and demanding 
that all states be regarded as equal within the UN framework. The UN must also pursue 
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an agenda that is more focused on protecting human rights. The GATT must be placed 
under UN control, while the World Bank must be dissolved and replaced by regional 
development funds. A comprehensive debt forgiveness program must be enacted to end 
the dependence of poor states. Additionally, foreign aid must stop financing corrupt 
officials and instead support efforts that aim at helping the general population in 
developing states. Rich countries must also pay 1% of their GDP into an environmental 
fund that is designed to counter the resource exploitation and the environmental impact of 
the economic activities of multinational corporations. With regard to trade, the Greens 
insist that future trade deals with poor countries be designed to pay more for resources 
that are exported from developing countries, and that the European community cease its 
protections of the agricultural sector (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 42).  
 
8.1.2 The 1994 Election 
The Greens' 1994 program begins with a preamble that outlines the society which 
the Greens envision for Germany. This ideal is based upon a social, ecological and 
democratic society that is multicultural and open, as well as peaceful and emancipated 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 4-6). These ideals are represented throughout the 
election program. For example, the idea of an open society is reaffirmed by the Greens’ 
rejection of any form of national ideology, as it leads to racism and discrimination. 
Instead, the party calls for a multicultural and multiethnic society (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1994, p. 43). This is also reflected in the immigration and refugee politics that 
the Greens promote, which are intended to foster an open society that provides refuge for 
those in need and allows everyone to participate and contribute. This is also why the 
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Greens call for the right of all permanent residents to become German citizens. This 
liberal and open understanding of society is also the goal that the Greens pursue with 
regard to Europe, which is why the party is fundamentally opposed to the idea of an EU 
that attempts to insulate itself from people who are in need (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
1994, pp. 46-49). The Greens emphasize that this culture of openness and inclusiveness 
must extend towards people with physical or mental handicaps and homosexuals 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 50-51). Education policies are only mentioned 
briefly without any distinctive elements. Another topic that is very important for the 
Greens is gender equality. Policies proposed in this regard include equal pay, more career 
opportunities for women, abolishing structures that favor or strengthen the dominance of 
men, prosecuting violence against women more rigorously, and guaranteeing the right for 
women to exercise self-determination over their bodies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, 
pp. 63-67).  
The Greens assert that the ongoing global recession reveals the dual structural 
flaws of a society that is organized by the principles of a capitalist market economy. On 
the one hand, there is an ecological crisis, because Germany’s economy produces the 
wrong kind of products with the wrong production processes. On the other hand, since 
labor and income are incorrectly distributed Germany also suffers from a social crisis. 
Nowhere does this become more apparent than in East Germany. This is why the Greens 
call for an ecological offensive, which will create new jobs through innovative and 
energy saving products. Germany in general, and the new states especially, need new 
investments and green technologies like decentralized energy production and supply, 
recycling, and an agricultural sector that dispenses with chemicals, a ban on nuclear 
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energy, and sustainable production and consumption (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 
8-11). A key element of this ecological offensive is the introduction of an ecological tax. 
Often the production cost that companies pay does not reflect the true ecological cost of a 
product. This can be changed by taxing energy consumption more heavily. This will 
make it more profitable for companies to invest in energy saving technologies (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 13-14). An ecological tax will also be the first step towards a 
social world economy, because it is unjustifiable that so few people in the world consume 
energy at such a disproportionate rate (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 15). These 
same points are reiterated within the 1994 election program in more detail, but the overall 
message to voters remains unchanged. A few additional details include a rejection of 
subsidies for fossil and nuclear energy and a strong commitment for renewable energy. 
Other points include an innovative mobility concept that moves away from individual 
transportation (e.g., cars) by introducing sizable annual tax increases on gasoline and 
diesel, and greater investments in public transportation as well as more bike lanes and 
more walkways for pedestrians. Agricultural reform and waste reduction / recycling are 
also a big issue for the Greens, here the goal is to reduce waste and to stop its export to 
poor countries. The way that our food is produced must become much more 
environmentally friendly, genetic modification must be avoided at all costs, and the 
reduction of chemical use is a top priority. The reduction of agricultural and export 
subsidies must be a paramount goal of the GATT negotiations, as well (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1994, pp. 29-39).  
The issue of high unemployment rates is an unacceptable development for the 
Greens and they essentially present three solutions to the problem. One is the investment 
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into new green technologies, which will create new and sustainable jobs. Another step is 
to reduce the number of hours worked each week to an absolute maximum of 42 hours 
and to introduce a greater number of positions connected to 30-hour weeks, this way the 
necessary labor needs can be spread among more individuals. Step three is that the state 
will invest more money in creating jobs instead of paying unemployment benefits, and 
these types of jobs must be more than just busy work. They can be important steps for 
society’s ecological and social transformation (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 18-
20).  
The social safety net is also a central concern for the Greens, who view the 
government’s social reforms as temporary saving measures with grave long-term 
consequences and huge risks for society. The Greens propagate a care package that 
covers the basic needs for all those who legally live in Germany and cannot sufficiently 
provide for themselves. Another important element of the social safety net is better care 
for people who require long-term care. In this instance, the state must invest in better 
concepts that allow for more self-determination of people in need of care, a better 
network of services, as well as a better distribution of the risk and cost that go along with 
long-term care in order to reduce cost and to guarantee accessibility for everyone 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 22-25). The Greens clearly favor socialized 
medicine over profit maximizing health care, in order to prevent a two-class system. The 
party is also in favor of a more holistic care approach that focuses on the overall health of 
an individual and includes first class preventative care, instead of what the Greens refer 
to as high-tech repair medicine that only treats individual symptoms (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1994, pp. 25-26). The final building block of the Greens’ social safety net is 
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government support for affordable housing, which is especially relevant for people living 
in East Germany where government run housing is rapidly replaced by for profit models 
that lead, in some cases, to large rent increases. In order to combat this trend the state 
must guarantee affordable housing by introducing rent caps in areas where there is a high 
demand for apartments and houses as well as a general regulation that rent must be in line 
with local rent averages (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 27-29).  
The Greens are very critical of the current international system and Germany’s 
aspirations within this system. Instead of the current unjust world order that leaves 
millions in poverty and creates instability through military conflicts, the Greens call for a 
social and ecological global system. This is based on demilitarization. Since the 
dismantling of the USSR there is no more need for NATO and a sizable reduction of 
Germany’s armed forces is in order. Instead of indulging great power aspirations the 
Federal Republic should increase its efforts to promote a peaceful global order, one that 
promotes inalienable human rights for everyone. The best framework to achieve this goal 
globally is the UN. However, the UN must pay more attention to demilitarization and 
conflict resolution to better promote human rights. In order to overcome the global 
injustice between the rich north and the poor south, the GATT must be integrated into the 
UN framework and there needs to be a greater focus on building a strong ecological and 
social global economy. One way to achieve this is for rich states to buy products from 
developing countries for fair prices, to remove import restrictions, and to stop export 
subsidies. On a smaller level, the EU is ideally placed to achieve the same goals within 
Europe. However, Europe is under threat from nationalism, which is Europe’s greatest 
challenge and necessitates a conscientious effort to combat it, by furthering integration, 
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openness, and to increase democratic legitimacy within the EU. Another challenge for the 
EU is accomplishing the ecological and social transformation of its economy, which in 
the wake of the internationalization of its economies has often resulted in a disregard for 
the environment in order to maximize profits (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, pp. 70-77). 
8.1.3 The 1998 Election 
The 1998 election program is a strong critique of the Kohl government, in 
particular of the social divide within Germany’s society. According to the Greens, social 
insecurity is now something that affects society in general, not just a small subsegment of 
society. Never before have there been as many people who depend on welfare payments, 
and the divide between rich and poor continually increases. Globalization has been used 
as a reason to cut back on the welfare state, in order to cut indirect labor cost for the sake 
of maintaining global competitiveness. While the Greens claim that Germany did in fact 
profit economically from globalization by becoming a formidable export champion, this 
achievement came at a high price, because now growth and employment are decoupled. 
This growth is also fueled by a disregard for the environment which is exemplified by 
high carbon dioxide emissions and a reliance on nuclear power. Additionally, Germany 
did not use the end of the Cold War to significantly reduce its military forces and its 
economy still profits from highly lucrative arms sales. Germany’s society is losing its 
cohesion and the current government only exacerbates the problem, pitting various 
groups in society against each other. In this atmosphere, hatred and racism grows, 
especially against the weaker segments of society, for example unemployed youth or 
immigrants (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 5-7). The Greens promise change with 
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new and better ecological policies, which not only protects the future existence of 
mankind, but also builds a sustainable and strong economy. The Greens will promote 
social justice instead of inequality and exclusion. Their goal is it to build a democracy 
where opportunities and success are open to anyone regardless of money, nationality, 
age, gender, or sexual orientation (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 9-11).  
At the core of this plan for change is an ecologically based economy that protects 
the environment and the individual in times when, as the Greens claim, the quality of life 
appears to be losing out in the global fight over material prosperity. The Greens want to 
counter such developments with a 10-year plan that is based on the introduction of a 
specific energy tax and higher gasoline taxes. These taxes are designed to curb energy 
consumption and to promote investment in energy saving technologies, which lead to 
innovations and investments that will grow the economy and create new jobs. The higher 
tax income of the state and the abolition of subsidies on environmentally damaging 
products (including products whose production is environmentally damaging) will 
generate enough funds to successively lower the indirect labor cost in a budget neutral 
manner so that companies will employ more people (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 
13-15). Recipients of government help can also expect more money from the state in the
future especially for housing assistance and welfare spending, which will be based upon 
real individual needs and not outdated standardized payment formulas (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1998, pp. 72-73). The Greens also advocate for a stringent reduction of overtime 
and the general introduction of a 35-hour work week, which will lead to more people 
being hired to get the work done. Lower incomes due to less time worked can be relieved 
by increasing the amount of the tax free base income and by increasing tax credits for 
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children (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 45-47). Another measure of how the Greens 
would increase employment, especially for the long-term unemployed, is employment 
opportunities created by the state to allow people a way back into the labor force 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 48). Other goals include ensuring the autonomy of all 
negotiations for labor agreements, with its vital element of comprehensive industry wide 
compensation standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 54), and to strengthen the 
state’s social infrastructure, by centralizing services under fewer organizations and to 
streamline them so that they can provide better services for Germany’s residents 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 71-72). A comprehensive tax reform will also be 
part of a Green policy catalogue whose key elements are a higher tax-exempt base 
income, a minimum tax rate of 18.5% and a top rate of 45% percent (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1998, p. 65). Health care costs are to be transformed to the point that patients do 
not have to make additional payments or pay fees to ensure access to care beyond the 
monthly insurance payments (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 80).  
A future Green government will also work more effectively with Germany’s 
partners in the EU to secure common standards for the common market so as to prevent 
social and environmental dumping in an effort to be more competitive than other 
economies. This also applies to the need for a harmonized tax code across the EU and a 
collective stop on subventions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 42, p. 67). The concept 
of increasing employment levels through a shorter work week is also supposed to be 
spread across Europe to ensure further harmonization of economies (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1998, p. 50). The shared currency is another key element of a unified and 
harmonized Europe that allows for easier trade of goods and capital flows (Alliance 
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‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 67).  
Environmental policies move away from fossil fuels to renewable energy and a 
complete ban on nuclear energy. Combined with a discontinuation of subsidies for 
environmentally harmful energy resources like domestic coal production and higher taxes 
on energy consumption, the state will have more resources to support research and 
development of new technologies, and the breakup of monopolies on the energy market 
will create competition and increased efficiency (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 23-
25). Waste reduction and waste recycling measures will further reduce Germany’s impact 
on the environment. For the Greens, sustainable living also includes higher standards for 
the agriculture sector, in particular food production. This includes a strict ban of 
genetically modified food (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 26-28). Additionally, the 
protection of the environment and human life as well as to secure sufficient nutrition for 
all humans is vital. This is why the WTO and GATT must focus on and promote 
agricultural policies that create a framework for trade of agricultural products, which 
helps to reach these goals. A primary step to this end is a ban on agricultural subsidies in 
rich countries. Prices must reflect the true economic and ecological cost of a product 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 26-27).  
With regard to immigration the Greens support an open society that helps 
refugees and that allows wide participation for all foreigners who permanently reside in 
Germany. This includes full access to government services and the right to vote in local 
elections after 3 years of residency within Germany. After 5 years, immigrants should get 
the right to choose if they want to become citizens. In general, the Greens advocate a 
move away from a citizenship definition that is based on ancestry to one that is based 
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upon territory (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 120-121).  
The last chapter of the 1998 program deals with foreign policy and how Germany 
should take on responsibility for a global society that protects natural resources and the 
environment as well as human rights. For the Greens, globalization is a big challenge, as 
it increases the already present gulfs in the world, highlighting inequality. Globalization 
changes the framework of how nation states can act and react to the global production 
chains. States must regain their control over unrestrained economies and redefine the 
relationship between trade, environment, security, and human rights. The world 
community must take responsibility for global developments. Profit maximization must 
be replaced with a globalization of social solidarity. We must enact structural changes to 
stop national power politics, which is why Germany’s government must pursue a foreign 
policy that promotes peace and is free from national interests. It must propagate 
demilitarization, an ecological and social world economic order, and the universal 
acceptance of human rights (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 133-135). In terms of 
international institutions this means that the Greens strongly support the UN as the 
primary conflict resolution and development organization. In order to strengthen its role, 
the Green’s call for increased funding of the UN, a more binding character of its 
resolutions, and more democratic structures that are more apt to represent the poor states 
of the world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 135-140). Overall, the guiding principle 
of the UN must be the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe, and in 
particular, the rights of women. When it comes to NATO, the Greens clearly envision a 
reduced role for the organization and its eventual dissolvement, in favor of a nonmilitary 
peace and security organization (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, pp. 142-143).  
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8.1.4 The 2002 Election 
The first chapter in the 2002 election program deals with ecological 
modernization and outlines the party’s general goals of protecting the environment, 
safeguarding the diversity of species, and improving food quality.  Some specific goals 
are the ban of nuclear technology and the gradual reduction of fossil fuels in favor of 
alternative energy, or new traffic models that foster more public transportation and cut 
cost for public mobility by reducing taxes for these types of transportation, or higher 
taxes for all forms of natural resources in order to reduce consumption and to increase 
recycling (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 12-19). Environmental standards are also 
an important issue when it comes to the enlargement of the EU. New member states must 
not become ecological dumping regions for environmental standards, which is why 
Europe needs shared standards that must be enforced during the process of extending 
membership to new states.  
The Greens like to be recognized as a party of social justice and economic 
renewal, and they actively support this image by backing policies that increase 
employment. These include, among others, wage subsidies for companies that hire the 
long-term unemployed in the low-income sector, government work creation schemes, a 
tax code that places a larger burden on the wealthy and one that is harmonized across 
Europe, a needs-based, individual basic social care, more financial support for children 
and more offers for child care (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 29-47). Another 
economic goal is to overcome the social gap between East and West, by promoting the 
new states and fostering increased economic development in the former East German 
region. An important step is for unions and employers to make a stronger effort to bring 
263 
wages in East Germany in line with wages in the West (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, 
p. 52). They also want to improve the health care system and provide better care for the
elderly by emphasizing the need for a more social nature in health care and more support 
for people to determine who they are being cared for once they require assistance. One 
thing the Greens categorically object to is genetic medical research and treatment 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 33-43). In terms of education the Greens assert that 
it must be part of the state’s educational goals to raise environmental consciousness in 
students. A special effort needs to be made to better include the children of immigrants in 
schools so that they perform just as well as other kids in terms of academic achievement. 
An important element for the Greens in this respect is also to overcome society's thinking 
in terms of foreigners and domestically born individuals. This is just an obstruction to the 
successful integration of all people who live in the German society. The Greens are also 
unequivocal in their statement that Germany is an immigrant nation. Immigration is 
indispensable for Germany due to economic as well as demographic reasons and it 
enriches society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 49-51, p. 62). The party takes a very 
inclusive approach to involve all groups in society in the creation of culture and art. In 
this context, it is also important to remember the Nazi terror regime and to develop a 
culture of remembrance and learning from the past. The same is true for the regime of the 
German Democratic Republic. (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 55-56). Gender 
equality is also a very dominant theme: Issues that the Greens address in this regard are 
equal opportunities and pay for women in their careers, the right to have an abortion, and 
better protection against violence. Foreign policy must also make human rights and 
especially the human rights of women a central focus of all efforts, including economic 
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policies and cooperation. In an age of globalization foreign aid and development 
assistance must be linked to a good human rights record and the equal treatment of 
women (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 71-75).  
The Greens’ final chapter in the 2002 election campaign addresses fair 
globalization. They assert that voters have the choice between global justice that 
promotes universal and indivisible human rights or the electorate can choose one of the 
other parties which will promote either a renationalization of foreign policy or allow 
globalization without restraint. Globalization can be beneficial for everyone, but currently 
the majority of people do not profit from it, because a form of economic globalization 
that is based upon growth and profit will largely only benefit multinational corporations. 
Those who are the winners of globalization are increasingly the rich and those who lose 
are the poor; according to the Greens this is true for states and regions, but also for the 
different opportunities of men and women. While globalization is not responsible for 
every negative development, if it is not ecological and socially responsible, then it 
becomes an important factor that leads to increased hunger, environmental destruction, 
racism, violence, repression of women, and exploitation of children (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2002, p. 79).  
However, globalization has opportunities that can be harnessed if corporations are 
faced with restrictions and rules. The pursuit of financial gain must not supersede the 
human right to have access to food, water, and an intact environment, and women must 
not be marginalized in the pursuit of financial gain. Environmental politics must spend 
much more time analyzing the impact that globalization has on the environment. The 
WTO must promote environmental and consumer protection as well as access to food. 
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Two other important elements for achieving more global justice are debt relief for the 
poorest countries and the abolition of subsidies for agricultural products, which prevent 
developing states from access to the markets of industrial nations (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2002, pp. 80-82).  It must be mentioned that earlier in the program the Greens 
stated that subsidies are an effective tool for protecting German farmers and for securing 
food production standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 27). The Greens clearly 
promote a strong UN and EU that help to actively shape globalization in a way that is 
environmentally friendly (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 83-86).  
8.1.5 The 2005 Election 
The 2005 election program is the only Green program in which ecological 
policies are not the first chapter. In this program, the Greens address their labor and 
economic policies first. The approach of demanding more for the unemployed in return 
for better support has failed: In general, the increased demands work well, but the added 
support is mostly missing. Social exclusion is a serious problem which must be 
combatted (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 15-16), otherwise there cannot be 
freedom. Without justice, there can only be the freedom of the few. This is why 
unrestrained globalization and capitalism must be kept in check. A confident and 
powerful state, and the EU, are important elements in correcting the negative 
developments of capitalism and market liberalism. The 2005 program is designed to 
address these issues and to define a social state that is a strong response to globalization 
and able to shape it (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 21-22). The guiding principles 
that the Greens define in this regard are to create a low impact economy, one that rewards 
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creativity and innovation where ecological and economical principles are mutually 
reinforcing each other, and where creativity is not stifled by bureaucracy. In order to 
create more jobs, the Greens want to subsidize indirect labor costs for the low-income 
sector to allow more people to join the labor market and create a binding national 
minimum wage. Additionally, the state must provide a better form of basic social care, 
one that does not leave recipients in poverty, but also one that has incentives for finding 
employment. Active government involvement in work schemes is also an important tool 
for getting the long-term unemployed back into the work force. (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2005, pp. 23-34). Other goals include a stronger civil society that is heavily 
involved in the community and a simpler tax code that does away with loopholes and 
places more demands upon the wealthy with a top income tax rate of 45% (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 42-48).  
With regard to ecological policies the Greens reiterate their demands to use fewer 
natural resources and cause less pollution. It is their goal to have 25% of energy 
consumption supplied by renewable sources by 2010 and to cut Germany’s carbon 
emissions by 80% by 2050. Additionally, the party reaffirms its commitment to a nuclear 
energy free Germany and to promote green and efficient technologies, because they are 
good for the environment and they create new jobs. Better regulation for environmental 
protection and more funds for public transportation are also important strategies for 
reducing human impact on the environment and for increasing quality of life (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 52-62). The Greens also promote better consumer protection 
laws, especially for agricultural products and a complete ban on genetically modified 
food. Agricultural goods production must be guided by the principle of sustainability and 
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subsidies must be reduced in order to make the sector more competitive for the future 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 63-65). All of Greens’ ecological policies are 
intended to address the issue of justice, because without the conservation of nature there 
can be no freedom and perspective for life (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 51).  
Education policies are an important topic in the 2005 program as well, as 
education is vital for the success of a resource poor country like Germany. However, 
nowhere else in Europe is academic and economic success as closely tied to social 
upbringing and ethnicity as it is in Germany. This is why the education system must be 
thoroughly reformed by giving schools and universities more freedom to allow various 
educational models to compete for the best results. The concept of preschool child care 
must also be reformed to be more academically focused and the last year before school 
must be free of charge to better prepare all children for school. Additionally, there must 
be more investment in university students to increase their numbers by providing more 
scholarships and a simpler and more comprehensive student aid process (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 70-74). Concerning gender equality, the Greens present 
multiple policies that strengthen the rights of women, such as calling for active measures 
to improve the quota of women in leadership positions, guaranteeing women reproductive 
self-determination, or by supporting them in their challenge to balance career and family 
goals. Another good example is the ability to enact a legal claim for parents towards the 
state for childcare spots, which are commonly too few in Germany (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2005, pp. 82-86). The Greens also assert that politics must pay more attention to 
preventing and fighting discrimination. It is unacceptable for an individual in Germany to 
be discriminated against due to their gender, ethnic background, religion, sexual identity, 
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or age. The pluralistic society model is vital for Germany and no one must be hindered 
from participating within that society. This is also true for immigrants who must be better 
integrated and Germany must recognize that it is an immigrant nation that needs to 
actively direct immigration, such as with a point-based immigration system (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 88-90).  
The Greens pledge to actively engage with globalization, to shape it in a more just 
manner. There are 10 such references within the 2005 program. While the Greens affirm 
that they view globalization as an opportunity, they are more concerned with 
emphasizing its dangers. In order to stop globalization from being a process without 
economic restraint or any ecological guidelines, it is important to build up supranational 
institutions. These institutions can help foster multiculturalism and cooperation across 
borders and ensure that human rights are respected and protected, this is especially 
important when considering the nations of the southern hemisphere whose values and 
ideas must be equally important in a globalized world. Globalization necessitates 
reformed institutions like the UN, the WTO, and the IMF that help to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. They advocate for more transparency within the UN 
and stronger involvement in social and environmental issues. The WTO must more 
vigorously pursue the abolition of agricultural subsidies and to allow developing 
countries more access to the markets of the rich world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, 
pp. 106-108).  
The Greens legitimize their support for the deployment of German military forces 
to Afghanistan, which is a huge step for the Green party to take, while in government. 
Nonetheless, they do call for a smaller German military and a ban of weapons exports 
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(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 111-113). Finally, the Greens also express their 
support for the EU and emphasize that Europe is more than just the shared internal 
market. It is also a standard for ecological, social, and tax policies with shared standards 
that create fair competition. One way in which the party wants to combat wage 
competition towards the bottom across Europe, is by introducing minimum wage 
standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, pp. 118-119).  
8.1.6 The 2009 Election 
In the wake of the 2007/2008 financial recession, the Greens try to package their 
program as the 21st-century version of Roosevelt’s New Deal, which was also the answer 
to a great depression that followed a financial crisis. Whereas Roosevelt’s program 
focused on economic and social issues, the Greens add the ecological component to their 
economic revitalization program; they refer to it as the Green New Deal. The financial 
crisis must not be an excuse to postpone nuclear power phase-out, or disregard ecological 
standards, or to not invest in sustainable technologies. Especially now, it is paramount to 
continue with the goal of building a green and sustainable society. This Green New Deal 
constitutes a new societal contract that, unlike the old one, does not provide social 
services that go beyond the state’s budget, at the expense of future generations. This new 
contract will create sustainability, a better environment, and social safety by aligning all 
state activity with the principles of climate protection, justice, and freedom. That way 
development and peace are maintainable in a globalized world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2009, pp. 12-17).  
Instead of the government’s short-sighted response to the crisis, like the cash for 
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clunkers program, the Greens promote a coordinated 4-year plan that will create 1 million 
new jobs. Instead of neo-liberal deregulation, the Greens plan to give markets ecological 
and social limits, as well as to introduce a binding minimum wage. Additionally, markets 
must be organized in a manner that rewards ecological and social actions (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 29-32). Specifically formulated goals include a more 
effectively regulated financial sector and better checks and balances in government 
actions. The party states that casino-capitalism has failed, because it rewards a select few 
while it places the risk and potential burden upon society as a whole. One way to achieve 
this is through better international cooperation of government financial regulators, by 
increasing the ratio of banks between lows and equity (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, 
pp. 38-45). Additionally, the state must operate differently, for example by having a limit 
for new government debt, providing tax rewards for environmentally friendly behavior, 
and awarding government contracts not by price alone, but also by how environmentally 
friendly or socially responsible a company operates (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 
46-58).
With regard to ecological policies the Greens again assert their commitment to 
abandon nuclear power and to heavily reduce the share of fossil fuels for transportation 
and heating. Additionally, the party wants to support and incentivize energy saving for 
new housing developments and for remodeling old homes to reduce their energy 
consumption. The Greens also want to promote new environmentally friendly vehicles 
and strict speed limits to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2009, pp. 62-75). The social impasse must be overcome as well, as it is not justifiable that 
millions of people are unable to access the increased wealth that Germany’s rich 
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economy creates. Social programs must be more inclusive and ensure that everyone 
receives the support that they need to succeed in life. This must include better basic social 
care that allows everyone to participate in society and is not exclusionary. Likewise, a 
more just health care system, where the quality of treatment is not linked to income, must 
be part of this new societal contract (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 77-93).  
The Green New Deal also includes provisions for better education; Germany 
unacceptably spends less than the OECD average on education. Higher spending needs to 
be initiated to ensure that all children receive an excellent primary education and not just 
those with affluent parents. Additionally, there must be more support for students to find 
positions in technical fields, apprentice positions. These are essential qualifications for all 
nonacademic tracks. However, too many companies do not participate in this system to 
train qualified employees and, thus, the Greens want to subsidize the training cost for 
industries in which there are especially few of these positions. The Greens demand more 
independence for universities and better financial support for students through an 
increase in available scholarships and simpler and better student loans (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2009, pp. 99-107).  
The Greens also call for more and better integration of immigrants. They must 
become an integral part of German society and dual citizenship must be accepted. 
Families that are separated by national borders should have support from the government 
in reuniting their families and not be hindered by restrictive immigration laws. The party 
also explicitly states that Islam must be treated equally with the Christian majority. 
Refugees must have better options to seek help and shelter than risking their lives on 
inadequate boats in the Mediterranean Sea, which is why the EU must not shut its borders 
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to refugees (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 147-153). When it comes to culture, the 
Greens seek to involve all groups in society in the creation of culture and to use 
government institutions abroad to promote German culture internationally. They also are 
adamant about fostering a culture of remembering the crimes of the Nazi regime, in order 
to learn from history (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 190-192).  
The party emphasizes that rich states must stop living at the expense of the poor, 
who are especially exposed to the negative consequences of climate change and resource 
exploitation. The new societal contract must be a global one; it must be a dialogue and a 
balancing of interests between rich and poor states, between north and south. In order to 
create fair globalization, the world needs more cooperation, civil engagement and 
exchange, as well as better ecological and economic rules. However, justice can only be 
achieved if the prosperous are willing to change their lifestyles and if the new societal 
contract entails a sustainable lifestyle, more environmental protection, and more self-
determination for all people. This type of multiculturalism necessitates a strong 
institutional framework which, for the Greens, starts with the EU, but also entails a 
stronger UN that is more democratic. The agenda of the WTO must address more than 
trade liberalization. It must promote environmental, social, and labor standards. The 
WTO should also fight against stringent intellectual property laws for medical treatments 
that are currently more aimed at securing profit of multinational pharmaceutical 
companies than to increase health and save lives. Agricultural policies must finally 
address the imbalances between developing richer countries and get rid of agricultural 
subsidies, especially the export subsidies of rich countries, which leads to a flooding of 
markets in developing countries so that producers in poor countries cannot compete. 
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Here, the EU is an especially severe transgressor and must immediately reform its 
agricultural practices (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 202-208). The Greens re-
declare their commitment to having German troops in Afghanistan, but they clearly assert 
that there must be a larger effort to find a political solution to the conflict, as military 
force alone will not suffice (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2009, pp. 214-216).  
8.1.7 The 2013 Election 
The 2013 election program is a comprehensive critique of Germany’s, Europe’s, 
and the world’s economic and social systems. The Greens claim that Germany’s so-called 
export success is only a disguise for an unsustainable system. Germany’s production 
processes destroy the environment and the massive export surplus creates vast 
imbalances across Europe. The singular focus of economic policies on GDP growth do 
not reflect equality, which is not only shrinking across Europe but within Germany as 
well. They advocate policies that focus on a form of prosperity that takes social and 
ecological dimensions into account (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 9-13). These 
imbalances are also reflected in the Euro crisis, which is, in fact, not a monetary crisis, 
but a manifestation of a flawed economic system. The balance of payments is colossally 
different across the EU, and states such as Germany only exacerbate the problem with 
their export dependent economies. The federal government in Germany would do much 
better if it would boost domestic demand (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 55-56). 
Additionally, the financial sector needs more regulation, because it threatens to grow too 
big, to the point that it is decoupled from the real economy (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2013, p. 59). The Greens also focus on the EU for their energy policies, in order to 
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protect the environment on a larger scale. Europe must cut its emissions by 45% and 
obtain 45% of its energy from renewable sources by the year 2030. The protection of the 
environment is a moral obligation for the Green party, because those who suffer the most 
from environmental pollution are also those who pollute the least (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2013, pp. 40-41).  
In terms of domestic policies, the Greens call for a tax reform that ensures that 
prices reflect not only the production and logistics cost of a product, but also its 
ecological cost. Germany’s tax code must also become fairer, meaning that those who 
have more means at their disposal also pay higher taxes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 2013, 
77). Tax loopholes must be closed and taxes in general require better harmonization 
across Europe (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 2013, 81). The party also promises that low-
income households will receive better support under a Green government due to the 
introduction of a minimum wage of 8.50 Euros, plus extended benefits for people who do 
not have full-time work or are in a contractor relationship (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2013, pp. 90-92). The Greens want to build up a social labor market in order to better 
support the long-term unemployed, although it is not really clear what this means 
specifically (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 102). Education policies are based upon 
the principles of early support and more inclusiveness. This translates into a 
comprehensive program to include all children in early childhood education through a 
kindergarten concept that starts at 3 years of age and is intended to prepare children for 
school especially by achieving sufficient language capabilities. While this system already 
exists, it is not available to all children due to capacity issues and often it is the children 
of immigrants who miss out, which only aggravates the language problem. Schools need 
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to be reformed to provide learning concepts that extend into the late afternoon. Schools 
also must foster more combined learning between strong and weaker students instead of 
segregating children (often as early as the fifth grade) based upon skill and aptitude into 
various educational tracks (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 105-108). When it comes 
to higher education, the Greens promise more investment to create more spots for 
students at universities and to reform scientific research to foster more interdisciplinary 
projects and to support research that takes into consideration the ecological effects of 
innovations and helps to build a more sustainable society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2013, pp. 111-114). Other social policies that are mentioned in the 2013 election program 
include a strong commitment to a robust universal health care system that is affordable 
for everyone and to prevent the development of a two-class system (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2013, pp. 123-125). Welfare spending should be increased (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2013, p. 137), as well as government spending for social housing projects to 
create affordable housing in a way that prevents the formation of ghettos (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 268).  
The Greens also address the need for better environmental protection and 
increased quality of food (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 153), increased consumer 
protection which includes fair energy prices, more transparency and a ban on genetically 
modified agricultural products (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 179-184). The 
argument is also made for a comprehensive mobility system that is based on new 
concepts like government supported car sharing and bike sharing, but also includes a 
greater emphasis towards green mobility through cars without combustion engines 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 169-173). In terms of culture, the Greens again 
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outline their traditional, open multicultural approach that is welcoming of outsiders. This 
is manifested by the willingness to grant citizenship much more liberally to foreigners 
who permanently reside in Germany than is currently possible (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2013, p. 231). It is also manifested by the lack of a national identity that might be 
promoted within election programs. In fact, the Greens criticize the promotion of the 
nationalist agenda and mindset of the current CDU/CSU and FDP government (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 11). The multicultural openness of the Greens is also reaffirmed 
by its unequivocal support for Turkey to enter accession talks with the EU (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 285).  
The Greens view the world as deeply unjust, because resources are largely 
consumed by a small minority of rich industrial states at the expense of others. Climate 
disasters and violent political conflicts primarily affect the world’s poorest nations and 
particularly the women in those nations. The destruction of the environment must be 
stopped, violent conflict has to be prevented or resolved, and prosperity must be globally 
shared. These are the Green’s foreign policy goals, to motivate citizens to think globally 
when they make local decisions and to be active in their communities and to find ways to 
build partnerships between northern and southern hemispheres. Their goal is a great 
transformation, to bring economic and ecological goals into balance, to find an equitable 
distribution of resources and to make better progress to protect human rights, in particular 
those of women (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 296-298).  
One way this can be achieved is by placing the long term equitable creation of a 
globalized economic order above German interests. Globalization must be shaped to 
benefit all people and not just narrow special interests or highly privileged individuals. In 
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fact, it must not be guided by economic interest, but by political, ecological, and social 
ones. Future trade agreements must promote environmentally friendly behavior and 
social standards. Trade policies must be used to actively promote human rights and labor 
standards. Additionally, export subsidies within the EU must be immediately eradicated, 
because they destroy economic growth in countries that need it the most (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299). Germany must also be more actively engaged in using 
development aid and trade agreements to increase climate protection, to improve the 
rights of women, to eliminate child labor, and to promote human rights as a whole 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 302-305). The goal must be to use economic aid to 
increase the political participation of the citizens in benefactor states (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2013, p. 303). Additionally, the Greens express clear support for the UN to 
remain the premier international organization for peace and cooperation, but the party 
acknowledges that this requires a reformation of the existing structure, especially the 
current setup of the Security Council and the veto rights of its five permanent members. 
The Greens advocate for a Security Council that is more representative of all UN 
members and more transparent. Moreover, NATO should realign its mission, since the 
confrontation between the East and West does not exist anymore. Instead, NATO should 
be a primary force for disarmament. A way for achieving this would be by reducing U.S. 
nuclear and conventional forces (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 312-314).  
8.2 Initial Election Program Analysis 
This section will outline a basic analysis of the five key terms as they appear in all 
seven Green party election programs since 1990. An in-depth explanation of how the 
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programs were analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded with regard to the key terms can 
be found in Section 4.3. When looking at all the direct references of the five key terms 
(see Figure 8.1), the first thing one notices that there are a lot references, altogether 226. 
This is a huge number compared to the mentions by other parties. The next closest party 
is the FDP with 122 references.1 The most frequently used term is exports with almost 90 
mentions, the term trade is used about a third less often, but both terms are regularly 
mentioned in all seven programs. The term globalization is used slightly more often than 
that of trade, but only starts to become relevant in the 1998 program. Since 2002 
globalization was mentioned quite frequently with most references in 2005, for a total of 
17. This is almost as many as the CDU’s 20 references over seven programs. Imports are
never mentioned in 2002 and otherwise only between one and three times, except for the 
2013 election, which refers to imports 11 times in a negative fashion. The Greens critical 
import comments largely focus on imports of energy (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 
12) and genetically modified food (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 161). The
references on free trade are negligible, since the concept is only mentioned twice. 
Looking at Figure 8.2, which shows the normative meaning that goes along with 
any of the five globalization key terms, it becomes quickly apparent that the Greens view 
of the current international economic system and globalization is very critical. The 
Greens refer to the key terms to emphasize the negative consequences or future risks 
more than 100 times. Another 25 references, most of which occurred after 2002, point to 
the unfair nature of global trade and globalization. By contrast, there are only six 
instances that mention positive outcomes with regard to the key terms. These are all in 
1 Total count of all five key terms for each party: CDU 78, SPD 88, FDP 133, The Greens 226, The Left 89. 
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the 2005 and the 2013 election programs and largely relate to the positive effects of 
emissions trading (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 53, 2013, p. 173, p. 289) and the 
positive effects of fair trade products (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 180, p. 277). 
While the Greens are clearly very critical of the way that trade is organized at the 
international level, they do believe that with the right type of ecological and social policy 
changes, trade can be improved and shaped into a sustainable (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2013, p. 53) process that also benefits people in developing countries (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1990, p. 42). The same is true for globalization, here the Greens also see 
potential to actively shape it into an environmentally sustainable and fair development 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 7, 2013, p. 298). 
Figure 8.2 does to allow for inferences regarding how the Greens feel about each 
of the individual terms. In order to allow for an assessment on each key term the 
following paragraphs address each individually. Starting with export references (see 
Figure 8.3), which is the key term that gets mentioned most often with 88 instances, one 
can see that two thirds of the references express the risks and negative outcomes that the 
Greens feel are associated with trade. Roughly a quarter of all trade references are neutral 
in character, which only leaves 10% of references falling into the other three categories. 
Two percent talk about the unjust consequences of trade, while 7% and 1%, respectively, 
address opportunities from exports and positive outcomes. The topic of imports is 
mentioned 20 times by the Greens (see Figure 8.4), with a little more than half of these 
references made in the 2013 election program. There are no positive statements about 
imports at all; there are two neutral instance and one refers to the unjust nature of 
imports. The remaining references all stress the negative consequences of imports; these 
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focus on the import of energy, genetically modified food, and feed for livestock (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2009, p. 139, 2013, p. 12, p. 72).  
Figure 8.5 shows how the Greens referred to trade throughout their election 
programs. It is interesting to note that even though references to exports and imports have 
been vastly negative the same is not true for the more overarching term of trade. There 
are fewer mentions of trade (a count of 56) than there are of exports. Approximately a 
quarter of them are neutral, while another fourth points to the risks and dangers of trade. 
Five percent of all trade references point out the unjust character of trade and another 9% 
relate the positive results of trade. The largest share (36%) goes to the opportunities of 
trade. It appears that while the specific instances of exports and imports are just viewed 
highly negative by Greens, they do see the potential to salvage the idea of international 
trade by introducing social and ecological standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 
152, 2013, p. 299) and to institutionalize such development through international 
organizations like the WTO (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 28). However, the 
majority of trade references do focus on the exchange of emissions certificates for 
pollutants as a form of creating incentives for achieving lower emissions levels of 
pollutants (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 23, 2009, p. 73, p. 205). The expression 
free trade does not appear to be particularly popular with the Greens since the expression 
is only used twice. One mention expresses the imbalanced nature of free trade agreements 
and that these treaties may be forced upon developing countries (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2009, p. 208), but the 2013 program points out that free trade agreements can 
potentially strengthen human rights, if trade agreements are negotiated in a way that they 
foster developments among all trade parties that promote better protection of human 
281 
 
rights (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299).   
Globalization is mentioned relatively frequently with a count of 60, of which 45% 
are neutral (see Figure 8.6). The second largest group is comments on how unjust 
globalization is, because it promotes the exploitation of humans as well as of the 
environment, while increasing the chasm between rich and poor world (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1998, p. 152). Especially the 2005 election program reiterates 10 times that 
globalization is not fair and must be changed to be more beneficial and inclusive for all 
states. The next group of references makes up a quarter of all mentions and highlights the 
negative effects of globalization, like that it increases insecurity and instability (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 40, 2013, p. 281). The final quarter of statements address the 
potential of globalization. While the Greens cannot see any benefits of an increasingly 
globalized world so far, they do assert from 2002 onward that globalization can be 
shaped to be fair and to protect the environment (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 7, 
2009, p. 16). The 2013 program also claims that globalization can be formed to allow all 
states to profit from it, if it is actively politically, ecologically, and socially molded 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 298).  
 
8.3 Comparing Election Programs to Globalization 
and Political Parties 
This section addresses the theoretical concepts and questions outlined in Chapter 
2 (see Table 2.1) and Chapter 3 (see Table 3.1). As with other German parties studied 
here, the Greens do not address the issue of partial factor mobility as put forward by 
Brawly (1997). It seems that partial factor mobility is too complex an issue to address in 
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election programs, even for a smaller niche party that produces very lengthy party 
platform programs and that appeals to a more educated segment of the population. The 
matter of volatility, defined by Woodruff (2005) as fluctuating between economic busts 
and booms, is only a marginal topic for the Greens. While the issue of the 2007-2008 
global financial crisis does emerge in the party’s 2009 campaign, it is only presented as a 
subsegment of a much broader issue. The financial crisis is simply part of a broad 
structural crisis in which Germany’s economy, as well as the global economy, is gripped. 
The constant challenge is to move away from structures that are built upon exploitation 
and destruction, and instead to move to production methods and consumption patterns 
that are innovative and sustainable, while protecting the environment and promoting 
human rights (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 29, p. 202).  
The question of what role the Greens envision for labor unions in a globalized 
world must be addressed as well. As outlined by Garst (1998), this is relevant as unions 
can have a key role for promoting globalization due to their ability to unite people behind 
the concept of trade liberalization. Labor unions can credibly promise to help distribute 
the gains from trade, more equitably. While the Greens support the role of unions as an 
important element within German society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 69), 
references about unions are few and far between. There could be more emphasis on 
unions and their role within society, but there are a few clear statements with regard to 
the role of unions in promoting workers’ rights and in establishing a minimum wage in 
Germany (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, pp. 89-90). Voters probably do take away a 
notion of a tacit support for unions by the Greens. Since the Greens are generally 
politically aligned with the SPD, especially at the federal level, it appears that there is a 
283 
certain division of labor between the two parties, with the SPD more prominently 
championing the role of unions and the Greens focusing more on environmental issues. 
Voters can have confidence that unions are an important element in defending their 
interests in a globalizing world, but there is no bigger vision for unions or their role for 
the future in more globalized world.  
Caproso (1997) points out that it is not necessarily a simple matter for voters to 
understand the consequences of globalization and how they are personally affected by 
globalization. This brings up the need to examine whether or not political parties present 
meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or do they merely use the 
issue for scapegoating? The Greens present a rather critical view of globalization, 
emphasizing how unjust it is and that it primarily serves the interest of multinational 
corporations (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79), and is exploitative by nature 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 152). The party also admits that globalization is not to 
be blamed for every negative development, but asserts that the current version contributes 
significantly to the increase of hunger, environmental destruction, racism, violence, the 
subjugation of women, and exploitation of children. This is why resistance to 
globalization is correct and necessary (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79). The 2013 
program also endorses globalization critical movements (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, 
pp. 63-64) and warns that globalization takes place at the expense of the poor (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 25). While the Greens are largely very critical of globalization 
they promote the idea that globalization can be transformed into a sustainable, fair, and 
peaceful process (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 16, 2013, p. 24).  
Regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement as outlined by Rodrik (2000), 
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as well as Ranjan and Lee (2007), are important topics for shoring up support for 
globalization and trade liberalization, because they foster the idea of a level playing field. 
Acceptance drops significantly if citizens feel that they compete unfairly with foreign 
companies or states that do not play by the same rules. Similarly, communicating party 
goals with respect to international agreements and to offer voters clear choices is 
important in order to generate support (Hays, 2009; Martin, 2000). The creation and 
promotion of standards is pivotal to election programs of the Green party. These include 
general environmental standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 9), but also specific 
EU environmental standards for clean air and water (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 
23), Europe-wide standards for food quality (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 27), and 
even trade agreements must promote environmentally friendly behavior and standards 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299). Additionally, the party asserts that Germany has 
to work better with its partners in the EU to secure shared standards for the common 
market in order to prevent social and environmental dumping in an effort to be more 
competitive than other economies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 42). Human rights 
and labor standards must also be unified across the globe by introducing a realignment of 
international trade standards (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 299). Particularly within 
the framework of the EU, the Greens have various ideas for standardizing and unifying 
policies and regulation. This includes a general call for a harmonized tax code across the 
EU, a collective stop on subventions (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 67), and the 
closure of tax loopholes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 2013, p. 81), but also a specific 
demand for harmonized income tax rates and a unified path towards the calculating of 
corporate taxes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 44). The Euro is another step towards 
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a unified and harmonized Europe (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 67). The concept of 
increasing employment levels through a shorter work week is also supposed to be spread 
across Europe to ensure further harmonization of economies (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
1998, p. 50) and another step towards combatting dumping wages across Europe is the 
introduction of a shared minimum wage standard (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 
119). With regard to international organizations, there is a consistent message, though 
their earlier programs are more radical and ambiguous. In 1990 the goal is to place 
responsibility for the GATT under the auspices of the UN, to ensure that the IMF gets 
back to fulfilling its original mission, and to dissolve the World Bank in favor of regional 
development funds (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 42). In 1994 the idea is still to 
democratize the GATT by placing it under control of the UN (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
1994, p. 79), but also to more specifically use GATT negotiations to completely banish 
subsidies for agricultural products (Alliance ‘90/The Greens 1994, 39). With regard to the 
GATT’s successor, the Greens state that the WTO must use more of its resources and 
influence to focus on overcoming starvation (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 26). In 
more recent years, a big emphasis has been placed on assuring better representation of 
developing countries within trade/economic organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and 
WTO. The programs that the IMF promotes must focus more on crisis prevention and be 
self-reflective in order to assess the ecological and social consequences of the programs it 
promotes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 81-82). Additionally, these three 
organizations must be reformed institutions to better assist with achieving the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals and the WTO in particular must more vigorously pursue 
the abolition of agricultural subsidies and allow developing countries more access to the 
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markets of the rich world (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 107). Concerning NATO, 
the Greens formerly argued that since the Cold War came to a peaceful end there would 
be no more need for Germany to be in any military alliance and Germany should 
completely demilitarize (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 18). This message was more 
or less repeated in 1994 and 1998, when the Greens once more called for dissolving 
NATO and replacing it with a peace pact (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 74, 1998, p. 
143). However, by 2002 the message had changed and the Greens started to acknowledge 
the relevance of NATO as a vital security organization, but added that it should get 
transformed into a more cooperative security organization (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2002, p. 211).  
While they do outline policies regarding regulatory harmonization and 
international organizations, these proposals are usually very ambiguous. For example, the 
proposal to shape NATO into a more cooperative security organization is not 
accompanied by any clear definition of what a more cooperative security organization 
looks like. Similarly, the claim that the IMF should get back to pursuing its originally 
designated mission is extremely vague. All that voters can take away from a statement 
such as this is that the IMF is doing something wrong and that it should do something 
better in the future. This is also true to some extent of the calls for better environmental 
standards, more consumer protection rights, or better treatment of animals. Voters do get 
a general idea, but specificity would often be helpful. One thing that is interesting and 
positive about the 2013 Green election campaign is that they acknowledge the need for 
Germany to change as well. Sometimes parties have the tendency to only focus on the 
policy upload and how other states or organizations have to change to meet German 
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standards, but the Greens clearly assert that Europe does not need to become more 
German, but that Germany needs to become more European (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2013, p. 293). While it is only a single instance, it is still an important acknowledgment. 
One way to make this goal even more meaningful would be to offer specifics as to which 
practices work well in Europe that Germany should adopt domestically.  
An important element for analyzing the domestic response to globalization, 
according to the literature, is the need for political elites to discuss the globalization 
dilemma (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). This is necessary because if 
political parties honestly debate the pros and cons of an issue, such as globalization, and 
outline how to address and alleviate its negative consequences, then parties can build 
support for an issue. The Greens do not address the globalization dilemma directly and it 
is not clear that they are actually interested in gathering support for the issue. As 
previously outlined, they are primarily focused on highlighting the unfair distribution of 
the gains from globalization and its harmful effects on the environment. Nevertheless, 
this does reduce, to some extent, resistance to globalization due to the fact that the party 
addresses social exclusion as a serious problem within Germany’s society (Alliance 
‘90/The Greens, 2005, p. 7). Unfortunately, the Greens’ devices are not specific and it is 
not clear that the plans to reduce unemployment by reducing weekly hours worked, and 
hence weekly pay, will create much of a sense of stability. One important fear that is 
often associated with globalization is dumping wages. The call for the introduction of a 
minimum wage has great potential of reducing resistance towards globalization. The 
Greens promote a minimum wage in four different election programs (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1994, p. 22, 2005, p. 16, 2009, p. 16, 2013, p. 28) and in 2013 the party even 
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commits to a minimum wage of 8.50 Euro (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 90). 
Overall though, it is reasonable to suspect that the constant emphasis on introducing new 
environmental standards and to reduce energy consumption does mean that some voters 
will question that a government with Green party participation will truly be able to build 
up a social safety net that can protect the individual from the potential pressures of a 
liberal trading order. Voters recognize that the ecological transformation of the economy 
will be quite costly, at least initially, for both the government and private entities. For a 
government with finite funds, this means that whatever resources the government spends 
on environmental issues will decrease the resources left to allocate among other areas, 
including welfare spending. While all parties have to make such allocation decisions, 
based upon its rhetoric, the Greens will spend the most government resources on the 
environment and not on social issues.  
The final theoretical building block which requires examination is that of identity. 
Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004) all focus on the idea that 
emphasizing a European identity is an effective tool for most European states to decrease 
negative attitudes about globalization. The Greens do not promote any form of national 
identity. In fact, they refer to identity twice in a gender context (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
1990, p. 29, 2013, p. 133) and very consistently when referring to sexual identity 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1990, p. 32, 1994, p. 48, 1998, p. 119; 2002, p. 63; 2005, p. 
89, 2009, p. 144, 2013, p. 16). This lack of a national identity makes it also very easy to 
accept other people with different backgrounds and to make them an integral part of 
German society, which is nicely reflected in the party’s call for the acceptance of dual 
citizenship (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 62, 2009, p. 148). With regard to Europe, 
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the Greens welcome the idea of a unified continent that creates stability, peace, and 
cooperation across Europe. An open Europe that embraces the world and fights for 
human rights and environmental protection is indispensable (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 
2009, p. 203). The EU is also one of the reasons that the party objects to any form of 
nationalism, because it destroys Europe (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1994, p. 77). Another 
instance that exemplifies the general openness and multiculturalism of the Greens’ is the 
party’s support for Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country, to enter ascension talks 
with the EU (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p.  285). For some, this clashes with 
Germany and Europe’s Christian identity and Europe simply lacks the ability to integrate 
Turkey (CDU, 2005, p. 36). In other words, there is nothing in the seven election 
programs of the Green party that would create a sense within voters that globalization 
would, in any way, infringe on their identity.  
 
8.4 Conclusion of Green Party Analysis 
The Greens are a somewhat curious case, because the party promotes a very open 
multicultural society that is firmly placed in Europe and that appears postnational in its 
election programs. The party talks frequently about international institutions and how 
they should play a role for good. This is outlined, for some institutions, in the analysis of 
the last section, but not for the UN which, according to the Greens, should play a strong 
international role by becoming an increasingly democratically legitimized actor that 
promotes human rights, global equality, and overcomes poverty. (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1990, p. 40, 1994, p. 78, 1998, p. 134, 2002, p. 86, 2005, p. 107, 2009, p. 202, 
2013, p. 297). The party also expresses its desire to shape globalization in a way that 
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protects the environment (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 07, 2009, p. 16). This 
constitutes ideal conditions for a society to embrace globalization and then to make the 
best out of it, so that it truly becomes the figurative wave that is able to lift all boats 
without damaging the shore, and while providing plenty of lifejackets for those who 
might need one. However, the party’s constant criticism of globalization, especially 
regarding trade, causes one to wonder whether globalization will be beneficial at all. 
Sure, the Greens promise to make globalization sustainable and fair, but the party fails to 
make a convincing argument for why participating in globalization is necessary at all. 
Instead of concluding that it is beneficial for Germany’s society to be exposed to a 
globalized world, voters might just as well conclude that they are better off without it. 
After all, the party makes it very clear what the consequences of failed globalization are, 
so why bother with globalization when its benefits are ambiguous at best? This question 
is especially relevant with regard to international trade. It is certainly important to address 
the negative consequences of export subsidies and import barriers for developing 
countries, but it is not clear why the Greens do not present a more differentiated view on 
trade. The German economy is built upon the ability to import and export goods and 
services from around the world, but especially from within Europe. Therefore, it would 
be more honest and beneficial for the German economy to recognize the value that 
imports and exports bring to the table. The kind of progressive and sustainable society for 
which the Greens call is impossible to achieve without sophisticated and efficient supply 
chains, global movement of people, international technology transfer, and complex global 
financial markets. Otherwise, green technologies will only remain an option for the more 
affluent segment of society that can afford expensive niche products that are 
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environmentally friendly.  
In essence, the oft justified critique of globalization and the open liberal trading 
order must be complemented by a stronger emphasis on the positive aspects of global 
trade. Well defined and specific policies as to how globalization can be improved and 
what the resulting benefits will be important as well. In the 21st century, in a trade 
dependent country like Germany, a party with such a strong environmental and human 
rights agenda should move away from its tacit or at best timid message that globalization 
can be widely beneficial, if it is actively politically, ecologically, and socially molded 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2013, p. 298). Instead this message should be front and center 
in any election program, highlighting how a Green party in government will shape 
globalization, so that it will make environmentally sustainable economies possible and 




















































































































































The Left with its roots in the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus), which is usually just referred to as PDS, is a socialist party 
with radical democratic and anticapitalist positions (PDS, 1994, p. 4). It is the successor 
of the German Democratic Republic’s Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which 
dissolved after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The new party broke with the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, but could not take on the role of a typical European socialist party, since that 
position was already taken by a well-established party. The PDS had to position itself to 
the left of the SPD, with a focus on criticizing the capitalist system of the Federal 
Republic and on developing into a protest party that represented an alternative to the 
existing parties (Decker, 2017b). In its early days, the party faced a lot of critique. To 
some, the party’s existence was simply untenable since it was so closely linked to the 
SED regime, which for many represents essentially injustice and repression. Even those 
who did not feel that the party’s sheer existence was an insult, nevertheless were critical, 
suggesting that the PDS inadequately dealt with its past (Patton, 2012). Initially, the party 
was just a regional phenomenon. In 1990, it received 11% of the votes in eastern 
Germany, but only 2.4% in the west. Due to a one-time provision in the 1990 election, a 
party only needed to cross the 5% threshold in 
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either the east or the west, which meant that the PDS was represented in the 1990 federal 
legislature. The party was able to build upon the image of a protest party and give a voice 
to all those who were disappointed and felt left out by the reunification process. In 1994, 
the PDS received almost 20% of votes in former East Germany, and nationally they 
received 4.4%. Fortunately for the PDS the party received a majority of the votes in four 
electoral districts, which granted it an exception from the 5% threshold rule. The result of 
the 1998 election, with the PDS’s success of garnering almost 22% of votes in eastern 
Germany, demonstrates that by the end of the 1990s, people in the eastern Germany did 
recognize that the PDS was ultimately the party that represented them against the other 
major parties, for whom they would always rank second to western constituents (Patton, 
2012, p. 12). Nationally, the party got 5.1%, but by 2002 the party fell under the 5% 
threshold and was only able to send two representatives who had obtained a majority of 
votes in their respective electoral districts to the legislature.  
The party drew its support mostly from citizens in the new reunified German 
states. One reason why they were so successful was the economic disparity between 
eastern and western Germany, which was most sharply demonstrated by high 
unemployment rates in the east (Hough, 2002, p. 91). The PDS’s role as a regional party 
did not change until after the Schröder government implemented its Agenda 2010 reform 
program, starting in 2003. The new government course was very controversial and led to 
a great deal of critique within the SPD’s base, causing some members to leave the party. 
Critique also grew within labor unions, and some union members joined forces with 
former SPD members to form a new political party: Labor and Social Justice – The 
Electoral Alternative (Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative, or simply 
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WASG). The WASG was formed to have a party again that represented social values 
after the SPD had adopted liberal market policies that were, for many, simply associated 
with a downward social spiral and poverty (Öchsner, 2013). The newly formed party’s 
acceptance sharply increased in the old West German states once a former SPD 
chancellor candidate and finance minister joined to lead the party. Both WASG and PDS 
quickly realized that they shared important political views and both parties’ acceptance 
was largely regionally based, which is why the two parties joined forces 3 months prior to 
the 2005 federal elections. While the party did not formally merge at this time they only 
ran one campaign and the WASG added the names of its candidates for parliament to the 
PDS candidate list for the federal election. Both parties ran under the name Left 
Party.PDS (Linkspartei.PDS) and they were able to obtain 8.7% of votes. The party 
merged formally in 2007 under the name The Left (DIE LINKE) and ran successful 
campaigns in 2009 and 2013 garnering 11.9% and 8.6%, respectively. Since The Left is 
the party’s current official name this study will always refer to The Left, unless a specific 
timeframe is referenced.   
Today, the party appears to be solidly established within the political system, but 
it is not free from internal strife, which revolves around how much capitalism as a system 
must be abolished, how to better overcome the party’s SED past, and to what degree the 
party’s pacifist ideology should influence foreign policy. Due to the party’s communist 
past and its, at times, extreme political positions, the other parties have categorically 
rejected the idea of forming a governing coalition with The Left at the federal level. This 
means that the party does not have to soften its positions during an election campaign in 
order to present itself as a viable partner for forming a government. Instead, it can 
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maintain its extreme and sometimes populist positions (Decker, 2017b). 
  
9.1 The Left’s Election Programs 
This section will present a summary for each of the seven election programs as 
they relate to globalization. The objective is to outline the core message that The Left 
communicates to voters for each election. The emphasis of these abstracts is on 
globalization and other economic issues, but the intent is to take an overall look at the 
election programs and to highlight some of the major themes. This is very helpful for 
addressing the questions previously raised (see Chapter 3), as some of them necessitate a 
wider view: For example, to assess how Hooghe and Marks’ (2004) assertion that 
building a European identity can overcome resistance to globalization requires a broader 
look at The Left’s election programs. The summary of the election programs is followed 
by an analysis of what the PDS says about globalization and how their programs relate to 
the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
9.1.1 The 1990 Election 
The PDS’s 1990 program begins with a justification for the party’s existence and 
to emphasize that this party is not to be mistaken for the repressive unity party SED that 
had ruled the GDR from 1949 to 1989. This particular form of socialism in East Germany 
had failed to promote either a peaceful and sustainable world, or to allow for individual 
self-determination/self-fulfillment. However, the system in West Germany is no better at 
fulfilling these goals. The current condition of the world, the lack of cooperation in 
Europe, and the demand of the German people cannot be adequately addressed by the 
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prevailing political system, which is irresponsible with its military, economically 
antisocial, and unfair from a societal perspective. The PDS has a new vision for Germany 
that is not just the continuation of the old Federal Republic, but one that is infused with 
socialism. The party rejects the conclusion that because of the human rights record of the 
socialist regime in East Germany was justifiably criticized, all forms of socialism must be 
wrong. The form of socialism that the PDS propagates focuses on demilitarization, social 
and ecological restructuring of the economy, the end of patriarchal dominance within 
society, equal treatment of minorities, and cultural wealth for all citizens (PDS, 1990, pp. 
1-3).  
The first major focus in the program is democratization of society, through an 
open multiculturalism that is inclusive and invites everyone to participate, for example by 
introducing the concept of regular plebiscites into the constitution. The desired openness 
of society is characterized by the inclusiveness of migrants, especially those who seek 
asylum, but also through the party’s general call to include all minorities and to fight 
racism and other forms of hatred (PDS, 1990, pp. 4-6). The second issue that the party 
addresses is the opportunity and need to demilitarize international relations in the wake of 
the cold war. A unified Germany is no reason for Germany to play a bigger role 
internationally. Germany must press for security arrangements that include the Soviet 
Union and reduce Soviet military forces. Weapons exports must be completely stopped 
and no foreign soldiers should be stationed in Germany in the future. All German forces 
must return home, and within 10 years Germany should be completely demilitarized by 
disbanding its armed forces. Goals with regard to international relations include debt 
reduction for third world countries, building up a European environmental program, and 
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the peaceful coexistence of all peoples and cultures. This also entails the idea of restoring 
a balance between rich northern countries and poor developing states in the southern 
hemisphere. The international capitalist economic system degrades developing countries 
to resource and agricultural exporters for the rich industrial states. Due to unfair exchange 
conditions, the developing countries become poorer while rich states become even richer. 
The PDS believes this problem can be addressed by changing the system, so that more 
resources and technology flow from industrial states to developing ones, through better, 
more purposeful and independence supporting development policies, and the creation of a 
development fund (PDS, 1990, pp. 8-12).  
The party also addresses its commitment to an antifascist and antiracist society 
(PDS, 1990, pp. 13-14), asserts its belief in an open society that accepts immigrants and 
especially refugees, while extending unto them full participation and even the right to 
vote (PDS, 1990, p. 15). The party emphasizes that need for society to let women more 
fully determine their own lives and to become better included on the labor market (PDS, 
1990, p. 16, p. 29). It is only once the party is almost half way through its program that it 
addresses the German economy and the effects of reunification on the people of former 
East Germany. In essence, the PDS is highly critical of the monetary and economic 
incorporation of East Germany into the capitalist structures of the Federal Republic. West 
Germany is not interested in investing and building up the newly rejoined East German 
states. Instead the East is only viewed as a new market for selling more goods and 
services. Many people in East Germany are unable to identify with the social element of 
the so-called social market economy. Mass unemployment, environmental destruction, as 
well as regional decay can only be prevented by increasing democratic control over 
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capital by turning private property over to local government and works councils. This 
constitutes no endorsement of Stalinism or the socialist SED rule, rather a support of 
socialism embedded in a truly democratic context, because this ensures maximum 
welfare for society as a whole (PDS, 1990, pp. 18-19). A key component of any future 
economic policy must also include a fundamental rethink on the environment, rejecting 
nuclear energy, outlawing chlorofluorocarbon, stringent emissions reductions, and better 
public transportation combined with regional structural development. These are the best 
solutions for protecting the environment (PDS, 1990, pp. 20-22).  
The PDS does present measures for fighting mass unemployment. This is best 
done through regional structural policies with direct public investment programs that 
focus on ecologically sound production methods and increase skill levels among 
employees. Publicly financed job creation is also an important step toward increasing the 
skills of the unemployed and providing them with a path back into the labor force. A 
reduction of hours worked each week down to 35 hours, without pay cuts, is another way 
to increase demand for labor. Labor unions are an important ally in the fight to increase 
wages, to reduce temporary contracts without benefits, and for making the economy more 
democratic. This includes efforts to equalize pay between East and West Germany. 
Women must receive equal access to every sector of the economy and receive equal pay 
for their labor. Additionally, employers must create more flexibility for families with 
children so that parents can better take care of their children and have greater job security 
(PDS, 1990, pp. 25-29).  
Other policy proposals include increased government efforts to stabilize the 
housing market and rent controls in larger cities to ensure that housing remains affordable 
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for everyone. With regard to health care, the PDS promotes the ideas of equality and 
community over profit maximization. Overall, the goal must be to provide better care for 
people, especially in rural regions, and to have more staff on hand for quality long term 
care (PDS, 1990, p. 33). The PDS strongly objects to efforts toward discarding the 
cultural identity and experiences of the people who have lived in East Germany in an 
effort to only promote a West German culture and identity. The cultural achievements of 
40+ years in the GDR must be recognized and protected. Culture needs to be affordable 
and become increasingly decentralized (PDS, 1990, pp. 37-38). Education policies are 
mentioned at the end of the 1990 program and the focus is on equal opportunities and 
access to education for everyone, regardless of age, gender, nationality, socio-economic 
background, sexual orientation, and political or religious identity. Education must start 
early with government provided child care programs and it must allow for flexibility and 
the option to personalize the education process based on individual skill and interest. An 
important element must also be the intercultural education and all students’ right to their 
own language and culture. With regard to the reunification process, it is also very 
important to institute equal recognition of all degrees irrespective of where these degrees 
were obtained (PDS, 1990, pp. 39-41). 
  
9.1.2 The 1994 Election 
The 1994 PDS election campaign program is primarily based on a substantive 
critique of Germany’s government, in particular, how it handled the reunification process 
over the preceding 4 years. The party recognizes the benefits of political rights and added 
consumption choices that had largely been previously denied to citizens of the GDR, but 
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the PDS criticizes that reunification was not the merger or a joining of two equal states, 
but rather a subjugation. Adaptation only took place in East Germany; the West remained 
unchanged. Additionally, citizens in the new states are treated as second class citizens, as 
they are not paid equal wages or government benefits compared to the citizens of the old 
states. A very sensitive topic is the misappropriation of land in East Germany by persons 
who now own land that had been stripped from owners of large estates in 1945, under the 
Soviet occupation. This was an issue of great contention for the PDS, since it solidified 
instability and created displacement, according to the party. In general, there is a strong 
critique of the Kohl government in the 1994 election program, because it had governed in 
a way that created unacceptable social injustice, discriminated against women, built an 
increasingly authoritarian government, attacked trade unions and their ability to engage in 
collective bargaining in an unprecedented manner, and fostered a dangerous form of new 
nationalism. This is why the party reaffirmed its identity as socialist party with radical 
democratic and anticapitalist positions in 1994 (PDS, 1994, p. 4).  
The greatest challenge that the PDS identifies for Germany in 1994 is the 
increasing number of unemployed people. The idea that good wages and benefits create 
unemployment is preposterous they argue. The only entity which stands to gain from low 
wages and minimalist benefits are the corporations who can claim record profits, but do 
not create more jobs. This is unsocial and unjust, which is why the PDS outlines various 
employment creation measures. The most important ones are to shorten the number of 
hours worked each week to 35, and to cut overtime. This alone will create 2 million jobs. 
Incomes that fall below society’s average income must receive government financial 
support. There needs to be a firm minimum quota of jobs that must be occupied by 
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women, and employees must receive better termination protection in their current 
contracts. The state should also create its own works programs for a publicly supported 
employment sector. This way, another million and a half individuals can find 
employment. This is especially important for the former East Germany in order to build 
up structures that attract further development. Additional measures that will strengthen 
employees and create more social justice are strong labor unions and codetermination 
within companies, something which is best achieved through works councils. This 
development must also be pursued internationally, especially within the EU, in order to 
strengthen employees as a collective. People without employment must not be pushed to 
the fringes of society. Instead there must be a needs-based social welfare system that 
provides for people in an adequate manner. This is especially important for women who 
are often in more precarious financial situations. An important building block to maintain 
quality of life and social equality is affordable housing, which is why the government 
must ensure that rents are fixed and the state takes the initiative to build high quality and 
reasonably priced housing. It is also paramount that people in the East do not lose their 
existing homes and land due to expropriation efforts for land that was redistributed after 
the Second World War. Another important issue is the commercialization of the health 
care sector, to which the PDS categorically objects. Health care services must be 
available for everyone and the burden of paying for the cost must be disproportionally 
paid by those who possess greater financial means. The state must also be more actively 
engaged in health care, especially when it comes to creating more jobs in hospitals or 
care facilities. Without the necessary personnel, adequate care is impossible and 
Germany already faces a shortage (PDS, 1994, pp. 6-11).  
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It is proposed that these measures be financed through higher employment rates, 
general economic growth, by reducing Germany’s defense budget by 10% annually, 
through higher income taxes for high earning individuals and various other steps are 
designed to tax the more affluent segment of society. This also includes closing loopholes 
that benefit the rich. The tax system must be much simpler, so that all citizens are able to 
fill out their own tax declarations, and taxes must be used more as a tool, to influence 
behavior. The goal must be to promote economically favorable behavior that protects the 
environment and rewards sustainable decisions. This can be reinforced particularly by 
raising ecotaxes that make people pay for their impact on the environment, such as 
paying for the emission of harmful gases like carbon dioxide (PDS, 1994, pp. 12-19).  
Other issues that the PDS addresses in it program are gender equality and better 
protection for people with disabilities, including a quota that demands that a company’s 
workforce consist of at least 6% of people with disabilities (PDS, 1994, pp. 14-16). The 
party also calls for a much more concerted fight against racism and right-wing 
extremism, which is a new development that is primarily caused by the conservative-
liberal government. What Germany needs instead is a society that is open to immigrants 
and extends the same civil rights to them that any other resident is afforded. Ultimately, 
the goal must be to guarantee every resident a path to citizenship, including dual 
citizenship, and the right to vote for foreigners who have already lived in Germany for a 
set amount of time. Foreigners also add to the cultural diversity in Germany and are an 
enrichment for society. The state must become better at supporting alternative forms of 
culture and lifestyles (PDS, 1994, pp. 20-24). In terms of education policies, the goal is to 
create equal opportunities for everyone regardless of their socioeconomic, racial, gender, 
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or nationality background, as well as for people with disabilities. Schools must be 
structured more democratically and allow parents, students, and local government a 
bigger say in schools. Schools that combine students of all skill levels must become the 
norm over schools that separate students based upon performance at an early age. 
Additionally, schooling must be free of cost including text books and school supplies 
(PDS, 1994, pp. 25-26).  
When it comes to foreign policies the PDS has two goals. The first one is to 
promote a holistic approach that encompasses all policy fields when it comes to 
development policies. Comprehensive debt relief for developing countries is a vital 
element in this regard. Additionally 0.7% of Germany’s GDP must be immediately used 
to foster development in poor countries, and in the long run this figure must even be 
increased. The primary aim of Germany’s development aid must be to promote 
disarmament in return for funds and to promote a fair global economic order, where 
developing countries have full access to the Western markets (PDS, 1994, p. 19). The 
other foreign policy goal is to support global antiwar policies. Germany must stop 
building and developing weapons systems, and there must be a ban on all arms exports. 
Germany must promote peace and advocate for the dissolution of NATO, as it is a 
military alliance. Instead, the UN should gain in importance and become democratically 
reformed (PDS, 1994, p. 20).  
 
9.1.3 The 1998 Election 
The 1998 program aims at offering a new political direction to Germany’s voters: 
an alternative that emphasizes social equality for a more just republic. Germany is 
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experiencing a lot of misery due to the neoliberal policies of the CDU/CSU and FDP, but 
the PDS has a plan to build a worthwhile future by introducing a social, ecological, and 
economic renewal of society. While the Kohl government has created policies that have 
led to increased productivity, this prosperity is only enjoyed by some. Instead of the tide 
lifting all boats, many people are faced with poverty, injustice, and mass unemployment. 
Unrestrained markets have created social coldness and ecological blindness. This is why 
Germany needs a protest and reform movement that the PDS wants to shape in large 
parts. The party also reiterates its position as Germany’s socialist party that supports 
radically democratic and anticapitalist positions. Part of this stance is the opposition to 
the predominant rule of capital and the striving for profits, which are the leading cause of 
all societal and global problems. Germany’s unique experience allows for many people to 
compare their personal experience of living in two very different political and economic 
systems. This experience makes people call for a democratic renewal and create a better 
society by learning from past mistakes (PDS, 1998, pp. 1-3).  
The election programs’ predominant theme is, again, social justice and 
employment, because that is what is most urgently missing in contemporary Germany 
according to the PDS. Interestingly, the PDS asserts that globalization is often incorrectly 
blamed for many woes in the world including unemployment and injustice. However, the 
cause for such developments is simply the neoliberal policies of the government, policies 
that even the SPD opposition has largely adopted. The neoliberal answers of the 
government and business organizations to the current economic and social challenges do 
nothing to protect people from the harsh competition of global markets. The PDS, by 
contrast, wants to counter such developments by creating a social and ecological 
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framework. In order to address the social imbalance within German society, the PDS 
calls for a redistribution from top to bottom, unlike the lately more persistent 
development of amassing more wealth at the top by exploiting the bottom. One important 
element in this development is employment opportunities that increase life quality, 
primarily through a humanization of work. This must happen under the leadership of 
trade unions and focus on gender equality, more flexibility for parents, rejection of 
employment without full benefits, or contracts that lie outside of collective bargaining 
contracts. The privatization of key sectors such as rail, telecommunications, or the postal 
system must be strongly rejected, because it leads to fewer jobs, less social justice, and 
more harm to the environment (PDS, 1998, pp. 5-10). Specific policies on how this can 
be achieved include a reduction of the hours worked each week to a maximum of 35, 
without a reduction in wages. Additionally, government contracts must be awarded by 
including considerations about the environment as well as gender equality and the state 
must build up a job sector that is financed by the government to give all people 
opportunity to find work. Indirect labor cost must be paid according to gross value added 
of a position and not its nominal wages. This way, jobs that produce fewer gross profits 
do not become economical unviable by adding high indirect labor cost, whereas jobs that 
create a lot of value for a company can be used to pay a larger share of society’s indirect 
labor costs (PDS, 1998, pp. 11-13). Income tax must also be reformed to a 20% tax rate 
for low incomes and a maximum tax rate of 53% for high incomes. The tax code must 
also be changed with regards to married people, so that the higher income, which is 
usually the male income due to the inequality of pay between genders, does not receive a 
lower tax rate than the lower income (PDS, 1998, pp. 20-21).  
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The PDS also wants to increase retirement benefits in order to prevent the 
increasing trend towards poverty among seniors. This is especially true for women, who 
often suffer from antiquated models of calculating benefits that do not account for time 
spent raising children. Health care is another issue that is experiencing a tendency 
towards division between rich and poor, where treatment becomes increasingly 
dependent upon the financial means of an individual. The PDS vehemently objects to this 
commercialization of the health care sector, because medical treatment must be 
accessible to everyone; especially preventative and rehabilitative measures must receive 
more funding. Housing assistance must be increased to allow people with low incomes to 
afford an adequate place to live. Government housing projects are an important element 
in any strategy of providing affordable housing (PDS, 1998, pp. 14-17). An economy that 
is sustainable is also very important, but it requires a radical reduction of resource 
consumption and better environmental protection. Waste reduction and recycling are 
important steps in this regard (PDS, 1998, pp. 18-19).  
Naturally, the PDS also emphasizes the need to focus on rebuilding the former 
East Germany, because economic growth is steadily declining and the unemployment rate 
has reached almost 30% in 1998, according the party’s campaign program. The best way 
to revitalize this region is through a highly active government reindustrialization policy 
and funding that is designed to structurally improve the new states and to create 
employment opportunities. Labor unions and their collective bargaining also play an 
important role in revitalizing the region and to secure wages that allow for sustainable 
living (PDS, 1998, pp. 21-23). The party also reiterates its rejection of the expropriation 
of land in the new German states, because it only adds to the treatment of eastern 
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Germany’s residents as second-class citizens (PDS, 1998, p. 31).  
With regards to immigration the PDS reaffirms its commitment to an open society 
that helps people who are in need. German society must extend the same civil rights to 
immigrants that every other resident enjoys. All immigrants must also be guaranteed a 
path to citizenship, including dual citizenship, and foreigners who have lived in Germany 
for at least 5 years must also get the right to vote at all levels (PDS, 1998, p. 29, p. 35). In 
terms of culture, the party talks about the need to better finance museums, theaters, 
historic monuments, and libraries. This should become a key responsibility of local 
governments with financial support from the federal level. Culture is an important 
element for self-determination, which is why it must be broadly available and inclusive, 
though there is no talk of a specifically German form of culture (PDS, 1998, pp. 39-41). 
Education is a closely related topic for the PDS, an area of policy where the party calls 
for more financial support to better fund education, but also structural reforms to 
prioritize public elementary and comprehensive schools that foster cooperative learning 
across broad skill levels. Since education is a basic human right, according to the PDS, 
the individual right to education must be included in Germany’s constitution. The broad 
goals of all education efforts must be to promote education policies that foster 
independence and oppose patriarchal or racist structures (PDS, 1998, pp. 42-44).  
The party’s foreign policies are intended to prevent an imminent global, 
ecological, and social catastrophe. The power hungry and market obsessed deregulation 
policies that are promoted by international corporations, the World Bank, and the IMF 
have the most devastating consequences in the southern hemisphere. The prevalent 
financial globalization policies with neoliberal character are generally opposed to 
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international democratization and humanization. Furthermore, the sovereign equality of 
all states and the self-determination of all peoples is undermined by the interest of global 
capitalism. It is therefore paramount to push back against nationalism and the 
neoconservative attacks against the fundamentals of the social state. Globalization 
necessitates a close look at the global ecological dangers that are present everywhere and 
require immediate attention. Interestingly enough, the party’s wording does not indicate 
that globalization is the cause of the environmental problems, only that it makes it 
unavoidable to deal with the issue by introducing international and European social and 
ecological minimum standards. These standards must not be used to create barriers for 
developing countries to access global markets. In fact, all forms of tariffs and market 
entry barriers must be removed in rich countries. Germany must also do more to finance 
development efforts in poor countries and these efforts must no longer be based upon the 
criteria of capitalist organizations like WTO, World Bank, and IMF. Instead, they must 
be based upon social and ecological principles and they need to reflect local interests. 
The party also stresses the idea that globalization is best achieved through 
regionalization, which is an alternative to pure global market expansion efforts. Instead, 
concepts that promote regional and local economic structures are much better at 
combining citizens’ involvement and social and environmental standards. This is 
important, because the environmentally destructive process of transporting goods around 
the globe is not sustainable (PDS, 1998, pp. 47-50). How this conforms to any traditional 
definition of globalization is not clear.  
With regards to other international institutions the party again clearly rejects 
NATO and any other military alliance, because it does not fit with the party’s pacifist 
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ideals (PDS, 1998, pp. 51-52). The EU is an important organization for the PDS, but it 
must become social, democratic, ecological, peace promoting, open minded, and create 
jobs (PDS, 1998, p. 6). The EU must also receive the support necessary to actively use 
regulatory measures to intervene in markets in order to create and promote binding social 
and environmental standards (PDS, 1998, pp. 53-54).  
 
9.1.4 The 2002 Election 
The primary focus of the 2002 program is, again, on creating jobs, and a 
significant reduction in the number of unemployed residents. This to be achieved by 
reducing the maximum work week, including overtime, to 40 hours a week. In the quest 
for more flexibility for employees to organize their work life balance, some people might 
opt for a shorter week. This will increase the demand for labor, thus creating more 
opportunities for people to find employment. Additionally, the state must build up a 
publicly funded or subsidized employment sector that can be primarily used to render 
social, cultural, or ecological services that are often not paid at all or receive only 
minimal compensation. Labor unions are also an important element in securing 
sustainable wages through collective bargaining, but it is also vital to overcome the 
erroneous idea that lower wages or tax cuts lead to more jobs. This idea is amply 
disproved by the high unemployment figures in eastern Germany. The PDS also asserts 
that prosperity only increases at the top and that despite the SPD government’s promises 
to represent the interests of ordinary people, in reality, Schröder only represents the 
interests of companies. One way that the PDS wants to assure that economic growth 
benefits not only corporate profits is by introducing a binding minimum wage off of 
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which people can live. Additionally, there must be special emphasis for affirmative action 
with regards to gender. Women are routinely discriminated against in the job market, 
which is why women must receive preferential treatment under condition of equal 
qualifications. Other steps for promoting job growth include tax levels that a deduct a 
minimum material standard, one that closes tax loopholes, an energy tax that is primarily 
used to improve public transportation, and an introduction of a tax on financial 
transactions (PDS, 2002, pp. 3-7).  
To be socially secure is another important issue, which according to the PDS, 
means to guarantee individual self-determination. An important element in this regard is 
the social safety net, whose funding has been questioned, because it necessitates a 
relatively high level of indirect labor cost. This is why the party, again, suggests paying 
indirect labor cost based upon the gross value added of a position and not its nominal 
wages. This way, job loss due to rationalization can be reduced. Additionally, individual 
contributions can be reduced if the group of contributors is widened by including the self-
employed and government employees, who are currently largely exempt (PDS, 2002, p. 
10). Additionally, there must be guaranteed provisions for everyone who cannot provide 
a basic level of prosperity. These basic provisions include financial means for anyone 
who has fewer funds available than 50% of Germany’s average net income, housing 
grants to make housing more affordable for low-income families, and guaranteed access 
to free healthcare and long-term care. The party also outlines specific efforts to pay more 
financial support for children and to provide more public childcare, in order to allow 
parents additional flexibility and further opportunities to pursue a career for women in 
particular. Concerning health care, the aim is to guarantee equal treatment for all citizens 
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regardless of income. The party also rejects the idea of adding competition over healthy 
patients and the lowest rates, or increased individual insurance contributions. When it 
comes to retirement benefits, the PDS warns of low benefits that lead to poverty. This is 
often especially true for women who have not worked continuously. Here, the state needs 
to calculate retirement contributions differently so that caring for children or elder family 
members does not lead to low retirement benefits. The party also strongly objects to the 
idea of increasing the retirement age (PDS, 2002, pp. 11-14).  
Naturally, the party also discusses education policies and emphasizes the need to 
allow all children an equal start in life. Education must foster the ability to grasp 
connections and pursue life-long learning, so as to obtain social and historic knowledge 
about one’s own society, but also understand other cultures. This type of education must 
finally be disassociated with a particular socioeconomic background and, instead, must 
be open to all, including people with disabilities. This is best achieved by providing more 
funding for early childhood education, by hiring more teachers, by providing better and 
continuous training for teachers, and by better funding classroom equipment and books 
(PDS, 2002, pp. 14-15). The party also reiterates its commitment to an open society that 
helps refugees and provides them with opportunities to become a part of Germany’s 
society. This includes illegal residents in Germany who must be afforded an opportunity 
to achieve legal status, so that they can fully participate in society and are not condemned 
to a life in the shadows, which is usually characterized by exploitation. The PDS also 
promotes efforts to harmonize asylum and migration policies across Europe based upon 
human rights (PDS, 2002, p. 20).  
Again, the PDS pays special attention to the structural problems in eastern 
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Germany, which has been more severely affected by unemployment and slow economic 
growth than the rest of the country. This is why a new start is necessary. The expansion 
of the EU is an important factor in this regard, because it places Germany’s new states 
very close to new states in the east and combined with structural support from the federal 
government, this can lead to a revitalization of the region by becoming a bridge between 
old and new regions within the EU. This entails great opportunities for economic 
exchange, but also for social and cultural exchanges which must be based upon mutual 
respect and understanding. This must be supported through exchanges and language 
projects. The equalization of wages between new and old states is still a very important 
topic for the PDS because the unequal treatment of citizens of the former GDR is 
unacceptable. This equalization must also include retirement benefits and better 
recognition of job qualifications that were acquired in the former German Democratic 
Republic, which are often viewed as inferior or not even accepted in western Germany 
(PDS, 2002, pp. 7-9).  
In foreign policy, there are two very important issues for the PDS; the first one is 
to stop the unrestrained capitalist globalization from exacerbating global differences 
between rich and poor. The policies of large and powerful industrial nations are only 
focused on increasing power by promoting capitalism through globalization, the 
consequences of which are disastrous, such as increased instability, violence, and 
injustice. The PDS wants to build globalization around the ideals of a cooperative global 
economic order that is social, ecological, and democratic. Important specific steps that 
the party identifies in this regard are taxes on international financial transactions in order 
to prevent speculation, the implementation of binding social standards, and the release of 
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patents that are vital for providing basic human needs, like for expensive medication that 
could be made available via inexpensive generic alternatives. Developing countries must 
also receive better access to global markets, which necessitates that rich countries stop 
export subsidies (PDS, 2002, pp. 21-22). This alone is not enough though. A “Marshall 
Plan” for developing states is necessary and can be realized by increasing foreign aid and 
comprehensive debt reduction measures. This can easily be financed by a reduction of 
defense budgets which account for vast expenditures in the rich world. This ties in with 
PDS's second core principle of international relations: pacifism. This is expressed by a 
strong commitment to decrease Germany’s military and to solve conflicts peacefully. 
This includes the fight against terrorism, which is why the party strongly objects to the 
war in Afghanistan, but especially to the participation of German forces. The party also 
maintains its commitment to dissolving NATO and to stop weapons exports (PDS, 2002, 
pp. 23-24). With regard to other international organizations, the PDF briefly mentions the 
UN and emphasizes the need for this organization to better promote peace and to allow 
third world countries more influence within its halls. The EU receives more attention in 
the 2002 program and the PDS asserts that the monetary and economic union must be 
complemented by a social and environmental union, because environmental and social 
standards must not be determined by international trade organizations like the WTO 
(PDS, 2002, p. 3). The EU must become more democratic and transparent (PDS, 2002, p. 
18) and Germany ought to use its membership to push for more social and ecological 
policies from Brussels (PDS, 2002, p. 21). The goal of the EU must be to foster 
cooperation and not competition among its members for the most favorable corporate 
investment environment. Its member states must focus on their domestic economies and 
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the necessary industrial, labor, and environmental policies to support it, instead of 
promoting international competition that only leads to social dumping. This must also 
include EU wide tax harmonization in order to create quality (PDS, 2002, p. 25).  
 
9.1.5 The 2005 Election 
The 2005 program represents the first election after the merger of the PDS and 
WSAG into The Left Party/PDS. Therefore, the following analysis will simply refer to 
the party as The Left Party, whose program begins with the assertion that new political 
direction is necessary for Germany, one that leads to new social and democratic 
alternatives. This refers especially to the policies of the Agenda 2010, which the party 
detests, because longer work hours, reduction of wages and retirement benefits, and 
higher health insurance contributions are all consequences of the new political course. 
Especially critical in the eyes of The Left Party is the monetary and temporal reduction of 
unemployment benefits. The whole agenda constitutes the erosion of solidarity which 
used to be an important pillar of German society. The policies of the SPD/Green coalition 
only continue the disastrous redistribution of wealth from bottom to top that the Kohl-era 
started. Democratic socialism compels The Left Party into action for a better society that 
is more inclusive and just (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 5-6).  
Job creation and social rights are the most important topics for the party in 2005. 
The guiding principle for all economic activities of the state must be to increase domestic 
demand. The increased demand for goods and services will create new and sustainable 
jobs that are much better than jobs that are dependent on exports, because export jobs rely 
on the whims of the international economy. In order to increase domestic demand, people 
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must have more purchasing power. This is why low wage strategies do not create jobs. 
Likewise, lower social benefits only lead to less domestic demand and fewer jobs. One 
step towards increasing domestic demand is the creation of a publicly financed labor 
sector that focuses on jobs that the private economy disregards as not profitable such as 
community, charitable, and nonprofit work. These jobs will not be in competition with 
the private sector and will be coordinated together with labor unions and employer 
associations. Other steps to increase demand include better qualifying workers through 
continuous training, a minimum wage of 8.50 Euros, to limit the work week to a 
maximum of 40 hours, and to promote better investments into sustainable technologies 
and better infrastructure for constant economic growth (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 7-10).  
To be socially secure in order to live a self-determined life is vital for The Left 
Party, which is why the party demands that no one in Germany should live with fewer 
financial means than 60% of Germany’s average net income. All government programs 
must work together to ensure that this minimum is met. With regard to retirement 
policies, the goal is still to reject lower benefits, because this often leads to poverty, 
especially for women. This is why the state must begin to calculate retirement 
contributions differently so as to include time spent caring for children and/or providing 
long term care for other family members. Health care must continuously be provided on 
the basis of a social system that provides equal care for everyone. The party also 
reiterates its demand that indirect labor costs for companies must be calculated based 
upon the gross value add of a position and not its nominal wage (Left Party.PDS, 2005, 
pp. 11-12). Wealth redistribution is also needed to create equality and to allow everyone 
the opportunity to participate in society. The idea is that wealth must be distributed from 
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the top down, which can largely be accomplished by tax reforms. Three important 
elements in this context are to better tax international corporations and to close loopholes 
so that they cannot redistribute profits among countries to avoid paying taxes. Another, is 
to reform income taxes and to allow for 12,000 Euro worth of tax free income. 
Everything above that will be taxed with a 15% tax, which will gradually increase to a 
maximum of 50% for incomes over 60,000 Euro annually. The third important reform is 
to get rid of joint tax filing for couples, which allows for an unequal taxation of incomes 
from both partners, which predominantly leads to higher taxes for women.  
Education takes a more prominent role in this election program compared to 
previous PDS programs. The party states that education is essential for the development 
of society and the individual, but educational achievement is disproportionally dependent 
on one’s background. Only a minority of children and youth experience great education: 
That must stop immediately. This is achieved through individual support and a school 
system that is inclusive, which means that all children attend the same type of school 
instead of being separated based on early childhood selection processes. Schools will also 
provide more academic and social opportunities for children by offering a full day 
program. Early childhood development opportunities must start before school which is 
why all parents must have access to free preschool/childcare for their children. A 
particular focus of this offer is the integration of immigrant children and to impart the 
necessary language skills so that all children can succeed once they start school. When it 
comes to tertiary education, The Left Party only states that there must be no tuition fees 
for students. The party insists on more cooperation between the individual states and 
more involvement of state legislatures in order to create uniform standards. All of these 
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goals will be financed by an immediate increase of education funding to 5% of GDP and 
a long term commitment to spend 6% annually of Germany’s GDP on education (Left 
Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 14-16).  
Environmental protection is an important issue, as well, in this election program. 
The way to achieve this is by bringing economic, social, and ecological goals in harmony 
with one another. In concrete terms, this means drastically reducing emissions by 90% 
based upon 1990 emission levels. This has to be largely achieved by relying on 
renewable energy, but also by a significant reduction of energy consumption. This can be 
done through taxes that encourage frugal behavior, building upon a European emissions 
trading system, and by breaking up energy monopolies. The production of nuclear energy 
must be stopped since it is too dangerous and the long-term storage of nuclear waste is 
harmful to the environment. The usage of chemicals must also be curbed due to the many 
negative side effects for humans, animals, and the environment (Left Party.PDS, 2005, 
pp. 20-21).  
Other issues that The Left Party addresses include the rebuilding of eastern 
Germany, although the emphasis is less pronounced than in earlier programs, and there is 
an added emphasis on improving all structurally weak regions within Germany (Left 
Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 17-18). The party promotes the regular use of plebiscites for a more 
direct form of democracy and to extend the right to vote to all permanent residents and 
not just citizens (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 22). Additionally, citizenship must be awarded 
to anyone who is born in Germany and dual citizenship will be acceptable too. Germany 
is an immigrant country and it is time that policies reflect that. This includes refugees 
who must be welcomed and there must be a way for all immigrants to obtain legal 
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residency status. Immigration and asylum policies must be standardized across Europe 
(Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 24-25). There is also a strong commitment to oppose any kind 
of discrimination including gender, race, age, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. 
The party also warns against right wing extremism and calls for a more persistent fight 
against racism, nationalism, and antisemitism (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 23-24).  
When it comes to Germany’s global role, The Left Party has a clear position. It 
must work with Europe to become a counterweight to America’s goal of global 
dominance, by promoting peaceful conflict resolution. German soldiers must not be 
stationed abroad and its armed forces need to be heavily reduced. Europe must also 
become free of nuclear weapons, NATO should be dissolved, and there must be an export 
stop on weapons systems. There is brief mention of the EU in the 2005 program, 
primarily focused on emphasizing the party’s commitment to Europe, but rejecting 
Brussels' focus on markets and monetary stability. Instead, the EU must focus on creating 
jobs and providing a social safety net (Left Party.PDS, 2005, pp. 29-31). Globalization is 
addressed on the very last page, expressing the party’s objection to the neoliberal form of 
globalization. Social and ecological standards are indispensable to guarantee a fair 
economic relationship between rich northern and poor southern countries. This 
necessitates that Germany meet its target of spending 0.7% of its GDP on foreign aid and 
to engage in debt relief for developing countries. Additionally, a comprehensive 
democratization process is necessary for international organizations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. Otherwise a social society with humane living standards is not possible 
and the overwhelming power of capital will not be restrained.  
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9.1.6 The 2009 Election 
The 2009 program begins with a comprehensive critique of the global economic 
order. People are afraid of losing their livelihoods, having to live on lower retirement 
benefits, or losing the government support on which they rely. The financial crisis 
exposes the weakness of the international system and proves that global capitalism is not 
capable of guaranteeing reasonably tolerable and humane living standards. The system 
has also created global imbalances that become more and more apparent, which lead to 
the destruction of production and productivity of jobs and prosperity globally. The Left’s 
goal is to outline a program that presents an alternative to the economic order that is only 
driven by profit, and they insist that governments stop their subservience to capitalism 
(The Left, 2009, pp. 1-2). Key steps in this regard are massive investments by the state at 
all levels to the tune of 100 million Euro annually, which is intended to boost the 
economy in a socially and ecologically sustainable direction. Privatization must be 
stopped and in important cases even reversed. A national minimum wage of 10 Euro 
must be introduced along with benefits in all employment contracts, and the maximum 
work week cannot exceed 40 hours, with a regular week of 35 hours, without reduction of 
wages. Additionally, families will get more support under a Left government to make it 
easier to combine children and work, which is especially important for women, who need 
more support. One way to do that is to introduce a binding employment quota for 
companies to fill at least 50% of their positions at all levels with female employees (The 
Left, 2009, pp. 4-6).  
Creating guarantees against sliding down the socio-economic ladder is still an 
important issue for The Left. The Agenda 2010 policies of the previous government and 
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the financial crisis created a tremendous amount of fear for people, and this has greatly 
served companies who can use that fear to suppress wages and in turn increase their 
profit margin. The social safety net is essential for society, which is why the program 
spends a good amount of content explaining the party’s position on various social pillars. 
The first one is the current threat to reducing retirement benefits, which The Left 
vehemently objects too. Living standards for seniors must be protected not discarded. 
This includes a return to the previous retirement age of 65 years and better recognition of 
the nonworkforce contributions of women to ensure that they are not faced with poverty 
once they retire. Health care is important, because it unavoidably affects everyone in a 
significant way. It is a basic human right to receive medical care regardless of one’s 
economic background, which is why the trend to commercialize healthcare in the 
interests of big pharmaceutical companies must be fought. Effective and quality treatment 
must not be subjugated to economic constraints. In the end, the determining characteristic 
of Germany’s medical system is the social component. One way to reduce the impact of 
medical care is to reduce sales taxes on medication as well as low binding prices (The 
Left, 2009, pp. 13-14). The Left also presents various policies that are aimed at increasing 
security for workers, like making it harder for companies to fire people, increasing 
unemployment benefits, allowing the unemployed to be selective in finding a new job 
without losing benefits, and better supporting labor unions in their fight for higher wages. 
Low income families pay disproportionally for housing, which is why the state must 
introduce rent ceilings, invest in more public housing, and subsidize rent payments (The 
Left, 2009, pp. 15-16). Besides these general factors that can lead to social exclusion, 
there is a continuous threat that especially women, immigrants, disabled individuals, and 
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homosexuals are more often excluded. There must be a concerted effort to stop this. More 
resources need to be dedicated to supporting people who are more likely to become 
victims of social exclusion (The Left, 2009, p. 17). The 2009 election program does 
contain a special emphasis on developing eastern Germany’s structurally weak regions. 
The objective is to develop them in their own right and not to attempt to copy western 
German models. A vital step towards this goal is adopting equal pay and government 
benefits with people living in the West. Additionally, there must be an emphasis on new 
ecological and efficient technologies, and a heavy focus on building strong regional 
economies with strong domestic demand (The Left, 2009, p. 12).  
Plans to pay for these policy changes and investment plans include the 
introduction of an annual 5% millionaire’s tax, a financial transaction tax, higher 
corporate taxes, and the personal income tax that should be as high as 53% percent for 
people who make more than 65,000 Euro annually. Additionally, the party proposes 
nationalizing the entire banking industry and putting the remaining financial sector under 
public control (The Left, 2009, p. 4, p. 7, p. 18).  
Environmental protection is an important issue in this election program as well. 
To achieve this, economic, social, and ecological goals must be brought into harmony 
with one another. The party restates its environmental core goals to reduce emissions by 
90% based upon 1990 emission levels, by extensively relying on renewable energy and 
reduced energy consumption. Another essential goal is a complete ban on nuclear energy. 
An issue that first crops up in this election program is mobility. Transportation still adds 
increasing amounts of emissions annually. This must stop, by heavily expanding public 
transportation. This will both decrease the environmental impact of transportation and, at 
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the same time, increase mobility for a large swath of people who rely on public 
transportation (The Left, 2009, pp. 8-9). Just as important as ecological issues is the 
education system, which is currently unable to overcome social differences among 
students, where achievement depends largely on a student’s background. Germany must 
develop a school system that creates equal opportunities, through better and more 
comprehensive free early-childhood education, integrative school structures, better 
integration for immigrants (including language support), better financial aid for college 
students, no tuition for college education, and legislating companies to create more 
vocational training positions (The Left, 2009, pp. 21-22). Research and development 
must become increasingly focused on creating technologies that foster a social society 
and sustainability, for example, by paying more attention to global issues such as 
inequality, climate change, clean energy, and more affordable medication (The Left, 
2009, pp. 22-23).  
The Left warns that cultural engagement is essential for a society in order to 
reflect and improve, which is why the state must be more actively engaged in protecting 
and supporting theaters, libraries, archives, and orchestras. Culture must also be 
inclusive, something to which everyone can contribute and minorities are included and 
protected; this includes foreigners, especially (The Left, 2009, pp. 24-25). The party’s 
asylum policies reflect this cultural openness as well, which is characterized by the idea 
that our shared humanity demands that anyone who has to flee their home due to 
persecution can find refuge in Germany. This is an issue that requires better coordination 
at the European level (The Left, 2009, pp. 29-30).  
In terms of foreign policy, The Left calls for a fundamental reorientation of the 
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relationship between Germany and countries of the southern hemisphere. Development 
aid is still focused on promoting the interests of donor countries. The aim should be to 
develop local markets that can become an opposing pole to global trade policies. This can 
lead to more employment and fair prices for developing countries. Other important steps 
include debt relief, striking export subsidies, and a focus of development aid on achieving 
human rights and gender equality (The Left. 2009, pp. 32-33). The UN must take on a 
vital role in achieving a peaceful global order, reducing global emissions, promoting 
human rights, and ending hunger. The general assembly needs more power within the UN 
framework to counterbalance the disproportionately controlling veto powers. The UN 
must become the central organization to organize global affairs. Other international 
organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank must be placed under control of the 
UN. Germany must do its own part in reducing conflicts around the world, by starting to 
completely withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, radically reducing military spending, 
and reducing the influence of NATO (The Left, 2009, pp. 32-35).  
9.1.7 The 2013 Election 
The Left’s 2013 program stresses the importance of overcoming poverty, which is 
why the party wants to redistribute wealth, promote social basic rights, good jobs, and 
free education. No one should have to face poverty due to age, unemployment, physical 
or mental incapacities, chronic illness, or poor parents. The necessary steps for 
overcoming poverty are more power for labor unions and a binding collective bargaining 
process. It also entails limiting the power of banks and big companies, and stopping the 
system that is only focused on short term profit maximization, especially on the financial 
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market. This has devastating consequences for people, and it is time to free citizens from 
this choke hold. Freedom for individuals is something different from the freedom of 
markets or free competition. The Left is the socialist civil rights party in Germany and as 
such will no longer tolerate a system where the poorest individuals are reviled and 
immigrants are treated as criminals. Social injustice is continually increasing; it is time to 
do something against this development. The remainder of the election program does 
exactly that, present a way out of the crisis towards universal prosperity (The Left, 2013, 
pp. 6-9).  
The first and largest share of the program focuses on good jobs and social justice. 
A good job is one that provides enough income to meet monthly expenditures and to 
allow for a self-determined life. This is why incomes must grow faster than prices, which 
is why collective bargaining, with its wage agreements, is indispensable. Politics must 
ensure that sector-wide wage agreements are binding and implemented. This must 
include all employees and not just the ones with permanent full time contracts. 
Contractors, nonpermanent contracts, and the abuse of free internships must all come to 
an end. All employment must be permanent and receive full benefits, with an immediate 
minimum wage of 10 Euros. In the long run, the minimum wage will be at least 60% of 
the average hourly national wage, which as of 2013, would result in a minimum wage of 
12 Euros. The Left also calls for maximum income for managers, which should not 
exceed the lowest incomes by more than 40 times (The Left, 2013, pp. 11-14). The 
average number of hours worked each week will be limited to 40, under a Left coalition 
government, with a standard work week of 35 and a long-term goal of only 30 hours per 
week. Additionally, companies must practice more codetermination and they must 
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become more democratic, by giving employees a direct say within their companies. In 
order to create more jobs, the state must operate through a publicly subsidized job sector. 
One provision of the Agenda 2010, with which The Left vehemently disagrees, is the loss 
of benefits for individuals who do not accept work which is not in alignment with their 
qualifications, a statute which they would strike (The Left, 2013, pp. 15-18, pp. 63-64). 
Mass lay-offs are a popular tool for companies in their effort to maximize profits and to 
restructure their businesses, with tremendous negative regional consequences, which is 
why legislation must be enacted to abolish the practice (The Left, 2013, p. 59).  
Social justice also means that everyone deserves a retirement which does not 
exclude them from participating in society, one which does not force an individual to 
confront poverty. The absolute minimum monthly retirement payment must exceed 1000 
Euro (The Left, 2013, p. 19). The health care sector is in need of a social overhauls too; 
the two-class system is unacceptable. We cannot allow poverty to make individuals sick 
and cause them to die early. All medically necessary treatments must be covered by 
insurance companies. Health care must be about providing optimal treatments and not 
about maximizing profit. The same is true of long-term care, especially for the elderly. 
Good care is essential and must be available to everyone. The state will provide more 
support options to individuals who care for loved ones within the home, by providing 
more training to caregivers and by implementing better mobile support. There is also a 
shortage of nurses and caregivers due to cost-saving measures that repeatedly cut 
healthcare positions. This must be immediately addressed by the government through the 
creation of new public jobs in healthcare (The Left, 2013, pp. 20-23).  
Affordable housing is also an issue in 2013, and The Left party largely trusts that 
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affordable housing is best ensured by limiting rent increases and safeguarding that no one 
has to leave their apartment, just because the ownership of the real estate changed. 
Government regulation must be enacted which prevents real estate purchases for 
speculative purposes. Additional housing can be provided by the government through 
investment in ecological and affordable housing. The overall goal of these efforts is to 
ensure that no one pays more than 30% of their income for housing and utilities (The 
Left, 2013, pp. 29-32).  
These measures will be financed through a top to bottom redistribution of wealth. 
Inheritance taxes will be increased to meet the European average, the corporate tax rate 
will be increased to 25%, a financial transaction tax of 0.1% will have to be levied, and 
tax exemptions will be cut. Income taxes will also be reformed so that individuals with 
lower incomes pay less taxes and incomes over 65,000 Euro pay taxes at a rate of 53%. A 
75% tax rate applies for all income earned above 1 million Euro. The government must 
also stop the privatization of government services in the name of raising funds for 
government budgets. Public services are essential and must be available for everyone; 
government debt is not bad if it is used for the social, cultural, and democratic 
development of society (The Left, 2013, pp. 24-28). However, Germany’s society needs a 
complete realignment of its focus. The current emphasis on profit maximization must be 
replaced by a focus on human needs and desires. The economy has to be restructured so 
as to provide sustainable employment that allows for a life without poverty. Additionally, 
the economy must also become much greener. Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 
by 90% before 2050, based upon 1990 levels, is top priority (The Left, 2013, p. 60).  
The Left criticizes the current educational system, because it reinforces privilege 
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and social exclusion. Education reform is urgently needed, in which we move away from 
the system that separates students at an early age and creates path dependencies that are 
hard to overcome. Every child must have access to early childhood education so that 
language competencies are established early on and full participation in school life is 
possible. Learning together, and from one another, enables all students to achieve better 
results and opens a path for higher education that would otherwise remain closed. 
Government and private companies must do more to ensure ample vocational training 
opportunities after school to allow for a successful start in a career. Higher education 
must remain free of charge and be open to more students. The EU reform process for the 
harmonization of university degrees is to be rejected, because it introduces a strict 
regulated framework that creates pressures and is counterproductive to a free 
development of self-determination, intellectual development, and critical thinking. 
Admittance to programs needs to be determined by students, and not universities which 
implement rigorous selection processes (The Left, 2013, pp. 33-36). 
Other policy issues include gender equality, with a strong emphasis on stopping 
all forms of violence against women, but also an effort to end the routine discrimination  
against women in the labor market. Here, the government can take on an important role 
by ensuring that 50% of all public job postings are filled by women (The Left, 2013, pp. 
39-41), which is why women must receive preferential treatment under condition of equal
qualifications. With regards to culture The Left points out that culture must be accessible 
for everyone and that it is vital for everyone to have cultural space for individual 
development. The party also asserts its support of cultural diversity and the need to build 
an open inclusive society that integrates everyone. Minorities need to fully participate at 
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all levels and the state must build up institutions that foster diversity including minority 
languages and cultures (The Left, 2013, pp. 43-44). A special emphasis on protecting and 
integrating immigrants is also necessary, as they are more often confronted with 
unemployment and poverty (The Left, 2013, p. 77).  
The global economy and its continuous crisis since 2007 illustrates the inability of 
capitalism to solve problems. It is designed to repress wages and to allow the rich to 
circumvent financing public goods. A key factor for the crisis, according to The Left 
party, is trade imbalance. Extreme export surpluses by some states leads to large debt for 
countries that import the lion’s share of their GDP. Solving the crisis must begin by 
reducing imbalances, increasing wages, as well as implementing a socially and 
ecologically sound government investment program. Thus, domestic demand can be 
increased and if this is paired with more comprehensive regulation of the financial sector 
and more taxes for the rich, then the crisis can be overcome (The Left, 2013, p. 46). 
Especially within Europe, the focus must shift from the free movement of capital and 
increasing competitiveness, to strengthening labor unions and collective bargaining. 
Wage dumping must be abolished through harmonized standards for wages, taxes, and 
social policies across the EU. The German government especially favors markets over the 
interest of EU citizens, and this must stop immediately. A free trade zone between the EU 
and the USA are only counterproductive in this regard and must be rejected (The Left, 
2013, pp. 49-51). Social justice is a global goal, which is why development strategies 
must be changed to better reflect the needs of the developing states and not be aligned 
with the interests of the rich industrial states. Increased funds for development are one 
important element in this regard, but different trade practices must be implemented as 
332 
well. Imports must only be allowed when products are fair trade products that have been 
produced under conditions that are both sustainable and in alignment with EU consumer 
protection regulation. This requires establishing a certification and control process (The 
Left, 2013, p. 54).  
Another important foreign policy issue for The Left is that war must never be 
used as a tool in achieving political goals. This is why Germany’s military must be 
withdrawn from all foreign engagements. Instead, Germany should focus on supporting 
the UN and its efforts to promote human rights. Germany must also ban arms sales even 
to allies. In fact, producers of military equipment must transition into other industries that 
are not related to fostering violent conflict (The Left, 2013, pp. 52-55).  
9.2 Initial Election Program Analysis 
This paragraph examines the five key terms as they appear in all seven party 
election programs of The Left/The PDS, since 1990. A detailed explanation of how the 
programs are analyzed, counted, clustered, and coded, with regards to the key terms, can 
be found in Section 4.3. Figure 9.1 shows all direct references with regards to the five 
key terms; one can pick out phases within the election programs. The first two elections 
hardly mention the key terms at all. There are absolutely no references to any of the terms 
in 1990 which is unique among all of the 35 examined election programs. The 1994 
election only mentions trade twice and exports twice, and it is not until the 1998 election 
campaign that globalization enters into The Left/PDS election programs. The two 
elections around the turn of the century most frequently mention globalization, a total of 
11 times. Issues like trade and exports are briefly touched upon. The combined election 
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program of PDS and WASG in 2005 marks a sharp reversal from the previous trend. 
Globalization is only mentioned once and trade is referred to twice, making this the 
program with the second fewest references of the five key terms. Globalization is pretty 
much a dead topic for The Left in their last two election programs, as there is only one 
reference on the issue. References on trade and export explode in the last two programs, 
with a combined 19 trade and 24 export references. These last two elections are also the 
only elections in which the party refers to imports and free trade in a meaningful manner. 
In essence, one can identify three phases with regards to these election programs: in the 
early phase, globalization and trade are largely irrelevant topics for the PDS. During the 
second phase from 1998 to 2002 globalization begins to become an important topic, 
which is in line with all the other parties, where globalization begins to gain traction 
around the turn of the century. Other trade issues are not mentioned much in this second 
phase, where the emphasis for the PDS is on shaping globalization (PDS, 2002, p. 22). 
The 2005 election separates the second from the third phase. In this election, the joint 
PDS/WSAG program focuses on tearing apart the domestic policies of the Schröder 
government, and there is hardly any mention of the five terms. The last two election 
programs of The Left party constitute the third phase, in which globalization is 
unimportant as a topic. It is as if the party is done with that subject and has moved on to 
focus on trade related issues. References to the other four key terms increase sharply. 
Overall, two thirds of all mentions of the five terms happens in the last two programs. As 
the following paragraph shows, the 2009 and 2013 programs focus on criticizing 
anything trade related.  
The message of Figure 9.2, which shows the normative meaning that goes along 
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with any of the five globalization key terms, is quite obvious. The Left party is highly 
critical of globalization and international trade. About a quarter of all references are 
neutral in nature. The only positive reference to trade was the trading of emissions 
certificates in the 2005 election (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 20). Both the 2009 and 2013 
programs mention opportunities with regards to trade twice. In 2009 the focus is on 
creating trade structures that can make trade more fair (Left, 2009, p. 32), and emissions 
trading, which is potentially an opportunity to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Left, 
2009, p. 9). Interestingly, this is already a step back from the 2005 program where 
emissions trading schemes are regarded as something positive. Additionally, the last two 
election programs both mention that emissions trading has failed as a means to curb 
greenhouse gas emissions (Left, 2009, p. 33, 2013, p. 65). The remaining 70% of 
references are all negative, with most of that contribution coming from the last two 
elections. The Left clearly has scaled up its critique of the neoliberal structures that 
dominate international trade (Left, 20013, p. 54).  
While Figure 9.2 does suggest that The Left party has a very negative disposition 
towards any of the five key terms, it does not allow for any specific inferences as to how 
the party feels about each individual term. The following paragraphs will assess how The 
Left regards each one of the key terms individually. Beginning with globalization, which 
is mentioned a total of 13 times (see Figure 9.3), one can see that references are close to 
equally distributed between neutral references and those that emphasize the risks and 
dangers of trade, with the latter having one more mention. There is no mention at all of 
potentially positive outcomes from globalization. 
Figure 9.4 shows how all trade references in the seven Left party election 
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programs are divided. This is the only term where the combined negative references 
make up less than 50%. There are a total of 28 references, with one of them, as 
previously mentioned, referring to the positive effects of emissions trading. Fourteen 
percent of all statements on trade highlight the opportunities that arise from trade and 
39% are neutral in nature. Overall, the picture of trade is more negative than it is positive, 
with 7% of references referring to the unjust character of international trade and 36% 
outlining the risks and dangers of trade. A common tenor of the negative references is the 
critique of international trade organizations like the WTO and its promotion of capitalism 
(PDS 1998, p. 49, 2002, p. 3, Left 2009, p. 34) and arms trading (PDS 1994, p. 3, 2002, 
p. 24). It is interesting to note that trade appears to be the issue that The Left is most at
ease with, since it is the only globalization related term that the party uses in a positive 
context, albeit being heavily outnumbered by negative references on the issue of trade. 
Figure 9.5 shows that all but one of the party’s 32 export references deal with trade in a 
negative manner. Most of them refer to the party’s objections to regular or nuclear waste 
exports (PDS, 1994, p. 18, 1998, p. 19, The Left, 2013, p. 65), or arms sales to other 
countries. For example, the 2013 election program refers to arms exports in a negative 
context 10 times. The only other reference on exports is neutral. The Left’s position on 
trade is illustrated in Figure 9.6, which demonstrates that a quarter of the eight total 
references on imports are neutral. The remainder of mentions are negative in nature. 
These important critical points are almost exclusively mentioned in the last two election 
programs and focus on the party’s rejection of importing agricultural products in order to 
produce fuel (The Left, 2009, p. 9, p. 33, 2013, p. 54, p. 67).  
Figure 9.7, the final figure in this chapter, illustrates The Left’s position on free 
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trade, which only became an issue in 2009 and 2013. One of eight total references is 
about the unjust nature of free trade, while there are two instances where trade is referred 
to in a neutral manner. The remaining references make up 62% and states that free trade 
has failed (The Left, 2009, p. 32), or that it only leads to price dumping and lower 
standards (The Left, 2009, p. 32, 2013, p. 59). Additionally, free trade is only good for 
large international companies and it fosters neoliberal structures (The Left, 2013, p. 54), 
which are all reasons that it should be resisted.  
9.3 Comparing Election Programs to Globalization 
and Political Parties 
A somewhat common thread throughout this study has been to point out 
incongruities in the assessment of party positions on globalization and trade, because of 
the role that trade plays for Germany and how it is over proportionally involved in trade 
compared to other developed economies of its size, or that parties should equally discuss 
the benefits of exports and imports. The same could be said for The Left party, but it is 
important to keep in mind that The Left is a party which is highly critical of the entire 
political, social, and economic system in Germany. It is also the only major political 
party in Germany that has never been involved in governing at the federal level.  
This makes it a lot easier for the party to formulate holistic criticism, because it is 
never responsible for the system. Similarly, since the party has never been seriously 
considered at the federal level for a governing coalition, it has also has had the ability to 
been extremely unrestrained in the policy proposals that it communicates to voters, 
because the party knows that voters will not measure its performance on its ability to 
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implement campaign promises. This means that the campaign program of The Left will 
always be more extreme than its counterparts’ programs.  
The question of whether or not factor mobility is addressed by The Left, as 
outlined by Brawly (1997), cannot be answered in the affirmative. Congruent with the 
other four parties, factor mobility is too complex an issue for political parties to address 
in an election campaign. As a matter of fact, The Left is the party that differentiates the 
least between industries or sectors within the economy. The only manner in which The 
Left breaks up the economy is through its regional focus on the former East Germany. 
Similarly, the issue of volatility, as defined by Woodruff (2005) as fluctuating between 
economic busts and booms, is not addressed by the party. The Left does not build 
arguments around pivotal events like the 2007/2008 financial crisis. The party 
consistently presents a systemic critique of capitalism (PDS, 1994, p. 4) and the 
neoliberal policies of Germany’ government (PDS, 1998, p. 5). The rhetoric does get a bit 
more pronounced in the 2009 election program, pointing out how companies have used 
the crisis and the threat of unemployment to squeeze workers (The Left, 2009, pp. 13-14). 
As previously stated, The Left has not been involved in any federal coalition 
governments nor have they been seriously considered for such a coalition by any of the 
other parties at the federal level. This allows the party to be consistently disparaging 
when it comes to German politics, society, and the economy, but there is no significant 
change in the party’s rhetoric that would correspond to the economy’s performance.  
The issue of how parties address labor subgroups as put forth by Midford (1993) 
is straightforward in the case of The Left, because the party does not distinguish between 
labor subgroups. Instead, the party’s language revolves around workers and employees 
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whose collective prosperity is in conflict with the capitalist profit maximization efforts of 
big companies. Garst (1998) argues that unions are an important element to overcome the 
negative consequences of globalization and that they are important for building support. 
While The Left certainly does not talk about unions as a tool to mitigate the negative 
effects of globalization and increase a sense of security despite increasing openness, the 
party does so indirectly. Ever since the 1994 election. the party asserts its commitment to 
labor unions and the vital role that they must play within society, by fighting for the 
rights of workers and employees (PDS, 1994, pp. 18-19). With regards to unions, it is 
important for The Left to strengthen their ability to speak for workers and to establish a 
degree of codetermination within companies (The Left, 2009, p. 6). The party also calls 
for protecting collective bargaining and the right to strike (PDS, 1998, p. 6). The Left 
also views labor unions as an ally in the fight to protect people from unemployment and 
institute shorter work weeks (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 8, p. 10).This message is 
consistently communicated to voters and the electorate should get a sense that unions are 
an important factor for guaranteeing the rights of all employees and for better wages. 
However, unions are also important players for strengthening the social safety net, not 
just for increasing wages of the currently employed. Unions are one important actor in a 
wider movement that collectively looks critically at globalization and fights against the 
neoliberal order (PDS, 2002, p. 1). Unions also play a role in addressing ecological 
problems within society, and they should use their influence to improve environmental 
standards (PDS, 1994, p. 18). In short, strong unions are essential both for a good work 
environment and living standards (The Left, 2013, p. 16).  
Caproso (1997) pointed out that support for globalization can be increased by 
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giving people real choices on the issue. The question of whether or not The Left offers 
voters significant policies when it comes to globalization is rather simple: It does not. As 
previously stated, The Left does not refer to globalization until 1998 and then it is only 
relevant for one more election, after 2002 the party uses the term only twice. Initially 
there is some talk about globalization in a neutral manner. The party asserts that 
globalization is not to blame for high unemployment rates, but rather neoliberal policies 
(PDS, 1998, p. 5). Similarly, globalization creates pressures to tackle certain problems, 
but it doesn’t create them (PDS, 1998, p. 49), except for the neoliberal financial form of 
globalization, which is counterproductive to human development (PDS, 1998, p. 48). The 
2002 program explicitly outlines the need to dispense with the capitalist form of 
globalization. Instead, this destructive form of globalization must be replaced by a 
globalization that is characterized by international cooperation and designed to be social, 
ecological, and democratic (PDS, 2002, p. 22). While the 2005 program still contains a 
chapter heading that asserts the need and desire to create a fair form of globalization, 
substantively, the chapter is rather devoid of anything that addresses globalization, except 
for the critique that neoliberal globalization must be replaced with a peaceful global order 
(Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 32). In essence, there are only two election programs that 
actually address the issue of globalization in any greater depth than a single side 
comment. The party’s lack of substantive policies that directly address the issue of 
globalization does lead to a decrease of support for the issue, according Caproso (1997), 
which appears to be exactly what the party prefers with its emphasis on regionalism over 
globalization (PDS, 1998, p. 50).  
The questions of how regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement (Ranjan 
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& Lee, 2007; Rodrik, 2000) are addressed by The Left is interesting, because the party 
does not pretend that Germany can just engage in a form of policy/standards upload, 
where in essence, other countries end up adopting German standards, like the CDU, for 
example (see Section 5.3 for details). This can be explained by the fact that the party is 
quite critical of existing standards and regulations and calls for them to be changed, 
anyway. Specific examples of policy fields that the party is interested in harmonizing are 
tax policies and dues across Europe in order to prevent tax evasion and tax dumping 
(PDS, 1998, p. 21), coordinating social and ecological standards across Europe against 
social or environmental dumping (PDS, 1998, p. 49, 2002, p. 25; The Left, 2013, p. 10), 
and aligning immigration and asylum policies in Europe (PDS, 2002, p. 20; Left 
Party.PDS, 2005, p. 24; The Left, 2009, p. 29). Contract enforcement is not an issue that 
The Left addresses.  
Broadly related to the issue of harmonization and contract enforcement is the 
matter of offering voters distinct choices with respect to international agreements (Hays 
2009; Martin 2000). The Left presents a clear view on the negative effects that the IMF, 
the WTO, and the World Bank have, due to their capitalist agendas (PDS, 1998, p. 49). It 
is not really clear what these organizations’ functions should be, according the party’s 
election programs. The programs only state that these organizations must be 
comprehensively democratized (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 32) and be placed within the 
framework of the UN, while also being complemented by regional development 
organizations (The Left, 2009, pp. 33-34). The party’s view on NATO is extremely 
critical with the first instance in which they call for the abolishment of NATO coming in 
1994. NATO is a Cold War relic and only propagates a violent form of dealing with 
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problems; a much better approach is to work through the UN (PDS, 1994, p. 20, 1998, p. 
4, p. 8, p. 52). This message is consistently repeated and emphasizes the pacifist agenda 
of The Left and its commitment to stop German participation in military missions (Left 
Party.PDS, 2005, p. 31; The Left, 2013, p. 35). This leads to the importance that the party 
places upon the UN as the primary organization in international relations. In order to 
better perform in that role, the UN must become more democratic and its resolutions 
must be treated as binding (PDS, 2002, pp. 22-23; The Left, 2009, p. 34). This also 
includes the more prominent role that the UN will have to play with regards to 
environmental issues (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 20). One thing that is not apparent is how 
the UN will actively promote a pacifist agenda and establish itself as the final institution 
in international matters, with binding character, without military enforcement options. 
The Left’s support for the EU is somewhat timid. The party does claim that the EU is an 
important organization, despite its social, democratic, and ecological deficits. The EU 
must work on addressing those problems and do more to create jobs and to promote 
peace (PDS, 1998, p. 6). This necessitates that the EU receive increased competencies 
from the national governments to actively use regulatory measures to intervene in 
markets and the power to create binding social and environmental standards (PDS, 1998, 
pp. 53-54). In more recent elections, The Left has focused on critically looking at the 
EU’s inability to better promote ecological and social change within its borders and to 
stop privatization, economic liberalism, deregulation, and dumping policies for taxes as 
well as social standards (The Left, 2002, p. 35). Particularly within Europe, the EU must 
focus less on economic liberalization, but on increasing social standards by strengthening 
unions, harmonizing social regulation, and averting tax dumping (The Left, 2013, p. 49).  
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With regards to globalization and global markets, The Left has two different 
approaches which are not fully compatible. The party consistently talks about granting 
developing countries full access to the Western markets (PDS, 1994, p. 19) by abolishing 
export subsidies, so that developing countries can fairly compete on the markets of rich 
industrial countries (PDS, 2002, p. 22); this is particularly important for agricultural 
products (The Left, 2009, p. 32). The party also calls for a fundamental reorientation of 
the relationship between Germany and countries of the southern hemisphere to the point 
that development support is no longer designed to promote the interests of donor 
countries. The aim must instead be build local markets (The Left, 2009, pp. 32-33). This 
goal of creating local markets is not just important for developing countries, because 
neoliberal policies are all too prevalent around the world and the harsh competition of 
global markets has only aggravated social challenges, within Germany as well (PDS, 
1998, pp. 5-6). A key element for combating these developments, according to The Left, 
is to build up regional economies. The goal is to cultivate and emphasize regional 
development (PDS 1994, p. 8) and to promote globalization through regionalization 
(PDS, 1998, p. 50). It is not clear how these two, globalization and regionalization, go 
together because the party only focuses on strengthening regions and regional 
interactions. The goal is to build regional economies and regional production chains that 
become increasingly autarkic (PDS, 2002, p. 3). This is especially true for regional 
agricultural sectors that focus on producing and consuming products within regions 
(PDS, 2002, p. 6). These efforts are supposed to be further strengthened by building up 
regional research clusters that focus especially on ecologically friendly technologies and 
that create additional independence for the region (Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 16), which 
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must include infrastructure policies that are designed to promote better regional networks 
(The Left, 2009, p. 8). Globalization, by contrast, leads to the marginalization of entire 
regions (PDS, 2002, p. 25). The Left has consistently supported not globalization but 
regionalization and tried to foster a distinct regional economic culture (Left Party.PDS, 
2005, p. 17). With international trade the party is opposed to what it refers to as a one-
sided focus on exports, rather than what is necessary, a collective effort towards regional 
economies (The Left, 2009, p. 12). This must also be reflected in the development 
policies that Germany promotes, which must focus on building strong economic 
relationships between developing countries so as to build regional markets, in opposition 
to global trade. This way more value added production processes can take place within 
developing countries, which will increase fair payment for products (The Left, 2009, p. 
32).  
According to the literature, if political elites are interested in a positive domestic 
response to globalization, they need to identify and address the globalization dilemma 
(Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997; Rudra, 2002). Addressing this point makes more sense 
for the other four major German political parties, since they all are supportive of 
globalization, at least on some level. This cannot be said of The Left. Besides the fleeting 
statements on shaping globalization in a social, ecological, and democratic manner (PDS, 
2002, p. 22), the party has a predominantly negative disposition towards economic 
globalization and trade. Since the party has no interest in promoting globalization, it 
would be ludicrous to expect that The Left addresses the globalization dilemma. 
However, the party does propose policies that will indirectly build greater willingness to 
adopt more economic openness. The consistent efforts by the party to support and 
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strengthen those people in society who are most vulnerable to a more competitive 
environment will create a greater sense of safety and assure employees that even if they 
lose their jobs, this will not result in a financial and social downturn. Examples of this 
increased safety net are the generally increased welfare payments for which the party 
calls, the added power that it wants to grant to unions (PDS, 1994, p. 18, 1998, p. 6; The 
Left, 2009, p. 6), the creation of a government funded jobs market (PDS, 2002, p. 4; Left 
Party.PDS, 2005, p. 8; The Left, 2013, p. 17), and a binding minimum wage of at least 10 
Euros per hour (PDS, 2002, p. 5; Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 9; The Left, 2009, p. 4, 2013, 
p. 13). In essence, while the party does not directly reference the globalization dilemma, 
the policies it promotes will assuage the fears that people might have with regards to 
globalization and possibly more competition. It is not clear that is indirect support is 
enough to offset the overtly negative message that the party is otherwise sending to the 
electorate on the issue of globalization.  
The last theoretical building block that must be addressed is the work by 
Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004), who claim that a useful 
tool for European states to overcoming resistance to globalization is to emphasize a 
shared European identity. The Left states that the EU is an important organization for the 
PDS (PDS, 1998, p. 6) and the EU’s enlargement is viewed very favorably by the party, 
not just for it economic opportunities, but also for the chance to engage in social and 
cultural exchanges (PDS, 2002, p. 9). Nonetheless, the party does not foster a European 
identity. The Left does not promote any form of German identity and it is extremely 
critical of nationalistic rhetoric and calls for a Europe without nationalism (PDS, 2002, p. 
25, Left Party.PDS, 2005, p. 31). Otherwise, The Lefts propagate a very open and 
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inclusive Germany, which is evident in the regular call for openness towards immigrants 
and especially asylum seekers. The party also attempts to promulgate an understanding of 
culture not as something nationalistic, but as something inclusive where everyone can 
contribute, including minorities and foreigners (The Left, 2009, p. 24). In fact, the state 
must build up institutions that foster diversity including minority languages and cultures, 
as well as structures that allow minorities to fully participate at all levels (The Left, 2013, 
p. 44). In a nutshell, while The Left does not promote a supranational identity that 
transcends nationalist thinking, at least it does not erect a national identity that would 
potentially be threatened by globalization. In an atypical sense for German parties, The 
Left is very skeptical when it come to the free movement of capital, goods, and services, 
but it promotes the free movement of people, which means that the party cannot be 
classified as isolationist.  
 
9.4 Conclusion of The Left Analysis 
The Left dependably calls for a social state that is supportive of everyone, 
especially of minorities, and one that fosters social cohesion and inclusivity with a 
plethora of policy suggestions that are designed to increase the social safety net. These 
include increased unemployment protection, more benefits for the unemployed, minimum 
wages, supplemental benefits for low income families, as well as an effort to push for 
higher social and ecological standards across countries. These policies have the ability to 
instill confidence in individuals and mitigate fears of personal hardship due to global 
competition. Combined with the party’s unfailing calls for a very inclusive and open, 
multicultural Germany that is not linked to national ideals, Germans should not feel 
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threatened by globalization and international trade. However, the systematic critique of 
international trade and the marginalization of globalization will most likely leave voters 
with a sense that regional economies and solutions are best. Trade, and especially 
Germany’s export surplus, are very negative in the eyes of The Left (The Left, 2013, p. 
49), so that the party’s supporters will most likely not favor trade liberalization in any 
form, but actually prefer trade restrictions.  
A liberal economic order is anathema to The Left, because free trade only leads to 
neoliberal structures and a form of capitalism that profits powerful companies and not 
individuals (The Left, 2013, p. 54). Capitalism has failed and is unable to address basic 
human needs or to guarantee sustainable living standards (The Left, 2009, p. 1). 
Similarly, free trade has only led to price dumping (The Left, 2009, p. 32). That is why 
socialism and government intervention is essential. The party repeatedly emphasizes its 
desire for peaceful cooperation and for Germany to become a fair partner for global 
justice and prosperity (PDS, 2002, p. 21), but instead of creating more equality, unbridled 
capitalist globalization only increases inequality, instability, and violence (PDS, 2002, p. 
22). Neoliberal globalization also undermines democracy and development, because it 
undermines the ability of states to act in a self-determined manner (PDS, 1998, p. 48). 
The Left clearly outlines the type of globalization that it does not want, but it lacks a 
vision for what globalization should look like. The party’s answer, that globalization 
should be regional, is not an outline of what globalization should look like, but what the 
party wants to see instead of globalization. Beyond 2002, the issue is pretty much dead 
when it comes to the party’s election programs, almost like one traveled back in time to 
the early 1990s, when globalization had not yet entered into Germany’s competitive 
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election vernacular. Even in the few instances that the party addresses global trade or 
globalization, it is not coherent. For example, The Left claims that developing countries 
must receive better access to global markets, which necessitates that rich countries stop 
export subsidies (PDS, 2002, p. 22). While this appears to be a sensible position, it is 
contradictory to an earlier point in the same 2002 program, in which the party asserts that 
Germany’s agricultural sector must receive special attention. The ecological 
achievements and social sustainability of farmers must be recognized, including through 
financial compensation (PDS, 2002, p. 6). Any form of domestic subsidies for farmers 
amounts to an export subsidy, because German farmers can offer their products at a lower 
price point and maintain profitability on domestic and international markets. Without 
government support, these price points would be unsustainable.   
The German electorate deserves better and more coherent policy proposals as to 
how to deal with Germany’s huge export and import share of GDP. It is unclear how an 
economy that excels at importing a vast amount of goods and that is then able use those 
imports to produce finished products that are exported at unrivaled levels for an economy 
of its size across the world can just transform into a regionally based economy without 
creating upheaval and job loss. Then again, it is the luxury of an opposition party to make 
all sorts of claims and assertions regardless of whether or not they are populist, because 
the opposition party is not judged on how many of its policy proposals are implemented 
or the consequences of such propositions. Nevertheless, this kind of communication is 
likely to negatively influence the view of voters on issues like globalization and free 
trade, thus increasing the voices of those who call for more economic isolation.  
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Figure 9.1 The Left Party Globalization References Sorted by Key Terms 









































































Figure 9.3 Globalization References The Left Party 



















   
 
 



















   
 











Before summarizing the findings of this study and outlining how they connect to 
future research, it is beneficial to briefly summarize the premise at the outset of this 
study. This work argues that globalization is the figurative wave that lifts all boats, i.e., 
small as well as large economies. Globalization is an essential tool to ensure a broad 
wave of growth (Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Moran, 1978), which is not to say that 
globalization amounts to a panacea; there is plenty of critique that can be lodged at its 
current state of operation (Dos Santos, 1970; Milanovic, 2003; Stiglitz, 2003). However, 
within the field of political science, the discussion does not revolve around a moratorium 
or even reversal of globalization; instead the discourse focuses on identifying and fixing 
its shortfalls (Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 2003; Wang, 2000). The ability to make 
globalization more universally beneficial necessitates a better understanding of the 
process. This study acts as one of the many puzzle pieces that help better explain this 
complex phenomenon, in particular by shedding light on the role that political parties 
play with regards to globalization, because the relationship between political parties and 
globalization has not been broadly studied and it is not as well understood as it could be. 
This is precisely the reason that drives this research, to gain added understanding of the 
relationship between political parties and globalization.
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The very first steps that this study takes toward this end are to reject a) the notion 
that increased globalization is inevitable due to technological progress and b) that 
globalization circumscribes the state’s sovereignty. Globalization does not confront the 
state with existential threats; instead, it alters the environment within which states operate 
and adds complexity. The state retains its power, even under increased globalization. In 
fact, the nation state is a major threat to globalization as, ultimately, states retain the 
potential to stop and even reverse globalization. The historic evidence of global economic 
upheaval in the 1920s and 1930s demonstrates that this is not just a theoretical 
possibility. The Great Depression was aggravated by global protectionist measures. It 
was only towards the end of the Second World War that governments started to 
increasingly replace protectionism with economic openness. The driving force behind 
this development in the Western World was the leadership of the United States, which 
was not predictable given the lack of prior domestic political will to break with 
isolationism. One key that had fundamentally changed within the United States was the 
domestic political will to promote an open economic global order. 
This study argues that globalization is dependent upon political will and that it is 
important to examine this political will more closely. From the 1980s until the recent 
financial crisis, global trade as a share of global GDP rose steadily, but since 2008 it has 
largely remained level (until today, 2017), which has caused some to say that 
“[g]lobalization has clearly paused” (“Special Report: The World Economy,” 2013, p. 3). 
The notion that globalization is bound to progress due to ever-increasing technological 
advancements and the ease with which global communication is possible is dangerous, 
because it breeds complacency (Ghemawat, 2017). If no one actively supports and 
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campaigns for globalization, then we cannot expect it to spread in the future. In fact, 
demonizing globalization is a popular approach for politicians to gain popular support. 
The French far-right leader Marine Le Pen, who has ambitions to become president of the 
EU’s second most populous country and is expected to make it into the second round of 
the French presidential election (at least) in 2017, started her campaign by warning 
“thousands of her flag-waving supporters of ‘two totalitarianisms’, globalization and 
Islamism, that want to ‘subjugate France’” (Nossiter, 2017, n.p.). When the new 
American president Donald Trump offered his first full speech on foreign policy while on 
the campaign trail in 2016, he asserted that “[w]e will no longer surrender this country, or 
its people, to the false song of globalism” (Tharoor, 2016, n.p.). The candidate of the 
Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton, did not use such extreme language, but also distanced 
herself from globalization while campaigning. For example, she expressed her opposition 
about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, even though she had championed it as Secretary of 
State. “Democrats and Republicans agreed on almost nothing at their conventions […], 
except this: free trade, just a decade ago the bedrock of the economic agendas of both 
parties, is now a political pariah” (Steinhauer, 2016, n.p.). This recent verbal attack on 
globalization also coincides with a trend that has been developing since 2010, where 
“greater openness has been replaced by an enthusiasm for building barriers – mostly to 
the world’s detriment” (“The world economy: The gated globe,” 2013, p. 13). Since 
nationalism is alive and well, and given its potential to end globalization like no other 
development (Bisley, 2007, p. 186), it is vital to examine and understand the political will 
which key political actors express. 
It is not uncommon for globalization scholars to disregard the impact of political 
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party platforms and preferences when it comes to analyzing a state’s disposition or its 
actions with regards to globalization. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, there are researchers 
who would reject this notion and argue that the way that parties compete with one 
another can have a substantial impact on a state’s foreign policy (Camyar, 2012; Shoch, 
1998), especially when it comes to passing protectionist measures (Callahan et al., 1994; 
Cupitt & Elliot, 1994; Pastor, 1980). This study identified party election programs as a 
useful tool to identify the different positions that parties take on the issue of 
globalization, because such programs constitute publicly available expressions of a 
party’s key policy positions that have been formulated by party elites and sanctioned by 
the wider party body (Crowson, 2007; Klingemann et al., 1994; Pappi & Seher, 2009). 
The perception that election programs are merely electoral tools for securing votes is 
erroneous. There is a strong link between party election programs and policy outcomes 
(Kavanagh, 1981; Klingemann et al., 1994; Mansergh & Thomson, 2007). This 
connection is also referred to as the program-to-policy linkage (Thompson et al., 2012), 
and extends beyond the governing party. In a country like Germany, where coalition 
governments have historically been the norm, election programs have a special function. 
They are not just about gaining votes but signal to other parties the issues on which they 
are compatible and willing to enter into negotiations on in order to form or join a 
governing coalition. As Jensen and Seeberg (2015) point out, opposition parties have the 
ability to develop issue ownership or reputational advantage, which can enable opposition 
parties to successfully pressure the government into accepting or at least adjusting 
policies in a manner that it otherwise would not have done. Additionally, opposition 
parties do influence the domestic discourse that sends signals to the governments of other 
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states and thus influences intergovernmental negotiations (Ramsay; 2004; Schultz, 1998). 
Before proceeding to a summary of the findings of this study, it is helpful to 
briefly remind readers of why this project focuses on Germany. Recent events offer a 
sound basis. By the end of 2016, Germany was attracting attention. There was a theme 
circulating in the print media, at the time of the closing of the Obama era, while Britain 
was busy figuring out how to leave the EU with as little hurt as possible, and as France’s 
political elite was struggling to fend off the populist surge of Marine Le Pen, that 
Germany’s leadership took on a special role. The New York Times wrote that 
“Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, has emerged as the last powerful defender of 
Europe and the trans-Atlantic alliance after the election of Donald J. Trump” (Smale & 
Erlanger, 2016). This sentiment was echoed by others as well, describing Germany’s 
Chancellor Angela Merkel as “the leader of the free world” (Garton, 2016; Noack, 2016). 
While this may or may not be an exaggeration, it does reveal a certain perception that 
German leadership matters and is more relevant than that of the average state.  
Although recent events further justify a study such as this one, at the point in time 
when the study was conceived, it was not possible to foresee the surge in 
antiglobalization and antiestablishment populism. This work rests on a more theoretically 
grounded logic, a structural approach that justifies the focus on Germany. Size matters in 
international relations and when it comes to an open economic order, there are three key 
economies: China, the USA, and the EU, which are all disproportionate in size to all 
other economies. Any one of these three would make for an interesting and important 
research project, but it would be hard to combine all three into a single piece. Even 
looking at the EU as a whole would not have been possible given the in-depth approach 
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that this study takes towards how parties present the issue of globalization and trade, in 
elections. The justification for looking exclusively at Germany is based on 
Kindelberger’s (1973) structural logic that the anarchic self-help system of international 
relations and the global economy can only be overcome when there is a stabilizer, a 
powerful state that has a significant incentive to create and enforce a stable free trade 
system. As Mattli (1999) and Crawford (2015) point out, Germany certainly takes on this 
role for the EU, because it provides leadership, payments to ease distributional tensions, 
economic clout, and institutional role models. In other words, closely looking at Germany 
instead of the EU as a whole is justified, because the EU’s overall position on trade 
liberalization and globalization will, to a large part, be determined by Germany’s position 
on the issue. 
 
10.1 Summary of Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Findings 
This study is built on the assumption that globalization causes domestic policy 
change, which in turn can shape globalization, because it can alter domestic political will. 
This political will acts as an intervening variable between globalization and policy. In this 
context, political will refers to the willingness to either promote or object to increased 
openness and trade liberalization. This claim is theoretically grounded in Rogowski’s 
(1989) idea to combine the economic Stolper-Samuelson theorem with a political 
element, which allows for the key assumptions that those who profit from a change in 
trade liberalization will rally together with others who are similarly affected, in an effort 
to generate more openness and even freer trade. Conversely, those who are adversely 
affected will try to stop any form of further trade liberalization and attempt to establish 
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obstacles to trade. Additionally, economic openness will also increase the political 
influence of those who see their income increase due to a change in trade policies. While 
Rogowski talks about alliance formation in a more abstract manner, this research argues 
that it is reasonable to infer that this also means a change in the overall debate as to what 
policies are favored and which ones discarded. As the political landscape shifts and new 
alliances are formed, one will be able to observe how such shifts in power are reflected in 
the manner with which parties vie for power and try to represent their clientele. In order 
to apply Rogowski’s sparing approach to the specific context of Germany, and in an 
effort to cultivate a better understanding of how political will is formed, this study 
identifies five key elements. These are elements that Rogowski’s critics claim are missing 
from his model for a better and more complete understanding of how globalization 
affects domestic politics (see Table 2.1).  
This study shows that three of the five additional elements identified by 
Rogowski’s critics do not in fact help understand this connection better, at least not in a 
competitive party context. The following paragraphs address each of these failed 
variables, beginning with the concept of partial factor mobility. Based upon the logic of 
partial factor mobility (Brawley, 1997), trade liberalization does not affect sectors 
uniformly, which means that one must differentiate between labor in the import versus 
the export sector, as trade affects people differently depending on whether they are 
employed in the export or the import sector. In terms of electoral competition, this means 
that parties should have opportunities to craft targeted messages for voters depending on 
the sector they work in: a message of openness for those who work in an exporting sector 
and a promise to increase import restriction for those who face a lot of competition from 
359 
 
imports. While Brawly is successful in demonstrating that including partial factor 
mobility is helpful to explain historic cases, it is not applicable to party competition. 
None of the five parties examined in this study even remotely addresses partial factor 
mobility. It appears that this is the case because it is too complex an issue to address in an 
election campaign. German parties are not able to address the issue in a manner that it is 
understandable for the broad electorate. German parties do have a certain core clientele, 
but they all try to attract a broad spectrum of voters. It would require a niche party to 
advocate specifically for policies that are designed to only advance the interests of capital 
within the import sector. The risk that such a niche party faces in Germany is that they 
may not clear the 5% threshold that any party must obtain in order to be seated in 
parliament.  
The same pattern emerges around the issue of volatility. Woodruff (2005) pointed 
out that volatility affects trade preferences, meaning that significant changes in the 
economic environment alter trade preferences. Parties should be able to increase votes by 
catering to such changed preferences, specifically, using economic volatility in the wake 
of booms and busts to gather support for more protectionism polices. Here too, volatility 
is not relevant for party competition in Germany. As previously outlined in the individual 
party analysis chapters, a party that is involved in a governing coalition has a strategic 
incentive not to address volatility, since no party that governs wants to be associated with 
any form of instability. This logic applies to all major German parties, except for The 
Left. Instead of focusing on specific economic downturns The Left is more concerned 
with emphasizing the East-West disparity within Germany. In essence, all parties briefly 
mention the 2007 financial crisis in their 2009 election programs, but not one party made 
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the argument that trade restrictions were needed because of the crisis and volatility. In 
other words, Germany’s major parties do not use the issue in their electoral competition 
with one another, although one can detect a slight increase of negative references to trade 
and globalization in the SPD and Green programs. The Left makes two thirds of all its 
critical trade and globalization remarks in the 2009 and 2013 elections. It is not clear if 
this is an instance of causation or simply correlation. At best, one might be able to claim 
that there is an indirect link between volatility and trade preferences when it comes to 
party competition. 
The third theoretical element that is not addressed in a meaningful way in 
Germany’s election process is the multifactor model, as Midford (1993) refers to it. 
According to this model, labor subgroups are an important element to consider in order to 
better understand how the international economic order affects domestic party 
competition. Such subgroups can be divided into skilled and unskilled workers, service 
versus manufacturing employees, or public and private workers. The five examined 
parties do not differentiate in their programs between labor subgroups. It appears that all 
parties prefer to appeal to the entire electorate instead of identifying policies that are of 
particular interest to a specific subgroup. The only two parties that briefly try to appeal to 
a subgroup are the CDU with a special emphasis on the agricultural sector and the SPD, 
which regularly vows to support coal mining. The CDU’s special attention to agriculture 
in its election programs is much more part of an effort to emphasize the party’s efforts to 
protect Germany’s countryside and farming as part of its cultural heritage and identity 
than it is an attempt to discuss economic policies let alone to formulate a response to 
globalization. A similar argument can be made for the SPD, which tries to curry favor 
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with one of its oldest constituencies, instead of communicating relevant trade policies as 
they relate to the mining industry. 
Unlike the three previously identified elements that do not relate well to party 
competition in Germany, the remaining two do so very well. Garst (1998) brought up the 
vital role that labor unions can play in globalized economies by fostering cooperation 
between capital and labor. This cooperation is essential for trade liberalization to succeed 
and unions can also play a vital role in figuring out ways to share the gains from trade 
liberalization more equitably. This is why this research poses the question, “What kind of 
positions do the five examined parties take on the issue of labor unions?” The FDP is the 
one party that does not express support for labor unions. Instead, the party wants to curb 
the influence of unions (FDP, 1990, p. 39) and replace them with local works councils, 
which are supposed to be more flexible and effective (FDP, 2005, p. 14), but of course, 
also have much less bargaining power. All other parties take a positive position on the 
issue of unions. The CDU is the most timid in this regard, clearly recognizing them as an 
important part of Germany’s society and economy, but not really interested in advancing 
their position either. The Greens do express tacit support of unions and their role as an 
important element within German society (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 1998, p. 69), but 
such references are sporadic, at best. The two parties that consistently and strongly 
support unions are the two parties on the left of the political spectrum. The Left’s position 
on unions can be summed up as strongly supporting them, because unions are essential 
both for a good work environment and living standards (The Left, 2013, p. 16). The party 
with the strongest endorsement is the SPD, which is not surprising due to its close 
historic ties to labor unions. The SPD regards strong labor unions as essential both for a 
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good work environment and living standards (The Left, 2013, p. 16). The party 
consistently emphasizes its desire to build a cooperative global world order that can 
shape the future by mutually solving problems. For the SPD, shaping this new order 
includes the support and influence of unions (SPD, 2013, p. 106).  
There is clearly some differentiation between party positions on labor unions with 
one party disregarding them, while two parties provide some support for them and 
another two strongly endorse their role in society and the work they do. Garst (1998) 
claims that labor unions have an important role to play in a globalized world, because 
they foster cooperation between capital and labor. The party election program analysis 
conducted in this study shows that the role of unions is secure within German society and 
their role as mediator is not in question, except by one of the smaller parties. This can be 
disregarded, in light of the otherwise supportive position that all the other parties take. 
Unions will remain an integral part of German society and its economy. Therefore they 
will continue to be an important factor in making adjustments to the economy and the 
relationship between workers or employees and the companies or large corporations that 
they work for in the global economy. However, German parties must better formulate a 
vision for unions in a globalized world. Does the role of unions change under conditions 
of increased trade liberalization? How can unions help distribute the gains from 
globalization more equitably? These are questions that German parties must address, 
because on the one hand labor unions are an integral and historic part of Germany’s 
society and economy, and on the other hand, Germany’s economy highly profits from 
globalization and trade liberalization. It is time for parties to outline how these two 
components fit together and how they can be mutually reinforcing to increase both 
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prosperity and equality. 
The fifth and final element that is identified in the literature as important for 
making Rogowski’s model more complete is Caproso’s (1997) claim that even though 
there might be cleavages within voter preferences, these cleavages do not necessarily lead 
to action. This is because voters are not experts and are not necessarily able to identify 
policies that are congruent with their individual preferences. According to Caproso’s 
logic, political parties ought to formulate clear choices based on preferences, so that 
voters can choose by casting a vote. This means that it is important to look at whether 
parties present meaningful policy suggestions when it comes to globalization or if they 
merely use the issue for scapegoating. 
The FDP policies that relate to globalization focus on deregulation and 
decentralization, in an effort to remove barriers to trade. Overall, the party regards 
globalization as a chance for growth, promoting peace, and increasing prosperity (FDP, 
1998, p. 91). The Greens, by contrast, paint a very critical picture of globalization 
emphasizing how unjust it is and that it primarily serves the interest of multinational 
corporations (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 79), and most importantly that the 
consequences of globalization are often environmentally harmful (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 1998, p. 152). The party asserts that globalization currently contributes 
significantly to the increase in hunger, environmental destruction, racism, violence, the 
subjugation of women, and exploitation of children. This is also why the Greens promote 
resistance to globalization and support movements that oppose it (Alliance ‘90/The 
Greens, 2002, p. 79, 2013, pp. 63-64). The SPD is also somewhat critical of globalization 
and claims that globalization must be shaped in order to ensure commensurate benefits 
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from it. The SPD presents itself as a party that can do this, emphasizing free markets, but 
at the same time making sure that the gains are evenly distributed (SPD, 2005, p. 41). A 
clear lack of meaningful policy proposals can be observed in the CDU’s campaign 
programs. The party does not use the issue for scapegoating, but aside from a few 
statements that developing countries need better access to markets, purposeful policy 
proposals are lacking. The Left does not unilaterally condemn the issue either; in fact the 
party does state that globalization in and of itself is not necessarily to blame for social 
challenges that society is facing, but rather neoliberal policies (PDS, 1998, p. 5). 
Similarly, the globalization of the financial system is bad because of its neoliberal form 
(PDS, 1998, p. 48). Overall, The Left has no substantive policies that directly address the 
issue of globalization.  
In essence, of the major German parties there is only one party, the FDP, which 
clearly and consistently argues in favor of globalization. There are two parties that are 
predominantly critical of globalization with The Greens highlighting the injustice of the 
current global order and The Left, which expresses some direct opposition to the issue, 
but mostly demonstrates its discontent with globalization by ignoring it in its campaign 
programs. The two remaining parties that are somewhat in the middle, showing some 
support for global and open markets, but in the case of the CDU just not consistently and 
in that of the SPD, a slightly stronger focus on the negative social consequences. Overall, 
one must conclude that German parties do not deal with globalization in an adequate 
manner, because if the issue is truly as important and all-encompassing a topic, as the 
CDU claims (CDU, 2009, p. 90), then parties would pay more attention to the issue and 
formulate precise policies to deal with issues such as social mobility and worker 
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protection in a global economy. Even parties that are more critical of globalization 
promote the idea that it can be transformed into a sustainable, fair, and peaceful process 
(Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, p. 16, 2013, p. 24). In fact, all parties, except for The 
Left which is simply ignoring the issue, claim that globalization can be shaped and 
formed into a beneficial process. It is time parties present voters with the details of how 
they are going to accomplish this, clearly linking domestic policy fields to globalization 
and international trade, including a more honest approach about the benefits and central 
role of both exports and imports for the German economy. 
To sum up, three of the additional elements that the literature identifies with 
regards to improving the link between politics and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem do not 
lend themselves well to electoral party competition. It appears that this is not a Germany 
specific issue for partial factor mobility and labor subgroups, but rather that election 
campaigns are not suitable for addressing such differences. With regard to a lack of 
references on volatility this might be based upon the structure of Germany’s multiparty 
system, which means that in countries with similar systems one can expect to make a 
similar observation. It is conceivable that within a party system where coalitions are not 
the norm and where there is a high degree of partisanship, addressing volatility and busts 
might be common practice during election campaigns. By contrast, looking at the role 
that parties envision for labor unions makes sense and while one can observe an overall 
strong commitment on unions, German political parties are lacking when it comes to 
defining a role and vision for unions in a globalized world. With regard to the 
formulation of clear policy choices, German parties do present policies, but they fall short 
in both quantity and quality for a heavily trade dependent country that has been 
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traditionally in favor of increased openness. The complexity and importance of the matter 
demand a more comprehensive approach with specific policy proposals as to how 
globalization ought to be shaped. 
This research also argues that globalization is not just affected by obvious trade 
related factors such as tariff rates or trade agreements, but also by many more indirect 
factors (see Table 3.1). The following paragraphs summarize how German parties relate 
to these indirect factors, in order to ascertain if German parties directly and/or indirectly 
support the concept of globalization. The first indirect factor identified by this study is 
the globalization dilemma, which addresses the problem that globalization relies on less 
government intervention and to some extent a smaller state. At the same time, popular 
support for globalization necessitates a certain level of government interference through 
regulation and taxation in order to compensate those people who are worse off as a direct 
result of globalization. Addressing this dilemma and devising policies that alleviate fears 
of social instability and a loss of prosperity are key in this respect. As the research 
conducted by this study shows, unfortunately the globalization dilemma is a topic that is 
not addressed directly by any of the five parties in their election campaigns. There are 
plenty of indirect references, however, because all parties have an opinion on the size and 
role of the state. The CDU for example, focuses largely on the message that a smaller 
state is better for society and that individuals need to take on more responsibility for 
themselves. This does not amount to shedding the welfare state, but it does create an 
emphasis on more self-reliance. In addition, the party’s recurring message that while 
increasing competitiveness can create a sense of empowerment and opportunity for those 
who believe that they have the skills and talents to succeed in such an environment, it can 
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also create anxiety for those who already feel that they are on the fringe of society, barely 
able to afford life in the 21st century. Increased competition is the last thing that people 
look forward to in that situation, which means that they will oppose any effort to increase 
global trade and competition. This is even more true for voters who read the FDP’s 
election programs, because the liberals have a more pronounced message of self-reliance 
and competitiveness. A need to compensate the losers is not addressed by the FDP at all. 
There is no need for government organized wealth distribution and regulation, because 
increased free trade simply means more prosperity for everyone. 
The Greens have a different perspective. They also do not address the 
globalization dilemma directly, which is to be expected as it is not clear that the Greens 
are actually interested in gathering support for globalization. The party is interested in 
protecting people from economic hardship: It supports a strong welfare system, and an 
active state. The constant emphasis on introducing new environmental standards and the 
ambitious goal to reduce energy consumption is most likely not able to assuage the fears 
of unskilled and financially struggling workers whom the state is primarily interested in 
assisting in times of increased international competition of the global economy. Thus, 
while the party generally supports the welfare state, it is not clear that the party’s overall 
policy platform would not leave some voters questioning if a ruling government with the 
Green party as one of the coalition partners would truly be able to build up a social safety 
net that can protect the individual from the potential pressures of a liberal trading order. 
The SPD also fails to address this issue directly. Even though the party does not link 
globalization with a need to strengthen the welfare state, its generally worker/employee 
friendly rhetoric does communicate a desire to support and strengthen the position of 
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people who might struggle in a more competitive environment. The party repeatedly talks 
about the need to strengthen the social safety net. The only problem for the SPD is that its 
message will be compared to the reality of Agenda 2010, which removed protections and 
stared requiring more self-reliance by citizens. Overall, the Social Democrats do outline 
policies that are mostly designed to alleviate the fears that voters can have in conjunction 
with globalization and increased competition brought about through trade liberalization. 
Nevertheless, the party could more directly address the link between globalization and 
policies that are designed to increase social security, especially for low skilled workers. 
The policies that The Left propagates with respect to the welfare system and the role of 
the state should assuage fears that people might have in regards to globalization and the 
possibility of more competition. This cannot offset the negative message about the 
capitalist form of globalization (PDS, 2002, p. 22) that the party communicates to voters 
and anyone who accepts the party’s message should emphasize a regional approach to the 
economy over a global one. The single most important policy all three politically left 
parties share, that is most likely to lower resistance to foreign competition, is a binding 
minimum wage. This would suggest to voters that regardless of whether or not Germany 
is more or less involved in a globalized world, there is a minimum standard for income 
below which no individual should fall. In essence, the three parties that range from tacit 
support for to quite critical of globalization mostly promote policies that will increase 
economic safety and thereby lower resistance to globalization, because voters feel 
increasingly protected. The two parties that are most in favor of globalization, 
competition, and trade liberalization do little to nothing to address the security dilemma 
directly or indirectly. It would be much better for these parties to instead increase support 
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for globalization by identifying specific steps to help everyone compete more effectively 
and strengthen those individuals who are at a disadvantage.  
Rodrick (2000) and Ranjan and Lee (2007) bring up the claim that emphasizing 
regulatory harmonization and contract enforcement can build acceptance for open 
economies and globalization, because people feel that they are competing with others in a 
fair manner. Contract enforcement is an issue that is almost completely ignored by 
German parties. Only the FDP brings up the issue, for example, when it comes to 
protecting of intellectual property rights (FDP, 1998, p. 71), or upholding and enforcing 
European competition laws (FDP, 1994, p. 32). The 1994 call for establishing a European 
law academy, which would ensure a unified understanding and implementation of laws 
across Europe, is the most far reaching policy in this regard (FDP, 1994, p. 60). By 
contrast, all parties call for some form of regulatory harmonization, especially when it 
comes to the tax code. This is seen as a crucial element for ensuring fair competition, 
particularly within the European common market, and vital for curbing tax evasion. Other 
common calls include shared consumer protection standards, common environmental 
standards, as well universal labor laws. The only party that is somewhat sparse with 
references on regulatory harmonization beyond the issue of taxation is the FDP, due to its 
preferred emphasis on deregulation. The Greens and The Left are the only two parties 
that call for a shorter work week across Europe to harmonize economies. Overall, 
German parties do communicate to voters that there are various efforts to harmonize to 
ensure fair competition between countries. One thing that is missing in this regard is that 
parties are mostly concerned with the policy upload, especially the CDU which is very 
strong on this shared standard, but with an exclusive emphasis on how German standards 
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will have to become the yardstick for everything. The FDP is the exception, here 
claiming that it is not about implementing German standards, but rather implementing the 
best regulations (FDP, 2005, p. 20). It would be a more honest approach to communicate 
to voters the standards Germany might have to change in an effort to create fairer 
competition.  
Martin (2000) and Hays (2009) claim that governments can more easily 
implement international agreements, such as the EU with its common market, when 
voters feel engaged and feel they have options. This is why this study asks if parties 
communicate their goals when it comes to international agreements and do they offer 
voters clear alternatives? All German parties support international institutions as a vital 
tool for peace and prosperity in international relations and all of them unequivocally back 
the UN and the EU. A common thread in this regard is the goal to reform these two 
organizations in order to make them democratic (this especially true for the UN along 
with a call for increased power for the General Assembly and better representation of 
developing countries). Primary global economic institutions like the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the WTO are also supported by all parties, except for The Left, which views 
them in a very negative light due to their overtly capitalist agendas (PDS, 1998, p. 49). 
The other parties do not share this negative view, but do see room for improvement, 
especially when it comes to giving developing countries a bigger say within these three 
organizations. There are also specific policy proposals like the Greens’ goal to ensure that 
the programs that the IMF promotes focus more on crisis prevention and are self-
reflective in order to assess the ecological and social consequences of the programs it 
promotes (Alliance ‘90/The Greens, 2002, pp. 81-82). Similarly, the SPD wants those 
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three institutions to not just focus on liberalizing markets, but also to promote shared 
standards, because social and ecological minimum standards are essential for preventing 
the exploitation of humans or the environment (SPD, 1998, p. 75, 2002, p. 16). When it 
comes to NATO, only The Left is critical of the institution and calls for its abolishment. 
Otherwise there is a strong consensus that NATO is Germany’s essential security 
organization. Even the Greens, who were initially opposed, changed their mind as a result 
of NATO’s engagement in the former Yugoslavian states. Differences only persist in the 
level of activity the organization should take, but not is legitimacy. Overall, German 
parties paint a positive picture of international institutions and their role for building 
prosperity and peace, which is a good thing. In terms of choice, voters do not have many 
alternatives, which is not to say that more parties should be more critical of specific 
organizations, like The Left, but to be more explicit in the way they want specific 
institutions to change or develop. Parties could also talk about specific policies they 
would push an organization to pursue after the election, if they are part of the 
government. Providing choices does not have to mean taking a stand for or against an 
organization, but rather can be about different priorities and goals within an organization. 
More specific choices would keep voters more engaged and lower public resistance to 
international agreements, as pointed out by Martin (2000) and Hays (2009). 
Anderson (2003), Hooghe and Marks (2004), and Rankin (2004) have argued that 
one way to decrease resistance to economic integration in Europe is to purposefully build 
a European identity. As a whole, German parties do not promote a European identity, 
although the SPD does makes some hand gesturing in this direction. The party is not 
actively trying to build a European identity, but it strongly supports the European 
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integration process and a European identity. In general, except for the CDU, German 
parties do promote and support an open and inclusive culture that is open to anyone who 
is not opposed to Germany’s democratic and pluralistic values (SPD, 2013, pp. 58-65). 
Culture and identity are not viewed as tools to propagate nationalism, but are rather 
treated as something inclusive where everyone can contribute, including minorities and 
foreigners. Any form of nationalism is despised in this context, because it destroys the 
idea of Europe and leads to conflict. In essence national identity is nothing that four of 
Germany’s major political parties talk about and their generally positive outlook on 
Europe combines into a message that accepts outside influences and is open to other 
cultures. While this does not amount to actively communicating a European identity in 
their election programs, voters should not view globalization as a negative development 
on the basis that it threatens German identity. Unfortunately, the party in Germany that 
has governed the most does communicate a German form of identity that is distinct and 
must be preserved. The party’s message is regularly about protecting a German 
homeland, a place of belonging and identification, a special culture with a Christian 
heritage. This type of identity is threatened by globalization. Thus, people who subscribe 
to the CDU’s message will more likely object to globalization on the grounds that it 
threatens their unique identity. It would be better for the party that is also very concerned 
with promoting growth and prosperity to change its message on identity to something 
more comprehensive and inclusive, and not just for the sake of globalization.  
To summarize, one should ask what can be said about the domestic political will 
in Germany with regards to globalization? Three of the five additional elements do not 
lend themselves well to party positions on globalization in German elections. On the 
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issue of labor unions there is a generally strong support for their role in Germany society. 
Thus one should expect unions to be an important element for building cooperation 
between capital and labor, as well as to ease distributional tensions. One thing that is 
lacking from all parties’ programs is a clear vision of the roles that unions should fill in a 
modern and increasingly interconnected globalized world, thus missing an opportunity to 
formulate a plan for engaging unions in the process to shape globalization. Similarly, on 
the issue of providing choice in order to increase support and voter engagement, one has 
to conclude that German parties leave voters largely uninformed as to what their specific 
goals are with regards to globalization, which also constitutes a missed opportunity to 
define how Germany should respond to globalization and in which way it should try to 
shape and influence it. After all, with the exception of The Left, parties repeatedly claim 
that they want to shape globalization. However, they all fail to outline what it should look 
like and how to get there, except for the FDP which largely responds with a message 
promoting deregulation to support globalization. Again, a missed opportunity for spelling 
out a vision for voters and engaging voters on a key issue. 
Concerning the four indirect factors that indicate how likely it is that German 
parties are in fact building support for globalization and trade liberalization, one can 
conclude that election programs in Germany are building tacit support for globalization 
when it comes to the issue of regulatory harmonization. Fears of unfair competition could 
be squelched if parties would be more specific on their harmonization goals, but also on 
their contract enforcement measures. When it comes to offering voters clear choices on 
the issue of international agreements and institutions, parties are creating minor support 
for globalization by affirming their backing of the EU and UN, but such affirmative 
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statements could be much more specific and thus create more support. This is especially 
true for key economic institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, which are 
hardly addressed at all. Stronger support and more specific reform goals with regards to 
these organizations would be helpful for reinforcing support for globalization and would 
constitute an indication that parties really do have a comprehensive plan for shaping 
globalization. Unfortunately, none of the parties directly addresses the globalization 
dilemma and while the three parties on the left of the political spectrum do provide some 
indirect assurances to voters that those who might be adversely affected by globalization 
will receive support from the government, there is a need for much stronger support from 
the CDU and FDP, who argue in favor of more openness. There have to be ways for these 
two parties to acknowledge the need to compensate globalization’s losers in a specific 
and targeted way, without promoting big government. One policy path is to emphasize 
more and better opportunities for the training of people in low skilled jobs who are most 
likely to lose their jobs due to international competition. When it comes to actively 
constructing a European identity in order to alleviate fears of national identity loss 
through globalization, no party really seizes this opportunity. Most promote an open form 
of identity that is not tied to a particular German identity, except for the CDU which 
persistently emphasizes a German identity that can be threatened by globalization. 
Unfortunately, of the two parties that most favor globalization and trade liberalization, 
the one that has more supporters and political power consistently communicates to voters 
a concept of identity that lowers support for globalization. Thus, it is not apparent that 
German parties are creating more support for globalization through the messages that 
they communicate to voters in their election programs. This, combined with the overall 
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sparse and ambiguous references to globalization, does not show a form of political will 
that is likely to promote policies which will increase globalization and trade 
liberalization. 
 
10.2 The Lessons of This Study and Questions That Still Need Answering 
First off, the research conducted here is different from the majority of other 
studies in the field of political science with regards to globalization, because they tend to 
favor large-N statistical studies over single case studies. One interesting result of this 
work is that it fails to corroborate the conclusions of some large-N statistical studies. For 
example, based upon their statistical research of European election programs Milner and 
Judkins (2004) conclude that increased exposure to international markets over time 
makes all parties seek increasingly liberal trade policies. Exposure measured in terms of 
the value of exported goods traded in 2013 was almost three times higher than it was in 
1991 and for value of imports roughly doubled (2.5 times) over the same time period.1 
The foreign trade quota (imports plus export divided by GDP) for Germany also 
dramatically increased over the same time period, with imports and exports accounting 
for less than 40% of Germany’s GDP in the early to mid-1990s, but increasing to 70% in 
2013. Clearly, exposure to foreign markets increased within the time period covered in 
this study, but there is no indication, overall, that German parties seek to increasingly 
liberalize trade policies. The statement is true for the FDP and in a more limited way also 
for the CDU, but not for the other three parties, which certainly do not promote 
                                                          
1 Exports in 1991 were 340 billion Euro and by 2013 the figure had grown to 1,093 billion, for imports the 
numbers had increased from 329 billion Euro in 1991 to 898 billion in 2013 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2015, p.7). 
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increasingly liberal trade policies during the 2005, 2009, and 2013 elections. Trade 
liberalization and globalization hardly feature in election programs prior to 1998, but 
trade liberalization appears more often in election programs around the turn of the 
century. For the Greens and The Left the issue is increasingly couched in a negative 
context and once the financial crisis hit, the SPD became more critical as well. The 
reason for the difference between this research and the work conducted by Milner and 
Judkins is the fact that there is a difference in the examined time frames. This study 
covers a later period, which includes the 2007-2008 financial crisis, but it also covers a 
period when exposure to international markets is relatively high in Germany. Further 
research should look at the effects that shocks, like the recent financial crisis, can have on 
the type of trade policies that parties promote in response to such a shock. Do such 
shocks lead to isolated instances of calls for less globalization and trade liberalization or 
is there a persistent change in the way that parties campaign with regards to these issues? 
Another explanation could be that once an economy reaches a certain degree of openness, 
backlash begins to grow. This would reflect a line of thinking that trade is in principle 
good, but there is a limit as to how much competition/imports or foreign meddling the 
domestic economy can handle. This would also be an interesting research question to 
address: Is there a point when increased exposure to markets causes parties to seek 
increasingly illiberal trade policies? It is also possible that Germany is an exception to 
Milner and Judkins’ hypothesis regarding exposure and party positions? After all, their 
findings apply to parties in general and not to a specific state. This is common for large-N 
statistical research, but it might make sense to also pay special attention to key states, 
whose approach to globalization is more relevant than that of others. 
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Another claim of large-N statistical research is that in countries that are net 
exporters of goods, political parties will largely support open markets (Haupt, 2010). 
Germany had a current account surplus of nearly 300 billion U.S. dollars in 2016, making 
it the country with the largest current account surplus in the world that year (“Germany’s 
current account surplus is a problem,” 2017), so one would expect German parties to be 
predominantly in support of open markets. The evidence from the 35 examined election 
programs does not confirm this hypothesis however. The FDP is Germany’s only party 
that is strongly and willingly in favor of open markets. The CDU does make some 
supportive statements about open trade, but overall these references appear insignificant 
for a country that is this heavily engaged in trade. The other three parties range from not 
really for or against open markets, in the case of the SPD, to quite against it when it 
comes to The Left, with The Greens somewhat critical, mostly due to the negative impact 
that trade can have on the environment. Overall, it is not that German parties are against 
open trade, but they do not communicate a purposeful message that is in favor of trade, 
either. Most importantly, in this regard, is the zero-sum thinking that all parties exhibit 
when it comes to trade, because all of them omit the positive role that imports play for the 
economy. The consistent message from all parties is that imports are seen as negative and 
exports are a good thing. In the long run, this can lead to protectionism in times of 
economic stress. Based upon this logic, a state can simply improve its wealth by reducing 
imports and increasing exports, since the economic downturn can easily be blamed on a 
negative current account balance. One ought to expect the political parties of one of the 
world’s strongest export nations to proclaim an unequivocal message regarding the 
benefits of both exports and imports without resorting to zero-sum thinking rhetoric. 
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Further research should look at why German parties generally do not actively support 
open markets in their election programs. One explanation might be that a positive current 
account balance eventually becomes counterbalanced by a desire for less openness if the 
economy reaches very high levels of exposure to trade. This is again the idea that 
increasing openness can eventually be viewed as too much of a good thing. Further 
research should examine if there is a general level of openness when parties or the 
electorate tend to favor less trade liberalization and if so, are there parties that are able to 
successfully maintain a message of openness? It would also be interesting to see if the 
vast imbalance in the way that imports and exports are presented by the five examined 
parties is a unique German phenomenon, or a much more common occurrence? Are there 
examples of parties that are able to present a more holistic picture when it comes to trade 
by including the benefits of imports and how German parties can learn from them?  
The conclusion of this research, that Germany’s major political parties are not 
demonstrating the type of political will that is likely to promote policies for increased 
globalization and trade liberalization, must not necessarily hold for other countries. The 
specifics of this study are not suited to allow for broad generalizations, but the fact that 
the political elite in a country that is as actively engaged in trading goods and services at 
a level that is far beyond the reach of most other countries and that has been one of the, if 
not the, primary driver for integrating Europe and building a shared economy with 
increasingly fewer borders to trade, is so unenthusiastic about globalization and is only 
able to muster the ability to pay lip service to the idea of shaping and building 
globalization, but fails at delivering truly meaningful policy proposals, make it difficult to 
be  hopeful that other states will feature parties that will behave differently from 
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Germany’s parties who correctly claim that the issue of globalization needs to guide all 
policy formation (CDU, 2009, p. 90), but fail to implement this goal. Nevertheless, there 
might be structural differences in the economy or the political system of other states 
which will lead parties to behave differently within these states, exemplifying the 
political will to promote globalization. Therefore, other states should certainly be 
examined as well, but as previously mentioned, the USA and China should receive 
special attention. They are the two pivotal states with regards to the level of global trade 
openness that the world will seek. A different way of examining political will is 
necessary though, since the U.S.’s presidential system does not rely on the same type of 
party cohesion and election programs as European parties do and China’s system of one-
party rule will also not allow for analysis based upon election programs. The vastly 
different structure of the Chinese political system and the sheer size of its economy 
promises to be a very interesting study that might even reveal a form of political will that 
is happy to speak out on trade liberalization and advocate on behalf of globalization.  
In the meantime, German politicians and those in other countries, that might have 
taken a similar approach to openness and trade should rethink their position, because an 
open and honest debate about how to shape globalization is indispensable. After all 
globalization “must be managed so that its fundamentally benign effects are ensured and 




















= Export Ratio – 
Import Ratio 
Foreign Trade to 
GDP Ratio 
= Export Ratio + 
Import Ratio 
2015 46,8% 39,2% 7,6% 86,0% 
2014 45,7% 39,1% 6,5% 84,8% 
2013 45,5% 39,5% 6,0% 85,0% 
2012 46,0% 39,9% 6,1% 86,0% 
2011 44,8% 39,9% 5,0% 84,7% 
2010 42,3% 37,1% 5,2% 79,3% 
2009 37,8% 32,9% 5,0% 70,7% 
2008 43,5% 37,5% 6,0% 80,9% 
2007 43,0% 36,4% 6,6% 79,4% 
2006 41,2% 35,9% 5,3% 77,1% 
2005 37,7% 32,7% 5,1% 70,4% 
2004 35,4% 30,4% 5,0% 65,9% 
2003 32,6% 28,9% 3,7% 61,5% 
2002 32,6% 28,2% 4,4% 60,8% 
2001 31,9% 30,1% 1,8% 62,0% 
2000 30,8% 30,6% 0,3% 61,4% 
1999 27,0% 26,3% 0,7% 53,4% 
1998 26,5% 25,1% 1,3% 51,6% 
1997 25,4% 24,2% 1,2% 49,6% 
1996 22,9% 22,1% 0,8% 45,0% 
1995 22,0% 21,5% 0,5% 43,5% 
1994 21,1% 20,9% 0,2% 42,1% 
1993 20,4% 20,3% 0,1% 40,6% 
1992 22,3% 22,8% -0,5% 45,1% 
1991 
 





     
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017 
REFERENCES 
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., & Glasgow, G. (2004). Understanding change and 
stability in party ideologies: Do parties respond to public opinion or to past 
election results? British Journal of Political Science, 34(4), 589-610. 
Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis. American 
Political Science Review, 63(3), 689-718. 
Anderson, J. J. (2005). Germany and Europe: Centrality in the EU. In S. Bulmer & C. 
Lequesne (Eds.), The member states of the European Union (pp. 77-96). New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Artés, J., & Bustos, A. (2008). Electoral promises and minority governments: An 
empirical study. European Journal of Political Research, 47(3), 307-333. 
Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: The human consequences. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press. 
Bellers, J. (1991). Sozialdemokratie und Konservatismus im Angesicht der Zukunft 
Europas. In J. Bellers & M. Winking (Eds.), Europapolitik der Parteien. 
Konservatismus, Liberalismus und Sozialdemokratie im Ringen um die Zukunft 
Europas (pp. 3-42). Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang Publishing Group. 
Bennett, A. (2004). Case study methods: Design, use, and comparative advantages. In D. 
F. Sprinz & Y. Wolinsky-Nahmias (Eds.), Models, numbers, and cases: Methods
for studying international relations (pp. 19-55). Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. T. (2012). Process tracing: From philosophical roots to best 
practices. Simons Papers in Security and Development, 21, 30. 
Bernanke, B. S. (2006). Monetary Aggregates and Monetary Policy at the Federal 
Reserve: A Historical Perspective. In Speech at the Fourth ECB Central Banking 
Conference, Frankfurt, Germany (Vol. 10).  
Bhagwati, J. (2004). In defense of globalization: With a new afterword. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
382 
Bisley, N. (2007). Rethinking globalization. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Billig, M (1995). Banal nationalism. London, UK: Sage Publications. 
Braumoeller, B. F., & Sartori, A. E. (2004). The promise and perils of statistics in 
international relations. In D. F. Sprinz & Y. Wolinsky-Nahmias (Eds.), Models, 
numbers, and cases: Methods for studying international relations (pp. 129-151). 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Brawley, M. R. (1997). Factoral or sectoral conflict? Partially mobile factors and the 
politics of trade in imperial Germany. International Studies Quarterly, 41(4), 633-
653. 
Budge, I., & Hofferbert, R. I. (1990). Mandates and policy outputs: US party platforms 
and federal expenditures. American Political Science Review, 84(1), 111-131. 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. (2017). Anzahl der Parteien. Retrieved from http: 
//www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/zahlen-und-
fakten/138661/entwicklung-des-parteiensystems 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (1994). BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN: Programm zur 
Bundestagswahl 1994. Bonn, Germany: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (1998). PROGRAMM ZUR BUNDESTAGSWAHL 98: GRÜN 
IST DER WECHSEL. Bonn, Germany: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (2002). Grün wirkt! Unser Wahlprogramm 2002 – 2006. Berlin, 
Germany: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (2005). EINES FÜR ALLE: DAS GRÜNE WAHLPROGRAMM 
2005. Berlin, Germany: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (2009). DER GRÜNE NEUE GESELLSCHAFTSVERTRAG. 
Berlin, Germany: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. (2013). ZEIT FÜR DEN WANDEL. 
TEILHABEN.EINMISCHEN. ZUKUNFT SCHAFFEN. 
Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013 von BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN. Berlin, 
Germany: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Burgoon, B. (2006, January). Globalization is what parties make of it: Welfare and 
protectionism in party platforms. In Annual Meeting of the American Political 
383 
Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania 
Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA. 
Burke, J. P. (2005). The neutral/honest broker role in foreign‐policy decision making: A 
reassessment. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 229-258. 
Callahan, C. M., McDonald, J. A., & O'Brien, A. P. (1994). Who voted for Smoot-
Hawley? The Journal of Economic History, 54(3), 683-690. 
Cameron, D. R. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis. 
American Political Science Review, 72(4), 1243-1261. 
Camyar, I. (2012). Party politics and international trade: Mainstream parties, niche 
parties, and trade openness. International Studies Quarterly, 56(2), 397-404. 
Caporaso, J. A. (1997). Across the great divide: Integrating comparative and international 
politics. International Studies Quarterly, 41(4), 563-591. 
CDU. (1990). Ja zu Deutschland – Ja zur Zukunft: Wahlprogramm der 
Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands zur gesamtdeutschen 
Bundestagswahl am 2. Dezember 1990. Bonn, Germany: CDU-
Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
CDU. (1994). Wir sichern Deutschlands Zukunft: Regierungsprogramm 
von CDU und CSU. Bonn, Germany: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
CDU. (1998). 1998-2002 Wahlplattform. Bonn, Germany: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
CDU. (2002). Leistung und Sicherheit Zeit für Taten: Regierungsprogramm 2002/2006 
von CDU und CSU. Berlin, Germany: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
CDU. (2005). Deutschlands Chancen nutzen. Wachstum. Arbeit. Sicherheit. 
Regierungsprogramm 2005 – 2009. Berlin, Germany: CDU-
Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
CDU. (2009). WIR HABEN DIE KRAFT – GEMEINSAM FÜR UNSER LAND: 
REGIERUNGSPROGRAMM 2009 – 2013. Berlin, Germany: CDU-
Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
CDU. (2013). Gemeinsam erfolgreich für Deutschland: Regierungsprogramm 2013 – 
2017. Berlin, Germany: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2017). The World Fact Book. Retrieved from https: 
//www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html 
384 
Conley, T. (2001). The domestic politics of globalisation. Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 36(2), 223-246. 
Cook, N. P., & Underwood, R. L. (2012). Attitudes toward economic globalization: Does 
knowledge matter? Global Economy Journal, 12(4), 1524-5861. 
Cupitt, R. T., & Elliott, E. (1994). Schattschneider revisited: Senate voting on the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Economics & Politics, 6(3), 187-199. 
Cutler, F. (2004). Government responsibility and electoral accountability in federations. 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 34(2), 19-38. 
Däubler, T. (2013). Wie entstehen Wahlprogramme? Eine Untersuchung zur Landtagswahl 
in Baden-Württemberg 2006. Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 22(3), 333-365. 
Decker, F. (2014). Follow-up to the grand coalition: The German party system before and 
after the 2013 federal election. German Politics and Society, 32(2), 19-40. 
Decker, F. (2017a). Etappen der Parteigeschichte der SPD. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/42082/geschichte 
Decker, F. (2017b). Kurz und bündig: DIE LINKE. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/42128/kurz-und-
buendig 
Decker, F. (2017c). Etappen der Parteigeschichte der LINKEN. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/42130/geschichte 
Deeg, R. (1996). Economic globalization and the shifting boundaries of German 
federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 26(1), 27-52. 
Deutscher Bundestag. (2003). Stenografischer Bericht: 32. Sitzung. Retrieved from 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15032.pdf 
Die Grünen. (1990). DIE GRÜNEN: Das Programm zur 1. Gesamtdeutschen Wahl 1990. 
Bonn, Germany: Die Grünen Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
Die Linke.PDS. (2005). Für eine neue soziale Idee. DIE LINKE.PDS. Berlin, Germany: 
Parteivorstand Die Linkspartei. PDS. 
Die Linke. (2009). Bundestagswahlprogramm der Partei DIE LINKE. Berlin, Germany: 
Parteivorstand Die Linke. 







Dolezal, M., Ennser-Jedenastik, L., Müller, W. C., & Katharina Winkler, A. (2012). The 
life cycle of party manifestos: The Austrian case. West European Politics, 35(4), 
869-895. 
 
Dreher, A., Sturm, J. E., & Ursprung, H. W. (2008). The impact of globalization on the 
composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data. Public 
Choice, 134(3-4), 263-292. 
 
Drezner, D. W. (2001). Globalization and policy convergence. International Studies 
Review, 3(1), 53-78. 
 
Ehrlich, S. D., & Hearn, E. (2014). Does compensating the losers increase support for 
trade? an experimental test of the embedded liberalism thesis. Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 10(2), 149-164. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (1989). The political economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. NBER 
Working Paper No.2001, August, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (2000). Hegemonic stability theories of the international monetary 
system. In J. A. Frieden & D. A. Lake (Eds.), International political economy - 
perspectives on global power and wealth (pp. 220-244). New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
 
Eichengreen, B., & Irwin, D. A. (2010). The slide to protectionism in the Great Depression: 
Who succumbed and why? The Journal of Economic History, 70(4), 871-897. 
 
Elff, M. (2012). Germany. In T. Inoguchi & J. Blondel (Eds.), Political parties and 
democracy: Contemporary Western Europe and Asia. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 




Europe's currency crisis: How to save the euro. (2011 September 17). The Economist. 
Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/21529049 
 
Evans, R. J. (2005). The coming of the Third Reich. London, UK: The Penguin Press. 
 
Featherstone, M. (Ed.). (1990). Global culture: Nationalism, globalization and modernity 





FDP. (1990). Das liberale Deutschland: Programm der F.D.P. zu den Bundestagswahlen 
am 2. Dezember 1990. Bonn, Germany: FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
FDP. (1994). Liberal denken. Leistung wählen: Das Programm der F.D.P. zur 
Bundestagswahl 1994. Bonn, Germany: FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
FDP. (1999). Es ist Ihre Wahl: Das Wahlprogramm der Liberalen zur Bundestagswahl 
1998. Bonn, Germany: FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
FDP. (2002). Bürgerprogramm 2002: Programm der FDP zur Bundestagswahl 2002. 
Berlin, Germany: FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
FDP. (2005). Arbeit hat Vorfahrt: Deutschlandprogramm 2005. Berlin, Germany: FDP 
Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
FDP. (2009). Die Mitte stärken. Deutschlandprogramm der Freien Demokratischen 
Partei. Berlin, Germany: FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
FDP. (2013). Bürgerprogramm 2013: Damit Deutschland stark bleibt. Berlin, Germany: 
FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle. 
 
Ferrara, F., & Weishaupt, J. T. (2004). Get your act together: Party performance in 
European Parliament elections. European Union Politics, 5(3), 283-306.  
 






Friedman, T. (2000). The Lexus and the olive tree. London, UK: HarperCollins. 
 
Gamble, A. (2003). Between Europe and America: The future of British politics. 
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Garton, T. (2016, November 11). Populists are out to divide us. They must be stopped. 
The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/11/populists-us 
 
Gelleny, R. D., & McCoy, M. (2001). Globalization and government policy 
independence: The issue of taxation. Political Research Quarterly, 54(3), 509-
529.  
 
George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social 
387 
sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Germany: Europe’s reluctant paymaster. (2009 February 26). The Economist. Retrieved 
from http://www.economist.com/node/13184821 
Germany’s current-account surplus is a problem: But not for the reasons Donald Trump 
thinks it is. (2017 February 11). The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21716641-not-reasons-donald-trump-
thinks-it-germanys-current-account-surplus-problem 
Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? American Political 
Science Review, 98(2), 341-354. 
Ghemawat, P. (2017, February 1). Even in a digital world, globalization is not inevitable. 
Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2017/02/even-in-a-
digital-world-globalization-is-not-inevitable 
Gilpin, R. (2001). Global political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gove, M. (2016, April 19). Michael Gove makes case for EU exit: 'It’s time to take back 
control'. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/19/michael-gove-makes-case-eu-
exit-bbc-today 
Gowa, J. (1994). Allies, adversaries, and international trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Hall, S. (1997). The local and the global: Globalization and ethnicity. Cultural Politics, 
11, 173-187. 
Haupt, A. B. (2010). Parties’ responses to economic globalization: What is left for the left 
and right for the right? Party Politics, 16(1), 5-27. 
Hayo, B., & Hofmann, B. (2006). Comparing monetary policy reaction functions: ECB 
versus Bundesbank. Empirical Economics, 31(3), 645-662. 
Hays, J. (2009). Globalization and the new politics of embedded liberalism. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Heisenberg, D. (2006). Merkel's EU policy: " Kohl's Mädchen" or interest-driven politics? 
German Politics and Society, 24(1), 108-118. 
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (2000). Global transformations: 
Politics, economics and culture. In Politics at the Edge (pp. 14-28). Redwood 
388 
City, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Hertzman, L. (1958). The founding of the German National People's Party (DNVP), 
November 1918-January 1919. The Journal of Modern History, 30(1), 24-36. 
Hines Jr, J. R., & Summers, L. H. (2009). How globalization affects tax design. Tax 
Policy and the Economy, 23(1), 123-158. 
Hirst, P., & Thompson, G. (2002). The future of globalization. Cooperation and Conflict, 
37(3), 247-265. 
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary games and population dynamics. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Hofferbert, R. I., & Budge, I. (1992). The party mandate and the Westminster model: 
Election programmes and government spending in Britain, 1948–85. British 
Journal of Political Science, 22(2), 151-182. 
Hough, D. (2002). Fall and rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany. Birmingham, UK: 
University of Birmingham Press. 
Huber, E., Ragin, C., & Stephens, J. D. (1993). Social democracy, Christian democracy, 
constitutional structure, and the welfare state. American Journal of Sociology, 
99(3), 711-749.  
Irwin, D. A. (2011). Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Irwin, D. A., & Kroszner, R. S. (1996). Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage 
of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. In Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy (Vol. 45, pp. 173-200). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Jensen, C., & Seeberg, H. B. (2014). The power of talk and the welfare state: Evidence 
from 23 countries on an asymmetric opposition-government response mechanism. 
Socio-Economic Review, 13(2), 215-233. 
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167-
214. 
Julier, G. (2009). Design and political economy in the UK. Knowledge, Technology & 
Policy, 22(4), 217-225. 
Jun, U. (2004). Der Wandel von Parteien in der Mediendemokratie. SPD und Labour 
389 
Party im Vergleich, Frankfurt/Main: Campus. 
Kacowicz, A. M. (2004). Case study methods in international security studies. In D. F. 
Sprinz & Y. Wolinsky-Nahmias (Eds.), Models, numbers, and cases: Methods for 
studying international relations (pp. 119-137). Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Kalogeropoulou, E. (1989). Election promises and government performance in Greece: 
PASOK's fulfillment of its 1981 election pledges. European Journal of 
Political Research, 17(3), 289-311. 
Kapstein, E. B. (1996). Workers and the world economy. Foreign Affairs, 75(3), 716-37. 
Kavanagh, D. (1981). The politics of manifestos. Parliamentary Affairs, 34(1), 7-27. 
Kent, J. (1993). British imperial strategy and the origins of the cold war, 1944-49. 
Leicester, NY: Leicester University Press. 
Keohane, R. O. (1988). International institutions: Two approaches. International Studies 
Quarterly, 32(4), 379-396. 
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2001). Power and interdependence (3rd ed.). New York, 
NY: Longman. 
Kindelberger, C. P. (1973). The world in depression 1929-1939. London, UK: The 
Penguin Press. 
King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton, UK: Princeton University Press. 
Klingemann, H. D., Hofferbert, R. I., & Budge, I. (1994). Parties, policies, and 
democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Klingemann, H. D., & Volkens, A. (1997). Struktur und Entwicklung von 
Wahlprogrammen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994. In 
Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland (pp. 517-536). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Kohli, M. (2000). The battlegrounds of European identity. European Societies, 2(2), 113-
137. 
Korte, K. R., & Schoofs, J. (2013). Wahlprogramme als Gegenstand innerparteilicher 
Demokratie im Bundestagswahlkampf 2013. Beteiligungsarchitekturen im 
Vergleich. Kurzstudie der Forschungsgruppe Regieren. Regierungsforschung. de 
390 
vom, 31(07), 2013. 
Krasner, S. D. (1976). State power and the structure of international trade. World Politics, 
28(3), 317-347. 
Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). 
Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European 
countries compared. European Journal of Political Research, 45(6), 921-956. 
Krings, T. (2009). A race to the bottom? Trade unions, EU enlargement and the free 
movement of labour. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 15(1), 49-69. 
Koyama, K. (2009). The passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: Why did the president 
sign the bill? Journal of Policy History, 21(2), 163-186. 
Krugman, P., & Venables, A. J. (1995). Globalization and the inequality of nations. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4), 857-880. 
Levitt, T. (1983). The globalization of markets. Harvard Business Review, 61(3), 92-102. 
Madsen, J. B. (2001). Trade barriers and the collapse of world trade during the Great 
Depression. Southern Economic Journal, 67(4), 848-868. 
Mahoney, J. (2010). After KKV: The new methodology of qualitative research. World 
Politics, 62(1), 120-147. 
Mansergh, L. (2004). Do parties make a difference? The relationship between 
government intention and government output in the public policy sphere: The 
case of governments in Ireland 1977-1997 (Doctoral dissertation, Trinity College 
Dublin, Dublin, Ireland). Retrieved from 
http://www.tara.tcd.ie/handle/2262/78071 
Mansergh, L., & Thomson, R. (2007). Election pledges, party competition, and 
policymaking. Comparative Politics, 39(3), 311-329. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political 
orders. International Organization, 52(4), 943-969. 
Martin, J. (2002). Organizational culture: Mapping the terrain. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Martin, L. L. (2000). Democratic commitments: Legislatures and international 
cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
391 
Matthijs, M., & Blyth, M. (2011). Why only Germany can fix the euro. Foreign Affairs, 
17, 117-35. 
Mattli, W. (1999). The logic of regional integration: Europe and beyond. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Mayda, A. M., O'Rourke, K. H., & Sinnott, R. (2007). Risk, government and 
globalization: International survey evidence (No. w13037). Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Mayda, A. M., & Rodrik, D. (2005). Why are some people (and countries) more 
protectionist than others? European Economic Review, 49(6), 1393-1430. 
McGrew, A. (2011). The logics of economic globalization. J. Ravenhill (Ed.), Global 
political economy (pp. 275-311). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York, NY: Norton & 
Company. 
Micklethwait, J., & Wooldridge, A. (2004). The right nation: Conservative power in 
America. London, UK: The Penguin Press. 
Milner, H. V. (1999). The political economy of international trade. Annual Review of 
Political Science 2(1), 91-114. 
Milner, H. V., & Judkins, B. (2004). Partisanship, trade policy, and globalization: Is there 
a left–right divide on trade policy? International Studies Quarterly, 48(1), 95-119. 
Mitchell, K. (2014). Does European identification increase support for further economic 
integration? Journal of European Integration, 36(6), 601-618. 
Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and power in the European Community: A liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 
473-524.
Moran, T. H. (1978). Multinational corporations and dependency: A dialogue for 
dependentistas and non-dependentistas. International Organization, 32(1), 79-
100.  
Nam, Y., & Barnett, G. A. (2011). Globalization of technology: Network analysis of 
global patents and trademarks. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
78(8), 1471-1485. 





and industrial policy. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.  
 
Naurin, E. (2011). Promising democracy: Parties, citizens and election promises (Public 
Sector Organizations). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Noack, R. (2016, November 21). How Angela Merkel, a conservative, became the ‘leader 





North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Nossiter, A. (2017, February 5). Marine Le Pen Echoes Trump’s Bleak Populism in 




Nye, J. S. (1970). Comparing common markets: A revised neo-functionalist model. 
International Organization, 24(4), 796-835. 
 
Obstfeld, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2003). Globalization and capital markets. In M. D. Bordo, 
A. M. Taylor, & J. G. Williamson (Eds.), Globalization in historical perspective 
(pp. 121-188). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Öchsner, T. (2013, March 9). Was von der Agenda 2010 geblieben ist. Süddeutsche 
Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/schroeders-
reform-des-arbeitsmarktes-was-von-der-agenda-geblieben-ist-1.1620192 
 
Odell, J. S. (2001). Case study methods in international political economy. International 
Studies Perspectives, 2(2), 161-176.  
 
Oppelland, T. (2017). Freie Demokratische Partei. Retrieved from 
http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/42106/fdp 
 
Oppermann, K. (2013, March). German foreign policy and the discourse of ‘normalcy’. 
Paper presented at the meeting of the Political Studies Association, Cardiff, UK. 
 
O'Rourke, K. H., & Williamson, J. G. (1997). Around the European periphery 1870–
1913: Globalization, schooling and growth. European Review of Economic 
History, 1(2), 153-190. 
 





Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pappi, F. U., & Seher, N. M. (2009). Party election programmes, signalling policies and 
salience of specific policy domains: The German parties from 1990 to 2005. 
German Politics, 18(3), 403-425. 
 




Pastor, R. A. 1980. Congress and the politics of US. foreign economic policy, 1929-1976. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
 
Paterson, W. E. (2011). The reluctant hegemon? Germany moves centre stage in the 
European Union. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(s1), 57-75.  
 
Patton, D. F. (2012). Out of the East: From PDS to Left Party in Unified Germany. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
  
PDS. (1990). WAH LP ROG RAMM DER LINKEN LISTE/PDS ZUR 
BUNDESTAGSWAHL 1990. Berlin, Germany: Wahlbüro der PDS. 
 
PDS. (1994). Opposition gegen Sozialabbau und Rechtsruck Wahlprogramm der PDS. 
Berlin, Germany: Wahlbüro der PDS. 
 
PDS. (1998). Programm der PDS zur Bundestagswahl 1998: Für den politischen 
Richtungswechsel! Sozial und solidarisch - für eine gerechte Republik!. Berlin, 
Germany: Wahlbüro der PDS. 
 
PDS. (2002). Es geht auch anders: Nur Gerechtigkeit sichert Zukunft! 
Programm der PDS zur Bundestagswahl 2002. Berlin, Germany: Wahlbüro der 
PDS. 
 
Perrons, D. (2004). Globalization and social change: People and places in a divided 
world. London, UK: Routledge. 
 
Pieterse, J. N. (2009). Globalization and culture: Global mélange. Plymouth, UK: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Poguntke, T. (2007). Europeanization in a consensual environment? German political 
parties and the European Union. In T. Poguntke, N. Aylott, E. Carter, R. Ladrech, 
& K. R. Luther (Eds.), The Europeanization of national political parties: Power 
and organizational adaptation (pp. 108-133). London, UK: Routledge. 
 
394 
Popper, K. (2002). The logic of scientific discovery. London, UK: Routledge. 
Porter, R. B. (1980). Presidential decision making: The Economic Policy Board. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. 
International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. 
Rallings, C. (1987). The influence of election programmes: Britain and Canada 1945-
1979. In I. Budge, D. Robertson, & D. Hearl (Eds.), Ideology, strategy and party 
change: Spatial analyses of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies (pp. 
1-14). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ramsay, K. W. (2004). Politics at the water’s edge: Crisis bargaining and electoral 
competition. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(4), 459-486. 
Ranjan, P., & Lee, J. Y. (2007). Contract enforcement and international trade. Economics 
& Politics, 19(2), 191-218. 
Ravenhill, J. (2011). The study of global political economy. In J. Ravenhill (Ed.), Global      
            political economy (pp. 3-28). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Reif, K. H., & Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual 
framework for the analysis of european election results. European Journal of 
Political Research 8(1), 3-45. 
Risse, T., M. G. Cowles, & Caporaso, J. (2001). Europeanization and Domestic Change: 
Introduction. In M. G. Cowles, J. Caporaso, & T. Risse (Eds.), Transforming 
Europe. Europeanization and domestic change (pp. 1-19). Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social theory and global culture (Vol. 16). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has globalization gone too far? California Management Review, 
39(3), 29-53. 
Rodrik, D. (2000). How far will international economic integration go? The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 14(1), 177-186. 
Rogowski, R. (1989). Commerce and coalitions: How trade affects domestic political 
alignments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rogowski, R. (1995). The role of theory and anomaly in social-scientific inference. 
395 
American Political Science Review, 89(02), 467-470. 
Rosamond, B. (2000). Theories of European integration. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. 
Rotte, R. (2000). Immigration control in United Germany: Toward a broader scope of 
national policies. International Migration Review 34(2), 357-389. 
Royed, T. J. (1996). Testing the mandate model in Britain and the United States: 
Evidence from the Reagan and Thatcher eras. British Journal of Political Science, 
26(1), 45-80.  
Royed, T. J., & Borrelli, S. A. (1999). Parties and economic policy in the USA: Pledges 
and performance, 1976-1992. Party Politics, 5(1), 115-127. 
Rudra, N. (2002). Globalization and the decline of the welfare state in less-developed 
countries. International Organization, 56(2), 411-445. 
Rudra, N. (2008). Globalization and the race to the bottom in developing countries. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Books. 
Sassen, S. (1999). Globalization and its discontents: Essays on the new mobility of people 
and money. New York, NY: New Press. 
Scarrow, S. E. (2002). Party decline in the parties state? The changing environment of 
German politics. In P. Webb, D. M. Farrell, & I. Holliday (Eds.), Political parties 
in advanced industrial democracies (pp. 77-106). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press. 
Schaeffer, R. K. (2003). Understanding globalization: The social consequences of 
political, economic, and environmental change. Oxford, UK: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Schattschneider, E. E. (1935). Politics, pressures and the tariff: A study of free private 
enterprise in pressure politics, as shown in the 1929-1930 revision of the tariff. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Schlemmer, T. (1998). Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung: die Christlich-Soziale Union 
1945 bis 1955 (Vol. 41). Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. 
Schmitt, H. (2005). The European Parliament elections of June 2004: Still second-order? 
West European Politics, 28(3), 650-679. 
Schultz, K. A. (1998). Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. 





Schwartz-Shea, P. (2003). Is this the curriculum we want? Doctoral requirements and 
offerings in methods and methodology. PS: Political Science and Politics, 36(3), 
379-386.  
 
Shea, P., Teo, T. K., & Levy, J. S. (2014). Opposition politics and international crises: A 
formal model. International Studies Quarterly, 58(4), 741-751. 
 
Shoch, J. (1998). Party politics and international economic activism: The Reagan‐Bush 
years. Political Science Quarterly, 113(1), 113-131. 
 
Sikorski, R. (2011 November 28). Poland and the Future of the European Union. Speech 
delivered in Berlin. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.pl/resource/33ce6061-
ec12-4da1-a145-01e2995c6302:JCR 
 
Silver, B. J. (2003). Forces of labor: Workers' movements and globalization since 1870. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Smale, A. & Erlanger, S. (2016, November 12). As Obama Exits World Stage, Angela 




Snidal, D. (1985). The limits of hegemonic stability theory. International Organization, 
39(4), 579-614. 
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (1959). Grundsatzprogramm der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Retrieved from 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bibliothek/retro-scans/fa-57721.pdf 
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (1989). Grundsatzprogramm der 
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Retrieved from 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bibliothek/retro-scans/fa90-00398.pdf  
 
SPD. (1990). Der neue Weg: ökologisch, sozial, wirtschaftlich stark. Bonn, Germany: 
Vorstand der SPD.  
 
SPD. (1994). DAS REGIERUNGSPROGRAM DER SPD: REFORMEN FÜR 
DEUTSCHLAND. Bonn, Germany: SPD-Parteivorstand. 
 
SPD. (1998). Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit: SPD-Programm für die 
Bundestagswahl 1998. Bonn, Germany: Vorstand der SPD. 
 






SPD. (2005). VERTRAUEN IN DEUTSCHLAND: Das Wahlmanifest der SPD. Berlin, 
Germany: SPD-Parteivorstand. 
 
SPD. (2009). Sozial und Demokratisch. Anpacken. Für Deutschland. Das 
Regierungsprogramm der SPD. Berlin, Germany: SPD-Parteivorstand. 
 
SPD. (2013). SPD DAS WIR ENTSCHEIDET: DAS REGIERUNGSPROGRAMM 2013-
2017. Berlin, Germany: SPD-Parteivorstand. 
 




Statistisches Bundesamt (2016a). Basistabelle zu den Staaten aus Europa Afrika Amerika 













Stein, A. A. (1984). The hegemon's dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the 
international economic order. International Organization, 38(2), 355-386. 
 
Steinhauer, J. (2016, July 29). Both Parties Used to Back Free Trade. Now They Bash It. 




Stiglitz, J. E. (2003). Globalization and its discontents. New York, NY: Norton & 
Company. 
 
Storper, M. (1992). The limits to globalization: Technology districts and international 
trade. Economic Geography, 68(1), 60-93. 
 
Swank, D. (2002). Global capital, political institutions, and policy change in developed 






Tallberg, J. (2010). The power of the chair: Formal leadership in international cooperation. 
International Studies Quarterly, 54(1), 241-265. 
 





Tharoor, I. (2016, November 3). After Clinton, Trump’s real enemy is ‘globalism’. The 




The euro crisis: The German problem. (2011 November 19). The Economist. Retrieved 
from http://www.economist.com/node/21538755 
 
The World Economy: The gated globe. (2013 October 12). The Economist. Retrieved 
from http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21587785-gated-globe 
 
Thomson, R. (2001). The programme to policy linkage: The fulfilment of election 
pledges on socio–economic policy in The Netherlands, 1986–1998. European 
Journal of Political Research, 40(2), 171-197.  
 
Thomson, R. (2011). Citizens’ evaluations of the fulfillment of election pledges: 
Evidence from Ireland. The Journal of Politics, 73(1), 187-201.  
 
Thomson, R., Royed T., Naurin E., Artes J., Ferguson M., Kostadinova P., & Moury, C. 
(2012). The program-to-policy linkage: A comparative study of election pledges 
and government policies in ten countries. Proceedings from APSA Annual 
Meeting. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2106482 
 
Tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalization and culture. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Vanberg, V. (2000). Globalization, democracy, and citizens' sovereignty: Can 
competition among governments enhance democracy? 1. Constitutional Political 
Economy, 11(1), 87-112. 
 
Vorländer, H. (2013). Die Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP). In Handbuch 
Parteienforschung (pp. 497-507). Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer Fachmedien. 
 
Wächter, H., & Muller‐Camen, M. (2002). Co‐determination and strategic integration in 
German firms. Human Resource Management Journal, 12(3), 76-87.  
 
399 
Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International 
Security 9(4), 3-43. 
Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York City, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Wang, S. (2000). The social and political implications of China's WTO membership. 
Journal of Contemporary China, 9(25), 373-405. 
Weber, T. (2007). Campaign effects and second-order cycles: A top-down approach to 
European Parliament elections. European Union Politics, 8(4), 509-536. 
Woocher, L. (2001). Deconstructing political will: Explaining the failure to prevent 
deadly conflict and mass atrocities. Journal of Public and International Affairs 
Princeton – 12, 179-206. 
Zolleis, U. (2008). Die CDU: Das politische Leitbild im Wandel der Zeit. Wiesbaden, 
Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
